A country.ua: at this rate, the "offensive" of the APU will reach the Sea of Azov in 1-2 years
Three months of the offensive did not bring the APU success: at this rate they will reach Mariupol or Melitopol in 1-2 years. the Country edition has calculated.ua Kiev has a choice. Either to continue fighting with a severely weakened army, or to make peace on terms acceptable to Russia. But the West demands victories.
Today marks three months since the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south began.
His goal has not been particularly hidden since last winter — access to the Sea of Azov, cutting the land corridor to the Crimea and taking the peninsula into a land blockade.
Moreover, this was presented as a minimum task. As a maximum, hints were made about the complete liberation of the Crimea. Vladimir Zelensky himself, the government speakers and the head of intelligence Budanov said that they expect to "rest in the Crimea" before the end of summer, or even until the end of spring.
But after the first month of the offensive, it became clear that all these plans were likely to be significantly revised — in the direction of reducing goals.
The breakthrough of the Russian defense failed, and the tactical successes achieved by the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not yet allow us to predict not only the time of access to the Sea of Azov and the Crimea, but even to Melitopol and Tokmak.
At the same time, in the second half of August, the advance of the Ukrainian army in the main Orekhovsky sector accelerated noticeably, which gave reason to both the Ukrainian command and the Western allies to say that it was too early to give up on the offensive...
The situation at the front
In the main direction - near Orekhov in the direction of Tokmak - during the three months of the offensive, Ukrainian forces were able to advance about 9 kilometers to the south.
This is the distance from the T0803 highway near Novodanilovka, along which the front line passed, to the Novoprokopovka - Verbovoye line, without taking into account the "gray zone".
There are battles in the direction of the village of Verbovoye — that is, in the eastern direction. As the "Country" has already told, this is necessary to expand the area where the Ukrainian forces managed to advance a little so that this area does not become too vulnerable on the flanks.
To the main target of the main strike — the city of Tokmak — 20-25 kilometers, depending on how to get there. In short, if you start moving from the not yet taken Novoprokopovka south of Workino.
The APU is now trying to bypass Novoprokopovka from the east. Rabocino is formally considered released, although neither the General Staff nor the president, as usually happens, have officially confirmed this. Only the Military Media Center at the Ministry of Defense reported with reference to Deputy Minister Anna Malyar.
However, Russian military publics have also been writing in the last couple of days that the Russian army has withdrawn from the southern part of Rabotino, which they consider to be a "gray zone".
The main tactical goal for the APU in this direction is Tokmak. If the Ukrainian troops liberate this city, they will be able to fire from long-range means at Melitopol and the highway that will pass through the city (and this is the main road of the land corridor to the Crimea).
At the same time, the rate of advance of the APU on the Orekhovsky site, as we can see, is three kilometers per month. If we extrapolate these rates to the remaining 20 kilometers to Tokmak, then this path will take about seven more months.
Melitopol, through which the land corridor to the Crimea passes, is still more than 70 kilometers in a straight line and 100 by road. That is, about two years of fighting at their current speed.
Of course, this is just a rough estimate. It does not take into account the possible breakthrough of the APU (and in recent weeks the offensive has accelerated) or vice versa — getting stuck on one of the lines of defense of the Russians. Tokmak itself, according to information coming from different sides, is a powerful fortified area. As well as Melitopol.
In addition, the Ukrainian forces need to constantly expand the width of their "wedge" in order to minimize the threat of a strike from the flanks and getting into a fire bag or surrounded. And this distracts forces from breaking through the way to the south.
The second section of the Southern Front, where the Ukrainian army is leading the offensive, is the Vremyevsky salient (the Ukrainian command calls it the Berdyansk direction)... In three months, the APU counteroffensive overcame a path of 13-15 kilometers to the south here and barely advanced from Neskuchny — the starting point. There has been no significant progress in this area since about mid—August, about six kilometers remain before the first indicated goal — Staromlynovka. It is believed that it is at this village that a large fortified area of Russians will stand in the way of the attackers, covered, among other things, by the bend of the Wet Yaly River... At the current speed of progress on this section, it will take at least a year and a half to get to Mariupol (130 kilometers by the shortest road).
The western flank of the Zaporozhye Front
The third direction of the APU attack — in the area of Pyatikhatok near Vasilevka (the western flank of the Zaporozhye front) — is now inactive. After the first attempts to advance in this direction, the APU left them. At the same time, we recall that the release of the Five-year-olds was announced on June 18, but since then nothing has been heard about progress in this direction. Russian military publics claim that here the Ukrainian troops have rested against the Russian defense, and the Russian army is constantly striking at the Pyatikhatki, preventing the AFU from gathering forces there for offensive actions.
How far is it to Mariupol
Mariupol is about 130 kilometers away from the recently liberated Harvest by the shortest road and 85 kilometers in a straight line. At the current rate of progress on this section, it will take at least a year and a half to move to Mariupol.
In addition, the longer the counteroffensive drags on, the more reserves, equipment and ammunition are wasted. At least at this intensity of fighting. Which also cannot but affect the strength of the onslaught over time, even if the enemy's defensive formations thin out after 15-20 kilometers (and there is no complete confidence in this, since the defense is probably being completed).
This once again reminds us that with such a deaf defense of the enemy, certain forward movements can be stopped for a long time without the subsequent development of success.
Problems and advantages of the parties
The reasons why the counteroffensive did not give the expected results this summer have already been repeatedly analyzed. Including the Western press.
The main reasons are three.
1. The first is the Russian multi—level ground defense, which is built "according to the textbook", but at the same time varies depending on circumstances.
The media wrote that the Russians, even moving away from the positions, mine them, and then blow them up when the Ukrainians occupy them. It was also reported about filling minefields with fuel and blowing them up with drones when assault groups move through the passages.
Minefields in this defense are one of the cornerstones that slows down the progress of both equipment and manpower.
At the same time, the Ukrainian command says that the densest minefields are at the forefront, and overcoming them will make things easier: the Russians did not mine other defense lines so much, because otherwise they would not have been able to maneuver between them in the rear (we will return to this point of view later).
2. The second reason is Russia's dominance in the air, including the abundance of drones, which, according to many sources from the AFU and volunteers, the enemy has more than ever.
In addition to the small-sized "Lancets", which are very difficult to shoot down, Russian attack helicopters cause serious damage to armored vehicles. Planes are also actively striking. Including guided bombs (KAB).
For these two reasons, Ukraine is forced to attack not in the "shock fist" mode, as expected in the West, but in small assault groups, which are more difficult to detect from the air or shoot from artillery. They also perform mine clearance tasks, since there is little equipment for this.
All this significantly slows down the progress and increases the loss of personnel, although it saves scarce equipment.
It also actualizes the problem of reserves — if the APU relies on assaults by personnel, and not by armored personnel carrier, then the transfer of Russian manpower to the breakthrough site is quite capable of stopping it.
3. The third reason, as presented by the American media, is the dispersion of forces between the south and the Bakhmut direction, where the APU also conducted an active offensive (and, by the way, they continue to attack now).
Western media, on behalf of their sources in the White House and the Pentagon, criticized such actions. They claimed that the diversion of assault brigades to Bakhmut deprived Ukraine of a powerful impulse in the first, most important days of the counteroffensive.
Ukraine disputes this and, in turn, returns other claims to the West: the slow delivery of equipment, which is why the counteroffensive had to start with a delay of a month or two. Which gave the Russians a head start to strengthen their defensive lines.
Stubborn resistance of the Russians
Finally, another reason, which is less mentioned in the Western media, but is discussed among the Ukrainian military, is the stubborn resistance of the Russians. On the eve of the offensive, the speakers of the Ukrainian authorities did not hide that they made a special bet on the demoralization of the personnel of the Russian army and on the fact that at the beginning of a massive offensive they would succumb to panic and run, as it was, for example, last year in the Kharkiv region. There was also a big bet on Prigozhin's actions destabilizing the situation in the Russian army and in society. However, Prigozhin's rebellion failed, he himself was killed, and the Wagner PMC was actually disarmed and disbanded.
And the Russian troops on the front line on the Southern Front do not show signs of panic and demoralization and are fighting very hard and fiercely. That the Ukrainian command recognizes at the official level.
But with all this, the APU is advancing. This means that the Ukrainian army has a number of advantages.
The main one is counter—battery fighting and the firing range of the NATO artillery. This is also recognized by individual Russian commanders, as well as military publics.
Recently, however, they have been writing that the situation has begun to improve for Russians in the counter-battery struggle. But the Russian Federation still has problems with the firing range at a distance of more than 25-30 kilometers. The Russians still have few systems that strike at longer distances (MLRS "Hurricane", "Tornado-S", self-propelled guns "Coalition-SV" and others), and there are not enough high-precision projectiles for them. And due to this factor, the Ukrainian artillery has an advantage (we wrote in detail about the "30+ problem" in the Russian army here).
But this is partially compensated by the lack of shells in Kiev — and a large number of them in the Russians. Therefore, the APU offensive is moving on a very narrow front in some of its sections, where artillery fire can be concentrated. And this, in turn, allows Russians to transfer reserves to problematic areas and plug holes.
In addition, it cannot be ruled out that gradually the Russians will still be able to solve to some extent the "30+ problem" by increasing the supply of appropriate artillery systems to the front.
A problem with three unknowns
Scenarios for further development of events rest on the following three factors.
1. The first factor is the reserves of the parties.
This is the key question. Apparently, both Ukraine and Russia, to one degree or another, will now strengthen recruitment into the army.
Kiev has already stated that there will be additional mobilization, and they are trying to significantly reduce the opportunities to "cut back" by threatening criminal cases to those who received white tickets.
Also, the Ministry of Defense has simplified the mobilization of the limited-fit, reducing their list of diseases, and is preparing to cancel the postponement for those who receive additional higher education. The bill has already been submitted to the Rada.
These measures began to be taken in shock mode only now — which means that the issue of replenishment of personnel arose very acutely just after the first months of the counteroffensive. Before that, the authorities had turned a blind eye to all these problems for more than a year, although they were well-known and lay on the surface.
Threats of extradition of those who have left Ukraine for military service have become especially indicative. This human "resource" is so difficult to extract from the camp of Europe that the very fact of discussing this topic indicates a sharp shortage of new personnel for the front line (previously, such methods of replenishing the army were not even discussed).
Also, information about high losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is constantly circulating in the Western media, and last week British ex-commander Richard Barrons called on Ukraine to conserve reserves.
"It would be a disaster to allow what is left of the 10th Corps, the unused reserve of Ukraine, to be defeated in the assaults of the Russian defense due to the hasty timing (of the counteroffensive - Ed.)," the general writes.
Ukrainian intelligence believes that even without mobilization, the Russian Federation is now sending 20-22 thousand recruits to the front every month. Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev today announced 35 thousand a month — or 280 thousand new contractors since the beginning of the year.
We also recall that last autumn Russia carried out a partial mobilization. According to official data, 300 thousand recruits were recruited (according to a number of observers — up to half a million).
At the same time, Ukrainian speakers say that the Russian Federation still does not have enough reserves.
In any case, if the APU now manages to multiply the recruitment into the army, then Russia will receive a mirror image. Moreover, the mobilization potential in Russia is many times greater than that of Ukraine. And due to the new wave of mobilization, Moscow can completely cover the shortage in reserves, if any.
2. The second factor is the supply of equipment and ammunition. When they come, they are spent in advance mode. Ukraine has switched to a mode of dependence on external supplies, the Russian Federation relies on its military-industrial complex in almost everything except drones and a number of components.
At the moment, it is believed that the Russian Federation has the advantage in conventional projectiles, Kiev has the advantage in long—range and high-precision ones (this includes reconnaissance of the enemy's distant rear, which is conducted, in all likelihood, with the help of NATO tracking systems).
Western analysts say that their countries will be able to increase the supply of shells to Ukraine no earlier than the second half of 2024 (this, in particular, is stated by retired British General Barrons). That is, by the next summer campaign — although there are more pessimistic estimates.
Artillery now, along with assault groups, plays the most important role in the counteroffensive. If a house or trench cannot be taken, a fiery shaft is brought down on it, and there is simply no point in holding the position further. The downside of this tactic is the overspending of ammunition, and the longer the counteroffensive goes on, the stronger the shortage of shells will become.
The West has repeatedly criticized the APU for using ammunition too intensively.
A separate story with armored vehicles. Observers believe that due to the slowness of Western countries with supplies, Russia is increasing its advantage in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
According to BILD military columnist Julian Repke, during the counteroffensive, the AFU lost several hundred pieces of military equipment, including at least four Stryker infantry fighting vehicles, 20 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, up to 15 Leopard tanks and more than 100 MRAP wheeled armored vehicles.
The losses of the Russian side in technology are also significant, but the Kremlin is changing its tactics. If at the beginning of this year the military leadership of the Russian Federation sent old Soviet tanks to Ukraine (such as the T-62, released more than 60 years ago), then in recent months new equipment has been coming to the front. Now the Russian military industry produces about 20 modern T-72B3 and T-90M tanks per month — all of them are immediately sent to Ukraine.
At the same time, the Russian authorities have launched a large-scale modernization program of old tanks: first of all, this concerns the T—72 vehicles - about seven thousand units of such tanks have remained in Russia since Soviet times. Thus, this year the Russian army can count on another 700 new tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
At the same time, Western countries, as Repke writes, have not delivered a single modern combat tank to Ukraine in recent months, less than 100 of the 300 promised infantry fighting vehicles have been transferred to the APU today.
At the same time, in September, the United States promised to send the first ten "Abrams" to Ukraine. The number is small, so it is still unclear whether the recovery of lost equipment is going at the pace necessary to continue operations.
British retired General Barrons believes that this year it will not be possible to get the right amount of "armor" and related funds.
"Ukraine has enough air defense to cover only about a third of the country's territory. The issue of the shortage of artillery ammunition was resolved only temporarily — due to the supply of cluster shells to the United States. Ukraine will need time until mid-2024 to restore a sufficiently powerful air force, and it is very short of key equipment needed for mine clearance. Fixing all this will postpone the war at least to next year," Barrons believes.
In addition, for Ukraine, the continuity of Western supplies is subject to political risks — skepticism is growing in the United States about further arming Kiev, and no one knows whether it will be possible to maintain support at the same level over the coming years. Moreover, presidential elections will be held in the United States at the end of next year. And among the Republican candidates, voices are sounding louder and louder with calls to stop providing assistance to Ukraine and to work towards ending the war and reaching agreements with Russia.
3. The third factor is the density of Russian defensive lines.
The Ukrainian point of view on this is that the first line has already been broken, and the rest will not be so powerful. This was stated by the commander of the Tavria group, Alexander Tarnavsky, in an interview with the Guardian newspaper. According to him, "it should be easier from now on."
"We are now between the first and second lines," Tarnavsky said, speaking about the Rabocino—Verbovoye area. According to him, now the Ukrainian troops are expanding the breakthrough front in both directions.
According to Tarnavsky, during the construction of three defense lines on the Southern Front, Russia spent 60% of its forces on equipping the first of them, and only 20% each on the other two.
The Ukrainian army approached the first line so slowly, because continuous minefields had to be cleared manually meter by meter at night.
According to his calculations, then there is a space in which Russian units have to move, and therefore their minefields are no longer a continuous strip.
At the same time, the Ukrainian military told Western journalists that the Russian defense is not "frozen in time", it is regularly strengthened. And it's hard to believe that the enemy has not improved its defense in the rear at all since the beginning of the counteroffensive three months ago — given that this direction is strategic for the Russian Federation.
That is, it can be assumed that due to Russian fortifications, the Ukrainian counteroffensive may be delayed more than once. And as Ukraine moves forward, the Russians, apparently, will become even more active in strengthening what remains under their control. Including mining the territory.
What will happen next?
All of these factors create, on the one hand, some uncertainty in the forecasts. On the other hand, it is clear that at the moment there are no unambiguous trump cards that would help the APU to make a quick breakthrough and dramatically increase the speed of the counteroffensive.
Most likely, Ukraine is now setting itself as a task -to reach the maximum distance of a long-range artillery strike on the roads that form a land corridor to the Crimea. To do this, the APU needs to advance at least to Tokmak.
And it is clear that the Russian troops will try to disrupt the fulfillment of this task by all means.
The already quoted British ex-commander Barrons believes that Ukraine needs to stop trying to attack at any cost: this is fraught with the loss of reserves and great risks in the future. Instead, we need to start preparing for the campaign, which starts in the second half of 2024.
"The current counteroffensive of Ukraine will not displace Russia — although no one expected it. It is also unlikely that the occupation area will be halved before the onset of winter, which could be one of the most optimistic goals," Barrons writes in a column for the Financial Times.
In his opinion, "Kiev should not insist on significant success on the battlefield until the means to achieve it appear." Which, according to the general, depends entirely on the West.
In the meantime, the only possible tactics of Ukraine, he sees the same as it was last winter: local battles on the fronts in order to exhaust and stretch the enemy's forces. As well as strikes on the rear of the Russian Federation and on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which needs to be "taken out of the game" by naval drones and missiles.
But it is far from a fact that the Ukrainian command will listen to this advice now.
So far, everything suggests that the AFU will try to intensify offensive actions in the coming weeks in order to achieve maximum success and a deep breakthrough of the Russian defense lines with access to Tokmak, as long as the weather allows.
And if there is success, it will justify the losses incurred.
But if the Ukrainian troops cannot break through the front deeply and run into a new line of defense of the Russian Federation not far from the current positions, then the risks that Barrons spoke about will manifest themselves — the depletion of the reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which can change the balance of forces at the front in favor of the Russian Federation.
At least one option is peaceful
And then the military-political leadership of Ukraine will have two options for action.
The first is to prepare for a long struggle, but already in a worse position (due to losses) than before the offensive. Especially given the fact that Russia can carry out a new wave of mobilization, which will provide it with a significant advantage in manpower and, it is possible, will allow it to launch its own large-scale offensive.
The second is to start negotiations on peace on certain conditions.
But the Ukrainian authorities are now rejecting the latter option. The bet is on a breakthrough during the offensive. And maximum efforts will be made for this. Therefore, the autumn battles, in fact, will determine the development of the strategic situation.
