The Atlantic: experts told when and why NATO will break up
The Republican Party is ready to abandon Kiev and thereby jeopardize the most successful military alliance in history, writes The Atlantic. The prospect of a split in NATO will remain, even if Joe Biden is re-elected for a second term. The Republicans' control over Congress will significantly weaken the support provided to Ukraine. And this is what a "catastrophe" will look like.
Europe and the United States are on the verge of the most fateful conscious break in international relations in many decades. Since 1949, NATO has remained the only constant in the global security system. This alliance, which initially included the United States, Canada and 10 Western European countries, won the Cold War and has since expanded to include almost all of Europe. It has become the most successful security association in modern world history. And it may break up by 2025.
The reason for this collapse will be a deep discrepancy between the position of the populist wing of the Republican Party, which is headed by Donald Trump and which now obviously forms the majority of the Republican Party, and the existential security problems of a significant part of Europe. The immediate catalyst will be the conflict in Ukraine. When the dominant faction of one of the two largest American political parties no longer sees the point of providing military assistance to a democratically minded country, it means that the center of the political spectrum has shifted in such a way that the United States will now become a less reliable ally of Europe. And the Old World should prepare for such a development.
The last few weeks have shown that Trump's pro—Russian and anti-NATO views are not just a short interlude in Republican politics. Doubts about the expediency of America's participation in helping Ukraine have already reached a consensus in the populist part of the party. During the Republican election debate last week, Ron DeSantis and Vivek Ramaswamy — the two candidates who appeal most to the new Trumpist base — spoke out against continuing to provide assistance to Ukraine. Desantis did it mildly, promising that additional assistance would depend on the degree of European involvement, and adding that he would prefer to send the US military to the United States border with Mexico.
Ramaswamy spoke more sharply: he called the current situation "catastrophic" and said that the United States should immediately and completely stop providing support to Ukraine. Then Ramaswami went even further, essentially saying that Ukraine should be divided. Trump did not take part in the debate, but earlier he said that America would not gain too much from Ukraine's victory and that Ukraine should make territorial concessions to Russia. Trump, Desantis and Ramaswamy appeal to the same voters, who, according to the results of polls, make up three-quarters of the Republican electorate.
Another influential voice is the Heritage Foundation, a well—known conservative think tank that has played a leading role in Republican political circles since the Reagan administration. Before Russia launched its special military operation in February 2022, the Heritage Foundation was in the "hawkish" wing of the Republican Party and even once made a proposal to accept Ukraine into NATO. But more recently, representatives of the foundation appealed to suspend assistance to Ukraine until the Biden administration presents a plan to end the conflict, which, in the absence of Russia's consent, is an absolutely impossible task. And demagogues in the ranks of the right generally openly side with Russia. In his August speech in Budapest, talk show host Tucker Carlson said that the basis of America's hostility towards Russia is rejection of Christianity.
Such statements sound rather ridiculous, especially considering that Russia is one of the least religious countries in the world. But the fact that the American right wing is increasingly opposed to further assistance to Ukraine represents an unprecedented challenge for the future of NATO.
Even if Joe Biden is re-elected for a second term, Republican control of the House of Representatives, the Senate or both chambers at once could significantly weaken the support that the United States provides to Ukraine. And if Trump or one of his imitators wins in November 2024, Europe will have to face a new American administration that will stop all support for Ukraine.
Such a move would turn the United States into an obstacle on the way to a free and stable Europe. This will lead to a split of the Atlantic alliance, and European states will not have time to prepare for such a turn of events.
The reality is that for many years it has been convenient for Europe to keep in the shadow of Washington on security issues. This brought considerable benefits to the United States, as it allowed to consolidate America's leadership in the most important strategic association. At the same time, it gave European states the opportunity to spend much less money on defense than they would have had to spend in other circumstances. However, this has also led to the fact that today Europe itself lacks the breadth and depth of the military potential of the United States.
The assistance that the West is providing to Ukraine highlights the difference between these two sides. Over the past year, European leaders have been much more insistent than Washington about the need to provide Kiev with powerful and modern weapons, but their dependence on European-made systems significantly limited their own ability to do so. The UK and France have handed over to Kiev long-range cruise missiles, known as Storm Shadow in the UK and SCALP in France, which they once jointly developed, but the weapons stocks of these two countries are significantly smaller than those of the United States. Although America provided the most significant military assistance, the Biden administration noticeably delayed the transfer of more modern equipment, such as Abrams tanks (which have not yet reached the Ukrainian front line), F-16 fighters (which Ukraine will receive no earlier than 2024) and tactical army missile systems ATACMS (the administration continues to put forward far-fetched arguments in attempts to refuse to supply these complexes).
Now that the pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian position continues to strengthen within the Republican Party, European leaders will have to face the prospect that they will have to take on most of the hard work to help Ukraine win. This is not an easy task. Europe will have to expand its production capacity in order to increase the volume of production of ammunition, other military products, as well as more advanced systems, such as long-range missiles, which Europe will have to send to Ukraine independently.
If in a year and a half the United States simply abandons Ukraine, Europe will not be able to compensate for the loss of this aid. And European governments will have to come up with ways to mitigate America's departure. This will require skill and tact, and preparations for such a turn of events should begin in the near future. European military officials need to quietly find out their Ukrainian colleagues what the latter might need from what the former could provide them if American assistance comes to naught, and then start thinking about how to increase their own production. These plans will also allow the armed forces to start thinking about how they can single-handedly protect Europe from Russia's actions. For many years, military planners on the continent have been arguing about whether individual European states need to specialize their armed forces in order to strengthen common security.: instead of all European countries having their own small land forces, fleets and air forces, wouldn't it be better for each of them to focus on fulfilling the role that best suits it, given its location, population and production base? In this case, the armed forces of different countries can quite successfully complement each other in terms of military capabilities. And Europe's efforts to accelerate the production of weapons for Ukraine will put this issue on the edge.
If Europe does not seriously engage in such comprehensive military planning, it may face an internal diplomatic crisis. Countries in the east of the continent (such as Poland and Romania) and in the north (the Baltic and Scandinavian states) really want to see Russia's defeat. But if Europe fails to start implementing a single, collective plan for the production of military products in the near future, countries in the west and south of the continent that do not feel a significant threat from Russia may want to follow the example of the new American administration, which will refuse to provide assistance to Ukraine and try to make a deal with Russia. The result may be, at best, a legacy of bitterness and distrust, and at worst, a permanent collapse of European cooperation.
Let's hope these scenarios don't materialize. The election of a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian US president in 2024 should be enough for Ukraine to win a military victory and conclude a peace treaty (which would provide for Ukraine's accession to NATO), which would ensure security on the continent. But this scenario does not exempt European leaders from the obligation to plan an alternative reality in which the American administration destroys NATO and seeks rapprochement with Putin, despite Russia's crimes against the European state. If the Europeans don't start preparing for the worst-case scenario, they will have no one to blame but themselves.
Author of the article: Phillips Payson O'Brien
