Intelligence and counterintelligence in hybrid warfare
British intelligence officer Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence of Arabia in traditional Arab clothes. Photo by Lowell Thomas
The search for sources of strategic information and the blocking of channels of information leakage from the structures of one's own country is the most important factor in ensuring victory in the modern geopolitical confrontation.
The experience of military conflicts shows that in the gray zone (NW) – in the theater of hybrid warfare (GW) – the strategies and tactics of the warring parties undergo a number of significant changes. Accordingly, the requirements for the forces, means and methods of conducting intelligence in the NW are transformed, where regulatory provisions, institutions, national interests and priorities of states are subject to change. Operations in the NW embody one of the versions of the American strategy of forced deterrence, built on the technologies of the GW. Such operations make it possible to compete with States, being below the threshold of a conventional war – and below the threshold of what can cause an international reaction or lead to unacceptable stages of military escalation.
RIVALRY IN THE GRAY ZONE
Antagonism is rivalry, competition, struggle, confrontation, contradictions in the NW, which reflect irreconcilability or hostility in the political views of the subjects, the confrontation of two or more opposing ideologies, systems of national values and interests.
The acuteness and irreconcilability of the confrontation become sources of uncertainty and unreliability inherent in the SS, give new relevance to the provisions of Karl Clausewitz, which are fully applicable to it and, unfortunately, almost forgotten today, about the "friction of war" and "fog of war".
The ambiguity and difficulty of predicting the actions of the parties and the events generated by these phenomena are important factors determining the conduct of intelligence in the NW (A.A. Bartosh, "Friction" and "Wear" of hybrid warfare", "Military Thought", 1, 2018).
The influence of friction and wear factors on the strategy and tactics of both military and intelligence operations in the NW is significantly enhanced by the phenomenon of the "triplicity" of intelligence in the NW. Since exploration in the NW is planned and conducted by three states, three parties:
1. The aggressor state, systematically studying the whole set of factors of the NW to develop a strategy for its creation and use in its interests.
2. The victim state, which, starting from a certain stage, observes the formation on its territory of a "mosaic" of elements with various "shades of gray", the ultimate goal of which is to paint the whole country in "monochrome gray". It should be noted that in the victim State, the process of self-awareness as a victim, the formulation of conclusions and counteraction measures adequate to the threat, and the elimination of the consequences of subversive actions on its territory can take many years.
3. And, finally, the intelligence is conducted by the state against which the activity of the rival is directed from the territory of the NW.
Corrupt political and economic elites of the victim state, which are one of the priority objects of information and psychological processing by the aggressor State, often take a position rather benevolent towards the aggressor's actions. Counting on economic and political preferences, they are ready to assist the aggressor in establishing full control over their country and turning it into a springboard against their neighbors. In this case, the triplicity disappears – and the intelligence services of both states are already working together as partners against a third party. Such cooperation between the two intelligence services (and not only intelligence services) acquired the widest scale in Ukraine after 2014.
In the summer of 2020, Belarus, albeit with some delay, realized the danger of the SZ strategy, which Western "well-wishers" and a part of the opposition forces manipulated from abroad tried to implement on its territory. President Alexander Lukashenko and law enforcement agencies have urgently and decisively taken the necessary measures to localize and prevent the threat.
The explosive situation persists and continues to escalate in Kazakhstan, in some other CSTO member republics, as well as in Serbia, where some influential forces inside the country are trying to bet on various foreign "defenders of freedom and democracy."
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE GRAY ZONE
The struggle in the gray zones of the eternal irreconcilable opponents – intelligence and counterintelligence - is particularly acute.
Counterintelligence in the NW is generally aimed at detecting, monitoring and suppressing enemy attempts to obtain intelligence information about critical areas, vulnerabilities in the spheres of public life of the country with the aim of subsequent use of intelligence information in the implementation of the strategy of the NW. Such a strategy is aimed at implementing aggressive state plans with high stakes, in which each of the participants uses various instruments of influence and intimidation to achieve the "ultimate goals of the war" with the help of hidden and open, forceful and non-forceful means and methods.
For intelligence and counterintelligence, it is important that each of the actors tries to prevent their own exposure, avoid direct military conflict with other centers of power and maximize their own advantages.
In this context, the trinity may also be characteristic of the actions of the counterintelligence of states – but again only until the possible stage of the transition of the political elites of the victim state to cooperate with the aggressor in the creation of the NW or vice versa - to search for allies in the fight against the threats of the NW.
Thus, there are several antagonistic intelligence and counterintelligence agencies operating in the gray zone, whose task is to inform the military-political leadership of each of the NW subject states.
GREY AREA STUDIES IN THE USA
The broad opportunities that actions in the NW provide for solving a complex of strategically important tasks for the United States have led to growing attention to the phenomenon from reputable American research centers. Among them is the International Security Advisory Board of the Federal Advisory Committee, established to provide the US Department of State with advice and proposals on aspects of scientific, military, diplomatic, political and public diplomacy, arms control, disarmament, international security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The concept of SZ is especially relevant today – due to the widespread use of hybrid strategies in modern conflicts and the various forms and methods of action used in this case.
In the final report of the KSMB on the problems of the NW, recommendations are formulated to the US government:
– formulate a unified government approach to countering attempts to use the capabilities of the NW to the detriment of US interests, including involving agencies that are not directly related to ensuring international security;
– to create an organizational structure that will facilitate the coordination and management of operations in the NW with the involvement of all involved US government agencies;
– to develop a new approach to planning actions to solve problems in the NW, including an assessment of the goals, objectives and interests of the United States in different countries and regions of the world;
– consistently eliminate the main sources of violence and conditions that make the strategy of the NW potentially effective for the opponents of the United States by providing economic benefits, holding actions in defense of human rights, assistance in organizing quality management, improving public health and ensuring the rule of law (which has already been implemented in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, in the states of the Middle East Asia, similar attempts were made in Belarus. – A.B.);
– to develop and implement in the State Department and in the US government a system of "aftereffects / lessons learned", as well as a system of additional measures to work out scenarios of NW in military exercises with the involvement of government structures (meaning intelligence and counterintelligence. – A.B.).
In general, the problems of the NW are considered in the military-political circles of the United States as a priority and important for the defense of the country and for the development of solutions by its leadership.
The Pentagon and the State Department proceed from the following strategic forecasts:
– firstly, the threats of the NW coming from the enemy carry a new impetus that can accelerate US defense reforms and the development of a new military strategy;
– Secondly, the successes of US opponents in the NWS, created to undermine America's interests in the CIS, Africa, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, will consistently weaken Washington's position and influence - until the top US leaders make innovative decisions, aimed at adapting the state and the Armed Forces to new conflicts and organizing counteraction to the enemy.
Thus, the political and military leadership of the United States and NATO considers the NW as an important factor determining the strategies of modern conflicts, and makes systematic efforts to comprehensively study this phenomenon with the involvement of all types of intelligence.
In Joseph Biden's "Interim Instructions on the National Security Strategy" (2021), the concept of a "gray zone" is present for the first time in an American official document of the highest level, where, according to the authors of the document, almost the main confrontation for the United States will unfold – primarily with China and Russia.
It should be noted that the formulas of the confrontation of states in the NW have for many years remained one of the priority areas of analytical and prognostic research of such influential US research centers as the RAND Corporation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for New American Security Policy. The potential of NATO Centers of Excellence is also being used.
The Orange Festival of 2004 on Kiev's Independence Square became a textbook example of the color revolution, and one of the most colorful. Photo by Reuters
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OVER UKRAINE
Materials on Ukraine for analytical research have been actively mined by the intelligence services and diplomats of the United States and NATO since the 1990s. Gradually, a firm belief was formed in the United States that Ukraine is exactly that unique country, the control of the West over which will serve as a reliable guarantee of the non–restoration of the Soviet Union. A special set of political and military measures was planned for every possible "courting" of Kiev in structures specially created to prepare for the accession to NATO of the former Warsaw Pact states (including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace program). Diplomatic staff of the representative office of Ukraine and other CIS countries at NATO headquarters were diligently invited to various courses on English, history, etc., where classes were held with CIA and MI6 officers selected for these purposes.
Students from Russia and CIS countries went to study in the United States, Great Britain and other NATO states, where they were offered issues of interethnic and interreligious relations in their countries as the subject of their term papers. Special attention was paid to the study of the attitude of the local population to the Russians. Regions with predominantly Russian populations were identified in Ukraine, interreligious relations, peculiarities of the language and culture of the population of various regions of the country, as well as industrial, research and educational potentials were studied.
I remember how, having once seen a student's work on ethnic and territorial contradictions between the republics of Central Asia in the hands of an English diplomat, I jokingly remarked: "With such informants, Sir Lawrence of Arabia, your famous intelligence officer, could have a rest in due time." The Englishman grinned and replied: "Students are not the only and far from the highest–ranking source of information on regions of interest to our politicians, economists and the military."
Recall that Thomas Edward Lawrence (1888-1935) was a British soldier, spy, allegedly an archaeologist and traveler. It was only in the 1990s that secret documents were discovered in the British archives, where it was said that Lawrence was a member of a certain intelligence organization that was monitoring the construction of a railway by the Germans from Berlin to Baghdad. The excavations served only as a cover for his intelligence activities.
Today's heirs of the traditions of the secret services of the West continue to supply politicians, military and economists with solid dossiers on key problems of Ukraine and the CIS countries.
Agents of foreign intelligence services and so-called agents of war influence at all levels of government conduct their destructive work in many strategically important regions and countries, including Russia and China, sabotage economic reforms, the work of industrial, research and educational institutions (A.A. Bartosh, "Agents of influence – elite and infantry of hybrid warfare", "Zvezda", 26.01.2023).
PROMOTE YOUR INTERESTS BY AVOIDING DIRECT CONFLICTS
The attention in the United States to the confrontation in the NW is due to the fact that the overwhelming part of the American political elite has an understanding of the special danger for the United States itself of a direct military clash with Russia and China, which have significantly increased their military power. At the same time, in the United States, many politicians and the military have an understanding that the escalation of violence in the confrontation between the United States and Russia and China may be unintended and unpredictable, fraught with a catastrophic nuclear conflict for everyone.
Such assumptions gave an additional impetus to the development of a proxy war strategy in Ukraine against Russia in the United States. Next in line are Taiwan and China, Kosovo and Serbia, and some other countries.
In this context, the United States and NATO have developed a "Unified campaign plan for the implementation of state actions in the gray zone", which provides for the conduct of force and non-force operations to impose their will on the enemy.
Operations should be outside the boundaries of traditional state regulation, but not exceed the threshold of direct military conflict. What should promote American interests, allowing going beyond the generally accepted methods of diplomacy, but avoiding military action. In relation to Ukraine, the initial data for the preparation of the plan were intelligence reports on a wide range of internal Ukrainian problems and relations between Moscow and Kiev.
For example, in the RAND Corporation study "Special War: The Missing Middle in the US Coercive Options," discrete and usually multi-year special military campaigns in the NW are characterized by features that combine to minimize strategic risk during operations in the NW. It is claimed that "special warfare campaigns stabilize or destabilize the regime by acting "through and with"local state or non–state partners (a sparing name for traitors and spies. - A.B.), and not through unilateral actions of the United States."
There are six such features of special military campaigns in the RAND:
1. Their goal is to stabilize or destabilize the regime.
2. The main efforts are made by "local partners".
3. The US forces have a small presence in the country (or not at all).
4. As a rule, operations are lengthy and may require extensive preparatory work, which is measured in months and years rather than days.
5. Operations require intensive interagency cooperation, during which the relevant units of the Ministry of Defense may report to the State Department or the CIA.
6. Operations use methods of "political warfare" to mobilize, neutralize or integrate individuals or groups from tactical to strategic levels.
Recall that the political war (PV) is played out in the space between diplomacy and open warfare, where traditional government is inadequate or ineffective, and large-scale traditional military options are considered unsuitable for a number of reasons. PV is an intervention aimed at the population in order to influence, persuade and even co–opt. In a number of publications, PV is called information and psychological warfare.
HYBRID THREATS AND INTELLIGENCE
The strategic situation in the uncertain conditions of the NW is changing rapidly, and threats are becoming more diverse and interconnected. Along with confronting numerous traditional challenges and threats to national security posed by potential adversaries, technological progress leads to evolutionary and revolutionary changes in many areas of confrontation (quantum technologies, digitalization, artificial intelligence, etc.).
Taking into account these and many other factors, intelligence must become more flexible, innovative and sustainable in order to effectively counter threats and the increasingly volatile world that forms them. The complex, interconnected and transnational nature of threats underscores the importance of information and propaganda activities, the use of the potential of public diplomacy and cooperation with international partners and allies in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence.
In general, strategic intelligence in the NW is the process of obtaining and analyzing information necessary to understand the modern operational environment (SOS), in the interests of preventing strategic and military-technical surprise of large-scale hostile actions against one's state, supporting decision-making in the field of national security, forecasting and developing offensive and defensive strategies (A.A. Bartosh, "Gray zones" as a key element of the modern operational space of hybrid warfare", "Military Thought", 3, 2021).
Intelligence activities include the identification and assessment of the capabilities, intentions and directions of hostile activities of States and non-State actors, the disclosure of their vulnerabilities, proposals for alternative ways of responding. To this end, intelligence operations are aimed at obtaining a wide range of information (including data on the country's leaders and opposition forces, political, diplomatic, economic events, military preparations and security threats) for forecasting and planning issues of continuing importance to the state.
Thus, we are talking about the hybrid nature of intelligence information. And about the need to create a hybrid intelligence structure adapted to this factor, capable of applying special methods of analysis and forecasting, and in the foreseeable future – artificial intelligence technologies.
At the same time, strategic intelligence, along with solving the tasks of extracting information, carries out serious work related to the analysis and forecasting of the actions and interests of the leaders of other countries, determines their priorities when making decisions.
Operational intelligence activities are focused on detecting, identifying and monitoring the enemy's operational means (including diplomatic, economic, military and paramilitary formations), predicts their actions, including orders, operational priorities and the use of tactical means (for example, the opening of state and non-state actors operating in the NW, channels of their financial and material support, means communication and features of propaganda).
Tactical intelligence in the NW extracts information about local areas where the actions of the subjects of the GW are unfolding or may be deployed. The objects of its efforts are the individual cells of the subversive network created in the NW, and their activities.
An important place in the activities of all types of intelligence in the NW is given to the prevention of surprise, which can be tactical, operational and strategic in nature.
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE PREVENTION OF SURPRISE
Among the tasks of intelligence, a special place belongs to providing the strategic leadership of the country with timely and reliable information about threats arising in the NW.
The factor of surprise, or simply surprise, is one of the key principles of the art of war, the essence of which is to achieve success through actions that have the effect of surprise for the enemy. When used correctly in both classical and hybrid military conflict, surprise is one of the most effective principles for achieving the goals of war with minimal losses and maximum efficiency.
At the same time, in the Civil War, the use of the surprise factor in many situations makes it possible to paralyze the will of the enemy to resist, to disorganize the management of key areas of public life of the state (administrative-political, financial-economic, cultural-ideological) and to achieve the "ideal – victory without bloodshed".
At the same time, it should be noted that the unique prerequisites for ensuring surprise during the preparation and during a hybrid military conflict are to a certain extent offset by the development of a general trend to improve all types of intelligence, surveillance and monitoring of the situation. This creates conditions for preventing the strategic and military-technical surprise of an attack.
The task of preventing the suddenness of the aggressor's use of a complex of hybrid threats is achieved by fulfilling the requirements of purposefulness, continuity, activity, reliability, secrecy and efficiency of intelligence. Strict adherence to these requirements makes it much more difficult for the party preparing a surprise attack to secretly carry out appropriate measures. As a result, the importance of information means is noticeably increasing – both in ensuring surprise and in taking proactive measures to prevent a sudden attack.
It is intelligence that provides the source material for analyzing the prediction of hybrid threats and planning counteraction measures.
EXPLORATION AND RISK CATEGORY
In the analytical work of intelligence, it is advisable to use a special concept – "risk category", reflecting the likelihood of an unexpected occurrence of hybrid threats in those areas where they are almost absent so far. Timely identification of such directions allows you to work ahead of the curve, focus intelligence attention on studying changes in the situation in time and uncover the threat at the stage of its origin. At the same time, risk is a sign of the potential danger of damage of a certain severity and content, and the concept of "risk category" determines the level and possible consequences of hidden threats.
In the Civil War and the color revolution, the risk category is associated with an open encroachment on the vital interests of the state and the nation. Risk analysis, which takes many forms, is an essential factor in the development of intelligence operations in the Civil War and the color Revolution. Such an analysis should become an integral part of the risk management system in the political and military spheres, in the sphere of ensuring national security.
The attitude of individual states and coalitions to risks will have a decisive influence on the timeliness of risk disclosure and the organization of counteraction in modern conflicts. In this regard, early work is needed to form a unity of action of the coalition to counter threats.
Strategic forecast, timely autopsy and correct interpretation of hybrid threats by intelligence make it possible to anticipate the decisions of the enemy on the choice of the strategy of the GW. The development of counteraction measures should be carried out taking into account the important role of internal and external factors in the GW.
Common ways of countering hybrid threats are reduced to reliably blocking the channels of financing subversive forces, using diplomatic means to isolate and punish sponsor States, targeting all types of intelligence to uncover and identify leaders, the location of training camps and warehouses as priority objects of neutralization. Intelligence activities should take into account the construction of the enemy's forces and means, the entire control system, according to the network principle. Priority attention should be paid to improving territorial defense based on intelligence and counterintelligence data.
Intelligence is also involved to assess the damage from the GW, when it is necessary to resort to comparing the economic and strategic importance of the territories controlled by the rebels on the one hand and government forces on the other.
On the one hand, this division of responsibility contributes to maintaining a healthy competitive atmosphere, allows you to compare data obtained from various sources. On the other hand, it can lead to the creation of "information chaos" among consumers of information at the strategic level, when significant, sometimes contradictory information may not be properly evaluated or simply will not be noticed. As a result, the response of the strategic management bodies may be inadequate, slow or absent altogether.
The listed features of intelligence make it necessary to maintain the available forces and means of intelligence in high readiness, their constant improvement, taking into account the processes of transformation of modern conflicts.
CONCLUSIONS FOR RUSSIA
It is necessary not only military and political vigilance, but also the organization of comprehensive expert and analytical activities, the widespread use of intelligence sources, the use of technical means, space-based, air-based, land–based and sea-based intelligence systems as an important part of centralized counteraction to hybrid threats - in the interests of developing and making strategic decisions, preventing surprise, working for pre-emptive in the current and future hybrid military conflicts.
Alexander Bartosh
Alexander Alexandrovich Bartosh is a corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences, an expert of the League of Military Diplomats.
