The situation in Afghanistan two years after the Americans fled
Two years after the Taliban movement came to power in Afghanistan again (banned in the Russian Federation), the question remains whether the country will again become a haven for international terrorist groups.
The long-standing fears of the international community were confirmed a little more than a year ago, when the US government discovered and eliminated the leader of Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia) Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul. The fact that the Taliban have brought Zawahiri back to Afghanistan (despite repeated assurances that they have distanced themselves from the group he leads) has greatly increased the general concern.
However, the elimination of the leader of Al-Qaeda by a drone strike allowed the administration of US President Joseph Biden to declare that Washington has an effective counter-terrorism strategy to mitigate the continuing threat from Afghanistan.
In addition, politicians seem to be comforted by the opposition of the Taliban to the terrorist group IG-Khorasan (banned in the Russian Federation). And Biden even suggested in passing that the Taliban is helping to contain the regional terrorist threat.
CHALLENGES AND THREATS IN AFGHANISTAN
Terrorist groups in Afghanistan are divided into two categories: allies and opponents of the Taliban movement.
Among the Taliban's allies are Al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, banned in Russia) and a number of extremist organizations from Central Asia.
The main group opposing the Taliban movement is the regional unit of the Islamic State (IS, banned in the Russian Federation), known as "IG-Khorasan".
In the first year of the Taliban's rule, the activation of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan became noticeable. This year, its leader al-Zawahiri made more statements than in several previous years, and some of these statements clearly read incitement to violence. Al-Zawahiri's presence in Kabul was at the peak of Al-Qaeda activity after the Taliban seized power.
After the group appointed Saif al-Adel as al-Zawahiri's successor, its central leadership issued threats against Sweden and Denmark, calling for attacks on their embassies in all countries of the world. At the same time, a recently declassified report by the US intelligence community states that Al-Qaeda is not capable of posing a threat to the United States until 2024.
Compared to the central leadership of Al-Qaeda, its unit in South Asia (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, AKIS) was more actively engaged in propaganda and sought support for its terrorist activities aimed against India. Nevertheless, even AKIS was not involved in any cases of violence.
It was reported that the AKIS, as well as possibly the central leadership of Al-Qaeda, are currently under the jurisdiction of the unit responsible for controlling foreign fighters in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Taliban (GDI).
Unlike Al-Qaeda, the TTP, which harbors thousands of its fighters in eastern Afghanistan, has intensified subversive activities against Pakistani government forces, killing several hundred security forces and several civilians.
The group had no difficulties in distributing and delivering material resources – from weapons to militants – from their shelters in Afghanistan. It is known that some militants of the Afghan Taliban provided assistance to the TTP.
Speaking about extremist groups in Central Asia, first of all, it is worth noting that Islamists based in Afghanistan, who are part of the Jamaat Ansarullah, have tried several times to carry out cross-border attacks on the territory of Tajikistan.
Cells of the "Islamic Movement of East Turkestan" (banned in the Russian Federation), a Uighur armed formation of a religious extremist nature, are also stationed in Afghanistan. What causes concern of the Chinese authorities, who have been trying to solve the Uighur issue for many years.
As for IG-Khorasan, the overall level of violence by the group has decreased over the past year. In addition, it has not been able to expand its territorial presence, which caused concern in the ranks of its leadership when the Taliban first came to power.
The Taliban have set themselves the goal of neutralizing ISIS in Afghanistan. In 2023, they managed to eliminate some of the leaders of the regional unit, including the commander who participated in the attack on the international airport. Hamid Karzai in Kabul during the evacuation in August 2021.
Nevertheless, IG-Khorasan still managed to carry out several high–profile terrorist attacks - including killing two provincial governors, as well as attacking facilities in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.
The group has also shown signs of integration into a powerful transnational network: there have been reports that IG-Khorasan receives funding and instructions from IG in Iraq, Syria and Somalia and oversees militants in the Maldives. Although there have been repeated reports of disruptions in the work of the IG-Khorasan media resources, recent publications of the group indicate that its propaganda has returned to its former course.
TALIBAN POLICY TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
The Taliban insist that their movement refuses to provide the territory of Afghanistan to other extremist groups for planning and carrying out subversive activities against other countries. However, upon closer examination, it turns out that the Taliban's policy towards militants of other terrorist organizations is divided into three main aspects: encouragement, restriction and suppression of their activities.
The leadership of the Taliban movement supports various militant groups, providing them with permanent shelter and guaranteeing security on the territory of Afghanistan. The Taliban also do not restrict the movement of these groups within the country. Moreover, in addition to other forms of material support, the Taliban provide social benefits, as well as access to weapons and ammunition to allied groups.
However, at the same time, the Taliban imposes restrictions on the activities of a number of terrorist organizations. For example, as part of the peace agreement with the United States, the leadership of the movement pledged to limit the activities of Al-Qaeda so that it would not attempt to attack the United States and its allies. This is evidenced by both American intelligence assessments and Al-Qaeda's own reports.
In addition, the Taliban do not allow groups stationed in Afghanistan to disclose their location in propaganda materials. This led to the fact that the South Asian AKIS began to issue written messages without video accompaniment. The TTP also denies that its fighters are based in Afghanistan.
It remains unclear to what extent the Taliban is able to exercise actual control over the situation in Afghanistan. However, there is evidence that the leadership of the movement formed an apparatus as part of the GDI to control foreign fighters inside the country.
The Taliban's repression of IG-Khorasan is conditioned by at least three goals:
– neutralization of the group's top leadership;
– a large-scale counterintelligence operation in the ranks of the Taliban to search for militants working for IG-Khorasan;
– bringing to justice civilians who are believed to be associated with the group (they presumably include the Salafi population in the east and north of Afghanistan). All signs indicate that this set of measures is led by GDI and carried out with the involvement of the forces of the Taliban Ministry of Defense.
conclusion
Extremist groups operating from Afghanistan are still determined to conduct long-term operations against their opponents.
The TTP is acting most aggressively, strengthening its structural organization and expanding its geographical presence, while other terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, are being cautious.
Some experts explain Al-Qaeda's restrained approach to conducting subversive activities with limited capabilities rooted in organizational weakness. However, the Afghan terrorist landscape does not actually hinder the capacity-building of most extremist groups, and their activity is not a problem if they do not directly confront the Taliban.
A more likely explanation is that extremist organizations associated with the movement operate within the rules set for them by the Taliban. If some group seems less capable and does not build up organizational strength quickly, most likely it happens by its own choice and it is possible that out of solidarity with the Taliban.
As for the Taliban movement itself, some analysts suggest that its leadership initiated a long and slow process of containing the militants. Others argue that in the event of a potential confrontation, the Taliban will not have enough opportunities to confront some of their current allies, so they are afraid of provoking a negative reaction.
A more plausible explanation is that the Taliban retain their long-standing political desire to accept foreign extremists who are dissidents in their countries, as well as to support "jihad" at the international level, especially in Pakistan. The supreme leader of the movement, Haibatullah Akhundzade, spoke about a long, protracted ideological struggle in general and with the Western world in particular.
At the same time, the Taliban are trying to find a delicate balance between realizing their ambitions and obligations to the Islamist brothers, on the one hand, and limiting their activities for geopolitical purposes, on the other. Apparently, this restraint is due to the fact that the Taliban do not intend to jeopardize the very survival of their regime due to potential actions by external forces aimed against the movement.
Similarly, the task of self-preservation is the main reason for the Taliban's repression against the IG Khorasan. The Taliban see this group as an irreconcilable enemy and the main opposition to their regime, capable of making political and religious appeals that weaken the movement from within. For this reason, the leaders of the Taliban movement are trying to resist enemy terrorist groups by force.
Larisa Shashok
Larisa Aleksandrovna Shashok is an expert at the Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies of the Higher School of Economics.
