Scenarios of a possible war on the Korean Peninsula
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin (right) with North Korean officers. Photo by Vladimir Karnozov
Assessing the nature of existing and potential threats, American and South Korean military experts proceed from the assumption that North Korea will remain the main source of military danger and the main destabilizing factor in the near future in Northeast Asia (NEA).
Pyongyang has not yet abandoned plans to unite Korea using force. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are still legally at war. At the same time, the existing mechanisms for ensuring security on the Korean peninsula are based on the temporary Armistice Agreement in Korea of 1953, which defines only the conditions for the cessation of hostilities and the separation of the warring parties. The inter-Korean military-political agreements reached later remain unrealized.
A VIEW FROM SEOUL
The Republic of Kazakhstan believes that a possible conflict, regardless of its scale, will be characterized by the following features:
– strengthening of the information confrontation;
– active conduct of operations by special forces, including before the outbreak of hostilities;
– the desire of the parties to suppress and disorganize the control and communication systems, the enemy's rear and its communications already at the initial stage of the conflict;
– the widespread use of high-precision weapons and long-range fire weapons in order to simultaneously strike military groups, military and civilian infrastructure facilities to the maximum depth;
– numerous civilian casualties and the threat of undermining the economic potential of the belligerents.
Deterring Pyongyang and ensuring the constant readiness of the national armed Forces to conduct military operations on the Korean peninsula is considered by Seoul as the main task determining the directions of military construction and combat training. The use of national armed forces against other NEA states is not planned at this stage (despite the clauses of the US-South Korean mutual defense treaty, which imply joint military operations with the United States within the entire Pacific zone in the event of an armed attack on one of the parties).
According to experts of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Seoul is currently unable to independently ensure its security and repel Pyongyang's aggression. Therefore, the United States is considered as the main ally. It is assumed that the likely conflict with the DPRK will take the form of a coalition war, which will be waged by the forces of the united American-South Korean grouping. In addition, the possibility of the participation of the Armed Forces of the countries that are part of the Command of the UN troops in Korea is not excluded.
Specific options for aggravation on the Korean peninsula and the likely steps of the warring parties are described by the operational plan of the Joint US-South Korean Command (JNC) called OPLAN–5015, which entered into force in 2016. The document combined the former OPLAN–5027 and OPLAN–5029, which regulated the procedure for protecting the ROK from an armed invasion of the DPRK and actions in case of destabilization of the internal political situation on North Korean territory.
INVASION FROM THE NORTH
The DPRK's invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea is considered by Seoul and Washington as the main option for the outbreak of an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, the possibility of Pyongyang using military force to solve its foreign and domestic political problems, as well as to protect the existing political regime, is not excluded.
The offensive may be sudden or begin with a series of armed provocations followed by an increase in the intensity and scale of hostilities. It is expected that the parties will use weapons of destruction to the full depth of the theater of operations (Theater of operations).
The initial stage of the conflict will be accompanied by massive missile, artillery and air strikes by the DPRK Armed Forces on military, industrial and administrative facilities of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as the landing (ejection) of tactical sea (air) landings and special forces units in the rear areas of the Republic of Kazakhstan. At the same time, Seoul does not exclude the possibility of Pyongyang using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The South Korean command assumes that the threatened period will be no more than 15 days. It is possible to start independent military operations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with the supporting role of the US Armed Forces in the Republic of Kazakhstan) as part of a peacetime grouping or after a partial strategic deployment.
The transfer of additional formations is planned in a combined way on regular equipment and vehicles (railway echelons, military transport and civil aviation aircraft, army aviation helicopters, and to the islands of the Yellow Sea - amphibious ships of the Navy and civil sea ferries).
The estimated duration of the first defensive operation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan can be up to 180 days. Its goal will be to repel the invasion, defeat the advancing enemy troops, hold the most important areas and borders, prevent the breakthrough of strike groups deep into the country, create conditions for mobilization measures, transfer additional contingent of the US Armed Forces to the peninsula and the transition of the troops of the combined group into a counteroffensive.
The main efforts are supposed to focus on the Seoul and central directions. With the completion of the strategic deployment, it is planned to conduct a counter-offensive operation until the restoration of the original position along the military demarcation line.
In the future, the development of the OAYUK offensive into the depths of the enemy's territory is not excluded. In its course, it is supposed to defeat the main forces of the Korean People's Army (KPA) south of the Pyongyang–Wonsan border and capture key areas of the DPRK, ensuring the formation of a new administration focused on Seoul and Washington. In this case, the ultimate goal of the war is considered to be the change of the North Korean regime and the unification of the country on the terms of the South.
An obligatory element of military operations will be the air operations of the united Air Force group. Their main content will be the application of massive missile and air strikes on objects throughout the DPRK in the interests of undermining its military and military-economic potential, creating prerequisites for the subsequent defeat of the KPA and the occupation of the North.
Taking into account the physical and geographical features of the Korean peninsula, special attention is paid to the use of special forces, tactical air and sea landings, light infantry formations, as well as to the organization of anti-sabotage defense of rear areas and the most important objects.
DESTABILIZATION IN THE DPRK
The option provides for the possibility of the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime and the military intervention of the ROK and the United States to stabilize the situation.
Several scenarios have been developed for the development of the situation, including a coup d'etat and the outbreak of a civil war in the DPRK, a large-scale natural disaster or man-made disaster, the loss of control over WMD stocks by the DPRK authorities, and the mass flight of the North Korean population to the territory of neighboring states. In these cases, it is expected that the JNR group will conduct an operation with the task of establishing effective control over strategic objects of the DPRK or destroying them.
At the same time, the nature of the allies' actions will depend on the positions of China and Russia. According to American and South Korean experts, they may also introduce contingents of troops into North Korean territory to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the immediate vicinity of national borders and to preserve their influence in the region.
A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST THE DPRK
The fundamental difference between OPLAN-5015 and previous documents was the provision on the possibility of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, together with the US Armed Forces, preemptive or retaliatory strike on important objects of the DPRK (missile and naval bases, airfields, WMD depots, state and military command posts, troop concentrations) when identifying signs of Pyongyang's preparation for aggression, threats or the beginning of their use of missile weapons and WMD. The main task in this case is to create conditions under which the enemy will not be able to proceed to full-scale hostilities.
According to experts, the possibility remains high that the North Korean leadership will be able to hide in underground structures even if the United States and the ROK achieve surprise. This will allow Pyongyang to maintain control of strategic missile forces and long-range artillery deployed along the demilitarized zone.
In such conditions, the risk of a retaliatory air and space strike by Pyongyang with significant losses to the allies is not excluded. Therefore, the probability of US and ROK actions in accordance with this scenario is considered low. The condition for its implementation is the identification of signs of the DPRK's preparation for a massive military invasion.
conclusion
The intentions of the main States of Northeast Asia to protect their national interests pose a tangible threat to the destabilization of the situation in the region.
The most likely participants in the confrontation may be the DPRK, on the one hand, and the alliance of the United States and the ROK, on the other. Under certain conditions, participation in military actions by China and Japan is not excluded. The prospect of Russia's participation in the armed conflict on the Korean peninsula is assessed by American experts as unlikely.
The ratio of the military potentials of the participants in a possible confrontation does not give an unambiguous answer to the prospects for the end of such a conflict, the armed forces of each of the states have their own strengths and weaknesses.
The DPRK has a significant number of armed forces, noticeably exceeding the peacetime OAYUK grouping. North Korean troops are equipped with weapons of mass destruction with their means of delivery and are fanatically loyal to a leader who is ready to send them to defend his regime. About 70% of the KPA troops, even under normal conditions, are permanently stationed in the immediate vicinity of Seoul (the distance from the South Korean capital to the border of the demilitarized zone is about 40 km).
At the same time, Pyongyang is not capable of providing long-term resistance to the United States and the ROK, whose troops, after the mobilization deployment, will receive overwhelming military-technical superiority in all indicators.
The Republic of Korea has a more compact army equipped with modern types of weapons and military equipment. But on its own, Seoul is ready to conduct only defensive operations aimed at ensuring the deployment of American reinforcement troops and creating conditions for the transition of the combined group to the offensive.
The US Armed Forces, despite the presence of significant Air Force and Navy formations in the region, are characterized by a certain inertia. The time required for the transfer of reinforcement troops from the continental United States and advanced bases in the Pacific Ocean zone can cost large human casualties among the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan and American servicemen stationed on the Korean Peninsula and Japanese territory.
China's participation in such a conflict does not guarantee the preservation of the territorial integrity of the DPRK. At the same time, the unification of the Korean peninsula on Seoul's terms is contrary to Beijing's interests, since it will lead to the loss of Chinese access to natural resources on North Korean territory, will bring American troops close to the borders of the PRC and cause a humanitarian catastrophe in the northeastern Chinese provinces due to the flow of refugees from the North.
Therefore, an open armed conflict is not needed by either side.
The preservation of the status quo is beneficial primarily to Washington, which is aimed at countering the economic and military strengthening of China. And to a lesser extent – to Beijing, which continues to maintain influence on Pyongyang.
Thus, it is possible to predict the preservation in the NEA in the medium term (five to ten years) the current military-political situation, characterized by regular exacerbations of tension on the Korean peninsula due to the irreconcilability of the positions of the competing parties.
Vasily Ivanov
Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.
