The United States seeks trilateral cooperation in Asia, strengthening relations with Japan and South Korea, writes the FA. However, this involves the risk of escalation in relations with Russia, China and North Korea, which do not welcome the expansion of US influence in Asia, the author notes.
How Biden can increase cooperation with Japan and South Korea
Andrew Yeo, Mireya Solís, Hanna Foreman
This week, US President Joe Biden will host Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yun Seok-young at Camp David. The summit will take place at a crucial moment for the relations of the three countries — now or never. In recent months, the allies have been encouraged to unite by missile threats from the DPRK and deep concern about China's military potential and intentions. But these mutual concerns have existed for decades, and domestic politics — especially Seoul and Tokyo — often prevent the three countries from successfully coordinating a strategy. However, the presence of an internationalist president in the United States, a bold leader in South Korea with foreign policy ambitions beyond the Korean peninsula, and a prime minister in Japan seeking to strengthen an active security policy marks a unique opportunity for trilateral cooperation, which Biden seeks to take advantage of.
The desire to develop trilateral relations reflects the broad approach of the American leader to geostrategic competition: building up the power of the United States by strengthening organizations and alliances.The US-Japan-South Korean relations are strong, as they are built around two high-tech allies of the United States, which have huge defense potential and collectively host hundreds of American military bases and about 80 thousand military personnel on their territory. But because of the historical confrontation, it will not be easy to get Japan and South Korea to come to an agreement. Biden needs to act quickly, because the window of opportunity will not remain open forever.
How it all started
Trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the United States has been developing in fits and starts over the past 30 years, accelerating during periods of increasing North Korean threats and stalling at times of deterioration of relations between South Korea and Japan.
Nevertheless, the three countries have made great progress since the mid-1990s, when they began coordinating their efforts in response to the emergence of a nuclear program in the DPRK. In 1998, it launched the first multi-stage ballistic missile over the territory of Japan. Today, such provocations have become commonplace, but then the whole region shuddered. In the same year, Japan and South Korea took an important step towards smoothing out the sharp corners of their common history. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi held a historic meeting in Tokyo, at which the latter recognized the colonial occupation of Korea by Japan from 1910 to 1945 and issued an official apology. This eased tensions and helped Washington prepare the ground for the development of trilateral relations, as a result of which the first operational meetings within the framework of the Trilateral Oversight Coordination Group were held in 1999.
In 2002, North Korea admitted to having a secret nuclear weapons program. The six-party talks on the denuclearization of the DPRK, which started next year with the participation of China and Russia, have become one of Washington's attempts to strengthen trilateral ties. However, historical enmity and domestic politics continued to affect relations between South Korea and Japan. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak increased tensions when in 2012 he made a controversial visit to a number of islands known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan, which both countries consider their own. And in 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Shinzo Abe) provoked the anger of South Korea and China by visiting a temple where soldiers who died for Japan, including convicted war criminals, are commemorated.
Despite the tensions, North Korea's nuclear tests and diplomatic pressure from the United States helped maintain relations between Seoul and Tokyo at that time. After the third nuclear test in 2013, US President Barack Obama convened a summit with Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye to demonstrate unity in the face of Pyongyang's aggressive stance. Washington also called on Seoul and Tokyo to address the problem of “comfort women” — a euphemism used to refer to Korean women who were forcibly enrolled in military brothels during World War II. Through Obama's efforts, in 2015, Park and Abe signed an agreement stating the desire of both sides to solve the problem “definitively and irrevocably.”
Unfortunately, many of these achievements have come to naught due to changes in South Korea's domestic political trends after the impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2017. His progressive successor Moon Jae-in was critical of the deal with Japan regarding “comfort women” and liquidated the fund that the governments of the two countries had created with Japanese funding to compensate victims and their families. In 2018, the Supreme Court of South Korea ordered several Japanese companies to pay compensation to victims of forced labor in Japan during World War II. This caused a series of new punitive measures on both sides, which led to a deterioration in relations.
In 2021, another provocation by the DPRK, including the test of a long-range cruise missile, again prompted the Biden administration to insist on holding trilateral meetings. There were ten of them during the year, although without the direct presence of the leaders. But the tension still hasn't disappeared. At a meeting organized by the United States in November of the same year, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Takeo Mori objected to participating in a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Jong-gon because of disputes over the Dokdo Islands/Takeshima. As a result, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman appeared in front of reporters in proud solitude. “There are some bilateral differences between Japan and the Republic of Korea that continue to be resolved,” she said.
It's now or never
However, today the stars are converging at the regional and domestic levels, and the Biden administration is seeking to strengthen trilateral cooperation before the offensive impulse fades.
Yun Seok's decision to prioritize South Korean-Japanese ties, despite weak domestic support, coupled with Kishida's pragmatic approach to Korean affairs, helped rapidly restore relations between Tokyo and Seoul. Meanwhile, Biden's liberal internationalist views and desire to strengthen alliances and institutions make him a real champion of trilateral cooperation. Several former Obama administration officials now working for Biden, including Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs at the US National Security Council Kurt Campbell, also have extensive experience in planning and conducting high-level trilateral meetings. Campbell, who acted as the main ringleader of the activation, has many years of experience and close ties in Japan and South Korea.
Despite the progress made over the past year, success is not guaranteed in the long term. Yun Seok-yong's cooperation with Japan was welcomed in Washington, but not in Seoul. The Democratic Party of Korea, which currently controls the National Assembly and is the main rival of the ruling People's Power Party, criticized the deal that the president concluded with Japan on the issue of forced labor during World War II, calling it “the most humiliating moment" in the diplomatic history of South Korea. And although the next presidential election is still four years away, the loss of seats in the parliamentary elections in 2024 or a change of government may again stall trilateral cooperation. As well as Kishida's low approval rating and speculation about the timing of early elections if “Korea fatigue” prevails in Japan again.
In the United States, both Democratic and Republican administrations have maintained trilateral relations. However, US President Donald Trump's rejection of alliances and his administration's relatively detached approach to the deterioration of relations between Japan and South Korea do not guarantee high Biden enthusiasm on the part of the Republican president. Next year, Biden will get bogged down in the presidential campaign and may not be able to hold another trilateral summit before the end of his term. Therefore, it is extremely important that all three leaders approach this moment as seriously as possible before the political situation changes again.
On the agenda
The visit to Camp David is important because it will be the first autonomous meeting of the three leaders to discuss trilateral cooperation. On the agenda, as always, are new measures to strengthen the deterrence of North Korea. Earlier this year, the parties agreed to exchange information on North Korean missile tests in real time, and this week they will probably discuss concrete steps.
The trio can also address potential gaps and misunderstandings related to contingency planning for nuclear accidents, including the newly established bilateral US-South Korean advisory group without Japan's participation. On the other hand, South Korea and the United States will want to learn more about Japan's future counter-strike capabilities, which are described in its National Security Strategy for 2022.
The parties will also try to build on the Phnom Penh statement made last November. Cooperation in the field of economic security, including the sustainability of supply chains, remains a high priority for all three. Despite American approval of the risk-reduction approach to economic relations with China, there are doubts about the Biden administration's will and ability to maintain the focus of defensive economic measures, and even in coordination with allies. These doubts will only increase as the US elections in 2024 approach and the temptation for uncompromising decisions on issues related to China increases. Japan and South Korea want the United States not to forget about these promises: adhere to the principle of “small yard with a high fence”, transfer supply chains to friendly countries and consult with allies.
Disagreements over China are inevitable. Seoul is building relations with Beijing more cautiously than Washington and Tokyo, given the geographical proximity and relatively high economic stakes. More than 40% of its semiconductor exports go to China. Korean firms like Samsung have large production facilities in China, which have recently come under the sights of US-Chinese competition. They were provided with the temporary lifting of American restrictions on the supply of equipment for the production of chips, without which the factories would have to be closed. The first reactions of Japan and South Korea to the US-imposed export controls against China were also different. Japan is more willing than South Korea to tighten export controls to comply with American restrictions.
Finally, Kishida, Yoon Seok-yeol and especially Biden will look for ways to legally organize cooperation. One of the possibilities is to hold an annual summit of the leaders of the three countries or at least formalize the trilateral meetings of national security advisers, which have been held on a temporary basis over the past three years. Also, deputies or working groups on specific issues can be involved in trilateral cooperation: economic security, energy cooperation and climate. Institutionalization will help maintain trilateral cooperation even in the face of domestic political changes and deterioration of Japan-South Korea relations.
I see the goal, I see no obstacles
The organization of planning and management of these trilateral relations by the Biden administration reflects its broad approach to restoring order in the Indo-Pacific region. They believe that a network of alliances and institutions will help expand influence and legitimacy and maintain a rules-based order, despite geostrategic competition with China. Kurt Campbell and Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan anticipated this approach on the pages of Foreign Affairs in 2019, when they wrote that the United States would need to integrate the Chinese strategy into a dense network of relations and organizations in Asia and around the world.
At the same time, strengthening trilateral cooperation risks further escalation in relations with North Korea, which is unlikely to give up nuclear weapons or return to negotiations. Such a way of creating a coalition can also provoke China and Russia, which criticize US efforts to strengthen alliances in Europe and Asia. Over the past seven months, the two countries have conducted joint military exercises in the East China and Japan Seas. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in December that Russia's deployment of a coastal defense missile system on Paramushir, one of the islands of the Kuril Archipelago, was partly a response to American deterrence policy. At the end of July, Shoigu visited Pyongyang and probably requested ammunition for military operations in Ukraine. By deepening trilateral ties and expanding the scope of activities to the entire Indo-Pacific region, Washington may inadvertently bring Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang closer together.
For this reason, it is important for the United States to clearly state the goals of the partnership. Security cooperation and contingency planning are not aimed at developing collective defense commitments, as is the case with NATO. This moment will be important in terms of the region's attitude to closer trilateral cooperation, and voters in Japan and South Korea — to the scale and pace of its expansion.
Andrew Yeo is a senior fellow and chairman of the Korea Foundation at the Brookings Institution, professor of political science at the Catholic University of America.
Mireya Solis is Director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies, Senior Researcher and Head of the Department of Japanese Studies at the Brookings Institution.
Hannah Forman is a researcher at the Center for East Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.
