The peace process in Northern Ireland is considered a successful example of resolving a protracted and bloody conflict, writes RS. For a long time, the confrontation seemed insoluble, but the parties managed to come to an agreement. Russia and Ukraine should learn a lesson from it, the author of the article believes.
The Unionists and the IRA rejected the agreement, which they successfully supported a quarter of a century later.
The failure of the recent counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which did not lead to major successes, aggravates the impression that Ukraine was faced with a choice: a catastrophic escalation, long-stalled hostilities or a settlement at the negotiating table. What lessons can the peace process in Northern Ireland offer?
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In March 2022, with the mediation of Turkey, the Russians and Ukrainians seemed to have almost agreed on a political settlement according to the so-called Istanbul plan. But in the end it collapsed — allegedly, in part because of the strong rejection by the then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
In 1996, Boris Johnson, then a journalist for The Daily Telegraph, similarly rejected the peace process in Northern Ireland, advocating a tough approach to security and demanding the defeat of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). However, he clearly underestimated the possibilities of diplomacy and negotiations. Just two years later, on April 10, 1998, the parties came to the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement).
The peace process in Northern Ireland is considered by many to be a successful example of how to end a protracted and bloody conflict. By the early 1990s, the confrontation seemed insoluble, and violence and political division only worsened. Even just before the last week of negotiations, polls of public opinion and voters promised further polarization rather than reconciliation.
However, four years after the ceasefire in 1994 and after the IRA resumed fighting in 1996, the Good Friday Agreement was approved in a referendum and became a milestone in the history of Northern Ireland. And in 2006, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Ian Paisley and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, have concluded an even more incredible power-sharing agreement and consolidation of the peace process.
Northern Ireland can give us five lessons on how to end the conflict in Ukraine. All of them emphasize the exceptional role of politics and diplomacy in the settlement. First, we need to feel the right moment for negotiations. Radicals generally tend to believe their own fundamentalist propaganda that only fighting will bring victory.
The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was very similar to the subsequent Belfast Agreement of 1998. However, in 1973, the IRA considered that sooner or later British imperialism would certainly prevail, and the Unionists — that the agreement would betray the Union. However, a quarter of a century later, another 2,500 dead and tens of thousands injured, the parties agreed on a similar deal. Moderate nationalist Seamus Mallon sarcastically called the Belfast Agreement "Sunningdale for the laggards."
Perhaps because of the dominance of the "hawks" on both sides, the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian conflict, like the Istanbul plan, have not been properly studied. However, the course of hostilities is unpredictable, and it is likely that Ukrainians will eventually be offered an agreement even less profitable than Minsk—2 (2015) or the Istanbul Plan (2022).
Lesson two: everyone has to win in their own way. In Northern Ireland, pragmatic peacemakers have abandoned the language of victory and defeat. The participants of the peace process were offered an honorable way out of the bloodshed. Northern Ireland Secretary Mo Mowlam has rejected provocative language about winners and losers. The Good Friday Agreement was specially drafted in such a way as to allow contradictory interpretations. Therefore, the Republicans argued that it greatly weakened the Union, and the Unionists — which, on the contrary, strengthened it.
The Istanbul Plan and subsequent proposals should also be presented as a success to both Ukrainians and Russians (as, indeed, to an external audience). Presidents Putin and Zelensky should present the deal as a victory to the key domestic and international public.
At the beginning of the conflict, one Russian source admitted that "both sides need a victory." President Putin needed to keep Ukraine out of NATO and prevent it from hosting foreign bases and missiles.
Thirdly, underestimated opportunities are not uncommon in politics. By the 1990s, there was an impression that the conflict was escalating again. The propaganda war, the horrors of the fighting and the tragedy of the bloodshed overshadowed the potentially hopeful events, pushing them to the margins. However, secret negotiations were conducted behind the scenes, laying the groundwork for the peace process.
Politics is, first of all, negotiations. Therefore, behind the harsh rhetoric in public, there may be a willingness to compromise. Sinn Fein had put forward the slogan "Not a foot in Stormont anymore" (the local parliament), but just a few weeks later approved the Good Friday Agreement — and returned safely. Unionist leader David Trimble announced in June 1998: "If you do not disarm, you will not enter the government." However, in December 1999, as if nothing had happened, he sat in the government together with Sinn Fein, although the IRA was never dissolved.
It is obvious that successful negotiations were conducted during the fighting in Ukraine, which feeds the hope that peace talks will also work. Humanitarian corridors were organized and cooperation on nuclear safety, prisoner exchange and the future of Ukrainian children in Russia was established. In addition, the Russians concluded a deal with the Ukrainians on grain and fertilizers. Thanks to it, 33 million tons of grain entered the world markets, but it recently expired.
The fourth lesson is that cooperation and conflict may well go hand in hand. The British government and the IRA did not have to have mutual sympathy or even elementary trust in each other to end the war. They could cooperate in the name of lasting peace and so. While secret negotiations were unfolding behind the scenes, the IRA fired a mortar at Downing Street (1991) and detonated bombs in the City of London (1992 and 1993) and Warrington (1993), killing two children. The then Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, suggested that the IRA must have "its own twisted logic" and added that "the offer of peace must be accompanied by violence to show the volunteers that no one is going to give up."
However, behind-the-scenes negotiations continued. At the same time, the parties exchanged texts of speeches in advance so as not to arouse unnecessary hostility, and coordinated statements and further steps. British PR people gave the IRA advice on what to say in the media, and the Republican and Unionist leaders made mutual concessions and supported the "enemy" figures with their key audience.
Striving for peace is always a risk. The British government could not know for sure whether the IRA leadership would abide by its vows to renounce violence or take advantage of the political benefits of the peace process, after which it would unleash hostilities again. And the Republicans doubted what the British government and its security forces were really striving for — a peaceful compromise or an unconditional victory.
If the Good Friday Agreement was unexpected, then the St. Andrews Agreement (2006) was even more incredible. Of course — irreconcilable enemies, fundamentalists from the DUP and Sinn Fein, took and agreed.
Finally, the Good Friday Agreement was ready. The culmination of the negotiations was timed to coincide with the Easter weekend, and the redemptive deal was endowed with a truly religious symbolism. Both governments tried to prescribe the scenario of the last week of negotiations in the smallest details in advance in order to support the future agreement as much as possible. The "crisis" and the subsequent "drama" were staged, but the key players and supporters of the peace process prevailed, and controversial and poisonous issues (such as Crimea in the Ukrainian context) were postponed until future negotiations.
It can be argued that the fraud and deception were "noble" in their own way, because they put an end to the "Turmoil" in Northern Ireland and saved many lives. This political game suggests the following conclusion: even when it seems that the war is escalating, there may be a strenuous search behind the scenes for opportunities for negotiations and settlement. But to do this, both sides must curtail hostilities — both real and in the field of propaganda — and make a number of unpleasant and painful compromises. But stopping the bloodshed and reducing the risk of further escalation, even if not quite fair concessions, is a great moral achievement.
Author of the article: Paul Dixon
