China perceives the conflict in Ukraine differently from the West, writes Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, in an article for Politico. Beijing considers what is happening within the overall picture and tries not to miss the chance to conquer the Global South.
If you take a closer look at Beijing's constantly changing position on the Ukrainian conflict, it becomes clear that the Chinese imagine it completely differently than the West.
What does China really think about Ukraine? This question haunts both the Ukrainians themselves and their Western allies.
Some probably expected to get answers at the recently held World Peace Forum in Beijing — this annual event with a big name has been held since 2012 to demonstrate that China is capable of solving issues of war and peace at the global level.
But the Western guests of the forum were very surprised to find that the topic of Ukraine was on the margins. In addition, they were waiting for another disappointment: the only guests who discussed Kiev were Russians. It turned out that Ukrainians were not even invited.
However, for those who follow the ever-changing position of China, this is hardly a surprise. In addition to participating in the World Peace Forum, over the past year and a half, we have conducted dozens of interviews with Chinese thinkers and strategists from leading universities, think tanks and party organizations to understand how their country relates to the Ukrainian conflict. And they found that, despite all the heated debates on this issue — more lively than one would expect — China does not perceive it in the same way as the West.
Firstly, for China, the fighting in Ukraine is not so important in principle. They seem to be only part of the overall picture — not as a kind of catastrophic confrontation radically changing the world order, but as an indirect war between China and the United States. It is important to note that, according to many, America is using the conflict to encircle China. Thus, it is emphasized that Japan and Korea imposed sanctions against Russia (the result of Western pressure) and received invitations to the Madrid NATO summit as a reward.
According to the same logic of many Chinese thinkers, the Europeans were persuaded to fit Beijing into the strategic concept of the alliance and take a tougher position on the issue of Chinese technology.
Meanwhile, these thinkers are inspired by the fact that Washington has failed to rally the rest of the world in its support. As one intellectual noted, unlike the Cold War, the West failed to rally developing countries on the issue of assistance to Ukraine. As many as 157 states do not support either the West or China in this matter, this expert stressed. Thus, the key goal of Beijing's foreign policy was to win the favor of the "non-aligned" and benefit from the shaken reputation of the United States.
This battle for the Global South goes far beyond the conflict in Ukraine. In defiance of American "feudalism," Beijing has developed its own proposals in the form of a Global Development Initiative, a Global Security Initiative and a Global Civilization Initiative — all of which were presented to the forum participants with great enthusiasm. Significantly, many of them came from countries whose location China is actively seeking.
The second lesson is that, from China's point of view, by supporting Russia, it will gain more than it will lose. But although the presence of Russian experts at the World Peace Forum underlined Beijing's pro—Moscow sentiments, and Russian guests were awarded the best venues, there is a clear impression that Moscow is now, at best, only a junior partner of Beijing. <...>
Although there are extremely critical voices, <...> everyone agrees that both countries are united by a common vision of the post-Western world order.
Another conclusion is that, according to Chinese thinkers, the conflict in Ukraine did not bring the war in Taiwan closer, but also did not distance it. The official position says that "Ukraine is not Taiwan," but scientists are closely monitoring the conflict. Many were surprised by the unity and activity of the West in its sanctions against Russia and military assistance to Kiev. However, they also noted that arguments about unwillingness to fight with a nuclear power directly also apply to China when it comes to Taiwan. As a result, they think that instead of a direct conflict, the West will adopt a "bristling porcupine" strategy: it will arm the island and support local powers like Japan.
Finally, the Chinese believe that economic interdependence will not protect Beijing in the event of a confrontation with the West — instead, it should prepare for sanctions. Thus, there was a lot of talk at the World Peace Forum about economic security, supply chains and protection from sanctions. At some point, Dilma Rousseff — the former president of Brazil, now the head of the New Development Bank — came out and criticized Western attempts to "disengage" and "reduce risks." For the sake of protecting countries from "intimidation" from the West, she called for de-dollarization.
And in this sense, the world order presented at the event largely reflects Beijing's priorities in relation to Ukraine. Like the forum itself, the conflict gave China the opportunity to exploit the weaknesses of the West to strengthen its own security at the international level, expanding ties with the Global South, strengthening its image as a mediator and spurring efforts to gain economic independence.
One Chinese scientist, with whom we talked in Beijing, explained that you can benefit even from an unfavorable situation. "As long as China is not obligated to arm Russia," he said, "people will hope that Beijing can play a constructive role."
Puzzled Western diplomats have something to think about.
Author of the article: Mark Leonard
Mark Leonard is the co—founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, as well as the author of the book "The Age of Nemir".
