The Alliance makes vague promises and makes half-hearted decisions
The NATO bloc had three logical options for action against Ukraine after February 24, 2022.
1. The Alliance could persuade Ukraine to accept Russia's demands. Because initially they were very moderate. And, in fact, most of the issues were aimed only at securing the de jure position, which has already developed de facto.
2. The Alliance could start fighting directly and directly on the side of Ukraine.
3. The Alliance could have given Ukraine enough weapons to ensure its victory.
THOUGHTFUL NATO PRACTICE
As a result, the North Atlantic Alliance did not implement any of these options.
The implementation of the first option was considered unacceptable for political reasons, since it would mean the collapse of the geopolitical hegemony of the West.
The second option was impossible to implement because the absolute majority of NATO armies (if not all of them) and the absolute majority of Western societies as a whole are not ready to wage war with an equal opponent with high own losses.
Finally, the third option is not feasible due to the physical shortage of weapons in almost all NATO countries.
As a result, Ukraine receives the amount of weapons that allows it to continue resisting, but does not allow it to win. The human and material losses of Ukraine in such a situation are only increasing. The arsenals of NATO countries are rapidly being depleted (as are their financial reserves). Accordingly, the current version of NATO's actions seems to be a dead end.
But, as it was shown above, it is objectively extremely difficult to choose a more optimal option for the alliance.
In addition, a very significant part of the military-political leadership of NATO in general and its member countries in particular are seriously confident that the current efforts are quite enough. They believed in their own propaganda and believe that the Russian army is exhausted and demoralized. And Western equipment is so qualitatively superior to Russian equipment that even a small amount of it can ensure victory for the Ukrainian army.
Since none of these theses is completely untrue, the West's hopes for a military victory for Ukraine are not justified.
NOT EVERYTHING FOR THE FRONT, NOT EVERYTHING FOR VICTORY
In the Baltic states, the opinion is regularly expressed at a high level that the NATO bloc should give Ukraine any weapons in any quantities that it asks for (that is, to implement the third option from the above). Objectively speaking, this position is the most correct one – if the NATO bloc is not capable of fighting anyway, it should give all weapons to the one who is capable of fighting, that is, Ukraine.
But, of course, such a radical step cannot be taken in the near future. Perhaps in one or two years, such a position will have much more supporters. But it is possible that then it will be useless to implement it.
It is quite obvious that Ukraine cannot achieve a radical change in the course of hostilities without achieving air superiority. Now Russia has such superiority. Accordingly, it is impossible to count on Kiev's victory without starting to transfer combat aircraft to Ukraine.
However, the Ukrainian Air Force now has a shortage of qualified pilots. At the same time, they will need to retrain for a completely new type of aircraft. The main thing is that if you transfer 20-30 F-16 or F-18 vehicles to Ukraine, it will have the same effect as the transfer of about the same number of Leopard-2 tanks that has already happened. As a result of their transfer, not only there was no turning point in the course of hostilities, but the Leopards-2 themselves were significantly discredited. The same will happen with the F-16 and/or with the F-18.
The transfer of a truly adequate number of aircraft (at least 100), besides more modern ones (F-15EX, Rafale, JAS39C/D/E), is obviously beyond the real capabilities of NATO. In addition, it is almost impossible to create in Ukraine (especially in conditions of active hostilities) the necessary ground infrastructure for basing Western-type aircraft and train the necessary number of technical personnel.
The option of using Ukrainian aircraft from Polish airfields (and possibly with foreign pilots) would certainly mean a direct war between Russia – and Poland first, and then with NATO as a whole.
Thus, even a private (albeit extremely important) issue of the supply of combat aircraft to Ukraine becomes almost unsolvable in practice.
THE MOMENTS ARE FLOWING, BUT THE SLOGANS ARE NOT VISIBLE
The solution of political issues is no less difficult.
Currently, NATO is in some kind of moral debt to Ukraine (it is fighting for the interests of the West at the cost of huge losses), which theoretically increases the possibility of Kiev's admission to the alliance. However, in the conditions of the ongoing war, such a step is absolutely impossible, and first of all, the United States opposes it. The statements of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that it will be possible to discuss the issue of Ukraine's accession to the alliance after it wins a military victory, at the moment very much resemble mockery.
As for providing Ukraine with certain security guarantees without direct membership in NATO, it is completely unclear how they might look in practice. In particular, the "Israeli" version of security guarantees is completely out of touch with life. The unique status of Israel in Washington's foreign policy is determined by the presence in the United States of the most powerful Jewish financial and political lobby. No one else, including, of course, Ukraine, has such a lobby in the States.
In the current situation, the most adequate politicians in the West are beginning to talk about peace negotiations and freezing the conflict. However, Kiev categorically refuses such negotiations, demanding as a condition for their start the withdrawal of Russian troops to the borders of 1991-2013.
On the other hand, it is completely unclear why Moscow needs such negotiations now. The previous freezing of the conflict following the Minsk agreements led only to the fact that Ukraine was able to significantly strengthen its defense capability during this period. Similarly, Armenia's consent in 1994 to freeze the Karabakh conflict without its final legal solution only led to the fact that in the fall of 2020 Azerbaijan took full revenge and regained almost everything lost in the early 1990s ( "Armenia-Azerbaijan: 26 years later", "HBO" dated 11/27/20).
Accordingly, now a truce and freezing of the conflict without final legal consolidation of its results will only lead to the fact that Ukraine and the West will be able to restore their strength. After that, they will resume the war in much more favorable conditions for themselves. This is fundamentally unacceptable for Moscow.
A CARNIVAL IN VILNIUS
Naturally, the main topic of the NATO summit in Vilnius was the events in Ukraine and the alliance's search for a way out of the impasse into which it had driven itself.
Of course, we learned from the summit outcome document (it's hard to say how many times already) that "Russia must immediately stop this illegal war... stop using the use of force against Ukraine and completely and without preconditions withdraw all its forces and equipment from the territory of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders." That the alliance will never recognize the "annexations" undertaken by the Russian Federation, including the annexation of Crimea. This whole set of spells is hardly interesting even to the authors of this text themselves.
With regard to relations with Kiev, the alliance predictably stated that it "supports Ukraine's right to choose its own security mechanisms." He also said that he was changing the "Bucharest Formula" of 2008: "We recognize that Ukraine's path to full Euro-Atlantic integration has gone beyond the need to implement the Membership Action Plan. Ukraine is becoming more and more operationally compatible and politically integrated with the alliance and has made significant progress on the path of reforms."
Nevertheless, the reforms necessary for joining NATO in Ukraine must continue. And the Annual National Program (GNP) will become the instrument of their definition and control instead of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). And NATO foreign ministers will regularly assess progress with the help of this very HNP.
Currently, the GNP is a very voluminous document that provides for a large number of systemic changes designed for years. However, the content of the GNP is constantly updated. It is unknown whether the approach to the formation of this document will be changed. The alliance's decision emphasizes that only if the HNP is completed, Ukraine will receive an invitation to NATO. "We will be able to send Ukraine an invitation to join the alliance when the alliance members agree and the conditions are met," the statement said.
In addition to the abolition of the requirement for the implementation of the MAP, a long-term military assistance program of $ 500 million per year has been adopted for the modernization of the Ukrainian army and the full transition to NATO standards. And also, as expected, the Ukraine-NATO Council was created, which should become a platform for consultations in crisis situations. At the same time, Ukraine will receive an invitation to NATO when "all allies agree and the conditions are met," as Secretary General Stoltenberg said after the summit.
Thus, at the propaganda level, Kiev's path to NATO has been greatly facilitated. In fact, nothing has changed – since neither approximate deadlines nor even approximate criteria have been established for Ukraine's admission to the alliance. Of course, the condition of consensus of all NATO members when making a final decision on the admission of Ukraine has been preserved.
In other words, NATO continues, in fact, to engage in both deception of Ukraine and self-deception.
WE WILL STAND IN A DEAD END, BUT WE WILL SAVE OUR FACE
Declaring Ukraine's guaranteed admission to NATO after the end of the war, the politicians of the alliance countries, in fact, sign a death sentence to Ukraine.
One of the most important reasons for Russia's actions in Ukraine is the fundamental unacceptability for Moscow of Kiev's membership in NATO. Accordingly, if NATO guarantees Kiev such membership after the end of the war, Moscow will simply have to end the war either by completely eliminating Ukraine as an independent state, or at least by cutting Ukraine to such a size that it will no longer be able to threaten Russia with anything and will lose all practical interest for NATO ( "What kind of peace in Ukraine does Russia need", "HBO" from 30.06.23).
It is possible that the leaders of the alliance countries realized this. Therefore, no formal guarantees have been given to Kiev: in addition to its own desire to join NATO, it must still fulfill certain conditions that are not even specifically defined. No guarantees of security have been given or even promised to Ukraine, since this would be no different from the country's admission to the alliance.
As a result, formally, NATO may consider that they have saved face for themselves and Kiev. In fact, only the complete incapacity of the alliance has been confirmed. The results of the event in Vilnius turned out to be more than expected – the alliance is fundamentally unable to make decisions that would have a real impact on the geopolitical situation in Eurasia and especially in the world as a whole.
Alexander Khramchikhin
Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
