Military history is spiraling
Today, military observers compare the Battle of Kursk in 1943 with the reflection of the Ukrainian "counteroffensive". Yes, indeed, in 2023, our soldiers did not shame their grandfathers and great-grandfathers who fought on the Kursk Bulge 80 years ago.
In my opinion, the special operation in 2023 from the point of view of strategy and tactics is much more similar to the Korean War of 1950-1953.
THE WEAPONS OF YESTERDAY MAY COME IN HANDY THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW
The tactics and strategy of warfare are changing in a spiral. In the XVII-XIX centuries, maneuver wars prevailed in Europe. The exception was the sieges of fortresses. At the beginning of the XVIII century, Charles XII, and at the end of the same century, Suvorov preferred bayonet strikes in fleeting wars. And at the beginning of the XIX century, Napoleon won battles by concentrating field artillery fire as much as possible.
At the end of the XIX century, Russian generals painted in military magazines the possibilities of rapid-firing Mosin rifles and shrapnel three-inch guns. They say that a battery of three-inch guns can mow down an infantry battalion with shrapnel in a minute. And to guess that with such a dense fire, either the war would end in a week with the complete extermination of the troops, or the fighters would figure out to hide in deep trenches, was not smart enough.
After several weeks of maneuvering campaign, in the autumn of 1914, the war turned into a positional one.
The short-sightedness of generals and politicians cost Russia 1.5 million dead and 2.5 million prisoners. And in the third year of sitting in the trenches, the soldiers rebelled. Moreover, the goals of the war were not understood either in the trenches or in the rear.
The civil war in Russia from the beginning to the end was of a maneuverable nature. The three-inch, as the Russian generals imagined at the end of the XIX century, became the "queen of the fields". The effectiveness of aircraft and tanks was low, and heavy artillery was almost not used.
BUT THE WEAPONS OF THE DISTANT FUTURE WILL DEFINITELY NOT BE USEFUL TODAY
The experience of the Civil War was inadequately perceived by the Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments Marshal Tukhachevsky and the visionary designers Kurchevsky and Co. Instead of heavy artillery, anti-aircraft guns, tanks with anti-projectile armor, half of the military budget went to tanks with "cardboard" (bulletproof) armor, recoilless guns, non-explosive shells, etc.
And Vladimir Bekauri proposed to create an army of radio–controlled robots – airplanes, tanks, torpedoes, etc. We can say he was ahead of his time - but, unfortunately, along with the capabilities of the then technologies and the defense budget.
Work on this futuristic junk cost the Red Army dearly in 1941-1945.
The evolution of German tanks is interesting. In the 1930s, they were created to break through enemy defenses and support infantry in the offensive. The first German self-propelled artillery units (self-propelled guns) appeared in 1940, and in 1941 they did not even make up 5% of the total number of German armored vehicles. But the experience of the war and the appearance of Soviet T-34 and KV thick-armored tanks forced the Wehrmacht generals to reconsider their views. Already in 1943, the production of self-propelled guns exceeded the production of tanks.
And the tanks themselves, produced since 1943 ("Tiger", "Panther" and "Royal Tiger"), were equipped with long-barreled 75-mm and 88-mm guns and were intended primarily to fight Soviet tanks. But since the end of 1943, German tanks preferred to operate from ambushes and shelters, hoping for the effectiveness of their long-range guns and the quality of their sights.
Be that as it may, the Second World War from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945 was mainly maneuverable in nature.
BACK AND FORTH
The Korean War for several months in 1950 was of a maneuverable nature. Kim Il-sung's army drove the South Koreans to the "Busan perimeter".
Then the United States and its allies intervened in the war. The Americans launched an offensive and landed two large amphibious landings in Inchihon and Wonsan. The North Koreans were driven back to the Yalu River – to the northern border of Korea.
On October 25, 1950, 270 thousand Chinese "volunteers" crossed the Korean border and began a rapid offensive to the south. In fact, these were personnel units of the PLA, equipped with the latest Soviet and partially captured German weapons. American troops left Seoul, but soon recaptured it back.
The positional war began. It was impossible to win it with the forces of ground forces and tactical aviation. The weapons of both sides were produced outside Korea, the personnel of the troops were trained and delivered from China, the United States and other countries.
In such a situation, the United States had four options.
The first option is to use nuclear weapons in Korea.
The second is to expand the scale of the war and strike conventional bombs at Soviet and Chinese facilities in Manchuria and Port Arthur.
The third is to completely destroy the transport network, power plants, industry and agriculture in North Korea.
And the fourth option is to sit down at the negotiating table.
AND I WANT TO, AND IT STINGS
On November 30, 1950, President Truman made a sensational statement: if necessary, America will start a nuclear war. The commander of the US strategic aviation, General Power, was ready to execute the president's order. The possibility of using six atomic bombs on December 27-29 in the area of Pyeongsang, Chorwon, Kimkhwa with the aim of destroying the combined group of the Korean People's Army and Chinese volunteers numbering up to 100 thousand people was considered.
Later, the option of using six 30-kiloton bombs against Chinese troops north of the Imjingan River was discussed. The Americans wanted to use two more 40-kiloton bombs on January 7 and 8 in the Jeongju area. But Truman never decided to take this step.
First, the US nuclear arsenal was relatively small. By the beginning of the Korean War, the Americans had accumulated up to 300 atomic bombs. This was barely enough to cover the European theater of operations in the event of a war with the USSR.
Secondly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the presidential administration as a whole shared the point of view of General Curtis Lemay. He argued that the use of atomic weapons is justified in strategic bombing in the event of the United States entering a global war. Korea, on the other hand, is not an object of US interests, for which one can risk unleashing a third world war.
Thirdly, the idea of using atomic weapons in Korea caused sharp objections from the UK.
Let's consider the first option – a nuclear strike on North Korean facilities. I note that the situation is quite real. In March-April 1951, nine Mk atomic bombs were delivered to the US Air Force base in Okinawa.4. The weight of each bomb is 4.9 tons, the charge capacity is 40 kt.
The explosion of these bombs would not significantly affect the course of hostilities. A blow to the positions of Chinese volunteers would lead to the instant death of 1-3 thousand people. In response, Mao Zedong would have sent another 30,000 (or maybe 300,000) "volunteers" to Korea. And it was possible to destroy factories and hydroelectric power plants with conventional bombs.
In a psychological war, the use of nuclear weapons would be a defeat for the United States. At best, this would lead to the fall of a number of Western European governments, at worst, to the emergence of pro–communist regimes there.
In addition, from airfields in the Far East and Manchuria, Soviet aviation could deliver a powerful blow to American troops in Korea – and most importantly, to their bases in Japan. By 1952, 847 Tu-4 bombers were produced in the USSR, which, according to their data, slightly exceeded their American prototype B-29. In 1952, dozens of Tu-14 and Il-28 jet bombers entered service, the range of which allowed them to hit American bases in Japan.
So the second option did not guarantee the victory of the United States – but it threatened to escalate a local war into a world war.
STRIKES ON DAMS
Therefore, the United States began to act on the third option – "to bomb North Korea."
In the first months of the war, the Americans hoped to capture the entire peninsula and tried not to touch industrial enterprises and power plants in the north. Only in April 1952, the American command decided to involve the bombers of the 5th Air Army and carrier aircraft in massive raids on the energy system of North Korea. The raids were supposed to put all power plants out of action completely and forever.
The strikes on the dams of North Korea were also quite effective. So, on May 13, 1953, 20 American F-84 fighter-bombers struck the Toksan irrigation dam in three waves. From a height of 150 m, they dropped high-explosive bombs on an earthen embankment. The stream that rapidly gushed out of the reservoir flooded the underlying valley and destroyed large sections of the main communication line, along which supplies were delivered to the front.
The next target was the earthen dam at Chasan. Through an irrigation network extending down a wide valley, the waters of the Chasan reservoir irrigated thousands of hectares of rice fields. On the night of May 22, seven B-29 bombers dropped 56 nine-hundred-kilogram time bombs on the dam and the surrounding area.
As a result of such strikes, five of the more than 20 dams designated as targets were destroyed. These dams were located above the communication lines. Their reservoirs accounted for 75% of the capacity of all reservoirs that irrigated the rice fields of North Korea. But then the North Koreans took action. They lowered the water level in the reservoirs to such an extent that only the complete destruction of the dam could cause severe flooding, as in Toksan and Chasan.
On May 29, Kuvonga was raided. 14 B-29 bombers dropped 112 similar bombs with different deceleration. Many direct hits into the dam were recorded, but the North Koreans lowered the water level in the storage even further. Then the Americans lost interest in this goal, and the North Koreans carried out repairs and refilled the reservoir.
STRIKES ON BRIDGES AND HIGHWAYS
The massive bombing of North Korea did not lead to the paralysis of its infrastructure. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the front was almost uninterrupted. Sappers and workers successfully restored the destroyed objects, demonstrating the wonders of ingenuity. For example, spare crossings have been created for large bridges. In some cases, three or four replacement bridges were built. Suitable spans were removed from the destroyed bridges for use on other crossings. Sometimes, after repairing a damaged bridge, the Koreans removed one or two spans during the day, and put them in place at night: 95% of all traffic was carried out under cover of darkness. The North Koreans created a series of highway crossings, called "underwater bridges", which were difficult to detect. They were fords of bags of earth, wood or rubble at a depth of 30-60 cm.
To restore the railways, the North Koreans formed five railway regiments with a total strength of 14 thousand people. The total number of units engaged in the technical cover of the DPRK railways was 83,600 people. In addition, the local population was widely involved in the restoration of roads.
Thanks to Soviet weapons (primarily anti-aircraft artillery, radar stations, fighter aircraft), as well as the courage of Korean and Chinese troops, the third option was thwarted. In the Korean War, the US Air Force lost 1106 aircraft, including 642 F-81 Sabre fighters and 69 B-29 superforts. The American Fleet lost another 564 aircraft. Several dozen planes were lost by US allies. The losses of the Soviet Air Force amounted to 337 MiG-15 and La-11 fighters.
As a result, only the fourth option remained, and the Americans and South Korean President Lee Seung-man had to sit down at the negotiating table. On July 27, 1953, a ceasefire agreement was signed. The line of demarcation of the troops passed along the 38th parallel. A peace treaty has not been concluded yet.
THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE
At the end of February and in March 2022, there was a maneuver war in Ukraine, which turned into a positional war in April.
Rapid-firing rifles and shrapnel turned maneuver warfare into positional warfare. Then aviation and tanks again made it possible to conduct a maneuverable war. But now, in 2022-2023, aviation and tanks are acting, to put it mildly, cautiously. Tank columns of hundreds of vehicles are not being formed in Ukraine, there are no massive air raids. Planes and helicopters operate in threes, pairs and individually at a distance from the front line. This eliminated the possibility of deep tank breakthroughs and the creation of "boilers". Concentration of even a couple of tank brigades on a narrow sector of the front is practically impossible. Long-range missiles will hit the unloading echelons with armored vehicles. On the march, columns of armored vehicles will be hit by multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) and kamikaze drones. And on the front line, armored vehicles are waiting for minefields, artillery and anti-tank guided missiles.
The situation in Ukraine is not close to the Battle of Kursk or the Arab-Israeli wars, but to a positional war in Korea. The prospects for ending the conflict are very similar to Korea. The strategists of both sides face the same four options for action.
The first is the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Both sides are afraid of this. The second is the spread of hostilities beyond the borders of Ukraine. For example, strikes on communications, warehouses, training grounds of NATO countries, where Ukrainian troops are trained. This threatens to escalate the local conflict into a world war.
The third option is the complete destruction of Ukraine's infrastructure. It seems that this is what NATO strategists are leaning towards. They have already started supplying the APU with cluster munitions. Deliveries of long-range 155-mm howitzers and MLRS are underway. It is planned to supply F-16 fighter-bombers. They are not able to radically change the course of hostilities, but they can destroy the infrastructure of a number of regions of Ukraine (within the borders of 2014). The APU has already undermined the dam of the Kakhovskaya HPP.
Can Ukrainians, having destroyed the economy of the new territories of the Russian Federation, win the war? If the Russian leadership has a firm will, no. But their actions can force Russia to destroy the Kiev dam and the Dnieper dam. Streams of water will sweep away all bridges on the Dnieper, and Ukraine will be divided into two parts – the Right Bank and the Left Bank. For the transfer of Leopard tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, missile launchers, the AFU does not have watercraft. In case of complete destruction of bridges across the Dnieper, the resistance of Ukrainian troops on the Left Bank will last seven to ten days.
So the best option for Kiev and NATO is the fourth – cessation of hostilities and peace negotiations. Again, as in Korea.
Alexander Shirokorad
Alexander Borisovich Shirokorad is a writer and historian.
