Despite all the promises, Europe has not seriously taken up the protection of its eastern borders, writes Foreign Affairs. Due to a number of historical and political reasons, the west of the continent is in no hurry to defend the east, which, according to the author of the article, may affect the entire NATO.
To contain Russia, something more is needed than just promises.
More than a year after the start of the largest land-based military conflict since 1945, Europe has not yet seriously taken up the protection of its eastern borders. Western European allies are still not making enough efforts to ensure the security of the eastern territories that joined NATO almost two decades ago.
At first, this statement may seem unexpected. Over the past few months, there have been constant reports that Europe is finally beginning to realize the threat from Russia. At the Madrid summit last summer, NATO unveiled plans to strengthen its defense in the east, including by almost tenfold increasing the number of high-alert forces and expanding multinational combat groups stationed in Poland and the Baltic States to brigade formations (an increase from about 1,500 to 5,000 troops in each country).
But a year later, these promises remained unfulfilled. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Germany's military presence in the east of NATO has increased from 653 to 2,225 troops, France — from 300 to 969, and the Netherlands — from 270 to 595. (Italy, meanwhile, has "increased" its military presence in the specified region from 350 to 385 people). In general, these figures may seem impressive, if we do not take into account that over the same period the United States increased its military presence in Eastern Europe from five thousand to 24 thousand troops. But the eastern members of NATO have undertaken a historic increase in the number of their armed forces, thanks to which Poland will soon have more tanks than the whole of Western Europe combined, and Ukraine currently holds almost every able-bodied man and many women under arms.
The disparity of these war efforts is partly a byproduct of the well-documented disparity in the capabilities of Western European countries. The reasons for this situation lie deep, its roots go back to a mixture of painful history, various ideas about threats and old taboos about enmity with Russia in its former sphere of influence. From the very beginning, Western Europe was unenthusiastic about defending the territory of Eastern countries compared to the level of determination with which it defended West Germany during the Cold War. As a result, the eastern allies of NATO lost all the advantages of joining the alliance in the form of significant deployment of conventional weapons on their territory and participation in the program of joint use of nuclear weapons, which were provided to the "old" members.
The Russian military operation in Ukraine was supposed to change that. Nevertheless, although this military conflict has done a lot to ensure that Western Europe takes its defense seriously, NATO is still bound by a large number of old restrictions that it created itself. Rethinking these taboos is now more relevant than ever, as Russian ambitions are being more openly exposed, and new members are joining NATO - Finland today, Sweden tomorrow, and perhaps, eventually, Ukraine. Ensuring the security of this expanded eastern arm of the alliance depends on whether the largest European states take responsibility outside their "comfort zone". If this time the allies can correctly formulate a security formula, it will benefit not only for deterrence in Europe, but also in the Indo-Pacific region.
Reasons for restraint
Western Europe's concern about NATO's east has deep roots. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, there was a fear in Western European capitals that the alliance's too decisive advance on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact Organization would provoke hostility from Russia. France was particularly cold towards NATO expansion, and Germany advocated the addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Treaty (Slovakia joined later), but shared a desire to avoid antagonism with Russia.
In 1997, mainly because of these concerns, the alliance entered into negotiations on the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Contrary to Moscow's claims, this document did not mean a rejection of the expansion of the bloc. What NATO has really done is promise to act cautiously in the east. The alliance said that "in the current and foreseeable security environment," it will focus on "strengthening potential, rather than additional permanent deployment of significant combat forces." NATO has agreed to the so—called three "no's" - "no intentions, plans and reasons" to deploy nuclear weapons in the eastern territories.
It is not difficult to understand what the politicians were thinking at that time: they wanted to create a space for interaction with Russia even when NATO was moving east. But despite the fact that the security situation has changed dramatically, the bloc continues to operate according to the old formula. The first major push came when Russia entered Ukraine in 2014. After that, NATO responded by forming an Expanded Forward Presence (EFP) — four multinational combat groups scattered across Poland and the Baltic states — and new high-readiness forces. But even then there was still hesitation regarding the violation of the Fundamental Act. The total number of NATO troops in these four groups (initially about 3,000) remained symbolic. And although the occupation of Crimea showed how suddenly Russia can strike, the alliance still focused only on the "strengthening potential" even after the crisis broke out.
Promises on paper
A similar process played out with the beginning of the military conflict in Ukraine. NATO has stepped up and made a number of beneficial actions for itself: It initiated the inclusion of Finland and Sweden as future members, expanded the total number and geographical coverage of the EFP program, and also committed to renew and increase the high–readiness forces from 40,000 to 300,000 people - this should also be accompanied by a new model of the layout of the armed forces and new regional defense responsibilities. But most of this plan is still an "exercise on paper." A year and a half after the start of the Ukrainian conflict, the situation on the eastern flank of NATO is not much different from what it was before. All the changes that took place were organized by the United States, which increased its high-readiness forces in Eastern Europe and led the modernization of its own EFP combat group in Poland.
The reaction of other Western allies was much slower. Take Germany. On the eve of the Madrid summit, the Lithuanian President and the German Chancellor issued a joint communique confirming Berlin's plans to deploy its brigade in Lithuania. But then she seems to have reneged on her promise. The German defense minister at one point said that the timing and scale of any increase in the country's military presence in Eastern Europe "depends on NATO" and that Germany plans to "remain flexible on this issue." This caused horror in Vilnius. To Berlin's credit, he recently confirmed his intention to fulfill the promise, but the timing remains unclear.
Or take France. A few months after the Madrid summit, Paris sent a battalion of its best tanks and an air defense system to Romania, bringing its total military presence in the country to about 750 troops. But a few days after that, reports began to appear that the deployment was hindered by the inadequate infrastructure of the host country. As with Germany in Lithuania, there is no indication when France plans to do more in Romania.
In both cases, the immediate obstacle is the infrastructure, which is less developed on the eastern flank of NATO than in Western Europe. The potential of the alliance members in question – Germany and France – is also limited by a number of well-known reasons: recent reports indicate that the German army, in particular, is unable to deploy its significant combat forces anywhere, even literally in the neighborhood of Germany.
But the deeper problem remains political will. Of course, Western European allies verbally support the goal of strengthening the eastern defense. For example, the recently published German National Security Strategy states that Berlin "will make purposeful efforts to expand its military presence on the territory of the Allies and deploy it on a more permanent basis." Similarly, the French government has recently fought quite successfully for a significant increase in defense spending, based on the need to do more to protect Europe.
Nevertheless, behind the scenes, major Western capitals insist that their new eastern commitments remain "within reasonable limits." The individual reasons for this approach vary. In the case of Germany, for example, there is an understandable psychological aversion to the deployment of military force in Eastern Europe, rooted in the history of the twentieth century. In addition, we should not forget about the constitutional restrictions that complicate bilateral agreements, such as those that the United States experienced in Poland.
Eastern misconceptions
However, the main problem remains the discrepancy in the perception of threats. Western Europeans still do not feel a high degree of danger coming from Russia. In Germany, mobilizing public support to increase defense spending on a permanent basis and persuading young people to enlist in the Baltic States is a difficult political problem. And although France does not have a similar military-historical sensitivity, the most important alleged threat there still comes from the Sahel region in Africa, and not from the Suwalki Corridor (the land corridor connecting the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad with Russia proper, and separating the Baltic states from Poland).
The idea of a possible return to a political dialogue with Russia also remains much more attractive in Western Europe than in countries located near the conflict. Paradoxically, Moscow's military failures in Ukraine have reinforced this stereotype of thinking: why bother and spend money to strengthen NATO's defense in the east, if the Ukrainians have taken care of it, and Russia will remain weak in the near future?
None of the above denies the assistance that Western European allies are providing to Kiev, and does not downplay the restrictions that prevent them from doing more in this regard. Rather, the fact is that behind the newspaper headlines about increasing military budgets and creating new "paper brigades" remains the harsh reality of a virtually "two-tier" alliance in which the United States and Eastern members bear the brunt of the risk. At the same time, the latter do not receive the same privilege in the form of a large-scale permanent US military presence that every country that joined NATO before 1997 received.
And this is a big problem for two reasons. First, Ukraine's experience shows that in a future war with Russia, NATO's current deep-echelon defense system, which relies on a combination of a moderate forward presence and future reinforcements, may not save the alliance. It will be difficult to return the occupied territory. Recognizing this fact, NATO has adopted a strategy of deterrence by denial aimed at countering aggression where it occurs, or, as Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put it, at protecting "every square inch" of the bloc's territory. But such a strategy only works if the alliance has a substantial forward presence to fight the conqueror from the very beginning. Secondly, a future crisis on the eastern flank of Europe may occur at a time when the United States is occupied by Asia. According to recent estimates, Russia can recover its losses in the Ukrainian conflict and restore the armed forces in just two years. In a two-front scenario, NATO will still be able to rely on the US armed forces, but it will inevitably have to rely on its conventional armed forces in Europe more than it does now.
Wake up
The military conflict in Ukraine represents a rare and short-lived window to eliminate the geographical imbalance of risks in NATO. Washington and its like-minded allies should use this moment with maximum efficiency to convince the alliance to lift the voluntary restrictions that accompanied the post-Cold War expansions.
First, it's time to repeal the Russia–NATO Founding Act. Although it is obvious that this document has lost its significance, it continues to overshadow internal negotiations on strengthening the eastern flank. A good starting point would be to ensure that at the summit to be held next week in Vilnius, the alliance stated that, in the opinion of its members, the "current and foreseeable" conditions of 1997 are a thing of the past. NATO should also work to reach a consensus on the cancellation of the "self-binding" commitments agreed on the eve of the adoption of the Founding Act, which limited the deployment of military groups in the eastern direction to the level of rotating brigades. The whole point of this promise was to pave the way for legally binding restrictions in the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces and Armaments in Europe, which were never implemented. The lifting of these restrictions will allow NATO to move to a larger and permanent military deployment in the east in the coming years.
In addition, the United States should encourage the European Union to devote more resources to improving Eastern European infrastructure. Last year, Brussels finally "gutted" the proposed budget for such projects. Building on its successful Ramstein Vostok infrastructure partnership with Warsaw, Washington should look for ways to combine US and EU projects. To do this, it is possible, for example, to provide appropriate funds for key projects and involve representatives of Western European allies in their Polish operations. The Biden administration should also withdraw its objections to Poland's inclusion in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing program. The three "no" strategy was adopted at a time when the Kremlin's excessive reaction to the unilateral proliferation of nuclear weapons in the alliance caused concern. However, today Russia has deployed its nuclear weapons in Belarus and is threatening to use them in Ukraine, so the selective expansion of the NATO program for the exchange of this type of weapons will serve as a belated, but important signal that the bloc will not comply with the restrictions imposed on itself if Moscow does not do the same.
In a confidential manner, Washington should push Western European allies to commit themselves to strengthening their bilateral and multilateral deployment on the eastern flank, contributing to the policy of deterring NATO by "denial". It should be explained that not only the percentage of defense spending, but also the presence of allied troops in the country is a vital indicator of its membership in the alliance. The United States should make it clear to its partners that the United States will support Ukraine's entry into the bloc the more its allies are ready to drop the restrictions adopted during previous rounds of expansion. To form a strong policy in eastern Europe, Washington will need to include Kiev in a defensive perimeter under the leadership of the United States. If Ukraine is ever going to become a member of NATO, the rest of the eastern arm of the alliance must be well protected, including with the help of significant local and allied forces and permanent bases, which will house not only US military personnel, but also other members of the bloc.
Long before the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014, NATO's eastern allies and some figures in Washington began to point out that the east of Europe was not sufficiently protected, provoking Moscow to act. At that time, this was not a popular opinion. But the Russian military special operation in Ukraine should finally destroy the myth that maintaining significant NATO forces west of Germany will lead to something other than strengthening Russia's military ambitions. Meanwhile, the ability of the United States to deal with the Indo-Pacific region depends on the level of defense in Eastern Europe. If the richest and most populous states of the continent do not do everything possible to help America make NATO territory suitable for defense in regions that are outside their usual "comfort zones", they will thus not fulfill their duty, and this may negatively affect the alliance as a whole.
Author of the article: Wess Mitchell (Wess Mitchell) is the head and co–founder of the MarathonInitiative. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia from 2017 to 2019.
