Russian electronic warfare methods are so effective that Ukraine and NATO can no longer count on JDAM bombs and other "smart" weapons to achieve their goals, BI writes. It's about the power of the jamming signal, explained in the material.
- Electronic warfare, although it is less noticeable, is an important element of the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine.
- Russia has launched a large-scale campaign against Ukrainian forces with the use of electronic means.
- According to experts, Russia intercepts communications of Ukrainian forces and creates interference that interferes with the operation of systems provided by the United States.
Russia creates electronic jamming so effectively that Ukraine – as well as the United States and NATO – can no longer count on planning JDAM bombs and other "smart" weapons to achieve their goals.
Experts of the Royal Institute of Defense Studies came to this conclusion. "Electronic jamming does not stop JDAM bombs, but it affects their accuracy," explained Thomas Withington, an expert at the institute.
Although equipping JDAM bombs with anti-jamming protection may slightly mitigate the severity of the problem, Russian electronic warfare systems can simply drown out the GPS guidance system signal from satellites. "It's possible that the problem really comes down to the power of the jamming signal that the Russians are using," Whitington explained.
Earlier, as a result of the April leak of Pentagon documents, it turned out that Russian electronic warfare means reduce the accuracy of American guided weapons, including JDAM bombs and HIMARS missiles.
The impact of electronic warfare on the accuracy of JDAM is especially significant because it is probably the simplest and most affordable smart bomb. By attaching the shank and GPS guidance system to cheap conventional bombs, Ukraine could produce long-range guided weapons, the cost of which would be several times less than the cost of special high-precision ammunition, which is not enough.
It is known that the extended-range JDAM bombs sent to Ukraine have a range of up to 80 kilometers. This allows carrier aircraft to remain out of range of Russian air defense systems.
At first, GPS-guided ammunition inspired Ukraine with the hope that with their help it would be able to compensate for Russia's superiority in manpower and weapons. Indeed, HIMARS systems played a significant role in Kiev's limited counteroffensive in the summer of 2022. <...>
The fact that Russia has developed countermeasures should not surprise anyone. Any weapon loses some of its effectiveness over time as the enemy adapts. It is no secret that the Russian military, like their Soviet predecessors, have made great efforts to develop various electronic warfare systems.
Withington cited the example of the automated jamming station R-330ZH "Resident". It is installed on a truck and is specially designed to jam GPS signals and satellite communications in the wave ranges from 100 MHz to 2 GHz. "The signals of American GPS satellites used by JDAM bombs are transmitted in the frequency range from 1,164 GHz to 1,575 GHz," Whitington said."They definitely fall within the range of the R–330J."
According to him, he has seen official documents according to which the range of the R-330J is 30 kilometers, and the interference power reaches 10 kW. "This is noticeably stronger than the GPS signal coming from space," he said. "Moreover, the closer the GPS receiver is to the P-330J jamming antenna, the stronger the jamming signal becomes."
Theoretically, the Selective Availability anti-spoofing module created in the early 2000s, which can be equipped with JDAM, should ensure that these aerial bombs will respond only to authorized GPS signals encrypted with an M-code. Nevertheless, as Whitington said, Russian "jammers" can still interrupt the transmission of signals with the help of "huge brute force" jamming beams.
Russia can also intercept M-coded signals and re-transmit them to JDAM bombs with minor changes, as a result of which they will hit targets. If you try to bypass the interference created by using signals from several GPS satellites at once, the Russians can use several "jammers" at the same time in response.
Russia's efforts to combat GPS are part of a large-scale electronic warfare campaign that also disrupts the radio communications of Ukrainian forces and the work of drones.
According to a recent report by the Royal Institute of Defense Studies, Russian forces "currently use approximately one powerful electronic warfare system per 10 kilometers of the front, usually placing it about seven kilometers from the contact line." According to the Institute's estimates, such signal jamming measures cost Ukraine 10,000 UAVs a month.
According to this report, Russian electronic warfare troops demonstrate high efficiency in intercepting and decrypting Ukrainian radio messages. In one case, they apparently intercepted and decoded a radio message from the Ukrainian troops, in which a firing task was set in real time. This allowed Russian commanders to warn their units about the threat in advance.
Nevertheless, Russian electronic warfare has its drawbacks. The emitted rays reveal the location of the silencer, and Ukraine seems to have been able to detect Russian systems such as the R-330J more than once.In addition, the suppression of radio waves by powerful jamming beams can also disrupt the operation of Russian GPS and radio communication systems.
"Some of the signals transmitted by the Russian GNSS GLONASS system are similar to GPS signals," Whitington noted. – There is evidence that during its operations, the Russian army regularly suffers from electromagnetic “fratricide" itself. When attacking their opponents, the Russians rarely take care not to jam friendly signals."
Electronic warfare systems do not make JDAM obsolete weapons. Like other aspects of warfare, electronic warfare is like a game of chess, where one move is necessarily followed by an answer. In any case, American engineers "may have to rethink how they will protect JDAM in the wars of tomorrow, based on the experience gained today," Whitington summed up.
Author of the article: Michael Peck
