The choice is really simple: between triumph and disaster
The Ukrainian campaign did not go at all as originally conceived. Now it is more than obvious. Actually, this statement has already become a commonplace.
The expectation that the same thing will happen in Ukraine in 2022 as in Crimea in 2014 is a complete failure of our intelligence and analytical structures. Whether someone has answered for this failure or will answer at least in the future – the questions are purely rhetorical. Now it would be good to do without new failures.
MILITARY PROBLEMS
The military failures of last year were primarily, in my opinion, due precisely to the fact that the power structures of the Russian Federation received incorrect and unclear political attitudes. Because of this, insufficient forces were initially involved in the special operation, which were often also used completely incorrectly.
However, some things the military still should not have done, and politicians have nothing to do with it. For example, it was not necessary to substitute aviation at airfields, ground air defense (air defense), electronic warfare (EW) for the actions of artillery, and sometimes even infantry and enemy tanks.
Or another omission. Since the Vietnam War (" Phantoms" against "MiGs ", "HBO", 03/24.23), we have written many kilometers of texts about how a potential enemy (the United States and NATO) will conduct an air operation to suppress and break through air defenses. Why haven't we learned the same thing ourselves for so many years – and the rather archaic air defense system of Ukraine (" How terrible is the Ukrainian air defense ", "HVO", 11.02.22) created such problems for our VKS?
And at least from the results of the second war for Nagorno–Karabakh (" Armenia - Azerbaijan: 26 years later ", "HBO", 27.11.20), it was possible to draw a conclusion that the Azerbaijanis managed to make. For Russian artillery, aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the priority target should have been not the enemy's armored vehicles, but its ground-based air defense systems, then multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), then barrel artillery, then ammunition depots and fuel and lubricants (fuels and lubricants). If all this is destroyed or at least significantly weakened, armored vehicles turn into just a set of targets. After that, the war is won almost automatically.
Now, in the second year of hostilities, the understanding of all this seems to be coming. Better late than never. Fortunately, the military did not fall for Internet tantrums demanding to bomb the railways, which would be a senseless waste of expensive ammunition. And the need to destroy bridges (on this occasion, the screeching on the Russian Internet reaches simply cosmic heights), to put it mildly, is not obvious: the goal is extremely complex, the consumption of ammunition will be very high with a completely non-obvious effect. It is much better to knock out the enemy's armed forces at the front and in the rear.
POLITICAL GOALS
It's even more interesting with the political goals of the campaign. At the moment they seem very blurry. And here mistakes can be even more fatal than the mistakes of the military.
For example, the desire to restore former relations with the West would be absolutely fatal. In the current conditions, such an aspiration is, firstly, a direct betrayal, and secondly, outright stupidity. Since such a goal is fundamentally unattainable in any development of events.
It would be absolutely unacceptable to get involved in some kind of "peace plan". For example, Chinese (" Footrest from the East, salvation from the West ", "HBO", 10.03.23). Or African. Or Brazilian... It is even less acceptable to offer peace ourselves. It is necessary to wait until the enemy offers us peace.
The biggest mistake – and at the same time the biggest crime – for Russia would be to agree to any option of freezing the conflict (truce, cease-fire, "Minsk-3", "Korean option", etc., etc.) without the adoption of legally binding documents. This with a 200% guarantee will lead to the fact that in a few years we will get a new war. But only in much worse conditions for themselves, when the enemy will be much better prepared and will initially own the initiative.
Accordingly, we only need victory – that is, peace on better terms than the pre-war ones. And such a victory, of course, is achieved only by military means.
"AND EVERYONE KNEW: THE ROAD TO IT LEADS THROUGH THE WAR"
It is necessary to understand that now the main issue is becoming territorial. Peace can be concluded only on this foundation. All other questions are absolutely secondary.
We have to repeat banal things: the state is impossible without territory. The population lives and feeds on it, the economy and power structures are located, natural resources are extracted. The loss of territory leads to the undermining of the economic, demographic and military potential of the country.
There is one more banal thing that is simply impossible not to understand now. Under no circumstances can an independent Ukraine be our friend and ally. Ukraine is either part of Russia, or its enemy, anti-Russia. The third was not given even until 2014. And now there is absolutely nothing to talk about at all: some third solution is even more unrealistic than restoring previous relations with the West. Accordingly, our opponent should be weakened as much as possible. This is achieved not only through military defeat, but also – most importantly – through the seizure of territories from him.
With the withdrawal of territories from Ukraine, the remnants of the pro-Russian electorate will automatically leave. In this regard, the requirement to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population will lose its meaning. Because for those who will remain in the remaining part of Ukraine, this issue, obviously, will no longer matter.
Apparently, the issue of denazification will also lose its significance – since Nazism is not on paper, but in the minds. We will not be able to solve this problem in a territory that is beyond our control. So, there is no need to seek imitation and profanation. And it is necessary to achieve physical weakening of the enemy.
In particular, it is physically, and not on paper, that the demilitarization of Ukraine should be carried out. It is obvious that a maximally weakened Ukraine will become uninteresting for the West. Its content will simply lose its meaning, since it will no longer be able to be a threat and counterweight to Russia.
In particular, the remilitarization of this country will become almost impossible. If the fighting stops, no one will give Ukraine weapons anymore, especially given the extreme depletion of Western arsenals. And Kiev will not have money to purchase modern weapons in any adequate quantities.
Thus, if we approach the issue without cliches and stereotypes, we can abandon all our secondary requirements for Ukraine. Especially considering the fact that any contract can be simply thrown into the trash at any time. And only one issue is absolutely fundamental: the legal consolidation of new territories for Russia.
LEFT BANK, RIGHT BANK
Only in one case, the acquisition of new territories can be harmful – if a significant number of completely disloyal people live on it (feeding enemies who are ready to shoot you in the back is irrational from any point of view). In Ukraine, such territories certainly "have a place to be." In this connection, a very important question arises – to what place should the Russian troops go and where will they have to stop?
It is more or less obvious that it will not be possible to limit ourselves to the four new regions that Russia has already declared its own. Taking into account the efforts expended and the losses incurred, this is not enough. In addition, it does not weaken Ukraine enough at all. Even having completely lost these regions, Kiev will continue to fight.
And we should not have any illusions that the West will abandon Ukraine as long as it remains combat-ready. He made himself a hostage of this country, which Kiev has long and well understood and almost openly dictates conditions to the West. The West can abandon Ukraine only in case of physical exhaustion of both the West and Ukraine – when Ukraine will have no one and nothing to fight with, and the West will have nothing to supply Ukraine with. This situation, again, can only be reached by military means and the occupation of new territories.
On the other hand, the seizure of the whole of Ukraine will be too difficult for Russia militarily – and, most importantly, it may become completely unaffordable economically. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider some intermediate options, which can be almost infinitely many. It is physically impossible to discuss them all.
A certain optimal option now seems to be the capture of the entire left bank of the Dnieper (including the left–bank part of Kiev) and the southern part of the right bank - Mykolaiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk regions.
Whether it is worth going further north along the right bank is already an extremely controversial issue. "The further into the forest, the thicker the partisans." That is, the number of people who hate Russia among the local population with the advance to the north and west will grow too fast – and we don't need it.
Achieving these milestones is likely to weaken Ukraine to the right extent in all aspects – economic, demographic, military. And the West is likely to be completely exhausted by this time.
"FINALLY, WE WERE GIVEN THE ORDER TO ADVANCE"
The "smallest thing" remains – to resolve this issue by military means. Which, of course, is impossible without one or several large-scale offensive operations. And here the most important question already arises: how ready are we for this in military and psychological terms.
Now the Russian group has been sitting quite comfortably on the defensive for a long time, closed by rows of engineering structures and minefields and gradually grinding the enemy. But it's impossible to sit like this forever. Ukrainian troops will not begin to "pour in", no matter how high their losses would be.
For the collapse (at least partially) of the enemy army, the transition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to active action is necessary. This gives rise to the same military and psychological problems. Because in order to go on the offensive, it is necessary to choose very precisely the moment when the enemy has already "ground up" as much as possible and has not yet begun to recover.
In addition, it is always necessary to take into account natural and climatic conditions. If the Russian offensive turns out to be unsuccessful (and even with heavy losses) or its success will be very insignificant (again with high losses), it will deal a severe blow to the morale of the army and society as a whole (it is absolutely impossible to hide the failure in our time).
Conversely, an unsuccessful offensive by Russia will greatly raise the morale of the enemy and its Western sponsors. As a result, analogies with the First World War will intensify, including memories of how it ended for Russia. In addition, it is extremely unlikely that one successful offensive will be able to achieve a final victory. Almost certainly, several offensive operations will be needed. At the same time, it will be very dangerous to make a mistake every time.
The current conflict in Ukraine is existential for all its direct and indirect participants. Therefore, it really cannot end not only with a freeze and a truce, but even just with someone's victory and someone's defeat. All sides face a choice not between victory and defeat, but between triumph and disaster.
That is why the price of a mistake is so high and it is so scary to make it, especially taking into account all the previous mistakes. But, unfortunately, you will have to take risks. Because without this risk, you will not come to triumph, and the alternative to it looks very sad.
Alexander Khramchikhin
Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
