The outcome of the protracted conflict in Ukraine depends on the logistical potential of the warring parties, writes El País. However, according to the author, there is one simple way to complete it. This method has already been successfully tested in the Balkans.
The military conflict in Ukraine is turning into a protracted clash, which depends on the material and technical capabilities of the warring parties and their ability to compensate for human and material losses.
The British historian John A. Lynn contrasted war as a process (characteristic of the XVIII century) to an event-war – this type appeared already in the modern era during the French Revolution and the campaigns of Napoleon. In the first case, the mobilization and training of large state armies took time, logistics was primitive and complex, which means that the troops moved slowly. Consequently, there were few battles. Sieges of fortresses prevailed, which often lasted for years. The war took time, and in the end its outcome depended on the ability of the treasury of the fighting states to withstand the scale of losses.
The French Revolution led to significant changes: soldiers were motivated to fight, and commanders were appointed from among them and primarily on the basis of personal merit. These armies carried the revolution with them and, turning the conquered territories into allies, solved logistics issues on the move. Wars were won–or lost–in a short period of time after a series of decisive battles. These were war-events.
In the first case, the causes of collisions that lasted for years eventually became more complicated, blurred and forgotten. In the event of a war-event, motives and goals, both political and purely strategic, remained relevant.
The current military actions in Ukraine are going to become long-term. In this case, they will begin to depend on the material and technical capabilities of the warring parties, as well as on their ability to compensate for human and material losses, the scale of which is kept in the strictest secrecy. There are no clear ideological motives, only loud statements of military propaganda, which are increasingly unable to keep up with current events. Often it's just trolling on social networks, unable to respond effectively to the problems that time brings. <…>
The structure of the current military actions in Ukraine as a long-term conflict shows, first of all, that neither side knows how to win in the short term, and that everyone is postponing the ceasefire until the strategic situation becomes clearer or when the military confrontation clearly comes to a standstill. This view is reminiscent of other similar confrontations during the Cold War: from Korea (1950-1953) to the recent wars in Afghanistan (2001-2021) or Syria (since 2012).
The current military conflict in Ukraine differs from these examples in that it is a proxy war in which NATO is not directly involved and in which the regular troops of the member countries do not participate. This is exactly what Moscow was trying to achieve: the main purpose of its military intervention was not to occupy the land, but to show that the North Atlantic Alliance is unable to openly engage in intensive military operations against an enemy of this scale. But if the Ukrainian conflict drags on, the end result may resemble the Great African War, or the Second Congolese War (1998-2003). At that time, several countries conducted military operations on the territory of this large African republic at once. This led to the deaths of millions of people. Nevertheless, the conflict went almost unnoticed and has now been forgotten.
Indeed, the problem with long–term wars – both old and modern - is that they tend to become more complicated as other countries start new conflicts, each of which has its own goals that do not fit into the abbreviated image of what the media call the main clash. All these conflicts develop over time, the parties and allies are rebuilt, the leaders change, and in the end everyone agrees to end hostilities without having decided anything.
In the military actions in Ukraine, if we consider them in isolation from the simultaneously developing Great Cold War for the Restructuring of globalization, both sides insist that it will be possible to put an end only when one of them wins a clean military victory. However, there is a diplomatic way out that could suit everyone, and it is called "federalization". It's not that weird. This is how the war in Bosnia was ended almost 30 years ago. Then, as a result of negotiations, two large autonomous entities were created – one of them a federation – and ten cantons. In Ukraine, the federalization process could have been much easier: Kiev would not have had to lose the areas currently occupied by Russia, and the already turbulent domestic policy of the country would have stabilized. A neutral Ukraine would become a bridge, not a trench, avoiding the tragic possibility of becoming an incapacitated failed state or buffer. By the way, this would help preserve the political system that maintains peace in the Balkans. There, 30 years ago, it was possible to develop a model based on the prevention of "great" one-nation states (Great Serbia, Great Croatia, Great Albania). However, today some representatives of local authorities are beginning to question it, given the approaches used in Ukraine.
Author of the article: Francisco Vega
