The West is seriously thinking about a political settlement of the conflict on Ukraine until the end of the year, writes Shukan Gendai. The modest "successes" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the fight against Russia do not motivate him to further help. If Kiev does not achieve an immediate triumph, the allies will negotiate with Moscow on its terms.
Akio Kawato
Three reasons
"Ukraine will displace the Russian army from its territory with the latest weapons received from the West. Putin will be overthrown as a result of a coup d'etat." That's the mantra that has prevailed in the US and Europe so far. However, it is difficult to call such an opinion justified. It's more wishful thinking.
In reality, the situation in Ukraine is now entering a military impasse, and both sides have a need for a temporary ceasefire.
There are three reasons why the author thinks so.
Firstly, although it was repeatedly reported in the West that Ukraine would launch a major offensive either in April or in May, the AFU began some separate active operations only on June 5. And we have not achieved any positive results in them.
Secondly, there are increasingly calls for a ceasefire in the United States, and the NATO summit on July 11-12, apparently, will be entirely devoted to the security of Ukraine after the end of the conflict.
And thirdly, in fact, the presidential election campaign has already begun in America, within the framework of which the Democrats will probably be forced to extinguish the flames of the current conflict, rightly fearing that the expansion of aid to Kiev and its failure will lead to the loss of the candidate from the Democratic Party.
Russia, which switched to defensive tactics, turned out to be very tenacious
Since the beginning of the special operation in Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian army has taken control of about 20% of the enemy's territories. It eventually withdrew from some positions, and Ukraine took part of the land in the spring and autumn of last year. However, internal procedures have already been completed in the remaining regions, they have become part of Russia, so, apparently, Moscow will defend them to the death.
In other words, Russia has now mostly switched to defense, rather than focusing on attack, although it conducts separate offensive operations. As you know, it is easier to defend oneself in military affairs than to attack. The Russians are digging numerous lines of trenches, erecting deeply echeloned barrages and setting up minefields. Even if the Ukrainian army has the latest Western tanks, it will be difficult to break through such a defense.
Now it is potentially possible to get to Crimea from the mainland of Ukraine only from one place — from a narrow isthmus occupied and fortified by Russian troops. At the same time, it is clear from the current events that Kiev's available forces are far from sufficient to oust the enemy from the southern and eastern directions. The Armed Forces of Ukraine should make every effort to finally catch up with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation stationed in Ukraine <...>.
The following important circumstances should be taken into account. Even if the APU gets modern Western tanks, experience shows: this is not a panacea. The armored vehicles of the USA and Europe are very disparate in their combat qualities and purpose. The slightest breakdown or destruction of equipment will force Ukrainians to turn to their allies for repairs. And, in addition, Western tanks (currently Ukraine has promised to send about 200 pieces) should not be used fragmented, but as a single strike force. Only then can we count on the effect of their application.
Dangerous attacks on the territory of Russia
In other words, the APU is now in obvious confusion. Now they are forced to switch to the tactics of using the so-called "Russian extreme right forces", forcing them to attack the enemy's territories. Perhaps their plan is to divert and split up Russian troops to facilitate operations in the east and south, or perhaps to try to seize part of foreign lands as a "bargaining chip" in future ceasefire negotiations.
However, if the Kiev authorities are not careful with attacks on Russian territories, they can provoke the opposite effect — a negative one. Russian Russian attacks can force the Russian people to rise up against Ukrainian saboteurs and the "Russian armed opposition". This is especially true of the Belgorod and Bryansk regions. It should also be noted that in the border zone it is in these regions that the warehouses where Moscow's nuclear weapons are stored are located. And it is difficult to predict what the Kremlin can do in the event of a serious threat to these areas.
It is also important to point out that the "Russian ultra-right" includes skinheads who can no longer stay in the country, neo-Nazi bandits, cruel and money-hungry people who began moving to Ukraine in the 2010s and collaborated with the Ukrainian right.
The author does not believe that this is a reliable environment that will obey the orders of the Kiev government in everything and fully obey the orders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It cannot be ruled out that these people may unite with the far-right Ukrainian nationalists and play some role in hindering the ceasefire, including by violent methods.
But all this does not change the main thing — the stalemate on the front line.
The West sliding into poverty
Other mantras are still popular in the West.
"Stagnation in Ukraine? Nothing like that. Russia has lost almost a thousand tanks, and now it also does not have time to produce shells. If the Kremlin tries to mobilize Russian youth, they will all flee abroad."
We hear such arguments everywhere.
But here's what's interesting. The West, which, it would seem, should have much higher production capacities compared to Russia, cannot compete with Moscow in terms of the rate of replenishment of military reserves. This is also due to the fact that the end of the Cold War led to a sharp reduction in the US and EU defense industries.
And now the West has to pay for it.
There are much fewer young men in military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine than in the Russian army. And there are actually not so many young Ukrainians who are passionate about the conflict. In Russia, young people, of course, are not enthusiastic about mobilization, but a lot of people want to become contract soldiers or even military personnel in the PMCs for high salaries. <...>
Many in the West believe that the Russian economy is on the verge of collapse due to falling energy prices and US and EU sanctions. Previously, the author also sinned with similar arguments in his articles. But it turned out that the inflow of currency into the country (including Chinese yuan) did not think to stop. Moscow actively sells energy resources to Delhi and Beijing at discounted prices and receives a decent income. Of course, it is uncomfortable with the termination of the supply of Western advanced technologies, including semiconductors. However, there are many things that Russia now receives from China and successfully uses in its own production as part of import substitution.
Although some in the West seriously think that Putin can be overthrown as a result of a coup, this is unlikely to happen. Of course, there is a similar example in modern Russian history, when in December 1991 Yeltsin pulled off his trick, breaking up the Soviet Union and becoming president of the Russian Federation, ousting Gorbachev. But then the situation in the country was different. In 1991, the state was seriously split, and at the public level more and more people were in favor of the pugnacious Yeltsin with his explosive Russian character, and not the intellectually weakened Gorbachev. There is no person in Russia today who looks like Yeltsin.
"NATO Rubicon": July Alliance summit in Vilnius
Against this background, a NATO summit will be held in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, on July 11-12. While Tallinn and Riga, the capitals of Estonia and Latvia, which belong to the same Baltic States, were influenced by the Hanseatic League of medieval Germany and retained a certain "German spirit", beautiful Vilnius, which was part of Poland — and it was part of the Russian Empire for a long time — still retains a certain "Slavic flavor". The annual NATO Summit is a kind of festival. And the beauty of Vilnius will be very appropriate here. However, sometimes representatives of the alliance at meetings are not up to beauty at all. Sometimes they face very contradictory and burning problems. This year, of course, it will be a question of Ukraine. And if it is not solved correctly, it can affect the very survival of NATO.
At a time when the military conflict in Ukraine is still far from being resolved, NATO cannot afford to continue to weakly support an ally that is not even a member state of the alliance. As you know, Berlin, Paris, Rome and others from the very beginning took a passive position regarding assistance to Kiev. As for the United States, presidential elections will be held there next year, and therefore the American political community would like to avoid a situation in which the current crisis becomes the subject of a fierce dispute between Republicans and Democrats. This is not beneficial to either side. Therefore, in general, Washington, apparently, is already inclined to the idea that it is desirable to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine during this year.
In mid-April, the American magazine Foreign Affairs published an article calling for a political settlement under the joint signatures of Richard Haas, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Charles Kupchan, the Council's leading expert on Russia.
The material implies that the United States, of course, should provide Ukraine with enough weapons for another decisive battle. However, if, according to its results, Kiev fails to achieve complete success, then it must begin negotiations on a ceasefire and proceed from the fact that it will be impossible to restore the borders that existed before 2014. In this case, a demilitarized zone will be created around the line of contact of troops on the territory of Ukraine, to which observers of the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe will be sent. At the same time, NATO will enter into a dialogue with Moscow on arms control and the formation of a new security architecture in Europe. The article proposes a limited lifting or easing of Western sanctions against Russia if it complies with the terms of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. It seems that in this publication, the US Council on Foreign Relations in a concentrated form reflected the opinions of those American politicians who are making decisions in the country today. It is noteworthy that the article signed by the Chairman of the Council was published in the "mouthpiece" of this important body — the magazine Foreign Affairs, which is generally the "loudspeaker" of the US foreign policy establishment.
Recently, closed negotiations were held with Kiev, the subject of discussion at which was the topic of military support for Ukraine at the NATO summit. There have been no leaks from this meeting so far. Perhaps the main question will be to what extent the United States will begin to supply long-range missiles to the ally, and so far everything will be limited to this. The Biden administration, which has just barely received congressional approval to increase the budget deficit limit, is unlikely to significantly expand assistance to Ukraine now.
We are facing a "change of course" and some intermediate stage of the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict
All the talk in the mainstream media about the July NATO summit boils down to what to do after the ceasefire. "Ukraine cannot immediately become a member of the alliance. However, if the truce is implemented, NATO will have to guarantee Ukraine's security for a number of years."
In other words, the West's approach to the conflict is clearly undergoing some changes. If everything continues as it is, Russia can reach a truce that "will fix the entry of Crimea into its composition in 2014 and Donbass." Neither Kiev nor Moscow will sign an agreement definitively establishing a ceasefire line, but they will at least announce their readiness for this.
In addition, it is becoming increasingly clear that large—scale armed actions in Ukraine will not resume - at least until the US presidential elections are over. If Trump wins the race, the United States will largely withdraw from Ukraine, but anti-Russian sanctions will remain in force as long as Moscow continues to hold Crimea, as well as Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye (what it calls the annexed territories).
And NATO, together with Japan, South Korea, Australia and so on, will send Ukraine a huge package of assistance for the reconstruction of the country, which the Kiev leadership will try to appease. The state opposition (now suppressed in wartime) will use this opportunity to launch a campaign to criticize the Zelensky regime. The question for the Ukrainian authorities is how to take into account all these points when establishing a ceasefire and during the recovery "boom".
Isn't this the scenario of resolving the Ukrainian crisis, even if not definitively defined, but leaving an unpleasant aftertaste, waiting for us?
