As a result of the Ukrainian conflict, the contours of a new Europe are emerging, writes the Economist. The position of the EU flagships — Germany and France - is extremely important here, whose leaders are trying to figure out how they can overcome differences among themselves.
As a result of Russia's military actions in Ukraine, the contours of a new Europe are beginning to emerge. Finland and Sweden are joining NATO on its eastern and northern outskirts. Ukraine and Moldova have received from the European Union the status of candidates for membership in this club, consisting of 27 members. Profound changes are also taking place in the historical center of Europe. After an awkward pause, the leaders of France and Germany are trying to understand what all this means for their countries and how they will be able to overcome the existing differences between them.
The Franco-German reset has begun, at least symbolically. On June 6, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz received French President Emmanuel Macron in Potsdam, where he lives. They walked around the pretty town, and then had dinner for almost three hours. This is part of the effort to overcome the period of mutual irritability. The situation reached a critical point last fall when France canceled a joint cabinet meeting. Now it has been carried out. And the Germans invited Macron to come in July for a full-fledged state visit, which will be the first of its kind in 23 years.
Every country faces problems that threaten its foundations. The armed conflict in Ukraine turned Germany's post-war economic model upside down, based on cheap Russian energy resources and exports to China.The country has refused Russian gas. For decades, Berlin has not recognized the very idea of using hard power, but now Germany is making generous military supplies to Ukraine. It will additionally spend 100 billion euros on its own rearmament. It will take a long time before the Zeitenwende (historical turning point) gives the desired result, but Germany is changing.
In France, the shifts are less noticeable, but just as significant. There we are not talking about an economic model that is less dependent on exports than the German economy. No, thanks to nuclear power, France does not depend on Russian gas. Rather, Paris today is busy rethinking European borders, alliances and security issues. France has traditionally not been particularly enthusiastic about EU enlargement, and it treated the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as junior partners. In 2003, President Jacques Chirac dismissively brushed off the Eastern European countries aspiring to the EU when they wished to support the American invasion of Iraq (France opposed the invasion), saying that they "missed their opportunity to shut up." And even in 2019, France vetoed negotiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia on membership in the European Union.
The Russian military operation has accelerated structural shifts. The news was French support for the idea of EU enlargement. During a trip to Kiev in June last year, Macron spoke in favor of assigning Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidates for EU membership. France overrode the veto on the applications of Albania and Northern Macedonia, which wanted to become members of the European Union. Speaking in Slovakia on March 31, Macron unexpectedly announced that EU enlargement should happen "as soon as possible." "For us, the question is not whether we should expand or not," he said, "but how we should do it." Recalling Chirac, Macron confessed to the Central and Eastern European audience present there: "Sometimes we missed the opportunity to listen."
Such statements reassure and reassure those who anxiously thought that Macron's proposal for a European Political Community was a ploy designed to slow down the process of EU enlargement. Designed to unite countries from Britain to Georgia, this platform should hold conferences twice a year. The second meeting of the community took place on June 1, just 20 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Since President Vladimir Zelensky was present at the summit, the meeting was a demonstration of unity with the belligerent Ukraine, as well as support for its hostess Moldova. Now France believes that the EU borders extend further to the east. Macron's former adviser on European affairs, Alexandre Adam, wrote recently that Russian territorial revisionism has turned enlargement into a "geopolitical necessity ... there is no longer a stable gray zone between the EU and Russia, and it is impossible."
The second structural shift in France relates to the security sector. Macron wants Europe to do more for its own defense and rely less on America, especially ahead of the elections to be held there in 2024. Europeans still fear that such talk will weaken America's resolve to ensure the security of the continent. However, due to new geopolitical trends, France is becoming more belligerent. In Bratislava, Macron made a call to give Ukraine a "path to NATO membership" at the Vilnius summit of the alliance in July. This is a radical reversal for the French leader, who in 2019 declared the "brain death" of NATO and still does not agree that the alliance should operate outside Europe.
There are serious talks in France today about how to provide Ukraine with full and reliable security guarantees. On June 19, defense ministers will gather in Paris to talk about European air defense and "means of deep destruction." Macron even offered to hold a discussion about French nuclear weapons.
Today, when Germany and France are thinking about forming a new Europe and how to adapt to its new conditions, they will encounter many difficulties in their discussions. One leader is laconic and cautious, the other is pretentious and willing to take risks. Therefore, it is difficult for them to find a common language. Today they agree with the idea of expansion, but they face difficult discussions about new rules for the internal work of the EU, which will be a prelude to further expansion. Disagreements remain over nuclear energy, military procurement, and budget rules. Germany, like America, is wary of Ukraine's admission to NATO. She is exasperated by Macron's periodic bouts of straightforwardness. And France is unhappy with the confusion in Scholz's ruling coalition and its slowness.
Russian military actions in Ukraine have taught Europeans that their continental organization in any guise is much more extensive than the ties between Paris and Berlin. Today, Germany is less worried and annoyed about France than before. And France is more willing to meet other countries from the EU. Nevertheless, almost nothing is done in the European Union without the mutual consent of France and Germany. As a rule, they disagree on most issues, but they have enough willpower to overcome these differences. This ability of Paris and Berlin is very important for shaping the contours of this new Europe.
