The Atlantic: A new Cold War seems almost inevitable, although there are no takers
The US is trying to curb China's development by trying to attract new allies. But they are not in a hurry to join the banner of democracy, having tasted the fruits of economic cooperation with Beijing. This will make the confrontation tougher, says Charles Kupchan, Professor of international Relations
Charles Kupchan
The Cold War between the United States and the Sino-Russian bloc may turn out to be even more costly and dangerous than the confrontation between America and the Soviet Union, according to columnist Charles A. Kupchan. Instead of getting involved in it, Washington needs to take a step back, think over the stakes and develop a plan to avoid a geopolitical gap, because it will significantly increase the risk of war between the great powers and leave the world too divided to manage global problems. Moscow has already thrown down the gauntlet by invading Ukraine. But ties between the United States and China are beyond repair, and China's growing economic and military might makes it a more serious competitor.
China is actually a more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was. Soviet GDP reached 60 percent of American GDP. And China's economy, at the current rate of development, will overtake the American one over the next decade. And if the USSR could not catch up with the West in technology, then China is developing the high-tech sector at a pace comparable to the United States. Yes, China's economy is slowing down and will be held back by domestic debt and demographic decline. But with a fourfold population superiority, China is likely to significantly outpace America in terms of economic output by the second half of the century.
China lags far behind the United States when it comes to geopolitical weight and reach. But history clearly shows that the economic rise of major powers is always followed by expansionist geopolitical ambitions. China is well on its way. Its navy has more warships than the U.S. Navy, and its air force ranks third in the world. The Chinese military is already capable of countering the American military in the western Pacific. China is on track to eventually take its place alongside the United States as one of the world's two full-service superpowers.
During the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union were at odds. Moscow could not unite with Beijing against the West. But today China and Russia are close partners. If a new cold war breaks out, the West is likely to face an authoritarian bloc stretching from Europe to the Pacific Ocean, forcing the United States to divide its forces between two remote theaters of war. Russia and NATO are facing off in Europe, the Americans are also threatening China in the Pacific Ocean.
The new Cold War will not be like its 20th century version. Then bipolarity made geopolitical competition predictable. Stability naturally arose as a result of balancing between the two dominant poles of power. Countries joined the USSR or the USA. The camp under the banner of democracy eventually won.
Today's world is becoming multipolar, and many countries, including the new heavyweights, are likely to refuse to take sides. It will be more difficult to create coalitions. The international system will also be much more confusing and unpredictable, and therefore more difficult to manage and stabilize than the bipolar world of the 20th century.
This showed Russia's invasion of Ukraine. More than three-quarters of the world's countries chose to stay away, hoping to survive the devastating impact of the conflict on food and energy supplies, trying to preserve the established political and economic ties. Thanks to the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, about two-thirds of the world's countries currently trade with China more than with the United States. If there is a rivalry between the United States and China, it is unclear to whom such large economies as India and Indonesia will join.
India does not unite with either the West or the East, but instead seeks to serve as a bridge and mediator between them. Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar recently explained that "an order that is still very, very Western" is coming to an end and will give way to a "multinational" world. In light of its proximity to China and trade ties with it, Indonesia is likely to lean more towards Beijing than Washington. According to a recent report by the Lowy Institute of Australia, the United States is losing influence in favor of China in Southeast Asia. This was stated by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.that his country's relations with China are "extraordinary," and warned that "no one can prevent Brazil from continuing to develop relations with China."
For now, the United States can count on such loyal allies as the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. But their global influence is waning. When the Cold War ended, the United States and its partners controlled almost 70 percent of the world's wealth. Forecasts show that Western democracies will account for less than 40 percent of global GDP in 2060. It may seem far away, but if a new cold war materializes this decade and lasts as long as the previous one, it will not begin to fade until about 2070.
In addition, America's traditional allies may not want to forever direct their collective weight against China. Many European countries maintain lucrative trade ties with China and stay away from the escalating geopolitical duel between Washington and Beijing. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron made recent trips to Beijing accompanied by dozens of German and French CEOs. Macron caused a stir during his visit by saying that Taiwan is not Europe's problem and that "the worst thing would be to think that we Europeans should be followers and adapt to the American rhythm and China's overreaction."
Even if the West unites against China, it must take into account its own political weakness. The West was, for the most part, politically sound during the first Cold War: ideological moderation and centrism prevailed in liberal democracies on both sides of the Atlantic, supported by universal prosperity. Such a solid economic and political foundation gave rise to a stable and purposeful grand strategy that allowed the West to win over the Soviet Union.
Those days are over. Automation and globalization have taken a heavy toll on the economic well-being of workers in the West, undermining the social contract of the industrial era. Populism is rampant on both sides of the Atlantic, and ideological moderation and centrist consensus have given way to harsh polarization and legislative dysfunction. Strategic stability has been replaced by impermanence. Until the United States and Europe recover politically, democracy will struggle to regain its global appeal, and Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin will still have reason to claim that the best days of the West are over.
Today's world is much more interdependent than the one that was split in two by the first Cold War. Therefore, the return of the geopolitical rift will cause much more damage. In the 20th century, Western economies were able to thrive despite minimal economic interaction with the Soviet Union. Today, on the contrary, China is deeply integrated into international markets. Severing trade ties between China and the West, if it comes to that, will damage the global economy. The United States has already taken steps to move individual supply chains from China to friendly countries and deprive China of access to advanced technology. This measured economic distancing from China is likely to accelerate into broader economic alienation if the rivalry continues to escalate.
In our interconnected age, great Powers must overcome ideological dividing lines not only to manage world trade, but also to address other common priorities, such as curbing climate change, preventing pandemics and strengthening global health, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and an arms race, regulating the cybersphere and managing migration. Warming up the rivalry of the great Powers would make impossible the collective management necessary to solve these pressing transnational problems.
History clearly shows that the rivalry between rising rivals and ruling hegemons, as a rule, ends in war. This is bad news, given the high probability that China's raw material power will soon catch up and then surpass the American one.
As China's power and ambitions continue to grow, Beijing and Washington will inevitably compete for primacy. Currently, ideological excess and zero-sum thinking in both the United States and China are fueling a spiral of mutual hostility. In the United States, neither Democrats nor Republicans are ready to recognize or even consider the potential end of America's long primacy. Irascible nationalism also influences Chinese politics; Xi Jinping has used the fight against the United States to strengthen his rule and strengthen control at home.
A new cold war is probably inevitable if China follows in Russia's footsteps on the path of military aggression, whether against Taiwan or other targets. But for now, the US and China have the opportunity to change the direction and intensity of their rivalry and direct their relations in a more positive direction.
To stop and reverse the escalation of hostility, Washington and Beijing will need an ongoing constructive dialogue, and they could even try to develop a model of joint global leadership. But in order to go down this path, it will require a change in thinking in Washington. The narrative of America's exceptionalism leaves little room for an equal competitor, and the prospect of a new cold war fits too easily into the prevailing paradigm. President Joe Biden foresees a century of "a battle between democracy and autocracy," insisting that "autocrats will not win in the future. We will. America will. And the future belongs to America." The United States and its allies deftly won the Cold War 1.0. Now Washington can shake off the dust from the same scheme and win the Cold War 2.0.
But it won't be that easy. For the first time since World War II and the advent of Pax Americana, the United States is about to come together on equal terms. If the United States and China want to avoid confrontation and instead work together to tame a world that is both multipolar and interdependent, the two countries need to learn to live comfortably next to each other in a global system that is ideologically and politically diverse. Americans will have to use their political imagination to coexist with a great power whose political system they consider threatening and contrary to their messianic desire to spread democracy. The alternative is an insurmountable geopolitical split and deepening global disorder.
China's potential intransigence, combined with confrontational nationalism, provoking debate in both Beijing and Washington, could force the United States to aim lower. If this is the case, Washington should at least agree with Beijing on guidelines for limiting and managing competition. The two countries could streamline military-to-military contacts, for example, and separate discussions of transnational issues such as climate change, global health and trade from more complex issues such as Taiwan and human rights.
Regardless of whether Washington is striving for common global leadership or only for controlled competition, the moment has come to start a dialogue. The United States still has economic and military superiority, and the two 21st-century superpowers can still avoid the dangers and turmoil that the geopolitical divide brings.
