FA: the future crisis over Taiwan will sharply distance the US from EuropeThe United States has long suppressed the development of Europe's defense potential with its dominant military presence, writes the FA.
But the future crisis over Taiwan may sharply alienate the US from the EU: Washington will not be able to participate in a confrontation with two superpowers at the same time.
Emma Ashford
Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Steven WertheimDiscussion of the “Asia first” approach
Europe must take a step forward
When French President Emmanuel Macron returned from Beijing in April, he caused a storm of indignation with a statement about the divergence of interests between Europe and the United States, especially in approaches to Asia. “When Europe manages to clarify its strategic position, it will be trapped in the destruction of the world and crises that are not ours,” he said.
Washington took these comments with alarm. The Biden administration is struggling to create an image of Western unity under the stable leadership of the United States. And the French president's remarks have intensified the heated debate about whether the United States needs to draw European countries into competition with China or reduce its leading role in Europe's defense in order to prioritize security needs in Asia.
For many analysts in Washington, the last step would be a costly mistake. As political analyst Michael Mazarr wrote in the article “Why America Needs Europe” on April 17, a significant reduction in US defense commitments in Europe “will confirm the gloomy picture that China and Russia are creating — about the ruthless greed and propensity of the United States for deals — which will seriously undermine the diligent attempts of the United States to build the reputation of that rare great power, which offers the world not only its own ambitions.”
This refrain is common among those who believe that any significant reduction of the US armed forces in Europe — most likely with the participation of other states that will take on the lion's share of the defense burden — will sever Washington's ties with the continent and with the whole world. In their opinion, this is fraught with exorbitant risks, will save little money and may destroy broader cooperation between the United States and Europe.
Such concern is exaggerated. It is based on excessive optimism about the ability of the United States to indefinitely restrain both China and Russia and unjustified pessimism about the path of development of a more functional Europe. In fact, countries on both sides of the Atlantic would benefit from transferring most of the responsibility for protecting Europe to the Europeans themselves, allowing America to play no more than a supporting role.The result is likely to be a balanced and sustainable transatlantic partnership, not discord. The alternative is to maintain the precarious status quo, which suppresses Europe's military potential and demands more and more from Washington.
It is not necessary to take on everything at once
The arguments in favor of reducing the obligations of the United States to Europe are not new. In 1959, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower complained that by refusing to replace American forces with their own, European NATO members were close to “fooling Uncle Sam.” Similar concerns have been expressed by politicians in successive administrations, both Republican and democratic. However, the nature of the discussion has recently changed due to the rapprochement of pro-Asian hawks with foreign policy realists who advocate strategic restraint. Concerned about the rise of China, hawks fear that US commitments in Europe could undermine priorities in Asia. Realists have long been in favor of reducing their presence in Europe for geopolitical and budgetary reasons.
The arguments in favor of European defense are unequivocal: with the strengthening of China and the aggravation of Sino-American rivalry, the United States gains little and sacrifices much, acting as the main "security supplier" for European countries that can finance their own defense in the face of the Russian threat. In any case, the situation in Ukraine suggests that reducing the number of American troops may be more achievable than thought.
Mazarr disputes this assessment and argues that the US commitments to Europe and Asia entail few practical compromises, and reducing the US presence in Europe will not save a lot of money. He argues that the main point is the stability of the American military presence in peacetime. His analysis practically does not take into account the prospect of a failure of deterrence in Europe or Asia.
Mazarr is probably right that in the short term, a significant presence in both theaters of military operations in peacetime is possible. But an armed conflict in at least one region is a real and growing prospect that cannot be discounted. In recent years, the likelihood of direct conflicts with China and Russia has increased, and there is a significant gap between the rhetoric of US leaders and the country's military capabilities. Although politicians talk about indefinite containment of both China and Russia, the National Defense Strategy for 2018 actually abandoned plans to maintain an army to conduct two armed conflicts at the same time — not to mention opposing two major powers.
Today, the armed forces of the United States are not capable of conducting full-scale operations against China and Russia at the same time. Opponents know this and may decide to put Washington's commitments to the test. In other words, peacetime deterrence and wartime defense are interrelated. Inadequate defense weakens deterrence, so plans for peace cannot be separated from plans for war. Recognizing the growing risks after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022, the European and Asian allies of the United States called on Washington to allocate more resources to their regions.
We are less concerned than some Asians that China intends to invade Taiwan in the near future until it declares independence and the United States considers it separate from the mainland of the country. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to ignore medium- and long-term risks. The future crisis around Taiwan and the nearby Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands may sharply distance the United States from Europe. Such a situation will give Russia the opportunity to challenge its suddenly threatened neighbors or invade their territory. To count on the fact that the United States will always be able and willing to allocate significant additional resources to Europe in case of war means putting all the eggs of the transatlantic alliance in one already loaded basket.
Fortunately, no one is interested in such an adventure. The European member states of NATO and the EU have significantly more hidden military power than Russia is able to gather. According to the World Bank, in 2021, the EU's GDP was more than nine times larger than Russia's, and the conflict in Ukraine has further widened the gap. Even the undeservedly criticized military expenditures and the population of EU members exceed the Russian ones by almost four times and three times, respectively. Moreover, the SVO weakened Moscow, giving Europe a unique opportunity to transform existing resources into an effective and coordinated defense system.
When considering the prospects of the outbreak of war in Europe, Mazarr downplays the costs of the current level of commitment of the United States to the security of the region. In his opinion, even if Washington retreats now, the war in Europe will pull it back, negating, first of all, the advantages of reducing its presence. “It is inconceivable that the US president could sit back and do nothing while Europe is fighting for life against a brutal autocrat,” he writes. But there is a huge difference between inaction and the deployment of the First Armored Division. The United States has changed the course of the current conflict in Ukraine, not by engaging in direct hostilities, but by providing Kiev with weapons and intelligence, providing training. If Russia attacks a NATO member, the United States will have a whole range of options for retaliatory measures. Article 5 of the Alliance's Charter requires its members to take “such actions as [they] deem necessary, including the use of armed force in order to restore and subsequently preserve the security of the North Atlantic region.” This does not require the United States to engage in the struggle from the very beginning, much less to conduct it in any particular way. If Europe could do more to protect itself, the United States could do less — and potentially much less in the decades to come.
First of all, the Russian threat should not be inflated, but accurately assessed. In the foreseeable future, Russia will not have enough military power and economic resources to seize the European continent with the subsequent threat to the vital interests of the United States. Its situation in Ukraine illustrated this reality, as well as the obvious desire of neighboring countries to restrain Moscow's ambitions in every possible way. Since the latter cannot become a European hegemon, Washington needs to develop realistic policy options commensurate with the threat to US interests. America can remain a constructive NATO ally with a predominant deployment of troops.
Completion of the pivot towards Asia
Even if deterrence succeeds in both theaters of war at the moment, maintaining the status quo will require significant compromises. Mazarr downplays their importance, arguing that the necessary types of forces and weapons systems differ for Europe (troops and tanks on the ground) and Asia (support at sea and in the air). Of course, there is some truth in this difference; the United States is not going to deploy armored divisions along the chain of islands of the Pacific Ocean. Mazarra's position has the greatest advantages in the short term. Against the background of the improbability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, there is no need to immediately reduce aid to Ukraine in order to increase supplies to Asia, which Washington calls for a number of adherents of the "Asia first" ideology, such as military analyst Elbridge Colby.
However, some of the most important weapon platforms are in high demand in both regions and face problems in the production process. If current arms supplies to Ukraine are carried out mainly from US warehouses, then future ones will depend on the ability of American arms companies to fulfill orders. This may lead to a conflict between the needs of Asia and Europe. The Air Force, in particular, is being overstretched due to the growing demands from both theaters of operations for air refueling and transportation, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Ultimately, the way the US Armed Forces are organized and preferences in terms of weapons purchases will determine strategic priorities. If Asia remains the most important theater for the country's interests, the Pentagon will focus on purchasing systems and developing forces optimized for conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region. That is, fewer resources will be allocated to those assets that are better suited for Europe (or the Middle East, for that matter). Similarly, the relative strength of different types of armed forces will be determined by strategic priorities — and how they form the defense budget. In the long term, European defense needs will compete with Asian ones. Mazarr is right that the direct financial costs of maintaining the current US armed forces in Europe are relatively small in relation to the overall defense budget, but this assessment is selective. The true cost of presence in the United States includes the opportunity costs associated with the redirection of funds for procurement and staffing. Even if Congress spends significantly more money on defense, as some argue, it will only mitigate the problem, but not solve it. In any case, such expenses will be at the expense of urgent domestic needs and entail a real political risk.
In addition, the dominant US military presence has long suppressed the development of Europe's own defense potential and hindered defense cooperation between European states. This result is more than a byproduct of US policy: it is a goal.By creating a security system after the end of the Cold War, the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Clinton sought to prevent Europe from building up military capabilities that would duplicate America's military potential or displace it from the position of NATO leader.American officials wanted to support the country's military superiority, not wanting to trust European states to manage their own affairs. But today the unipolar period is over, and the United States is facing the power of an Asian rival, problems in other countries and discontent within its own. It is necessary to change course. We need to start distributing the burden of transatlantic defense now. It is difficult to imagine the best circumstances for this, as opposed to catastrophic ones in the future.
Stay or leave
Critics of the broader transatlantic division of labor traditionally make three arguments. Firstly, it should be organized on a thematic rather than geographical basis. Mazarr, for example, suggests that the United States ask its European allies to take an active role in the Asia-Pacific region, even if their contribution will not be particularly outstanding. But it hardly makes sense to expect that Europe will send resources to the other side of the planet, while maintaining dependence on the Pacific power in matters of its own defense. The deal is unprofitable for the United States. Although this dependence may draw European states into the Asian theater of operations, it does not guarantee that Europe will follow the United States to Asia, and certainly does not make European states skilled players capable of reducing the US military burden.
The second argument is that the United States benefits from the existing network of alliances, which it will lose if it assumes a more restrained role in European defense. However, Mazarr's example of military cooperation between the United States and Scandinavia is indicative in this regard: America cooperated with Finland and Sweden long before they joined NATO. Work in many important areas, such as intelligence sharing and cybersecurity, is carried out through the mediation of bilateral ties or agreements, not NATO. Such cooperation will almost certainly continue in the absence of a large American contingent in Europe.
The third argument is that European states would abandon strong transatlantic economic ties if the United States made a smaller contribution through NATO. But in previous decades, when the States' commitment to European security was seriously questioned, transatlantic trade and investment remained stable. Today, the economies of Europe and the United States are even more intertwined. The EU exports more goods there than anywhere else, and is America's third largest export partner. As the largest global blocs with industrialized economies, Europe and North America share common challenges and goals, such as achieving a coordinated transition to green energy. No one claims that the presence of American troops in Europe allows Washington to prevent European countries from trading with its enemies. During the Cold War, European states, despite the protection of the United States, opposed trade control over the USSR. This precedent casts doubt on the notion that Washington can use its military presence in Europe to limit or reduce the EU's trade ties with China.
Of course, European states will become less respectful towards Washington if, while remaining in NATO, it reduces the presence of its armed forces and defense assets on their territories. On the other hand, they will still have incentives to protect themselves from Chinese espionage, surveillance and economic coercion, and to form global rules and regulations in partnership with the United States. The risk of a transatlantic commercial rupture is small, especially given that European states may well not join the American policy towards China, even if the United States retains all its forces in Europe. The potential benefit is also significant: Europe will be able to defend itself if necessary.
Veins of the world
The organization of European defense costs Washington dearly, and not only in material terms. The role of the defender is reinforced by arrogance and allows Washington to neglect the often valuable advice of friends. When Western European governments opposed the Iraq war in 2003, they were ignored, despite being right. If Europe had greater strategic autonomy, Washington would not so zealously entertain fantasies that it can shape the world alone at will. American dominance also infantilizes European states, treating them as unable to ensure the security of their own citizens and restricting freedom of action in foreign policy. And here the risks are getting higher, because the overall strategic picture creates a gloomy prospect of a sudden withdrawal of American troops under difficult circumstances.
Then it is better to give the European allies the opportunity to start filling future gaps in the US potential. The original goal of American politicians in the first 10 years after World War II was to help Europeans get back on their feet and defend themselves. However, instead of admitting that they are now capable of doing it themselves, some officials in Washington, ironically, seem to be afraid of their real success, seizing on an excuse to make the American presence in Europe permanent and further expand the country's defense obligations.
Despite the barrage of criticism that has fallen on him, Macron is asking the right questions. What kind of relations should the United States and Europe strive for in the coming decades? Should they represent a real partnership capable of adapting to changing circumstances? Or should it be a one-sided dependence with the support of America's habitual dominance, while the European states will be its vassals rather than allies, as Macron suggested? Asking Europe to step up, though it seems a risky step, but it is safer.
This transition will not be easy. Building a workable European defense will require skillful political maneuvering, strengthening Europe's military-industrial base and comprehensive changes in strategic culture. If everything is done correctly, it will take time. But the result will justify the effort. Contrary to the claims of Mazarr and other critics, the alliance will become stronger, safer and more stable, as its creators imagined. Far from signaling a retreat from international affairs, America will prove that it is not a decadent hegemon clinging to its former superiority and far from the world, but a global leader striving to work with functional partners to build a safe and sustainable world.
Michael Mazarr's answer
Michael MazarrI am glad that three such astute observers of international politics as Emma Ashford, Joshua Shifrinson and Steven Wertheim decided to respond to my article from April 17, “Why America needs Europe".
I agree that the United States should be choosy in choosing global commitments, but when it comes to its role in Europe, the authors fail to formulate actual policy recommendations, and they concentrate on universal, but often inapplicable accusations against the American government.
Defender of Europe
To begin with, I still did not understand what specific policy the authors support. They advocate “a significant reduction of the US armed forces in Europe — most likely with the participation of other states that will take on the lion's share of the defense burden” and for “transferring most of the responsibility for protecting Europe to the Europeans themselves, allowing America to play no more than a supporting role." Rather vague wording. The authors do not indicate what a “significant” but not complete reduction would look like, and do not offer either a corresponding lower bound or any graph. They also do not specify whether the United States should take an extreme step and leave NATO. This ambiguity speaks of strategic neutrality: the call to reduce the US Armed Forces in Europe accompanies the assumption of their long-term military role within NATO with a hint of bolder steps in the future. Such an ambiguous position risks undermining the principle of deterrence and jeopardizing the credibility of US global promises that do not lead to the results desired by the authors.
Their reasoning does not allow for the fact that Washington has already moved to a “supporting role" in Europe. At the peak of the Cold War in the 1950s, he had more than 400,000 troops in Europe, and already in the mid-80s there were about 300,000 of them. In 2021, the figure fell to 60 thousand. But non-NATO countries sent more than 1.9 million troops there in 2021, including 500+ thousand regular army soldiers from France, Germany and the UK alone. US spending is also not as burdensome as the authors of the article suggest: direct spending on forces in Europe — from $30 to $40 billion, according to IISS — is about a tenth of what other NATO members collectively spent on defense in 2022. Thus, the US presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War has already led to a “significant reduction". If this were the key to increasing European defense spending, it should have already happened.
Ashford, Shifrinson and Wertheim have never mentioned whether the security of Europe is a vital interest of the United States. If not, then the latter should withdraw their troops and leave NATO. But if their most important interests are really at stake — and I think they are — then Washington should take all necessary steps to maintain NATO unity and European stability. On this issue, the authors do not adhere to any specific position, but call for a break - serious enough to encourage allies to increase defense spending, but not so radical that there is a threat to deterrence or the global authority of the United States. There is no perfect balance here.
A dead end?
It is also not entirely clear what kind of problem the authors are trying to solve. They do not claim that the US armed forces in Europe pose a significant risk, but they do point to one danger associated with long-term commitments to NATO. Washington's involvement in the affairs of both Asia and Europe, they argue, creates the risk of waging war in both theaters at the same time, highlighting the lack of potential that can embolden China and Russia. I would suggest that the solution to the problem of the inability of the United States to wage two wars at once is not to leave Europe, but to practice effective deterrence. Yes, Ashford, Shifrinson and Wertheim write that “in the foreseeable future, Russia will not have enough military power and economic resources to capture the European continent.” But if this is the case, then deterring attacks on NATO should remain possible, and the United States is unlikely to face a terrible scenario of two wars. And again, the authors' strategic half-measures, limited to a break with NATO, will not solve the problem. If America remains in the alliance and some of its troops remain in Europe, the risk of simultaneous wars will remain.
Ashford, Shifrinson and Wertheim suggest that Washington could fulfill its obligations under the fifth article of the Charter of the North Atlantic Alliance — a provision that obliges it to collectively defend one of its members in case of an attack from outside — without the participation of American troops. This, according to them, is possible by sending military cargo alone, as in the case of Kiev. This is unrealistic for a number of reasons. Although the wording of the fifth article allows for such a strategy, Washington has never been limited to supplying an official ally that has been attacked. In Europe, Asia and elsewhere, unwillingness to send soldiers would be regarded as a rejection of obligations to the alliance. Moreover, this option makes sense only if the United States completely leaves Europe: any remaining forces on the continent will necessarily involve them in the conflict.
The real goal of the authors is, apparently, not so much the dangers associated with America's European position, as its own foreign policy problems in general. "The role of the defender is reinforced by arrogance and allows Washington to neglect the often valuable advice of friends," they say. What needs to be corrected is the “fantasy that the US alone can shape the world at will.”
The limitations of such general provisions become apparent when applied to specific cases. A striking example is the role of the United States in Europe, where for 75 years they have helped to ensure peace and stability. There is no reason to believe that commitments to Europeans influence Washington's propensity to embark on risky foreign adventures. These commitments have not changed since 1945, while the desire to interfere in the affairs of other countries is increasing and weakening. Ashford, Shifrinson and Wertheim do not see much value in Washington's European role, but they cannot bring themselves to call for a final break. They advise withdrawing troops in an indefinite number and pace in order to negate abstract risks and achieve dubious benefits.
Moreover, they voice their arguments at a very strange moment. “It is difficult to imagine better circumstances” for the beginning of the separation of the United States and Europe, they argue, alternatively calling “the preservation of the shaky status quo, which suppresses the military potential of Europe and demands more and more from Washington.” Such a thing causes only bewilderment. Europe is facing the most serious security crisis since the end of the Cold War. The United States and its NATO allies have joined forces to help Ukraine. These allies, including France and Germany, have made many commitments to strengthen military capabilities, and the North Atlantic Alliance is in a hurry to restore the ability to act effectively. This is not a “shaky status quo.” In the face of the newfound transatlantic resolve, a sharp U-turn and a declaration of intention to abandon the burden of European security will be one of the most destructive and failed great-power steps in modern history for the United States.
