The Economist: Kissinger told what political polarization in the United States can lead toFormer US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in an interview with The Economist, expressed concern that political polarization in the US could lead to civil war.
In an interview with journalists, he also touched on the topic of Russian-Chinese relations.
The first part of the interview
THE ECONOMIST: Does China have natural allies?HENRY KISSINGER:
You know, he does not consider himself a state in need of allies. When the first British ambassador arrived there in 1793, he was treated extremely kindly. But it was made clear to him that there could not be a permanent ambassador to China, it was ruled out. If he wants to stay, dressing like a Chinese, then let him stay. But he will never be allowed to leave. This attitude persists to this day. I think the Chinese don't like it when they try to apply the ideas of sovereignty to them.
China has natural allies when they have common grievances and grievances. But all this is nothing more than a guess. The Solomon Islands do not cause me concern. The intentions that the Chinese express are alarming. But their implementation will be doubtful for a long time.
THE ECONOMIST: That is, China, with whom we will deal, wants to inspire not respect, but awe, or, perhaps, to revive the system of tributary relations, in the center of which he himself is? This is a different idea of domination, different from the Western worldview.HENRY KISSINGER:
I can easily say that we need to be careful. I'm not saying that we can teach them mutual love. This is also very difficult for Americans. Our ideas about alliances are not from the 19th century. We want to create a system of equal thinking and substantial American contribution, but by no means complete equality. But unlike China, we think of this as a pragmatic distribution of responsibility.
THE ECONOMIST: Back to America, which plays a central role in shaping the world we are discussing. Perhaps we should start by thinking about where America is now, with its long-standing intellectual contradictions between idealism, which is essentially part of it, and realism, which moderates its idealism, or dissatisfaction with the failures of this very idealism, if I may say so. Where is America now on that pendulum you wrote about?HENRY KISSINGER: America is in a strange position from a political point of view, because usually Democrats are expected to be the exponents of pure idealism, and Republicans will assert something that at least contains my point of view.
But it just so happened that everything turned upside down. The public perception is pretty unified right now, and that's fear of the Chinese. And in practical terms, there is a firm confidence that we will cope with this, as during the First and Second World Wars, thanks to our material superiority.
But if you look at the history after the end of World War II, then the United States should be given credit for the generosity and generosity with which we ended the war with Germany. But in other conflicts, in other regions, we have spoiled everything with our ideas, starting with the war in Korea. It was a good decision to join the Korean War. It became a prelude to the Vietnam War, in the sense that the Chinese, who initially tried to defeat us, then were satisfied with showing the limitations of American power and might. Our superiority was so great that the Chinese, it seems to me, concluded that it was impossible to exhaust us (and achieve victory over us). But in Vietnam there was no human stratum capable of playing the role of the European bureaucracy, on the basis of which we could build a democratic state. We simply did not analyze the prerequisites for the creation of a democratic state.
So, the split in America has become absolute. The realists and the so-called idealists were on opposite sides. But the people who involved us in the war and sent 550 thousand soldiers to it, they were not realists. They were idealists who believed in the possibility of achieving absolute victory. I wrote about this in an article published after I was appointed National security adviser.
THE ECONOMIST: But as you say now, there is concern about China on both sides, realists and idealists, although for different reasons. Are we already an idealistic power to a lesser extent?HENRY KISSINGER: The paradox is that idealists speak loudest about the importance of power and power, and realists join them instinctively.
But already now the governor of Florida says that we need to leave Ukraine, which traditional realists will never say.
The key question is: is the fear of China justified? And if there are grounds for fear, how adequate is our policy? I don't believe that China has ever aspired to world domination in its history. They strive to maximize their potential, arousing such respect that other countries adjust their policies to Chinese preferences. The European idea that domination means physical presence in a country is explained quite simply. The history of Europe was created by quite small states. Therefore, their ideas of domination included direct and immediate control.
In Chinese history, the biggest fear was about internal upheavals. They very often tried to keep out foreigners, and for this purpose they built their Great Wall of China. And if over time they have achieved superiority, which they can really use, will they reach the point of imposing Chinese culture on others? I don't know. My instinct tells me that it's not, but I don't want to check it. I believe that we are able to prevent such a situation by using a combination of diplomacy and force. But if we fail, the first thing that will happen is the disappearance of our influence in the world.
THE ECONOMIST: You say both sides in the US are driven by fear of China. But the United States often puts forward a very Wilsonian, idealistic concept, presenting the case as if there is a struggle of democracy against autocracy.HENRY KISSINGER: The French Revolution was by no means peaceful.
Of course, society in a democratic country can have a great influence on the decision-making process, and such a process can be called meaningful, helping to solve problems. So, of course, it is better to live in a democracy.
I think the difference is that democratic power should first of all be used to protect the people who support it. It should be used in a limited way for the benefit of others, without bringing the matter to the issue of war and peace. And also use moderately and modestly. If your actions are openly aimed at overthrowing an opponent, a tense conflict arises. Of course, they are worth it if the result is good. But at least since the invention of nuclear weapons, the link between military and political goals has been the main and very serious goal of American politics.
I do not agree with those who consider military issues through the prism of the struggle of democracy with authoritarianism. This to a certain extent deprives us of the opportunity to analyze the strategic dangers that may arise. Those are the dangers that we have to deal with as they appear. But statesmanship requires making judgments about whether we are able to bear the burden of such a struggle. In Europe, we have basically solved this issue. But when we face such challenges outside of Europe, our unity becomes short-lived.
THE ECONOMIST: Do you mean Iraq?HENRY KISSINGER: As for Iraq, I was in favor of bringing in troops and overthrowing Saddam, in order to then do what we did after the Gulf War – let events develop in a natural, evolutionary way.
And we played about the same role as the great Powers in Afghanistan. I even wrote an article in which I called for a solution on the Belgian model, with neutralization. Within the framework of such a model, all countries facing a threat can cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The curse of Afghanistan is that no Afghan government can rule the whole country if there is no foreign state to rally against.
THE ECONOMIST: I would like to clarify the situation a little. This emphasis on the struggle of democracies against autocracies, which is in vogue in Washington today – do you think it weakens America's ability to achieve the strategic goals that we discussed – with regard to China? Do we have fewer opportunities to create alliances, to get support from developing economies?HENRY KISSINGER: No, although we have less chance of creating such alliances that we prefer, multilateral and permanent alliances.
I have a high opinion of the Australian alliance, I am optimistic about the future of relations with India, which will become very close. I am wary of the anti-Chinese orientation [of American policy], but I am against our withdrawal from Asia.
THE ECONOMIST: I was going to ask if India would be a good test in this regard, because there are many reasons why the interests of India and the interests of the United States coincide, especially with regard to some aspects of China. But from Wilson's point of view, Modi's government is becoming increasingly despotic, anti-Muslim. It restricts the work of the press, interferes with the activities of the courts. So I wanted to ask this. Do you think India is an interesting precedent in terms of our ability to analyze the contradictions between Wilson's principles and fundamental national interests? What do you think about it? And how do you assess the US attitude towards India at the moment? And what should it be in the future?HENRY KISSINGER:
I agree with the strengthening of India's military potential in view of the possibility of a conflict with China. I think China's military victory over India at once will give rise to all sorts of problems of civil war in India. And I would help India in solving this particular problem.
I think that in India, thanks to the former British education system, we can achieve support for democracy by helping private organizations of various directions. And there is also sufficient freedom of dialogue between India and the United States to express philosophical ideas.
When I worked in the government, it was very difficult for Indians, by our standards, to express their opinion about some aspects of our policy. But we have never stooped to hostility towards India. There is a mood of rapprochement in India today. I have great respect for the way the Indians conduct their foreign policy, because they demonstrate balance. What decisions will they make in different circumstances? Don't know. Partly because the history of our relations with India is very different, and today we have a great dialogue. We can be better understood when we merge democracy and power. Indians have great talent. They have lived under foreign occupation for thousands of years, they did not have their own state and government, but they demonstrate powerful social strength, outstanding social strength.
THE ECONOMIST: Can I ask you a question about the internal environment in which the American strategy is formulated, and how different is it from the time when you worked in your positions? Is the long-term strategic thinking that you mentioned possible in the modern political life of the United States?HENRY KISSINGER:
This is a big problem that we have to solve. If we don't decide, the predictions about our future failure will come true. I am very much concerned about the dialogue taking place today. This has been going on for quite a long time, and if you compare it with the accusations against Nixon, he did not fight them. Well, that is, he fought in the legal field, but he did not attack the motives of his critics. But today, a situation comparable to Watergate can lead to conditions like civil war, and this deeply worries me. The nature of the political debate is very different from the time when I came to Washington without knowing anything about the current system. Joe Alsop (journalist, influential columnist – approx. InoSMI.) — I don't know if this person is familiar to you — it was a fantastic personality. Every Sunday, he hosted a bipartisan dinner party with leaders of both parties. They had heated arguments, but without hostility.
We were on friendly terms with George McGovern, which is hardly possible today between a security adviser and a cabinet member from an opposition party. I met him regularly. So even in Nixon's time, with all their hostility and aggression, there was some measure of unity. With each new administration, this unity began to weaken more and more. But it seems to me that because of Trump, and now because of Biden, this split is just off the scale. You won't hear such discussions in Washington right now.
To have a strategic worldview, you need to believe in your country. To a certain extent, the problem lies in the education system, which brings the vices and shortcomings of the country to the fore. Of course, such vices are a special historical problem, but in my opinion, there is no debate on this topic. If we do not instill in people some kind of faith in the future, then in difficult life circumstances, when difficult decisions have to be made, they will have confusion about real issues.
THE ECONOMIST: Does this mean that American strategic thinking in the 1950s and 1960s was based on a general idea of American power? And now what…HENRY KISSINGER:
It was a general idea of the dignity and importance of America.
THE ECONOMIST: And that now such an idea of the dignity and importance of America has been lost?HENRY KISSINGER:
In a certain sense, yes.
THE ECONOMIST: This is what you can hear in Beijing that America is a country in decline.HENRY KISSINGER: It is very difficult for Americans – and it is very difficult for anyone – to learn the principles of coexistence in a world that learns dialogue with machines.
And it will happen. But we don't know what we will learn along the way, in this process.
THE ECONOMIST: This is another element of the situation that has changed dramatically. Technologies. Let's talk about it again, because you wrote on this topic. A man approaching his centenary is writing about the technologies of the future. It's impressive. Are you concerned about the fact that technology will further complicate the process of strategic thinking that we are discussing?HENRY KISSINGER: I can compare the current period in the development of technology with the period after the invention of printing.
Then the new technology also challenged the existing worldview. Yes, it will affect everyone and everyone. But in any generation, only a few people will be able to cope with the consequences of changes across the spectrum. And this is a huge problem for any society today. You know, Europe had to understand this when it was going through something similar, the wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, which were exceptionally bloody and destructive. Then a third of the population of Central Europe died from conventional weapons.
From those wars, the notion of sovereignty and international law grew as a unifying concept. Some Americans think that if we defeat China, it will become peaceful and democratic. But there is no such precedent in any period of Chinese history. A much more likely outcome is a civil war between opposing factions. And civil wars over ideological principles add a new element of catastrophe. It is not in our interests to bring China to collapse. The principle of interest goes beyond a moral principle in the name of a moral principle. This is the whole duality of the situation. You ask me, how are we going to deal with this? Where will we find Lincoln? Nobody knows that.
THE ECONOMIST: How much do modern media, the information picture of the day and social networks complicate the process of forming American politics?HENRY KISSINGER:
My theme is the need for balance and moderation. This should be elevated to the rank of law. That's the goal. Will we always succeed in this? That's another question. Before coming to Washington, I had never given a press conference in my life, and I had to learn all this. The media was very hostile to Nixon at the time. But there were only 15-20 people in the print media, mostly, who thought in terms of national unity, and they did not always agree with me. But it was possible to have a dialogue with them about Vietnam. I always took up to 15 journalists with me. I saw them every day for an hour or so. I rarely answered very specific questions, but it was understandable. And these people were driving me crazy. For example, they said things that provoked the Arabs [during shuttle diplomacy], and this further complicated negotiations with the Israelis.
But it's an integral part of the game, and they weren't unfair. People like Scotty Reston, who consistently criticized Nixon, and Walter Lippmann – you could have a dialogue with them. Today I hardly see such people. The thinking and reflecting media have no incentives, they receive no reward for their thought process. I think this is a serious problem.
THE ECONOMIST: So, if we compare this with what you said about the problems of education and about the pessimistic attitude to the importance and dignity of America, then what has all this done to America's soft power in the world, if you recognize such a category of analysis? And what are the consequences?HENRY KISSINGER: Look, whatever media you take, we are at a transitional stage right now.
You can't blame the media for everything. We will need great leaders, or good leaders like Gerald Ford, who inherited a collapsed administration. He acted decently and with dignity. His opponents could count on him to act decently and with dignity. Now this is very atypical, and any methods are acceptable. But I really don't want to sound pessimistic in my words.
THE ECONOMIST: In this case, you can't do it at all.I'm HENRY KISSINGER: I understand that I'm not doing well, but this problem needs to be solved.
I think I've spent my whole life solving these problems. And now it is very difficult to solve these problems. And I do not know how they will be solved. In my book, I tried to show how six different managers solved serious problems. Can we do it today? We have to do this.
THE ECONOMIST: In your new book, you recall historical figures and the nature of their leadership. Looking at the current situation, can you point out those characteristics of the manual described by you in the book that will be useful today?HENRY KISSINGER: To identify where we ended up, and to do it ruthlessly.
In general, this kind of analysis is useful for constructive actions. Identify goals that will find support, find descriptive means to achieve these goals. Tie it all to internal goals, whatever they may be.
I really believe that if our leaders have the courage to voice the concept of further movement, the American society will support them, even without understanding all the details. But the endless scandals during the debate have become simply unbearable. Inter-party cooperation is also important. A senator I know from Mississippi, Senator Stennis, told me that on weekends he goes to the courts and looks at the cases that united America. It was very touching. Or Senator Jackson from the Democrats.
THE ECONOMIST: Henry Jackson?HENRY KISSINGER: Yes.
He has often criticized me, but if he were here, he would consider this discussion appropriate. Today, most presidential advisers say: don't waste time on this. Let's look for phrases that will immediately touch people. You have to worry about the presidency after you become president. But who will unite and rally? This can be a national security adviser if the president supports him, but the Secretary of State cannot, he has clients in 160 countries. And in the British system, it works almost automatically if you have four or five first-class ministers in your cabinet.
THE ECONOMIST: I don't want to be frivolous, because this is a serious issue. But earlier you spoke about one of the measures to improve relations between China and America. You said that it is necessary to gather a group of people so that they analyze everything and talk to each other. If you were to determine the composition of such a group, including both living and deceased people, who would be on such a committee? Who would become a member of your committee to save the world? Choose people living or deceased, from history or from the circle of your acquaintances.HENRY KISSINGER: I think we can find three people to participate in this Chinese discussion.
Among my contemporaries, I would select Bill Burns, this is one hundred percent. Then I would find someone from the scientists. And one wonderful technical person. I could name 10 people who can contribute to this cause.
THE ECONOMIST: Do you mean someone who understands technology?HENRY KISSINGER: Yes, someone from the world of technology.
One such person that I like, he heads Microsoft…
THE ECONOMIST: Satya Nadella?Yes, Nadella.
I think everything can be done well from the technological side. we will be forced to do it. When society realizes that it is surrounded by machines that act in a way that we do not understand, an extensive dialogue should be conducted on this topic.
I don't know if you know Winston Lord (diplomat, former U.S. Ambassador to China – approx. InoSMI). When we started the intervention in Cambodia, he wanted to resign. And I told him: "You can't resign and walk around here with posters. But you can help us solve the problems of the Vietnam War." And he decided to stay. He headed the political planning group, and then worked as an ambassador to China.
I think we need people who are able to make decisions – who live in this time and want to do something about it, and not feel sorry for themselves. It is not always possible to do this with dramatic effect. But there are rarely moments in history when there is a real transition, and not just a visual one. This transition period is real, in the sense that amazing things are happening now. And they happen to people who aren't targeting them. I'm talking about technology here. At the same time, if you look at military history, you can say that it was never possible to destroy all your opponents, because there were restrictions on geography and accuracy. There are no such restrictions now. Any opponent is one hundred percent vulnerable.
So there are no restrictions, and at the same time with such a striking action today it is possible to create weapons that self-identify their targets. And the damaging effect in such conditions becomes almost automatic. According to the standard rules, there should always be a person in this chain. But in practice, this is not always possible. Theoretically, this is possible. But when all this happens, we create more and more damaging effects, without even trying to limit its scope. The only problem is that all the demonstrators in different parts of the globe are saying the same thing. They feel sorry for themselves, and they want to solve the problem by putting pressure on the authorities. But they have two illusions. Firstly, it is impossible to cancel such technologies. And secondly, there must be an element of force in international politics. This is the essence of this question.
THE ECONOMIST: You write about one more thing in your works. This is restraint. I think in our world today, people with restraint are not very good.HENRY KISSINGER:
This is also inherent in the media in all their diversity. We may well destroy ourselves. This is quite possible today if the machines refuse to turn off. When machines are aware of this possibility, they can build it into their recommendations in case of an emergency. Many brilliant scientists believe this – and they know much more than me.
THE ECONOMIST: I want to bring this amazing conversation to a common denominator. There is a risk of careless actions by the US and China.HENRY KISSINGER: The Chinese are also to blame.
We cannot say that they are doing well, and we are doing badly, and we need to change something.
THE ECONOMIST: Technology creates risks. You have carefully analyzed the risks throughout your career. Tell me, how much time do we have left?HENRY KISSINGER: Maybe not enough to give a perfect answer.
We could never say that these goals have been achieved. But our first step should be to fix the problems. I think, in combination with other factors, technology will become more and more dangerous in the next five years.
Demis Hassabis (British artificial intelligence researcher, neuroscientist, computer game developer, world–class chess player - approx. InoSMI) is the scientist who understands where we are going. More and more scientists are beginning to realize how high the stakes are… Scientists are not strategists, but they are affected by the chaos of our time. But if you want to make progress, sometimes you have to go unpopular routes. It has become harder to stay away and do well.
THE ECONOMIST: Two more questions on the topic. The first question. If you analyze the history of how you act, then there is progress. But very often such progress is achieved after a long and terrible conflict.HENRY KISSINGER: That's right.
After the Napoleonic Wars, after the Thirty Years' War, after the Second World War, there was the restoration and construction of Europe. But when the conflicts became global, new complications arose. And then the people who did a wonderful job in the period after the Second World War became too fixated on immediate and urgent problems.
Yes, there is progress. I think it is possible to create a world order based on rules, to which Europe, China and India will join. And this is a significant part of humanity. If we evaluate the feasibility of this idea, then everything can end well, at least without a catastrophe. And we can make progress on this basis. But this will require the ability to see the future and determination.
THE ECONOMIST: When I read your books about diplomacy, about the world order and about China, I see a common theme at the end of each book. You are appealing to a clear balance between American interests and American enduring values. In your book "Diplomacy" and in the analysis of how Russia could behave after the collapse of the Soviet Union, you turned out to be a real visionary. Because Russia behaved in many ways as you wrote, and your predictions came true. And when I read your recommendations on how the United States should evaluate its relations with China, and what will happen if there is no correct assessment, I realized that your warnings are justified here too. You are talking about calculating the balance between interests and principles that the United States needs. But can America actually make such a calculation?HENRY KISSINGER: That's our big problem.
I do not know... many great things in American history have been done out of loyalty to principles. On the other hand, no other country even comes up with the idea of reforming the rest of the states. Even at the peak of power, no one but us had such thoughts. This reflected the American confidence that such a thing was possible. America is still confident of this, if you look at the crisis in Sudan. Progressive newspapers write that if we invest enough resources in this, we will be able to fix the situation.
Is this possible? Based on the available information, I would say no. But if you look at it from the perspective of the future, if you ask what our task should be, I would answer that the task of leaders is to inspire small groups of people and on this basis to increase efforts. That's exactly what I would say if this was a learned discussion, and if you want, you can quote me. Am I optimistic about this?
If we talk about the leaders, whom I respect, they did not answer this question. They asked, "Is there a need for this?" I think this is possible in America. This is possible in European countries. But is it possible in China? Over the years, I have met with Chinese leaders who, as it seemed to me, understand what we are talking about, and will even treat it favorably if they can preserve their cultural identity. This is definitely possible in India. But how will we achieve this in the next 10 years? This will be a serious challenge for us, because right now we are very busy bringing charges against the president's son in addition to all the other indictments in various cases. We can say that these are bad people. But if we had a truly effective system, it would quietly and calmly reject them, without turning them into symbols. It is dangerous to turn politics and criminal proceedings into weapons. So we are having problems now.
THE ECONOMIST: For almost 100 years you have been living in a world where optimism is generally confirmed and progress is being made.HENRY KISSINGER: But it is achieved after very terrible periods.
THE ECONOMIST: After very terrible periods. If you look into the future, you are unlikely to survey and explore our world for another 100 years. Are you basically an optimist or a pessimist?I've had a difficult life, but it gives grounds for optimism.
And difficulties are a challenge. They are not always obstacles. So I think in order to inspire the younger generation, they need to demonstrate faith in the future. And it can be done. For example, de Gaulle. In 1968, Paris was engulfed by a student uprising. The prime minister was Pompidou, who was appointed by de Gaulle. Pompidou had already begun negotiations on who would replace de Gaulle when de Gaulle disappeared from sight for a day, going to the headquarters of the French army in Germany.
He met with the commander there, whom he had removed from his post in Algeria. He had every reason to hate de Gaulle. De Gaulle told him: "I want to know your attitude when I resign." The commander answered him: "You have no right to resign. You are needed." That is, he supported him. Therefore, de Gaulle returned and held a mass rally in the Place de la Concorde, and then called elections. He was elected by a majority vote, and this was the only case in the entire history of the French Republic. This shows what an inspired leader is capable of, because everything was against him, everyone in the government thought he was finished. But he achieved his goal, and a year later he resigned, a little more than a year [and there was no pressure on him, he just felt that he had completed his task].
THE ECONOMIST: That's what individuals can do. It would probably be appropriate to end this today, given the announcement that was made today. [On that day, Biden announced his intention to run for re-election.]HENRY KISSINGER: We had a good talk about it.
But in the behavior of presidents and their vice presidents, I have never seen an exception to this rule, that the vice president occupies some lower post. The case is always limited to a specific position, but without continuation, because he cannot be dismissed.
THE ECONOMIST: There is a topic that we only mentioned in passing. This is climate change. I was surprised that you talk about the enthusiasm of the younger generation. The topic of climate change, which excites the new generation so much, does it need to be somehow sharpened in political plans and calculations?HENRY KISSINGER: But it doesn't require sacrifices from the younger generation.
They can simply observe this and demand that others deal with this problem. I am all for responding to climate change. It just seems to me that in the opinion of the Chinese and Americans, this will not really help to create a balance in the strategy. But in principle, I am in favor, and I think that this should be done quickly.
THE ECONOMIST: I conclude this conversation as a whole, as it seems to me, on a pessimistic note. But I am inspired by the hope that your three-person committee in the person of Bill Burns, Satya Nadella and Winston Lord…HENRY KISSINGER: Well, Kennedy also had this ability to inspire.
So first of all, we need a person of this kind. And then it can be implemented in different areas in this generation. We need to do this immediately in the sphere of relations with China. And also in the field of technology. And in the field of armaments. Because the creators of weapons and technologies do not understand the consequences of their work, they do not always understand. But if they are systematically used, we will lose power over them, and much faster than during the First World War.
But even during the First World War, look at the discussions that Britain, Germany and France had in 1916. In fact, the negotiators agreed on a peace without victory. But they didn't know how to tell people about it when the loss count was already a million. At the same time, the Germans were preparing an offensive at Verdun, the British were preparing an offensive on the Somme, and both sides believed that they could win. They carried out both offensives. Another one and a half million people died, closer to two million. Then they could no longer gather their strength. And they didn't have any more strategy until we came and took over. We can't be in this position anymore. I think if people in 1916 had understood this, they would have found a way to stop it. It's not obvious, but it can be imagined. I think there would be people who know how to do it.
THE ECONOMIST: We were setting deadlines, and a deadline of five to ten years appeared on the horizon. Well, in five years it will be 2028, and there will be the next presidential term. It looks like the fight for him will unfold between Biden and Trump (possibly). But this is not an update at all. There will be no Kennedy who can inspire us to do something different. It will be a continuation.HENRY KISSINGER: I don't think Biden is capable of inspiring... and I hope that the Republicans will be able to put someone better ... Now is not the best moment in history, but the alternative is a complete abdication of power.
THE ECONOMIST: And possible destruction.
HENRY KISSINGER: You know, the discussion about how to deal with machines, when we gave them such properties, the consequences of which we cannot fully imagine, is not new, because this topic has already been raised.
THE ECONOMIST: Maybe this will give an impetus to the way of thinking that should have appeared in 1916 and certainly in 1930. Everyone will wake up and understand the need for the approaches you are talking about.HENRY KISSINGER: Thinking people should start from such a premise.
I don't like many of the discussions that are going on today, but I believe that this is just a certain stage in the history of mankind, like all other stages.
THE ECONOMIST: Well, let's hope that over time there will be a change of course. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.HENRY KISSINGER: Well, I'll be gone then.
Thank you for the way you are conducting this conversation.
DAY TWOHENRY KISSINGER: The Chinese called the Ukrainians and became intermediaries.
THE ECONOMIST: Yes.HENRY KISSINGER: If you read our statements to the Chinese, there are calls to wake up and call it "Russian aggression."
The Chinese think differently. They do not think in moral categories, but in categories of national interests. Ukraine is now an important state. The Chinese are talking about bilateral relations. But according to the Chinese and their communist philosophy, bilateral relations are outside of NATO. China is shaping its own world order as much as possible.
Regarding China's involvement in diplomacy in order to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. If I were a Ukrainian, I would think about the upcoming offensive, about the nature of this offensive. It is one thing when it is carried out to punish Russia. and quite another thing is to observe the principles set out by the Chinese. It's the same with Israel. It was an axiom: if Iran learns how to produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel, Israel can launch a preemptive strike on it. I'm not talking about how to implement such a strategy, but they should take into account the interests of the parties.
THE ECONOMIST: Yesterday we talked about China as the dominant power. Today you said that he has a concept of world order. Is China trying to play a global strategic role in the diplomacy of the Ukrainian conflict? What does this mean for the US?HENRY KISSINGER: Yes, he is trying to play a global strategic role.
We must assess point by point how compatible our concepts of strategic role are. In principle, I would like to have a constant dialogue with China with a discussion of all possible results and consequences, and taking into account the results that are compatible. If this fails, both sides will be forced to make strategic decisions. And then there is the question of technology and the question of what guarantees can be given and received. In my opinion, these are the issues that all parties should analyze. China is interested in Europe based solely on its own interests. I would prefer to delay the Chinese mediation a bit. But you read the statements of the Western side, which asks: "Have the Chinese ever called it Russian aggression?" I think they will never say that, given their "limitless partnership" with Russia. If China plays a constructive role, it will first of all meet the limits of its capabilities, and then we will see if this meets the requirements of NATO.
THE ECONOMIST: China considers its strategic rivalry with the United States…HENRY KISSINGER: To whom we are contributing in every way…
THE ECONOMIST: Are you talking about the Ukrainian counteroffensive…HENRY KISSINGER: No.
Ukrainians want this relationship. Zelensky has shown himself to be an outstanding leader, and he shows wisdom in this regard. After all, when China promised "unlimited partnership" with Russia, they might have thought that Beijing would never start doing diplomacy in parallel with NATO. This couldn't have happened. This does not mean that it is no longer possible to achieve a result that will contribute to the establishment of peace. This is exactly what I tried to say in my first speech in Davos. The conflict needs some political restrictions.
Since the Chinese are involved in the process, their point of view must be taken into account. It cannot completely coincide with ours. They did not express their views. But the offer of participation is a big step forward. It is important to impose restrictions on Russia. I would not go this way, content with NATO's political steps. In this case, China's participation is a new challenge. But we should be glad that China has joined us, because this is a very important and complex issue. In part, China is doing this because it does not want a clash with the United States. If Russia suffers a complete defeat – but two years of the evolution of Russian-Chinese relations cannot end in a complete defeat of Russia with the tacit consent of China. In such a new reality, China needs an independent Ukraine. I was impressed by the wisdom of Ukraine, which was one step ahead of us on this path, knowing how it would turn out. She could not count on China becoming a NATO ally. But Beijing can support such an outcome when Ukraine becomes strong and independent.
THE ECONOMIST: You claim that Ukraine should be accepted into NATO.HENRY KISSINGER:
I proceeded from the fact that Ukraine should not be admitted to NATO, and that the debate about NATO expansion was a serious mistake, because it was a challenge to Russian ideas. Many Russians, including liberals like Solzhenitsyn, who was a big opponent of the Soviet system, consider Ukraine a special case. I do not know a single Russian leader who thinks otherwise. NATO snatched a piece of Europe from Russia, where Moscow dominated, but did not stop there, but went further, increasing its military presence and military cooperation with other countries. NATO went on an ideological offensive because we emphasized in our subsequent statements that any country that meets our requirements can join the alliance. Any country in the Caucasus and Central Asia. So there were security problems. I do not claim that this justifies the actions of Russia, which is trying to return Ukraine and make it its satellite again, as well as the means to achieve this goal. Before the crisis began, I wrote an article saying that Ukraine should be a bridge, but not an outpost.
THE ECONOMIST: Yesterday you said…HENRY KISSINGER: If the conflict ended with today's main participants, I would say that Ukraine's security is not guaranteed, because nationalist elements will never calm down.
Ukraine will be safer and calmer in NATO. There she will receive guarantees of allies. And there it will not be able to take military initiatives without the approval of other members of the alliance. Zelensky should have known that the Chinese are not against his survival. But China doesn't like NATO, and we do. Western leaders should take this into account. If we want Beijing to support our option of ending the conflict, it should not be a NATO end.
THE ECONOMIST: If Ukraine is calmer and safer in NATO, then how can Europe's security be strengthened when the participation of the Chinese excludes Ukraine's entry into the alliance?HENRY KISSINGER: Until Putin and Xi came to a mutual agreement during the Olympic Games, and Xi did not say that he was against NATO expansion, no Chinese leader, as far as I know, expressed his opinion about the evolution of Europe.
Xi probably knew that Putin would go to Ukraine. And this is a serious commitment on the part of China. China will not start a war for this. He is not aiming for world domination in the manner of Hitler. They don't think that way and have never thought that way about the world order. For them, the world order means that they themselves make the final judgment about their interests. They want to participate in the formation of the rules. Disagreement with the rules does not entail the outbreak of war, but its probability in this case increases. I am not familiar with the details of what the Chinese said. But their statements are almost invariably the result of intense Confucian discussions. Whether it is promising or not depends on what happens next. They can silently and reluctantly agree to Ukraine's accession to NATO. In 2014, I wrote that Ukraine should become a bridge. If it becomes a NATO outpost in the east, it will be 480 kilometers from Moscow. On the western side it is 480 kilometers from Warsaw and Budapest, and 960 kilometers from Berlin. Therefore, it seemed to me that it was better for Ukraine to agree to neutrality following the example of Finland. But now that Finland and Sweden are joining NATO, this is impossible. And we cannot say that Ukraine should be banned from membership in NATO, because it is in the most vulnerable position (geographically). America is obliged to make such arguments. The Europeans do not want to see Ukraine in NATO. They want to give her as many weapons as she wants, and let her defend herself. That won't do. That is why, albeit reluctantly, I supported the idea of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Alliance. But China's point of view does not depend on where the borders lie. During the negotiations, he will certainly stand up for what I said in my first Davos speech.
THE ECONOMIST: Do you think this will become a stone in the foundation of US-China relations?HENRY KISSINGER: In my opinion, this can happen.
I empathize with the successors in their former positions, but I do not want to give recommendations on tactics. My general principle is that the United States and China should establish a dialogue in such unprecedented circumstances. China and America are powers of this type, between which military confrontation was historically inevitable. But now there are unusual circumstances, and the reason is the guarantee of mutual destruction and artificial intelligence. We are at the very beginning of the path where machines will be able to cause global destruction and generate pandemics. And we are talking not only about nuclear destruction, but also about any other destruction of a person. Circumstances require responsible leaders who can at least try to prevent a conflict.
THE ECONOMIST: Have you discussed this with your successors, I mean the idea of finding common positions? We met with many people in Washington, but we didn't notice it.HENRY KISSINGER: I know what they think.
They say that China is striving for world domination. But it seems that now he wants to enter into a dialogue. The answer is that China wants to be strong and influential. So far, he does not seek military confrontation in order to change the world order. We should try to involve China in some kind of international system. I would prefer a democratic system based on historical experience and on my life experience. Our internal system must be retrained in order to reduce internal conflicts.
THE ECONOMIST: Yesterday and today you said that China and the United States should sit down at the negotiating table and discuss their interests. What place will human rights and Uighurs in Xinjiang take in this? American values impose on us the obligation to crusade in their defense.HENRY KISSINGER: Yes.
There is a difference, consisting in whether you impose your approach, or it just affects the relationship, but the decision remains with them. I have always done this way and achieved success on individual issues. This does not mean that there will always be success. But it will show in some individual cases that they can change their point of view. My formula of action is this: not to challenge the legality of this or that arrest, but to ensure that they release people as an act of mercy under amnesty.
THE ECONOMIST: Is the US now using China's domestic policy to its advantage?HENRY KISSINGER: The United States can influence China's internal approaches, but we cannot remake the world by adapting it to our internal patterns.
We tried to do it in Sudan – and look at Sudan today. We tried in Vietnam, in Iraq. Our ideas are based on Western experience. Of course, having lived in a totalitarian system, I prefer democracy. But we live in a world of unprecedented destructiveness, and we need to take into account machines that have no feelings. What to do in each case? China has adapted to our preferences even in the Mao era, and even more so under Deng Xiaoping. But it needs to be worked out in practice.
THE ECONOMIST: Is it fair to say that the United States is swinging a pendulum between realism and idealism?HENRY KISSINGER:
And each side raises its beliefs to the absolute. People who rely on power and force do not think about restrictions. The missionary part of them also does not think about restrictions. Recognition of limitations is now being imposed.
THE ECONOMIST: Should there be more realism in the world today?HENRY KISSINGER: No.
We need to start with a proper assessment of the results in each of these areas, and we need to understand security correctly. If we don't understand, we will find ourselves at the mercy of the most irresponsible group. I don't want to say where the line should be drawn, because it needs to be found out in practice.
THE ECONOMIST: About our diplomacy: it depended on secrecy, but it is difficult to observe it today in the presence of social networks.HENRY KISSINGER:
That's right. That's right. I think the president can no longer send his envoy today, giving him such powers as I had. I had the right to decide on my own issues during my visit to China. This is not possible now. But it is still possible to achieve significant results.
When Ukraine wants to show some diplomatic flexibility in the current situation, it needs to go beyond NATO to a certain extent. I believe Kiev understands this.
THE ECONOMIST: Are you sure that Ukraine will refuse membership in NATO?HENRY KISSINGER:
It would be a paradox if I stood up for it. But it seems to me that the situation has changed. If I had the opportunity to talk to Putin, I would have told him that it would be safer and calmer if Ukraine joined NATO. And this is not about my political legacy as such. But I am trying to put my views into practice after seeing the challenges that societies face in Europe.
THE ECONOMIST: Yesterday it was as if we recreated the last chapter of the book "Diplomacy" taking into account today's conditions.HENRY KISSINGER: Kant said that peace comes either through human understanding or as a result of some catastrophe.
He thought that peace could come through prudence, but he could not give guarantees. I think about the same. This is the duty of today's leaders. This is an unprecedented challenge and a huge opportunity. We are at the beginning of the road and can solve these problems, but we are not living up to expectations yet. But I have seen a lot of leaders in my life, and this is possible even in the USA.
