FP: we cannot talk about Ukraine's immediate membership in NATOThe author of The Foreign Policy believes that it is premature to drag Ukraine into the NATO orbit.
This will thwart any attempts at a peaceful settlement of the conflict. He suggests expanding the scope of Western military support.
John R. DeniIf Ukraine is accepted into the North Atlantic Alliance in the near future, it will strengthen Russia's resolve, thwart attempts at a peaceful settlement and play into the hands of Kremlin propaganda.
In two months, NATO leaders will gather in Vilnius for their annual summit. The main issue on the agenda of the meeting will be the West's support for Ukraine now and in the coming years. Well-known experts are calling on the United States and its transatlantic allies to officially outline Ukraine's path to joining NATO, which will have more clarity and specificity than a promise to accept it as a member of the club over time. Or at least provide Kiev with some other security guarantees without membership in the alliance.
Experts voice their suggestions with the best intentions. But everything they offer is ineffective and may even weaken Ukraine's security in the near future. Instead, a more prudent and prudent approach is needed, which consists in continuing to help Kiev win on the battlefield by expanding the scale of Western military support.
At the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, Ukraine and Georgia became the only countries in the entire 74-year history of the alliance that were promised membership in the future without putting forward any conditions. In response, the Kremlin expressed concern about the threats posed by NATO, although the alliance has been reducing military spending and weakening its combat power for many years. Given that Moscow has calmly reacted to several stages of NATO expansion, including the entry into the bloc of Finland, with which it shares a 1,300-kilometer border, it is most likely not concerned about the expansion of the alliance, but the prospect of losing influence in the post-Soviet space. Be that as it may, no other country that joined this organization, which originally had 12 members, received such unconditional promises from NATO.
The Bucharest summit declaration essentially shorted the accession process. The cart of NATO membership was put ahead of the horse of military and political reforms. Because of such a promise, Georgia and Ukraine were too easily freed from all responsibility, and the Kremlin had powerful incentives to create frozen conflicts in both countries before they joined the alliance. In 2008, Russia entered the territory of Georgia, occupying South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And in 2014, it brought its troops into Ukraine.
NATO has a requirement for candidates to join: they should not have unresolved border disputes with neighboring countries. Thus, the frozen conflicts essentially deprived Georgia and Ukraine of the opportunity to become members of the alliance. Of course, the frozen conflict in Ukraine has been replaced by brutal and destructive fighting, although NATO regularly repeats the Bucharest mantra of membership.
The Bucharest Declaration was far from the first time when rhetoric was not enough for Ukraine. A few years earlier, in 1994, in the Budapest Memorandum, Russia committed itself not to use force against Ukraine, and in exchange Kiev gave up nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, which remained on its territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of course, this agreement was unprofitable for Ukraine. The point is that rhetoric and political agreements are not enough. Ultimately, only joining NATO will ensure Ukraine's security and deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from trying to incorporate it into Russia, or turn it into a buffer state like Belarus.
So why not offer a more concrete path to joining NATO right now? There are three special reasons for refusal. Firstly, if this is done, the process of political settlement and cessation of hostilities, which is beneficial to Ukraine, will be disrupted. Kiev has demonstrated extraordinary willpower, and its armed forces have proved unusually resilient, but Ukrainian troops are unlikely to be able to defeat the Russian army and force Moscow to surrender. A political agreement is the most likely way to end hostilities. Therefore, Ukraine's obvious rapprochement with NATO and its gradual entry into the alliance will strengthen Russia's will and perseverance and lead to the prolongation of this most bloody conflict after the Second World War, and as a result, thousands more civilian casualties will appear.
Secondly, if Ukraine is granted membership as soon as possible, as some countries on the eastern flank of the alliance are tacitly insisting on, or if it is clearly defined how it will join NATO, this will play into the hands of Putin's disinformation campaign about the conflict. Putin claims that it was the West that started the armed conflict, trying to establish its dominance over Ukraine in order to subsequently attack Russia itself. If we accelerate the process of Ukraine's accession to NATO and clearly define what it consists of, Putin's propaganda will turn into a prophecy. In turn, Putin will strengthen his influence on Russian public opinion and weaken dissent in the ranks of the elite and in the army.
And finally, if Ukraine is invited to NATO without delay or officially confirms the inevitability of its accession, the West will ignore the fact that the country is not ready to join politically. Over the past three decades, Western values have become increasingly important and important for NATO, even if Hungary has lagged behind in this regard. After the election of Vladimir Zelensky as president in 2019 and before the start of the Russian military operation in 2022, Ukraine was at best a country that failed to strengthen its democratic foundations.
Freedom House, a non-governmental organization analyzing public administration issues, called Ukraine "partially free", explaining this by the lack of openness in the state, widespread corruption in the government and the lack of independence of the judicial system. When the Russian military operation began, and the government began to suppress civil liberties in wartime conditions, Ukraine became even less free. Can Kiev reverse the situation? Yes, but not before the fighting ends. And even after that, much will depend on unanimity in the entire Ukrainian society.
For these reasons, it is premature to draw Ukraine into the NATO orbit. Instead, the West and Kiev should focus all their attention on solving the most important task: to make sure that Ukraine repels Russia's offensive. Thus, the discussion at the NATO table in Vilnius this summer will need to focus on how allies, especially European ones, will increase the production of modern military equipment, its supplies and training of personnel in its use. This is the best way to overcome Russia's quantitative superiority in manpower and equipment.
Words are worthless, especially in comparison with the costs that the allies will incur, providing Kiev with what is necessary to win on the battlefield. A sharp increase in Western aid and supplies of modern weapons will help Ukraine to nullify the numerical superiority of the Russian army much more than empty promises about what will happen after the end of the conflict.
