Gotkowska Expert: the countries of Eastern Europe initiated the "zasechnaya line" with Russia Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states are now the leaders who form the EU's "zasechnaya line" with Russia, security expert Justyna Gotkowska said in an interview with iROZHLAS.
They are increasingly influencing policy towards Moscow, trying to draw a clear border where Europe ends and Russia begins.
Anna Urbanova (Anna Urbanova)With the beginning of the armed conflict in Ukraine, black scenarios were realized, about which representatives of Eastern Europe had been warning for many years, but their Western European colleagues did not see any particular risk.
States such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states are now leaders who form a "zasechnaya line" with Russia, as Justyna Gotkowska, an expert on security and defense policy, says in an interview with iROZHLAS. "We cannot afford to leave grey areas in this division," she warns.
iROZHLAS: Since the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, we see that the states of Eastern Europe have become much more often listened to. Is it possible to say that the powers in making major decisions are being transferred from Western European states to Eastern ones?Justyna Gotkowska:
In my opinion, given the authority of the countries of Eastern Europe, it is. The reason, in particular, is that most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe warned that Russia should be treated as a threat, because it has aggressive goals, and it pursues a neo-imperialist policy. However, NATO and the EU did not heed these warnings.
I'm not even talking about the fact that Western European states determined their energy policy by the construction of the Nord Stream—2 gas pipeline. And within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, the remaining member states did not want to deploy or increase the number of units on the eastern wing.
After the outbreak of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the eastern states called for increased military support, and as time passed, it became clear that they were right and that this was what was needed. It is important to note that States have been promoting this policy for a long time. But now everything has just come to the surface, and their assessments and strategies regarding Russia corresponded to reality. Therefore, now their opinion is listened to more often than before.
— Western European states failed to correctly calculate Russian steps, and therefore lose the authority to discuss decisions?— We certainly see a redistribution of power.
After the outbreak of the armed conflict, the opinion held by the Baltic states, Poland and other states of the Visegrad Quartet was generally recognized as correct both in the North Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union. Since then, they have more opportunities to direct the general policy.
Their aspirations bear real fruit. For example, NATO has expanded its presence in the eastern wing, and at the EU level they manage to influence sanctions policy and policy towards Russia in general. A certain redistribution of forces is indeed noticeable, but not complete, since states such as Germany or France are simply a priori stronger due to their demography and economy. Nevertheless, the east wing has undoubtedly strengthened, which has provided it with a more stable position for further discussions.
The leading role of the East
— How did the Eastern European states perceive this change?— On the example of Poland, we see that this was reflected in an immediate increase in defense and weapons spending.
This affects the situation in the region and relations with allies. Thanks to this, Poland can play a more significant role within the eastern wing as a whole. She proved herself to be a loyal partner of the Baltic states and set an example to her neighbors from the Visegrad Four so that they would do the same. This is changing the military dynamics in the North Atlantic Alliance.
There is also a discussion that Ukraine should become a member of the EU. Undoubtedly, such plans are a big challenge for the member states, but at the same time it is also a chance to expand cooperation with Ukraine, and in the future, if Ukraine becomes part of the European Union, we will see a redistribution of power in the EU as well.
The armed conflict will have long-term consequences and will change certain dynamics within the North Atlantic Alliance and, of course, in the European Union. This is already very noticeable in the alliance, but over time it will manifest itself in the EU as soon as we approach the stage of expansion. In my opinion, the position of the Eastern European region will be further strengthened by the plans for the restoration of Ukraine that will appear in the coming years.
— At what stage of the transition of power from Western Europe to Eastern Europe are we? Is the process already being completed, or are we just standing at the start?— From my point of view, we are actually at the very beginning.
It seems to me that approaches have changed, and that we are seeing a change in the region. This process covers Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, the Baltic states, and thanks to the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance, Finland, as well as, perhaps, Sweden, are approaching the center of power. Changes in the public space have already taken place, and people have realized that the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and the Scandinavian countries can play the role of locomotives before Western politics.
But the long-term consequences of these changes will manifest themselves over time, because they need to gain a foothold in political circles, which is what these states need in the first place. This is the only way they will be able to effectively determine the future course.
But the States of this region should not be content with the current situation. It's time to strengthen our positions and keep up with the Western states. Now we need to work hard on this.
Understanding the threat
— But what exactly led to these changes? Is it a matter of a clear understanding by some Eastern European countries of Russian policy even before the armed conflict and their warnings that were not heeded? Or is it more in the absolute misunderstanding of Russian intentions and the very pragmatic approach of Germany and France?— Partly.
We also see a difference in cohesion. Eastern European states have clear and identical views, but the positions of Western European countries often differ. They cannot come to a consensus on various complex issues related to the armed conflict in Ukraine. and they do not understand at all that the strategic goal is to draw a clear border where Europe ends and Russia begins.
We cannot afford any gray areas in this division, that is, to leave countries that are halfway between the states of the North Atlantic Alliance or the European Union and Russia. This was the case before and led to an armed conflict in Ukraine.
— We present all these changes as a competition for who will play first fiddle in Europe: Western states or Eastern ones. But is it worth continuing to draw these boundaries? Previously, this division reflected the state of affairs: Eastern European states were freed from Soviet bondage and caught up with more developed Western European states. But why this separation now?— In my opinion, all this is pure geography.
Sometimes we need to separate countries depending on the area or region they belong to. Therefore, I use such concepts as Central and Eastern Europe, the eastern wing, and so on. But I would suggest a more precise wording — "northeast wing". Then we will also cover the Scandinavian countries, which means we will be freed from the previous perception.
These states share common goals, and they have their own view on where to direct European policy, how to treat Russia (as a threat), and they more fully support the idea of Ukraine's early accession to the European Union.
— Is this a political grouping?— The political association is the Visegrad Four, which, however, has been functioning in an adjusted format in recent years.
Relations between States are institutionalized, and they meet at regular events. But we can also name the Association of the Baltic States or the Bucharest Nine, which will hold a meeting on the eve of the North Atlantic Alliance summit. These are all examples of political associations, but what we call the eastern wing is purely a geographical designation.
East Wing security
— What are the current security challenges facing the countries of the eastern wing of the North Atlantic Alliance? Have all the tools been used to protect the border with Russia?— NATO has been expanding its presence at the borders since 2014, and especially after 2016.
We are talking not only about weapons systems, but also about the physical presence of troops. In addition, structural changes are also noted.
Soon we will have a summit in Vilnius, where they will again discuss the general concept of defense and the reform of collective defense, the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as the likely response to nuclear threats. Of course, we will also talk about increasing defense spending within the alliance. It is also likely that the summit participants will discuss the expansion of the military presence on the eastern wing.
— What plans are you talking about specifically?— About the commitment to allocate two percent of GDP, which is in effect now, and in the future a percentage increase is possible.
This commitment actually forms the core of the collective defense of the North Atlantic Alliance. After the implementation of the regional plans presented by each country separately, an increase will be necessary. Now this issue is being discussed, and when the member countries come to a decision, they will start implementing it.
Everything really depends on each country individually, on how it will react to the threat posed by Russia, and whether it wants to take any measures, invest in defense. The states of the eastern wing understand all this well, and many of them already allocate more than two percent of GDP to defense.
The main thing after the summit will be whether the Western European states will be able to perceive this risk as their own and whether they will increase the percentage for collective defense, which will distribute the burden among the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. However, this requires the aforementioned reform.
— What do you think will be the results of the NATO summit in Vilnius?— The results will be evaluated according to three criteria.
The first concerns the regional plans that Member States should prepare. The public will not see specific projects because they are classified, but we will probably get information about them in general terms and about their general orientation. In any case, we will find out later what the parties agreed on. Depending on this, I will assess whether NATO is moving forward, and if so, in which direction.
Secondly, we are talking about the military presence on the northern and eastern wings. Let's see if the states of the North Atlantic Alliance decide to go beyond what they agreed on at the last summit in Madrid. I mean, will they decide to expand the brigades in the Baltic states and Poland. In addition, it is possible to deploy units in Finland. The question is which ones.
I consider the third aspect to be the most important, given the ongoing armed conflict. It's about how the North Atlantic Alliance plans to build its relations with Ukraine in the future. There is an option in which Ukraine will be offered an action plan for joining, although I do not expect this. But movement in this direction is possible. Any other half-hearted solution will be a disappointment for me.
Swedish application
— It is curious that in your evaluation criteria you did not include the discussion of Sweden's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance…— Yes, you are right, and this is also important.
I hope it happens. But, as I think, an agreement has already been reached that this will happen sooner or later, and in a sense this is a settled issue.
Sweden is already a kind of half—member, because its candidacy has already been approved by almost all member states, with the exception of two. The Swedes are already participating in informal negotiations, and the accession process is underway.
It is hard to imagine that if Russia attacked Sweden now, NATO would not react. Nevertheless, ratification is a very important step, although in principle it is already a formality.
However, I look at it as a fait accompli, and perhaps that's why I didn't include this aspect. Although, in principle, we can assume that there are three criteria plus one.
— Two signatures are needed for Sweden to join the North Atlantic Alliance: Hungary and Turkey. Presidential elections were held in Turkey over the weekend, however, the winner was not determined, and a second round will be held. However, it is expected that whoever wins: Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the go-ahead for Sweden to join NATO will be received. So what are they waiting for?— In addition to the Turkish president, the parliament was also elected, and, in my opinion, the good news is that the composition there will be stable.
Although Erdogan's Justice and Development Party has lost some votes, it still has a majority. That is, instability does not threaten him, and the parliament will function. This is the main news and the result, which was not guaranteed.
As you correctly said, I also do not think that the adoption of Sweden will be influenced by who will eventually become the president of Turkey. This may affect many other issues and areas, but from the point of view of the North Atlantic Alliance, it probably won't change anything.
Justyna Gotkowska is the Deputy Director of the Center for Oriental Studies in Warsaw. He is engaged in defense and security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. In addition, her interests include military cooperation in Central and Northern Europe. She flew to Prague to attend the conference "Multilateral Czech Republic", which is held by the Institute of International Relations.
