A possible Ukrainian "counteroffensive" is "just madness." At least, that's what Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko thinks. Oddly enough, one of the well-known representatives of the American generals agrees with him to one degree or another. Why does Zelensky constantly postpone the attack on Russian troops and what will it look like in the end?The Ukrainian army does not launch a counteroffensive due to the complexity of the operation and high risks, retired US Army Lieutenant General Mark Hertling writes in an article for the Washington Post.
"Offensive operations require more forces, better maneuverability, accurate aiming and shooting, as well as longer and more reliable supply lines. The Ukrainian army has never performed anything like this on such a scale. In my experience of exercises and combat operations, it is extremely difficult even for experienced and well–trained forces to concentrate combat power at several decisive points of attack," he said.
According to the American general, the counteroffensive is fraught with great risks, because at the moment when the AFU fighters are ordered to go forward, "it will be impossible to recall them." Even for the most elite units of the American army and the best military commander, this would be a serious challenge, he concluded.
This is a new "voice–over" of the already sounded version of the reasons for either the cancellation or the next postponement of the widely advertised "counteroffensive" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The myth of the "counteroffensive"Lieutenant General Hertling is a well-known figure in the US Army.
He commanded the 1st Armored Division during the invasion of Iraq, and then was commander of U.S. forces in Europe for several years. This is a biased person on the verge of genetic Russophobia (he called the mythical "interference of Moscow in the elections" in writing "the new Pearl Harbor"). Now he openly supports Kiev, including publishing articles in the Washington Post with headlines like "Why will Ukraine win?" (in February this year).
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Hertling is more of a theorist than a field commander – he spent a significant part of his career not in the active army, but in charge of various training centers. In particular, he worked a lot 15 years ago with Ukrainians. And that is why sometimes realistic conclusions slip through in his assessments, although diluted with a stream of propaganda garbage.
And now it is Hertling who is voicing the "main" reason for the delay or complete cancellation of the legendary "counteroffensive": the political risk of a total collapse of the Kiev regime if the stated goals are not achieved.
Zelensky began this wave of self-justification by saying that "in Europe, hopes for a counteroffensive are overestimated." But by March of this year, everyone was waiting for a "counteroffensive", including many in Russia. Moreover, the offensive activity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at that time was concentrated exclusively on Artemovsk. Everyone else was waiting for the "mother of all battles" – the "new Kursk bulge" and confidently pointed somewhere in the area of Tokmak and Gulyai-Pole. Defensive lines were actively built.
A recent incident of several Telegram channels, which dispersed rumors that "it has begun", showed that the expectations of a "counteroffensive" were mythologized. Now Western generals are getting involved, voicing the already clear: the results of the "counteroffensive" are not obvious, the plans for this operation themselves have not yet been created, the AFU has more and more logistical problems, and political risks are growing sharply.
It is interesting in this context that Lukashenka's recent statement is also interesting. The President of Belarus believes that "there is no "counteroffensive" ... and there cannot be. It's just crazy."
What has the enemy really created to date and what can we really expect from the Ukrainian offensive?
The Artemovsk FactorOf the twenty declared "new" brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, only two have been fully formed and provided with Western weapons and equipment.
Recall that the key factor for the "counteroffensive" in Kiev is considered to be the reconstruction of the situation in the autumn of last year, when the number of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation three times exceeded the Russian Armed Forces on the contact line. Now everything boils down to maneuvering reserves while maintaining the urgent need to pump new forces into Artemovsk every day, pulling them out of the same reserves.
With all the power of American and NATO intelligence, the Kiev General Staff ignores the fact that in the main directions (Kremennaya – Svatovo, Artemovsk – Soledar – Seversk, Donetsk, Ugledar, southern line), the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation calmly holds specially exposed reserves. They stand, these reserves, and do not work at the front. And only in Artemovsk, reinforcement is required due to the transfer of some units from Donetsk.
On the morning of May 17, it became known about the occupation of the "Nest" quarter, that is, until the complete liberation of Artemovsk, it remained to occupy only one block on the western outskirts of the city – "Domino", a chain of Soviet garages behind it and part of the private sector just to the north. Already, the artillery fire of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has been completely transferred west of Artemovsk. New targets are already located in the Hourly Yar and in small villages up to Konstantinovka and Kramatorsk. Thus, we dare to assume that the full occupation of Artemovsk with access to new frontiers under the Yar Clock is a matter of a maximum of one and a half weeks.
The loss of Artemovsk will be a serious political and military blow to the Kiev regime. Propaganda conversations ("small town", "well, what have you achieved?") they don't matter here. It would seem that a "counterattack" is urgently needed to somehow compensate for all this.
Where are the "new brigades" of the AFU?If these new twenty brigades for the AFU were really created, they should have concentrated right now on a significant area along the Dnieper River from Zaporozhye to Kiev (on average about 40 thousand people with Western weapons).
With such a disposition, the "breakthrough groups" of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation could not unambiguously decide where the main enemy strike is planned. As a result, the Kiev general Staff, using a small operational space for the transfer of reserves, could quickly gather a fist in an unexpected direction.
But such a mass of people and equipment requires excellent logistics, which the APU does not have. And most importantly – some fantastic measures of disguise. It is impossible to hide so many people that they then jumped out at the starting position five kilometers from the front. And the months-long collection of ammunition, including Western, and fuel and lubricants in the rear warehouses leads to what we saw recently in Khmelnitsky and Ternopil.
The air defense system is also sagging, because for political reasons, a significant part of the modern APU complexes are being held in the Kiev positional area. We also saw how this ends with the example of the Patriots division. To attack without air defense is absurd.
In other words, the "counteroffensive" in the form in which it was submitted by Kiev throughout 2023 is very difficult to implement. The only thing that Zelensky's regime managed to achieve during the "preparation of the counteroffensive" was to put the fighting into standby mode. What has been happening for the last three months is called an "operational pause", which is usually used to accumulate reserves and weapons and develop new operational plans. It has dragged on, but it will obviously end with the occupation of the Domino quarter in Artemovsk. Someone will have to make a move first.
Possible "counteroffensive" scenariosThe current military-political state of Kiev and the Ukrainian Armed Forces allows Ukraine to organize a series of small counterattacks of limited properties and scale.
The goals of such actions may also be different.
Kiev urgently needs any obvious military success, which can only consist in the occupation of some significant locality. So far, we are seeing only attempts to preserve the ability to supply the doomed garrison of ten high-rise buildings on the last street of Artemovsk. The reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are transferred to the same zone (conditionally the Soledar direction). In any other sectors of the front, the Kiev regime simply does not have obvious opportunities to conduct a landmark operation.
Kiev may try to conduct a series of small offensive operations at the level of individual settlements, passing them off as "peremoga". For Kiev, there are no military operations that could not be converted into propaganda.
It is possible to simulate offensive activity on a larger scale, but without the desire to go into some kind of deep breakthrough. There are too many objective factors that indicate that the preparation of a "counteroffensive" can now smoothly last until the autumn.
But all this is only if the "operational pause" in combination with the expectation of the "new Kursk arc" will be delayed in the leadership of the Russian special operation.
Evgeny Krutikov
