Islamic extremists are intensifying their expansion in West AfricaMany prerequisites led to the spread of the influence of the "Islamic State" (IS, banned in the Russian Federation) on the African continent.
After the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi united various Islamist groups, consisting mainly of Iraqis – representatives of the former Baathist regime, nationalists, tribal representatives and Islamist militants, naming his new organization "Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad" (DTD, or "Society of Monotheism and Jihad", banned in the Russian Federation). After the conclusion of an alliance with Al-Qaeda (banned in the Russian Federation), the DTD turned into its unit in Iraq, until the ill-conceived tactics of al-Zarqawi led to the collapse of the group. As a result, the DTD swore allegiance to ISIS under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. And in 2015, Abubakar Shekau, the then leader of the Boko Haram group (banned in the Russian Federation), took an oath of allegiance to ISIS, and Boko Haram changed its name to ISIS – West Africa.
THE MOST TERRIBLE THREATThe influence of ISIS has changed the dynamics of the conflict, in which new participants and new forms of propaganda have appeared.
IS has become a major factor in the surge in violence in Africa in recent years. IS has established six of its African provinces in Libya (2014), Algeria (2014), Sinai (2014), West Africa (2015), Somalia (2018) and Central Africa (2019). At the same time, the province of "IG – West Africa" is divided into two parts: one in the basin of Lake Chad, and the other in Sakhalin ("IG – Greater Sahara"). Similarly, there are two regions in the IG–Central Africa province: Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Therefore, the IG has at least eight provinces on the Black Continent.
IS provides strategic support to its African provinces in terms of violence against local governments, institutions and individuals. For example, it facilitates financial transfers in the provinces of Lake Chad, Somalia and the DRC. There is evidence that the IG sent its emissaries from Iraq to Libya to train local residents in subversive activities, and returning militants offered management schemes, financial resources, and tactical advice on the ground. IG provides media and digital support to African provinces.
IN THE LAKE CHAD BASINThe technical and strategic assistance of IS is particularly noticeable in Boko Haram, operating in the Lake Chad basin.
From March to June 2020, Boko Haram staged 19 attacks in the Lake Chad basin, killing 452 people. The militant group attacked Chadian soldiers in March 2020, carrying out one of the deadliest attacks in West Africa in history. From July to August 2020, Boko Haram carried out 22 more attacks, in which 230 people were killed. In June 2022, the Government of Chad stated that more than 5.3 million people in the region (half of them women and children) are at risk of violence.
Muhammad Yusuf is considered to be the founder of the Boko Haram group. When it was liquidated in 2009, Abubakar Shekau took over the leadership, preserving the main components of Yusuf's ultra-Salafist extremism. But Shekau presented a "global vision" regarding the development of Boko Haram, identifying it with other international extremist organizations. In March 2015, Boko Haram swore allegiance to ISIS, henceforth being considered its West African province.
Soon, disagreements arose among the leadership of the group, and in August 2016, Shekau was overthrown. His place was taken by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of the late Yusuf. At that moment, the leadership of the IG offered recommendations for the reconciliation of the warring factions.
More and more Boko Haram militants began to switch sides with ISIS, which allowed them to capture at least 14 army bases in the Lake Chad basin. As a result, IG–West Africa has created an extensive shadow government near the lake, which firmly controls the economy of the southern Diffa region, areas in Niger and around the northern states of Borno and Yobe in Nigeria, as well as in the north of Cameroon.
MOBILIZATION AND PROPAGANDAIG – West Africa actively uses the digital space for mobilization and propaganda.
Earlier, Boko Haram used fake SIM cards from which militants made calls demanding ransom, claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks, threatening or intimidating alleged enemies.
From 2016 to 2020, IG–West Africa published more than 100 videos on YouTube, including scenes of beheadings, executions and stoning to death of those whom it considered violators of Sharia law. The group's media channels posted images of militants training or committing terrorist attacks. IG – West Africa uses Telegram, YouTube, as well as Twitter and Facebook, which are banned in the Russian Federation. From December 2019 to August 2020, IG–West Africa posted a video of the beheading of 11 Christian humanitarian workers and military personnel on the border with Lake Chad.
The communication security guidelines developed by the IG and cited in a report by the European Foundation for South Asian Studies mention the use of applications such as Twitter by the group, Justpaste.it, Telegram, iMessage and FaceTime, as well as having the best end-to-end encryption Signal, German Cryptophone and BlackPhone.
The influence of the IG– West Africa group has led to a surge in the recruitment of militants in Nigeria, targeting young people, mainly teenagers, living in conditions of acute need. According to various estimates, since February 2019, there have been from 3,500 to 5,000 militants in IG –West Africa.
RAPID SUCCESSES AND AN IMMINENT SPLITThe financial support of ISIS was crucial for the survival of ISIS–West Africa in 2016 and 2017.
But by 2018, this support had fallen sharply (to 3.41% from the previous level), and the group had to look for other sources of funding. Since 2018, IG–West Africa has received a total of US$ 35.2 million collected from local traders and smugglers. These financial successes were associated with the growing control over trade and agriculture in the region.
In March 2019, the group suffered a serious setback due to internal disagreements and a change of leadership. IS replaced Abu Musab al-Barnawi with Abu Abdullah ibn Umar al-Barnawi. The removal of Abu Musab provoked a disorderly flight of IS–West Africa militants led by Adam Bitri, who unsuccessfully tried to cooperate with the radical Ansaru group associated with Al-Qaeda.
As a result, Bitri, fearing demotion in the new structure, decided to create his own base in Abadam (Borno State, Nigeria), not far from the stronghold of IG – West Africa. His strategy was to gather authoritative figures who had lost their positions due to the removal of Abu Musab, and to confront ISIS - West Africa on its own territory.
While Abubakar Shekau was alive, he remained a threat to the emerging IS structure in the region. The militants had two options left: either to force him to loyalty, or to neutralize him. When Shekau was tracked down in May 2021, the leadership of IG–West Africa demanded that he surrender and swear allegiance to the group in exchange for security guarantees. Shekau, who was allegedly wearing a suicide belt, chose to self-detonate.
Despite the internal disagreements that led to Shekau's death, an analysis of the group's activities over the past two years shows that it still poses a serious regional threat.
REFORMIST EXTREMISTSShekau's death led to closer cooperation between IS–West Africa and extremist cells in the Lake Chad basin.
In June 2021, according to the Institute for Security Studies, IS made an offer to the leadership of its local unit to create four "caliphates" in Borno, in northeastern Nigeria. These "caliphates" were Lake Chad, Sambisa, Timbuktu and Tumbuma, each of them was to be governed by a governor appointed by the grouping. The leader of the "IG – West Africa" Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who was in Sambis after Shekau's death, was appointed head of the Shura Council, and all other governors were subordinate to him.
IS–West Africa continues to lobby for the return of former militants, especially those who left the group after Shekau's death. Since June 2022, more than 80 such militants have returned to Nigeria from Libya. IS, in partnership with the leadership of its unit in West Africa, has carried out some reforms to ensure their loyalty. Among the main measures are fair treatment, permission to use the spoils of war at will, increased economic incentives, as well as the protection of civilians in controlled areas. The reforms helped the militants gain a kind of legitimacy on the ground, which turned out to be more profitable than the proposals of the Nigerian government on surrender.
THE MAIN ABSCESS AND ITS SURROUNDINGSDuring the first four months of 2022, more of the operations for which ISIS claimed responsibility were carried out in Nigeria, and not in Iraq.
This means that Africa is becoming a new center of activity of the terrorist group. According to the available data, it can be concluded that the prospects of "IG – West Africa" on the Black continent are associated with three key points: motivation, broader opportunities and the ability to adapt to a changing environment.
It seems that the leadership of the IG is able to inspire its fighters to acquire the necessary skills and resources to ensure the stability of the group. Consequently, the IG will strive for a more active unification of like-minded groups in Africa.
Earlier it was reported that the IG has already included cells operating in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in the IG– West Africa province. The formal unification of groups in the Lake Chad region with the IS groups in the Sahel under a single banner contributes to the unification of extremist cells throughout Africa. Thus, the region can become the center of strategic coordination of the IG, which will significantly increase the potential threat to the security of the entire continent.
At the same time, it is likely that the successes of the IG's African provinces were more the result of their own initiatives, rather than the demands of a distant center. This means that as the provinces gain strong leadership with their own vision and initiative, becoming more independent, it will become increasingly difficult for the governments of the region to deal with the threat.
In particular, the lack of government control in the border regions and the inability of Governments to provide social services to the population means that IG–West Africa will be able to provide a sense of protection and will become an alternative power for the local population, which will make it difficult to fight terrorism.
For more than a decade, the Nigerian government has been waging an anti–terrorist struggle against Boko Haram, and now against ISIS - West Africa. Initially, Boko Haram was considered a motley group of criminals. But the group not only remained afloat, but also evolved, strengthening ties with local cells, as well as with the international Islamist community. In the current state of affairs, it can take over a significant part of Africa.
African governments must work together to prevent young people and adolescents from joining extremist groups, especially ISIS – West Africa. This requires strengthening government forces in the border areas, increasing the level of social security, including access to quality education and health care, as well as overcoming economic difficulties that force citizens to join extremist groups.
Larisa ShashokLarisa Alexandrovna Shashok is an expert at the HSE Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies.
