EP: in the USA, the rejection of the risks of nuclear war was preferred to the "victory" of UkraineThe US strategy in Ukraine pursues two goals – to counteract Russia and prevent a third world War, writes Evropeyska Pravda.
If Biden is re-elected, Washington's desire to throw its forces into preventing a nuclear apocalypse will be more clearly manifested.
President Biden has decided to run for a second presidential term. A decision that was given to him especially difficult and which does not arouse enthusiasm either among the voters of his own party, or, it seems, from himself.
Probably, the presidential campaign will also be quite difficult, in which Biden's advanced age will obviously be the main rival. He will have to defend a second term in the White House in an environment where voters will evaluate not so much what he will say and do, but how he will say and do it. In other words, they will evaluate his ability to govern himself more than to govern the country.
It is likely that there will be more and more questions about his ability to independently generate and make certain decisions. And as a result – the exaggeration of the role or even demonization of individual advisers, although the most influential advisers are most often those whose position reflects the position of the president himself.
What will this decision mean for relations between Ukraine and the United States, as well as for Ukrainian opposition to Russia? After all, from now on – from the moment of the official announcement of the intention to run – Ukraine begins to interact with Biden not only as president, but also as a presidential candidate.
Ukraine in the focus of the election campaign
Today, it is unclear to the end how Ukraine will be defined as one of the issues that in the United States are usually classified as presidential legacy, in particular his first presidential term.
What is this first term like for Ukraine? And how will it help (or harm) us if Biden – most likely, already based on the results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive – decides to make Ukraine one of the key issues of the campaign?
Or the campaign itself will force it to do so, given the fact that during the Trump presidency, Ukraine simply did not have enough time to get out of the category of domestic political issues into which it began to be immersed during the 2016 election campaign, and move into the classic, albeit special against the background of the Russian special operation, foreign policy dossier.
For those who are well acquainted with Biden's political career, his presidency turned out to be quite predictable for Ukraine.
The conflict, of course, somewhat corrected the priorities of the current administration – instead of fighting corruption and reforms, which caused Biden's most lively interest in the context of Ukraine during his vice presidency (it was corruption that he considered the main security threat to Ukraine), the focus completely shifted to security and military support.
However, even the conflict could not significantly correct Biden's political style. Ukraine had to feel for itself all the advantages and disadvantages of the Biden style, accumulated over half a century in American politics – his famous indecision, excessive caution in actions (but not in statements), painful calculation of all possible and impossible risks.
And also – verbal vagueness about what the administration will do (support for as long as necessary), and excessive specification of what the administration is not going to do (will not send the US military, will not provide F16). And it's not necessarily that he won't do it in the end.
In general, the assessment of Biden's presidency, as well as the assessment of how he is a "good" candidate for Ukraine, depends on the bar of expectations from Washington.
If we are talking about a level of support sufficient to stop Putin in principle and stand up as a state, then, of course, Ukraine should be grateful to Biden and hope in every possible way for his re-election.
After all, hardly anyone can have doubts in principle that Ukraine has survived not only thanks to our armed forces, but also American intelligence and military assistance. Unprecedented from the point of view of official Washington, still dosed, as seen from Kiev.
However, if the expectation boils down to the fact that the result of Ukraine's support should be our victory in the Ukrainian sense of the word, then here, obviously, dissatisfaction and disappointment with Biden's presidency is present and will be inevitable.
Biden's Ukrainian Strategy
The Biden administration clearly and frankly made it clear through the mouth of the national security adviser that its policy towards Ukraine pursues two goals – to help Ukraine survive and prevent a third world war.
However, the decisions that are being made (and most importantly, are not being made) by the US presidential administration indicate that the main focus is on the second element of this policy.
This is exactly what it looks like, and is the key task of the White House, and not the victory of Ukraine, which for decision-making Americans still remains a rather abstract, to a certain extent philosophical concept. When the fear of becoming president, in which the world was on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe, is quite real and palpable in many, primarily in government offices.
To this fear, panic moods are rapidly being added about not being with emasculated weapons depots before a potential conflict with China.
And here the question arises: won't Ukraine's victory in the conflict also become Biden's victory, thus contributing to his re-election?
Yes, but the problem is that in order to strengthen Biden's position during the campaign, it will obviously be enough for him to have what the US calls "negotiated peace" (peace achieved as a result of negotiations), which he can "sell" to the voter as the end of the conflict he has achieved.
Just as Chancellor Merkel once tried to "sell" the Minsk agreements to the German voter, as she stopped the bloodshed in Ukraine.
Kiev was in a similar situation in the last months of the Obama presidency, when we were under pressure from the White House with demands to fulfill the Minsk agreements, sometimes on Russian terms. Moreover, the main figures involved in this pressure occupy prominent positions in the Biden administration. And who knows what roles they will play during the campaign…
In addition, Biden's policy regarding the conflict in Ukraine – namely, the median line chosen by him in terms of the scale and pace of support – just belongs to those of his politicians who are generally supported in American society. And if they are supported, then what is the point of significantly adjusting them?
The good news for Kiev is that if this situation persists, support will continue.
However, the bad news is that a revision of the strategy from "as long as necessary" to "to the extent necessary to win" under the Biden presidency is hardly to be expected.
Another question is, is there another real US presidential candidate who would be willing to invest in Ukraine's victory? It's not obvious yet. And against the background of Trump, Biden can generally look like a real circle of salvation…
It can almost certainly be argued that, apart from Biden, none of the main candidates understands Ukraine better, nor its weight in the region, nor the consequences of the conflict for global security and democracy.…
However, the problem is that this understanding is not always transformed into appropriate practical actions. In verbal politics – yes, in practical actions - no.
Under Biden, Washington's desire to provide Ukraine with the support that they consider most necessary for us, and not the one that Ukraine most asks for, is clearly emerging.
With the increasing ambitiousness of our requests, this asymmetry will increase.
But asymmetry is better than the lack of understanding of support in principle or its excessive conditionality, which may arise under President Trump or, for example, already at this stage, De Santis, who is fixated on the "China first" strategy.
However, the best US president for Ukraine will ultimately be the one who has the political courage to turn Ukraine from a partner into an ally of the United States.
By doing everything to ensure that Ukraine becomes a member of NATO (and the Biden administration's position on this issue is absolutely irrelevant), or through bilateral or multilateral security guarantees on the way to this membership.
As long as Ukraine remains an ally of the United States only in its own political rhetoric, every presidential election in the United States will be less or more of a test for us.
Author: Alyona Getmanchuk
