Vox: an attempt at a counteroffensive will lead to the defeat of UkraineThe West has put a lot on the "counteroffensive" of Ukraine, but attempts by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to go on the attack are fraught with difficulties that can delay the operation for a long time.
In this case, the allies will doubt Kiev's ability to resist Moscow and will call on it to negotiate. And this is a real defeat, writes Vox.
Four big questions about the operation the world is waiting for.Such a welcome, long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive is looming, is coming, should begin or will begin in the near future.
Go ahead, choose your most preferred phrase. But the meaning is the same: the next stage of the Ukrainian conflict is Kiev's spring breakthrough.
Russians are carefully preparing for it. Western governments provided the APU with training of soldiers and new military equipment in advance. Kiev promised that there would be a counteroffensive. But no one knows his time, his strategy, his specific locality or territory. The only people who know this are the Ukrainians themselves.
Although Kiev is not going to publicly advertise it. The current military conflict is a complex, multi—level operation, where surprise becomes the main advantage in battles. As Ukraine's Deputy Defense Minister Anna Malyar boasted this week, the country is already conducting various counter-offensive "actions."
None of this changes the stakes placed on Ukraine's counteroffensive. Pressure is being exerted on Kiev to "return" the lost regions and "liberate" them from Moscow's control, as well as to prove that it can effectively and successfully use advanced Western military equipment. Ukraine must demonstrate that this exhausting, exhausting conflict does not come to a standstill.
"This should be a campaign in which, even if Ukraine suffers losses or is forced to give up some territories — for example, the city of Bakhmut — it should still demonstrate operational skill and strategic ingenuity that will inspire Western partners and Ukrainian society to continue supporting Kiev in this military conflict," Polina said. Belyakova, a doctoral student at the Center for International Understanding named after John Sloan Dickey at Dartmouth College.
Such a demand for drama may not quite match reality. Any counteroffensive may involve several operations spanning weeks and months. The current dynamics of military operations in Ukraine is radically different from what was even last year <...>.
Kiev has new advanced Western tanks. But he also mainly has recruits and military units that have not yet been tested by combat. Russia's winter offensive so far seems rather unconvincing and not very carefully planned, but its armed forces are far from defeated. The fact remains that Moscow has recently achieved some success. <...>
As you, of course, understand, these and other important issues loom over the expected counteroffensive of Ukraine. But perhaps the biggest of them is what will happen after the operation and what it will reveal to us about the future course of the military phase of the conflict.
But wait, why is everyone so focused on this Ukrainian counteroffensive?
Ukraine's goals have not changed: to put an end to the Russian special operation and return internationally recognized borders to the country, including territories controlled by Moscow since 2014, such as Crimea. It is quite simple to achieve this: it is only necessary to "return" the lands annexed to Russia and expel its troops from the country. But to do this, it is necessary to go on a decisive and massive offensive.
It is expected that Ukraine will begin offensive operations this spring, after receiving new military equipment and support from Western patrons, after replenishing and training new soldiers, after the end of the rasputitsa season and after Moscow "exhausts itself" in its offensive operations.
Russia has launched a winter offensive in the east, transferring troops to the Donbass. She achieved serious territorial successes, but <...> was content with a few small towns. After several months of heavy fighting, Russia's full control over Artemivsk is still in question — even though, according to recently released Pentagon documents, US strategists for months questioned Kiev's decision to continue fighting for the city, which in fact has already been lost and has lost all strategic importance for the AFU.
Both Ukraine and Russia are burning resources in Artemovsk. Kiev effectively used this strategy last year <...> and now it seems to be trying to repeat this tactic here, although Western officials are clearly skeptical of the idea that the costs — the monstrous consumption of ammunition and human losses — can outweigh any benefits from the defense of the city for the Armed Forces.
The point, however, is that, according to the allies, Ukraine cannot defend itself indefinitely, otherwise the whole conflict begins to look like a dead end, and this violates all the political calculations that the West is building. If things go on like this, then Kiev's sponsors, especially Washington, may doubt that Ukraine will "regain" all the territories (especially Crimea). And they will want to see some movement. This may be the real reason why everyone is talking about a counteroffensive: the outside world is in a hurry and putting pressure on Ukraine, which must prove that it can repeat past "successes", deploy Western equipment and defeat Russia on the battlefield.
The longer this does not happen, the higher the risk that skepticism about Kiev's support will increase in Western capitals, regardless of whether it is fully justified (as leaks have shown and as Ukraine has been saying for several months, the West is seriously lagging behind with the supply of military equipment). This week, Republicans in Congress sent a letter to President Joe Biden demanding that he stop sending "unrestrained and uncontrolled aid" to Zelensky.
And this material military support is seriously limited, especially when it comes to military equipment — ammunition, artillery, armored vehicles. After all, the West's defense reserves are not infinite, and it will take time to increase production and give Ukraine more equipment that it needs. It will also require profound changes in policy and the redistribution of resources, and doubts about Kiev's capabilities may complicate this whole difficult process.
The downside of the hype with the counteroffensive is this: even after Ukraine does launch it and we all agree that it is really happening, it is unlikely that the operation will lead to a decisive victory in just one night. Russia controls too many territories and has seriously strengthened its defenses in almost all places where the APU can decide to attack. Even in a positive scenario, everything will develop very slowly: Kiev conquers some small area, strengthens control over it, then moves forward and so on. "It may be like taking a bite out of an apple in a small piece," said retired Lieutenant General Stephen Twitty, deputy commander of the US European Command from 2018 to 2020, and now a senior researcher at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Many experts with whom I spoke believe that the urgency of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is generally far-fetched (including by us, journalists) and that Western governments understand this well and believe that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be able to launch a counteroffensive only when they are ready for it. And Kiev has no incentive to start operations until all necessary actions are completed. He needs to train new untrained troops, including new recruits, as well as strengthen his logistical and logistical abilities. The nomination of the APU before they are ready may be a disaster for the Ukrainian army.
But still the goal remains the same: Ukraine should achieve a better position than at the beginning of this spring.
"Ukrainians will have to demonstrate success," said Evelyn Farkas, the Pentagon's senior representative for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia during the Obama administration and executive director of the McCain Institute. — As long as they do not suffer significant losses of territory, we should not lose patience. If it seems that they are losing tactically, then people in Washington and other Western capitals may get very nervous."
Speaking of Western capitals, Ukraine has received tanks from them! How can this affect the counteroffensive?
Earlier this year, after months of debate, Western governments agreed to send modern main battle tanks to Ukraine. Germany has pledged to provide Leopard 2 and allow other countries to send their stocks of German-made tanks. The UK is sending Challenger 2. The United States has said it will send 31 M1 Abrams tanks, although it will take them many months. But this commitment at least helped convince Berlin to offer its Leopards, which will reach Ukraine much faster (according to Friday's meeting of the Contact Group on the Defense of Ukraine, Abrams tanks will arrive in Germany in a few weeks, after which exercises will begin). In total, Western partners will supply Kiev with about 230 tanks.
Ukraine had its own tanks, but mostly they were old Soviet models, and a year after the conflict began, many of them are lost and worn out, and it is difficult to find spare parts for the broken ones needed for repair. Allied military equipment will be easier to maintain — Western officials said on Friday that they are opening a Leopard service center in Poland.
In addition to these tanks, the US and European governments have supplied infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. All of them are very important for the counteroffensive. This technique delivers troops to where they need to be — to the front line. After all, if you are faced with heavy artillery of Russian troops, it is very dangerous to walk or move around on ordinary trucks.
On paper, everything seems to look fine: the equipment is delivered, the Ukrainian soldiers are trained in combat operations on tanks.
But Kiev has many different types of tanks and armored vehicles from different countries, and they all have their own characteristics. When you talk, say, about the German Leopard 2 and the British Challenger 2, each of them uses its own type of weapon, and ammunition for them is incompatible with each other.
"Delivering all this equipment and operating it in the long run is really going to be a big challenge," said Sonny Butterworth, a senior analyst specializing in ground platforms at military research company Janes. Perhaps now Ukraine could find enough shells for each type of weapon, with personnel assigned to the right units. "But when it comes to the battlefield and Ukrainians start losing cars, they will need to quickly replenish supplies right on the ground, and everything will become much more confusing. It will be much more difficult logistically," he added.
In other words, it is not so much about tanks as about the supply and logistics capabilities to support and successfully deploy all armored vehicles in combat. In a war zone, this becomes a real challenge, especially when you have a hodgepodge of different models from different countries. For example, pontoon equipment helps tanks to cross rivers, but it also depends on the weight of tanks. And Western technology is heavy. If you are in combat and the available pontoons are not suitable for your particular tank, you will need other pontoons, and such inconsistencies can slow down maneuvers and make troops vulnerable. Ukraine will also need support for mine clearance and breakthrough, real-time combat engineering and much more.
"All of this is necessary for offensive operations," said Michael Kofman, director of the Russia studies program at the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). — Most of the discourse is now focused on things like tanks, right? But the reality is that they probably have a much lower priority compared to other military capabilities."
How prepared are the Ukrainian troops and how ready is the Russian army to fight them?
Ukraine suffered heavy losses last year — according to recently published Pentagon data, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost from 124 to 131 thousand people, about 17.5 thousand were killed on the battlefield. <...> But the Ukrainian forces as a whole were more motivated and ready to fight: the fight against Russia is existential for them. Nevertheless, after a year of armed operations and a significant expansion of the armed forces, Kiev had to mobilize more personnel, and new soldiers are joining the ranks of retired experienced, well-trained and highly motivated servicemen. This created significant distortions and unevenness in the personnel composition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
"A serious problem here is the coherence of the units," says Belyakova. — We don't know if untrained novices will be able to fight alongside experienced soldiers. After all, they have not fought together until now."
This raises questions about the quality of the armed forces of Ukraine. Replenished troops, trained and armed with Western equipment, theoretically should have an advantage. "It's hard to say which part of these forces will really be ready," Kofman said of the AFU. "Of course, it depends on the actual time of the offensive."
This may fundamentally determine whether Kiev will be able to achieve a large-scale breakthrough of the defensive lines of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. It also depends on the state of these very lines. Russian defense has not yet been tested by new advanced Western weapons. But Moscow is building up its defense against the alleged counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, actively learning lessons from last year. These preparations can make any operation for Ukraine very costly and very difficult.
<...>
The past year has been a difficult test for both Ukrainian and Russian troops. In addition to manpower, there are also real issues of armaments, in particular, ammunition <...> — probably the shortage arises from an attempt to save them for subsequent operations.
Western governments are in a hurry to increase supplies to Kiev, since earlier this year Ukraine "burned" ammunition faster than the United States and its NATO allies could replenish them. Even if the Ukrainian Armed Forces are ready and fully equipped for the start of their offensive operations, the big question is whether the United States and its partners will be able to continue to supply Ukraine with what it needs to consolidate any achievements and carry out subsequent attacks.
And what happens after the counteroffensive?
This, according to experts, is really the biggest question. Everyone knows that there will be a counteroffensive, but most of the experts I spoke to did not want to make predictions. The general opinion seems to be that yes, Ukraine will achieve some success in "returning" some territories. But no one can say anything about their size, as well as about the scale and pace of operations now. A lot depends on how success will be measured from the point of view of Kiev and the West, and Moscow too.
Ukraine, of course, wants to push Russia beyond its borders. But it is quite unlikely that she will achieve this with one counter-offensive jerk. It's just that Moscow controls too much territory — about one—sixth of the area of Ukraine - and no matter what difficulties the Russian troops may have in achieving significant success, they are still in business, they are still not defeated.
Any counteroffensive can cost Kiev dearly. He may face significant losses of personnel and equipment. If the West wants to support Ukrainian operations, it will have to continue to seriously help the AFU with weapons and supplies.
But the stocks of weapons and ammunition are by no means limitless. A successful spring counteroffensive could buy time for the West and allow it to collect more equipment and produce more ammunition, but it will not be easy for it to send basic weapons systems such as tanks.
Many allies have transferred to Ukraine what they already did not have enough, and now they have very few reserves of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that they could transfer without sacrificing their own combat readiness. "If in the future Kiev needs even more equipment to replace the lost one, where to get it from?" Butterworth asks.
On the eve of the counteroffensive, Western governments reaffirmed their support for Ukraine, both political and practical. But the longer the operation lasts (and it can take a long time) and the more expensive it will cost (and it can cost Ukraine very much), the higher the likelihood that the West will begin to doubt whether Kiev can really win in this military conflict.
The risk now is not a possible stalemate of the conflict. It consists in the fact that observers and supporters of the West will begin to perceive it that way. "If Ukraine does not succeed, it will strengthen the voices abroad that call for negotiations with Russia, in fact saying that the conflict cannot be resolved militarily," Belyakova said.
"It means less help, less support, less training, less money, and that would be a defeat — not on the battlefield, but actually politically," she added.
Author: Jen Kirby is a senior columnist on US foreign policy and national security at Vox.
