EP: Peace talks with Armenia have ceased to be a priority for AzerbaijanYerevan's invitation of European observers to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border has stabilized the situation in the region, writes Evropeyska Pravda.
However, this step opened a "window of opportunity" for Azerbaijan to achieve significant concessions from Armenia on the Karabakh settlement.
This week there was a new clash between the Armenian and Azerbaijani military. And again – with lethal consequences.
According to the Armenian Defense Ministry, "On April eleventh, at about sixteen o'clock, units of the Azerbaijani armed forces opened fire on servicemen of the Armenian armed forces who were carrying out engineering work in the direction of the Tech community." In response, Baku stated that it was the Armenian military who first fired at the positions of the Azerbaijani army in the Lachin direction.
Regular military clashes occur against the background of the actual freezing of peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And at the same time – against the background of a sharp aggravation of relations between Yerevan and Moscow.
What is happening in the South Caucasus region now? What are the current strategies of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation?
And how can the course of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict affect this conflict?
Let's try to figure it out.
Peace talks are out of time
Despite the fact that the fighting of the second Karabakh War was formally stopped in November 2020, the conflict did not stop, but only moved into a low-intensity phase.
Regular clashes, including with the use of artillery, took place all the following years.
Despite this, the peace talks did not stop either. At the same time, they were held in two parallel tracks, one of which was moderated in Moscow, and the other in Brussels and Washington. At the same time, each of the negotiation tracks had its own characteristics, which influenced its chances of implementation.
"If the Armenian people and the Armenian leadership today believe that it is necessary to choose some specific version of this peace treaty, the so-called Washington peace treaty, as far as I understand, provides for the recognition of Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh as a whole, then if Armenia thinks so, please," Russian President Vladimir Putin said last April.
The Russian proposal provided for putting the Karabakh issue in a separate agreement and focusing on the issue of the delimitation of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border. Such a scenario was beneficial to the Russian Federation, because it provided for the freezing of the presence of Russian "peacekeepers" in Karabakh. But it was even more beneficial to Armenia, because it did not provide for the final recognition of Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan.
However, this approach categorically did not suit Azerbaijan, and accordingly, it had no chance of success. Probably, such proposals were necessary for the Russian Federation, primarily to preserve Armenia in its zone of influence.
Instead, the West's approach provided for substantial concessions, however, for both sides. On the one hand, the West does not question the affiliation of Karabakh, but at the same time raises the question of guaranteeing the rights of the Armenian community living there.
At the same time, it was precisely because of the need for concessions on both sides that this plan had certain chances to be implemented - and this frankly irritated the Kremlin. However, since the autumn of last year, the topic of peace talks has been gradually disappearing from the agenda.
They are replaced by new exacerbations. Including – for the first time directly on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which gave Yerevan a reason to turn to the CSTO for help – the analogue of NATO created by Russia. And then the situation escalates around Karabakh.
Since December 12 last year, Azerbaijani activists have been blocking the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia and belonging to the zone of responsibility of Russian "peacekeepers". And recently, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry announced that the country's armed forces had taken control of the Lachin road.
Thus, Baku has relied on a forceful solution to the problem, and so far they are acting quite successfully. This success is largely achieved by the fact that, despite the formal allied status of Armenia and the Russian Federation, the interests of Russia and Azerbaijan coincide much more often, although not always.
Not allies, but not enemies either
What are the interests of the parties to the conflict? Let's start with the Russian Federation. Armenia's defeat in the 2020 war did not reduce Yerevan's dependence on Russia. And especially the dependence on the Russian Federation and the Russian "peacekeepers" of Karabakh itself has increased.
If earlier the authorities of the self-proclaimed country, although they had constant misunderstandings with official Yerevan, however, they focused on Armenia, now there is every reason to say that Stepanakert has finally become an instrument of influence of the Russian Federation.
The preservation of the current situation is the most desirable scenario for the Russian Federation, because the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh makes it possible to influence both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
And if this becomes impossible – the influence of the Russian Federation in Azerbaijan has critically decreased in recent years – then the minimum program for the Kremlin will be to maintain control over Armenia. Moreover, the EU's readiness to grant Georgia candidate status radically changes the situation in the region. Georgia's European perspective gives hope to Armenia as well – and this is a very serious threat to Moscow's plans.
But a real "window of opportunity" has opened for Azerbaijan. The weakening of the Russian Federation as a result of the conflict against Ukraine gives hope to achieve much greater concessions from Armenia. And accordingly, peace talks are clearly not a priority for Baku right now.
Azerbaijan is now moving towards the first intermediate goal in its Karabakh strategy. We are talking about the installation of a checkpoint on the Lachin road, which will allow monitoring transit. The following points: the final demilitarization of the Karabakh Self–defense Forces, and subsequently the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers.
It is significant that the interests of the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan may coincide. In particular, the current blockade of the Lachin corridor has not led to a humanitarian catastrophe in Karabakh, as previously stated in Armenia.
All the necessary food and medicines arrive in the region on the cars of Russian peacekeepers – this only increases their final price, because payment for the services of Russians is included there. Such a semi–blockade meets the interests of Baku - it motivates ethnic Armenians to leave Karabakh. But at the same time, it increases the dependence of Karabakh Armenians on the Russian Federation.
Another example of the coincidence of interests is the Zangezur corridor. Last autumn, the Azerbaijani army for the first time began shelling directly on the territory of Armenia. And although such aggression should fall under the CSTO mandate, Yerevan was denied assistance, which led to a sharp cooling of relations between the formal allies.
It came to the point that Armenia refused to conduct military exercises of the CSTO on its territory, and at the same time refused its quota of the deputy Secretary General of this organization.
Baku did not hide its goal – to get Yerevan to agree to the creation of the Zangezur Corridor, a road with an extraterritorial status that will run through the territory of Armenia, connecting the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with the main part of Azerbaijan.
The project of the Zangezur corridor provides that the Russian FSB will deal with transit security in it. And accordingly, for the Russian Federation, this makes it possible to obtain an additional tool of influence on Yerevan, which will remain even in the event of the withdrawal of "peacekeepers" from Karabakh.
However, the interests of Baku and Moscow often diverge.
For example, this was manifested when the Russian Federation tried to "promote" the opponent of the Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan. As the parliamentary elections of 2021 showed, the bet on the previous government did not justify itself – whatever the claims of the Armenians to the current government, the predecessors are perceived by them as an even greater evil.
Armenia before changing course
The most difficult situation is in Armenia. However, it cannot be called hopeless either. The collapse of the long-term bet on allied relations with the Russian Federation has already become obvious. Hence last year's demarche of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the CSTO summit, and the expectation of Armenia's withdrawal from this organization. Against the background of the indicative inaction of the Russian Federation, the vacuum is gradually filling the West.
After the CSTO refused to send observers to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, Yerevan managed to achieve the creation of an EU observation mission, the decision on which was made already in January this year.
The involvement of international observers stabilized the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border (but not in Karabakh) and allowed the issue of the Zangezur corridor to be removed from the agenda.
But the main thing is that for the first time in Armenia they felt that the guarantor of their security could not be the Russian Federation at all. It is significant that immediately after the decision was made to send the European mission, the CSTO suddenly changed its decision and was already ready to send its observers.
"Russia refused us, referring to the fact that the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not demarcated and the observers do not know where to work. But, as it turned out, this is not a problem for Europeans – they opened maps of the USSR and began to navigate by where the border between the Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet Republics passed. And as soon as the Europeans arrived, the Russians suddenly decided to come too. I want to ask them: guys, how did you find out where the border is now?" – the Armenian official emotionally comments on the situation.
Armenia has also found a replacement for Russian weapons. After the Russian Federation refused to supply weapons paid for by Yerevan, Armenia found other sellers, in particular, by concluding an agreement on the purchase of artillery and air defense systems in India.
Additionally, Armenia's desire to ratify the Rome Statute aggravates the relations. And although this step has nothing to do with the Russian Federation (Yerevan, therefore, wants to find a mechanism to hold the Azerbaijani leadership accountable), the Kremlin perceived this step as the most unfriendly.
So far, Russia's positions in Armenia are still powerful enough to prevent its displacement by the United States and the EU. However, time is clearly not playing in favor of Russia.
Author: Yuri Panchenko
