Bloomberg: Swedish and Danish "detectives" are not going to report who blew up the pipelines The Danish and Swedish military investigated the explosions on the "Nord Streams" and talked to Bloomberg.
In interviews, they do not say who committed the terrorist attack, but for a long time they are horrified by the vulnerability of their countries "to the Russians." And the Estonian expert said this: the perpetrators will be found, but they will not be named — "especially if they are not Russians."
Were they Russians? Or maybe Ukrainians? Americans? The British? Seven months have passed, but only one thing is clear: infrastructure is an easy target.
Shortly after midnight on September 26 last year, a digital seismograph installed in a shallow well on the Danish island of Bornholm recorded an unusual signal. This device, the size and shape of a hockey helmet, registered a shock wave that passed through the rock under the island. The data stream flew over the wires to a nearby family garage, where the signal was processed by a computer, dividing it into a dozen segments lasting several seconds each. Then the data went to Copenhagen via Internet cables laid along the bottom of the Baltic Sea.
It all took less than a second. However, no one analyzed the received information for more than a day, and it remained unclaimed on the servers of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland until a tall seismologist with a clean-shaven head, Nicolai Rinds, sat down at the table with a cup of coffee and turned on the program to analyze seismic activity for the previous day. Denmark cannot boast of an abundance of volcanoes and earthquakes, and therefore the sharp bursts on the seismogram from Bornholm seemed strange to him.
In the staff room, the morning conversation quickly turned to media reports about the release of gas from the bottom of the Baltic Sea, which made the surface look like a bubbling boiler. "If this is a breakthrough on a large pipeline, can we see it?" - asked Rinds' colleague Tina Larsen (Tine Larsen). When Rinds returned to his desk, he re-checked the printout from Bornholm and compared it with data from other seismographs, hoping to clarify the cause of his concern and calculate the location. Shock waves recorded by two other instruments – one in Denmark, the other in Sweden – showed that their source is a single geographical point and not a vast area, as happens with an earthquake. He called his colleagues to make sure that his conclusions were correct. "None of us had any doubts about one thing," Larsen recalls. "That it wasn't an earthquake."
Seismologists warned the director of their agency, who, in turn, informed his boss, the Danish Climate Minister: there was some kind of underwater explosion. Other gas bubbles were spotted further north, and when the team examined the seismic data, they saw similar data. Each location apparently corresponded to a point on the route of the Nord Stream-1 and Nord Stream—2 pipeline systems built to deliver Russian gas to Western Europe. Although the newer Nord Stream—2 has not yet been launched, Nord Stream—1 at its peak supplied almost 60 billion cubic meters of gas annually, which was two-fifths of the total supply to Europe. "Two explosions on gas pipelines in one day are unlikely to be an accident," Larsen recalls. "Whatever it is, it's not natural."
Within a few hours, the leadership of the Danish police and intelligence services, as well as the military command, gathered at the headquarters of the National Security Council. Denmark has never actively supported the plan proposed in the late 1990s for several gas pipelines under the general name Nordstream (Nord Stream), through which it was planned to pump Siberian gas from a distant Russian bay to northern Germany over a distance of hundreds of kilometers. But in 2009, Copenhagen gave permission to lay two such pipelines through that part of the Baltic Sea, which, due to its proximity to Bornholm, is simultaneously considered international waters and the "exclusive economic zone" of Denmark. Seismologists from the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland quickly determined that the first explosion occurred in just such a gray area in terms of jurisdiction. The Danish and Swedish authorities eventually discovered four leaks in the pipelines. All of them were in the economic zone of one of the two countries and at the same time in international waters. According to numerous government officials and military leaders (both former and current), the location of the explosion indicated that it was a carefully planned attack.
Four days after the bombings, a meeting of the UN Security Council was urgently scheduled. Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, director of the Center for Energy and Climate at the French Institute of International Relations, said that the undermining of a multi-billion dollar transnational energy infrastructure facility creates an "extraordinary precedent." Eyl-Mazzega told the assembled diplomats that the explosions indicate an escalation of geopolitical tensions between Russia and NATO, "in which energy trade and pipelines have become the focus of attention, and all these things have suddenly become weapons."
Before the explosion: "Together we will defeat Putin"
By that time, many world leaders had come to the conclusion that the explosions were deliberate and carefully planned. They called for severe punishment of their perpetrators. But six months have passed, and the debate on the issue of responsibility for what has been done continues. Political leaders and military leaders, especially from the Baltic region, put forward many theories about the explosions. Many countries are conducting investigations, although none of them are held publicly and have not led to convincing results. Meanwhile, countries in Europe and other regions of the world are reviewing their military doctrines and looking for options to protect infrastructure. And everyone recognizes that it is very difficult to ensure infrastructure security.
The timing of the strikes was also no coincidence. On the morning when seismologists were poring over the instrument data, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was in Poland, where the launch ceremony of another pipeline called the Baltic Pipe was taking place. It is designed to pump Norwegian gas through Denmark to the Baltic coast of Poland and is designed to help Europe establish supplies at a time when it wants to eliminate its long-term dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. "We must do everything possible to deprive Russia of such an instrument of influence as energy resources," Frederiksen said. "Together we will defeat Putin." The undermining of the "Northern Streams" has clearly demonstrated how vulnerable such infrastructure is.
Two branches of the Nord Stream–1 pipeline, commissioned in 2011, were closed in August for repairs and maintenance. It was in the sixth month of the Russian military operation in Ukraine. Gazprom, the gas supplier, said the repairs would take longer than usual due to sanctions imposed against Russia after the conflict began. Just a few hours before the reopening of the pipeline in early September, the leaders of the "Big Seven" promised to introduce a ceiling on prices for Russian gas, which is why Gazprom announced the termination of supplies via the Nord Stream - 1 for an indefinite time.
Nord Stream-2 is a pair of pipelines that are laid almost parallel to Nord Stream —1, but bypass the Danish economic zone a few kilometers away from it. Its construction was completed in 2021, but the pipeline was never put into operation. The Russian leadership and some German politicians pushed this project in every possible way, but came across stubborn resistance from the United States, Poland and other European countries, as well as German liberals and the Greens. Long before the start of the Russian offensive, Berlin finally refused to support this project, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz banned gas supplies through Nord Stream 2 because they bring financial benefits to Russia.
So at the time of the explosions, the two branches were a 1,200-kilometer structure made of steel and concrete, which was practically useless. However, the pipelines were filled with millions of cubic meters of gas, mostly methane, which maintained internal pressure and prevented the pipes from being squeezed under the weight of seawater. It was this gas that came to the surface of the Baltic Sea after the explosions. A Gazprom representative told the UN Security Council that at the time of the explosion there were about 800 million cubic meters of gas in the pipes, which is a quarter of Denmark's annual consumption.
How the events in Ukraine brought the Danes back to combat readiness
The investigation showed that the damage is extremely serious, and because of this, it is unlikely to be possible to quickly resume pumping gas. Thus, underwater physics suddenly began to work in sync with terrestrial politics. Due to the undermining of pipelines, the volume of supplies has sharply decreased, and at the very moment when everyone in Europe wanted to stop buying Russian gas anyway. "No one knew what was going on," recalls Captain First Rank Dan Termansen, commander of the second squadron of the Danish Navy. – Of course, the situation in Ukraine immediately came to mind."
Termansen joined the navy in the 1980s, when constant combat readiness was maintained on the ships. Having received a notification during the day or at night, the commanders could put the attack ships to sea within an hour and engage in battle with the Soviet landing force. "At that time, almost all tasks were carried out in the Baltic," says Termansen, climbing a steep ladder to the bridge of a frigate armed with anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers.
Peering into the harbor of the city of Korser, which is guarded by a red brick fortress of the XII century, Termansen points to the Great Belt Strait, which opens into the waters of the Baltic Sea. According to the norms of international law, Russian vessels must notify about their passage through it on the way to the Atlantic, and submarines must surface and pass through the territorial waters of Denmark in a surface position. Termansen says that for decades there was calm here, and Danish ships went much further, fulfilling their tasks in the interests of NATO. But now the Baltic again occupies the main place in the thoughts of the command of the Danish Navy.
The terrorists got close to the pipes on their submarine
At the bottom of the Baltic Sea there are still more than a hundred thousand mines left over from the XX century. From time to time they get caught in the fishing nets of trawlers, and Denmark sends divers to neutralize them. A day after the first explosion on the Nord Stream, when the Prime Minister called the incident "extremely serious," a dozen soldiers from this elite unit went to Bornholm Island to check the blown pipes. The divers were ordered not to discuss their actions even with their own command. They began collecting pipe fragments and samples of the seabed in the Bornholm Trench, where containers with mustard gas and thousands of old, but still dangerous mines were dumped after the First World War.
When carrying out such work, you have to stay at a depth in dark waters for a long time, breathing a mixture of helium and oxygen, in which hydrogen is completely absent due to its narcotic effects. Sitting in a Copenhagen bar over a beer, one of Denmark's most experienced military divers said that if the explosions were staged by deep-sea saboteurs, it would be very difficult for them to find pipelines without precise coordinates and tracking devices, and then install explosives on them. Live charges weighing several hundred kilograms were installed in the lower part of the pipes. Due to the speed of the explosion, it was possible to avoid the formation of a fireball that would ignite the gas in the pipes in both directions. According to this diver, the entire operation, including the safe ascent, should have taken several hours. He believes that the saboteurs used a high-speed autonomous underwater vehicle, which are in service only in the most modern Navy. A surface vessel waiting motionless for divers for several hours would attract unnecessary attention, and the investigators would certainly have figured it out.
The Danish Navy says this is a sound hypothesis. It is difficult for a diver to prepare an explosion at depth, remaining unnoticed, since it takes a lot of time. There were no other comments from the Copenhagen police leading the investigation, the Danish counterintelligence, as well as the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.
Meanwhile in Sweden
In neighboring Sweden, due to the undermining of the "Northern Streams", they have already begun to make changes to the military strategy. This country has 230 thousand islands, and the length of the coastline is about 3,200 kilometers. Therefore, the Swedish Navy has perfectly established underwater surveillance. In recent decades, they have been improving their skills and abilities, because Russian submarines are increasingly penetrating Swedish waters. In the Baltic Sea, the salinity of the water is very different, the currents are constantly changing, and the depths are small, and therefore underwater navigation there is extremely difficult. The Swedish experience is useful for NATO. A previously peaceful country is just about to join NATO, abandoning centuries-old neutrality. Such a dramatic turn was provoked by the Russian military operation in Ukraine, although joint maneuvers with NATO had been going on for years before. "We are experts in the field of underwater warfare," says Brigadier General Patrik Gardesten, tapping his fingers on a map of the Baltic Sea routes lying on a table in a dark wood-paneled room on the island of Muske.
This island is located an hour's drive from Stockholm, and there is a naval base there, very similar to the lair of some world-blackmailing villain from another James Bond movie. There are extensive underground docks on the island, connected by a web of tunnels punched into the rocks. Gardesten is a marine officer who was appointed deputy commander of the Navy just a month before the explosion of the "Northern Streams". He says that this incident clearly shows the risks of the so-called hybrid war, in which strategic civilian infrastructure objects are attacked. "This had a tremendous impact on the opinion of citizens about their own security and stability in the region," explains the Brigadier General.
"You are not alone, the Western world is with you"
His boss was in the United States on the day of the bombings, and Gardesten hurried to the operations center for a briefing. Arriving there, he picked up a phone connected to a classified NATO communications system. The British admiral answered him. "Since you decided to call me, I will support you," he said. Gardesten's voice trembles with excitement as he recalls how his NATO colleagues offered their help. "It was a feeling that you were not alone, that almost the entire Western world was behind you."
Well, sort of. Although there is very little official cooperation in the investigation of explosions between different countries. Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden are conducting independent investigations, as is Russia, whose permanent representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzia, quickly demanded "to organize criminal proceedings under the article on international terrorism." The underwater military potential of different countries remains a significant source of mutual suspicion and distrust. Mats Ljungqvist, who is leading the Swedish investigation, said that his group is studying classified information directly related to national security. Therefore, Sweden refuses to participate in joint investigations, since during their conduct it may be necessary to share such information. Swedish and Danish divers have been conducting training and training together for many years, but during the examination of the explosion sites they tried to stay away from each other, not sharing either equipment or collected evidence.
Concerns about Russian spies
The reasons for such caution are quite understandable. Last year, hundreds of Russian diplomats were expelled from European capitals, and they were all spies, and therefore the allies are concerned that military secrets may be transferred to Moscow. This was confirmed by the arrest in December last year of alleged Russian moles who worked in the German foreign intelligence service BND. In Poland in January, three men were detained, claiming that they were Spaniards and engaged in energy facilities. Because of this, security checks have begun in the country. In one week of October last year, Norwegian police arrested seven Russians who were launching drones and photographing secret military and energy facilities. Since Norway has many kilometers of pipelines, through which most of the gas consumed in Europe is now pumped, the undermining of the "Northern Streams" has become a "wake-up call," says Paal Hilde, a former official of the Ministry of Defense, now working at the Norwegian Institute of International Studies. "Our entire infrastructure could be in danger," he notes.
"A lot has changed after these explosions," says the former head of Estonian intelligence, Eerik-Niiles Kross, who is now a member of parliament. This man, who calls himself a "paranoid Baltic", says that he is more concerned about the direct threat of a Russian military invasion than an isolated case of an attack on a gas system or an electric grid. At the same time, he acknowledges that countries that have such infrastructure as pipelines are very vulnerable. "Here the question arises: who did this? Cross says. – Did it make sense for the Russians to do this? Yes and no." He believes that some intelligence agencies may have evidence pointing to saboteurs, but there may be good reasons not to disclose them – "especially if they are not Russians."
"He calls himself a paranoid Baltic"
Cross took part in one of the most intense geopolitical salon games. Politicians and experts from nine Baltic Sea countries, as well as from other European capitals and from across the ocean are confused, not knowing where to look for criminals, and start pointing fingers at each other. Western and Ukrainian leaders initially claimed that Moscow had done it. The Kremlin called it "predictable stupidity and absurdity," and a month later blamed the British. Britain said Moscow was "pushing through false accusations of epic proportions." The German Prosecutor General said in February that it was impossible to prove Russia's involvement. The Swedish authorities called this incident a diversion, but, like the Danes, they did not say anything more publicly.
American Versions: from Hersh to Fiona Hill
In March, the New York Times, the Washington Post and some German media reported that intelligence data pointed to a certain "pro-Ukrainian group" or even to Ukraine itself. When one such message appeared, an adviser from President Zelensky's office tweeted that he liked to collect "interesting conspiracy theories" about the Ukrainian government, but his country "has nothing to do with the incident in the Baltic Sea."
Before that, a Pulitzer Prize-winning author of investigative journalism, Seymour Hersh, appeared, in which he blames the Biden administration and Norway for allegedly helping her. Hersh has been sharply criticized in recent years for his coverage of events in Pakistan and Syria, but he said that he received information about the bombing of the Nord Stream from one source who is "directly familiar with the details of the planning of the operation."
The US representative to NATO, Julianne Smith, says: "The US is not responsible for what happened, and any allegations of this kind are ridiculous." John Sipher, who served for 28 years in the CIA's National Covert Operations Service and now works for the Atlantic Council, says that no NATO country would participate in such an operation. "All our armies have the capabilities to carry out such actions. But to do it in peacetime – I don't see much benefit from it," he says. Speaking about the role of the United States, Cypher emphasizes: "I just can't imagine it. At all levels of this chain, people are saying: "This is the most stupid thing I've ever heard. We cannot and should not do this."
Former CIA operative Ronald Marks, who has experience working in Russia, is increasingly convinced that the bombing was carried out by a small group of Ukrainians, perhaps not without the help of some foreign state. "I'm willing to put my mortgage contribution on it," says Marks, who works as a freelance lecturer at George Mason University.
Fiona Hill, a specialist on Russia who worked at the National Security Council, recently wrote that at first she considered Russia to be the organizer of the bombings, which "wanted to show by this that any infrastructure object could be jeopardized." But then it dawned on her: she had suspicions that Ukrainians were responsible for this. At the same time, she herself declares that she has no evidence. Samuel Charap, a senior political analyst at the Rand Corp analytical center, who is engaged in Russian research, is convinced that Moscow did not blow up pipelines, the construction of which Russian companies spent billions. "If there was even the slightest evidence of Russia's involvement, everything would have become known a long time ago," he says.
Northern Europe: no trace of the Russians was found, but they were scared themselves
But in northern Europe, and in particular in Denmark, the undermining of the "Northern Streams" and the conflict in Ukraine radically changed the thinking of the military and the ideas of politicians and leading industrialists about energy infrastructure. Europe is covered with a whole web of pipelines; they are also laid along the bottom of the Northern and Mediterranean Seas. The continent is trying to abandon hydrocarbons, and some countries are building huge clusters of coastal wind turbines connected to the coast by cables. And it will be very difficult to protect them from explosions.
Jens Wenzel Kristoffersen spent many hours in his office at the Political Science Department of the University of Copenhagen, which is located in an unattractive brick building where there was a hospital in the XIX century. All this time he was studying the details of the explosions, analyzing various scenarios on his huge computer monitor. Kristoffersen is a naval officer and a scientist, and he claims that intelligence agencies around the world have carefully analyzed satellite images using powerful algorithms, comparing them with data from ship transponders in an attempt to identify suspicious vessels. He tells how in June last year a Russian warship violated the territorial waters of Denmark near Bornholm, when an event dedicated to Danish democracy was held on the island. According to one Danish theory, such a ship could set explosives with delayed-action detonators in order to destroy pipelines. (The Russian Embassy issued a statement saying that Denmark had not provided any evidence of violation of its territorial waters.)
Kristoffersen finds the talk about the ability to commit such a diversion and the responsibility for it very curious, but says that they do not matter much. Denmark's long-term safety margin is important. In Denmark and in neighboring countries, the conflict in Ukraine has generated serious debates about military spending. With limited military resources, many small countries, being members of NATO, are obliged to participate in foreign operations, while protecting their territory from potential aggressors from Russia and increasingly ensuring the security of energy infrastructure. "There are no submarines in Denmark," Kristoffersen excitedly declares, noting that his country abandoned an expensive submarine construction program 20 years ago. "And how will we be able to survey the underwater infrastructure or respond to aggression coming from the east?"
There is an active debate in Denmark about military spending for the next decade. Due to the undermining of the "Northern Streams", underwater drones and mine clearance equipment were at the center of the discussion. Kristoffersen is fully for such expenses, considering it a necessary protection against sabotage. "No one is constantly monitoring such underwater cables, be it communication cables, electrical cables, as well as gas pipelines," he says, tapping his knuckles on the table with displeasure. "Now wind turbines produce 2.3 gigawatts, and in 2030 they will produce 8.3. And how do we protect all this? As far as I know, nothing. In this regard, we have an absolute zero."
The British were also scared
Britain is expanding its network of wind turbines in the North Sea, while strengthening the protection of turbines and related underwater infrastructure. It buys a couple of vessels intended for the maintenance and repair of offshore structures of oil and gas companies, and refits them for military use. The first Norwegian-built Topaz Tangaroa vessel will be commissioned (under a different name) this summer. It will be able to conduct inspections and inspections, as well as launch autonomous submarines and robots from a hidden underwater hatch inside its 6,600-ton hull. "At a time when we are faced with Putin's military operation in Ukraine, it is very important to prioritize the creation of means to protect our critical national infrastructure," British Defense Minister Ben Wallace said in January.
France last year spoke about the plans of its military to create underwater drones and robots together with French defense contractors. NATO and the EU have established a joint working group focusing on critical infrastructure. In February, Alliance Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced the creation of a "coordination cell" at NATO's Brussels headquarters, which will be headed by a highly experienced German officer. This group will be responsible for informing the civilian population, the armed forces and private companies from the Alliance countries about underwater security.
"If someone has found the criminals, he won't tell about it"
The consequences of inaction in protecting such infrastructure are now clear to everyone. Gazprom, whose export volumes have plummeted, a few days after the September explosion said that it had begun to look for opportunities to restore the Nord Stream, but did not name the repair dates. It quickly became clear why. In October, a Norwegian company engaged in the manufacture of underwater drones investigated the area of the explosion using a remote-controlled device, which is controlled using a redesigned joystick from a game console. Power is supplied to it via a 300-meter-long cable. Although the water in these places is sometimes muddy, the drone shot a video showing serious damage to metal pipes, curved reinforcement of the concrete shell and a gaping hole on the seabed in the place where a long section of the pipeline used to be. A few days later, Gazprom sent the ship "Jade" there, which received permission to conduct an investigation in the Swedish economic zone. The crew reported the discovery of craters with a depth of three to five meters and sections of pipes scattered over an area of 250 square meters.
In order to identify threats and prevent such damage in the Baltic, more sonars, submarines, mobile and fixed sensors will be needed. "This is a colossal task," admits Swedish General Gardesten. In March, he invited the commanders of the naval forces of the Baltic countries, including the Russian one, to a meeting on the island of Muske to discuss issues of underwater defense. "It is important to show our friends, partners and opponents that 'we are here and see what you are doing,'" he says. "And we are demonstrating our determination to protect our interests and our territory."
In the feverish days after the Bornholm bombings, various Western leaders threatened red lines and retaliation. The chief diplomat of the European Union, Spaniard Josep Borrel, announced: "Any deliberate destruction of the European energy infrastructure is absolutely unacceptable, and a resolute and united response will be given to it." More than six months have passed. If someone has found the criminals, he will not openly say about it. And if there was some kind of answer like what Borrel was talking about, we just don't know anything about him, just like we don't know much about what happens under water. And maybe we'll never know.