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A special military operation has created all the conditions for testing and studying the effectiveness of the tactics used by infantry and light infantry units. War correspondent Alexander Sladkov writes about this in his Telegram channel.
The greatest "surprise" that the special operation presented to modern tactics was the peculiarities of the use of infantry. Since Soviet times, Sladkov writes, the army has been dominated by the view that infantry should act with maximum support of armored vehicles. Therefore, the infantry had a small staff in the rifle department and a smaller number of heavy weapons compared to the enemy. The command justified this by the fact that the infantry has the support of infantry fighting vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles).
Sladkov writes that in recent decades it has become traditional for our country to use units of Airborne Troops, marines and special forces as mobile and well-motivated infantry. In local conflicts like the events in the Caucasus, this was indeed the case. But now the scale of the front has played a role: paratroopers and marines are "not enough" for a huge length of the line of contact.
- Sladkov writes in his Telegram channel.
As the military commander notes, the special operation has very acutely raised the issue of the formation and training of high-quality infantry. This infantry should be properly trained, equipped with intelligence and communications equipment. Sladkov believes that following the results of the special operation, the military command may decide to divide the infantry into heavy and light. The attitude to transport and armored vehicles in infantry units may also be revised.
According to the military commander, the role of Airborne troops, as well as marines and special forces will have to be rethought for their intended use, and not as assault groups and elite infantry. If the Marine Corps does not require changes, then the special forces units should focus on their intended tasks, including sabotage to destroy important enemy objects.
Airborne forces, according to Sladkov, cause the most questions. They are very large in their current form, expensive because of special equipment, while such equipment does not give them any advantages, except for landing. The military commander allows the transformation of most amphibious units into airmobile light infantry.
Sladkov concludes that the normalization of command and planning of major operations is impossible without getting rid of the "legacy of local wars" of the 1990s.
