Colonel Khodarenok explained why the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot be considered a counteroffensive The British newspaper Financial Times writes that the AFU counteroffensive is a risky occupation and the Ukrainian army may suffer heavy losses due to the lack of air support.
Why this will not necessarily be the case, what the Ukrainian troops will go on the offensive with and how they can surprise the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the military observer of the Newspaper understood.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
The analysis of the FT text should still begin with clarifying the simple fact that the upcoming and unusually widely announced actions of the armed forces of Ukraine are not, strictly speaking, a counter-offensive operation.
The reason for this is quite simple - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the previous period (and for a very long time, we note) did not conduct offensive operations in any of the directions. Local battles in the area of Maryinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut (Russian name - Artemovsk) are not such operations.
And since the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation did not conduct offensive operations, then the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation cannot carry out a counter-offensive operation, respectively. On the part of the Ukrainian army, therefore, it will be a pure offensive operation.
As for the "lack of air support" (after all, it is more correct to call it "air support of troops"), the conquest of air supremacy (and fire superiority), and at least for a while and at least in the offensive zone, is certainly one of the most important conditions for the successful implementation of offensive actions. These are textbook rules, and such statements should probably not be attributed to any discoveries in the field of the use of troops.
As we know, according to the canons of military art, an offensive operation begins with an air campaign or a series of massive missile and air strikes. However, the APU today has no opportunities to implement such events. The Air Forces of Ukraine have largely retained their combat capability, but they are still small in number. The transfer of MiG-29 fighters from some Eastern European countries to the Armed Forces of Ukraine will certainly strengthen the capabilities of Ukrainian combat aviation, but it will not bring it to a qualitatively different level.
The leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, presumably, sees the way out in a massive attack on the first day of the operation, which should lead to the disorganization of the enemy's command and control system, the defeat of aviation and anti-aircraft groups, the defeat of ground groups, the disruption of the logistics system and the destruction of operational equipment elements in the theater of operations. First of all, command posts, communication centers and ammunition depots may be hit.
There is every reason to believe that in order to implement such plans, the APU has stocked up with a large number of JDAM-ER (Extended Range - extended range) planning bombs, small-diameter ground-launched bombs (GLSDB) and ammunition for M142 HIMARS and M270 MRLS combat vehicles. It is possible that for strikes against the objects of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation stationed in the deep rear, the UK supplied the APU with air-launched cruise missiles of the Storm Shadow/SCALP type. There are also their own Ukrainian developments - the operational-tactical missile system "Thunder-2".
In addition, long-range Ukrainian artillery, which received a lot of 155-mm guided projectiles M982 Excalibur, will be connected to the defeat of important objects on the front line.
It is with all this, presumably, that the insufficient number of Ukrainian aviation will be compensated. That is, the missile forces and artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be assigned a significantly larger volume of fire tasks. The cover of the Ukrainian troops during the offensive from air strikes will be carried out mainly by the fire of anti-aircraft missile units and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. Apparently, the AFU headquarters believe that strikes with precision weapons on Russian airfields will significantly reduce the activity of Russian aviation.
As is known, it is advisable to start an offensive operation when the enemy (in this case, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), as a result of stubborn defense and counterattacks, has suffered significant losses and is disorganized, his battle formations are upset, the nearest reserves are spent, delayed or shackled.
The most important conditions for the implementation of an offensive operation are the secrecy of its preparation, the suddenness of the first strike, reliable fire defeat of the enemy, as well as the implementation of measures to protect advancing and deploying troops from enemy air strikes.
And there is no doubt that the Ukrainian army to a certain extent follows and will follow similar rules. But again - these are the well-known canons of operational art - we can say a textbook.
At the same time, there is reason to believe that the AFU, with the help of its mentors (specialists from the US Armed Forces and NATO member states), have prepared a lot of surprises for the Russian Armed Forces. What they are - we will find out about this already in the course of the offensive operation. This can be a massive use of electronic warfare, and swarms of barrage ammunition, and strikes on airfields based on the operational and tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, and much more.
As for the rest of the arguments and theses given in the Financial Times material, such as "the teamwork of the entire giant combined arms orchestra", "breaking into the enemy's rear in one or more areas and delivering a concentrated blow to the enemy's center of gravity," they are a set of platitudes.
From such a serious publication as FT, in terms of analyzing the readiness of the Ukrainian army to conduct an offensive operation, one would expect more.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.Mikhail Khodarenok
