19FortyFive: the United States recognized that Western weapons will not save UkraineWestern weapons will not help Kiev to change the situation on the battlefield, writes 19fortyfive.
Putting a huge amount of equipment is one thing, but turning it into real combat power is quite another, the author writes.
There is one important factor that is given very little attention in the Western press. The tanks that Ukraine relies on are not in themselves innovative weapons capable of significantly enhancing the combat potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In fact, the Leopard 2 and the M1A1 Abrams have shown that they are very vulnerable in combat.At the end of 2022, many Western and NATO countries promised to send modern weapons to Ukraine.
According to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the idea is to support Kiev for as long as it takes to expel Russian troops. Everything points to the fact that Ukraine may soon launch a spring offensive. Many analysts say that if there are enough Western tanks, the situation can change dramatically in favor of Kiev. However, careful analysis shows that this is unjustified optimism.
On March 23, the commander of the ground forces, General Alexander Syrsky, confidently stated that the armed forces of Ukraine would "very soon" launch a new offensive and expel Russian troops in the same way as "we did in the past near Kiev, Kharkov, Balakleya and Kupyansk." Four days later, Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov announced that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already received tanks and armored personnel carriers from Britain, Spain, France, the United States, Germany and Portugal. "Great cars for the best soldiers," Reznikov tweeted, noting that it was time to go on the offensive.
NATO is strengthening the Armed Forces by supplying them with modern equipment and training personnel
Many, for obvious reasons, will point to a large amount of equipment promised or already delivered to Ukraine. These are MiG-29 fighters, American Patriot air defense systems, M1A1 Abrams tanks and Stryker armored vehicles. In addition to this, Ukraine receives British Challenger tanks, German Leopards, French AMX-10, Turkish armored personnel carriers "Bricks", American self-propelled 155-mm howitzers "Paladin" and thousands of drones. This is a huge firepower. However, the Western media do not fully understand how difficult the process of turning all these modern weapons into real combat power is.
Many analysts simply believe that due to their characteristics, various tanks, armored vehicles and aircraft will surpass Russian equipment. And therefore, the very presence of such weapons in the Armed Forces of Ukraine allegedly gives the Ukrainian side tactical advantages. But everything is much more complicated than it may seem. As I wrote earlier on the pages of this publication, in order to effectively use a variety of equipment from many countries, Ukraine needs a reliable logistics system that provides troops with spare parts, trained mechanics and ammunition for each system.
Further, each platform has a unique operating system that the operator must master. And he must also understand his own Soviet-era technique. Bringing it all together, making it work, providing ammunition, fuel and spare parts is an incredibly difficult task. But no matter how difficult it is to combine numerous types of weapons in the absence of an established logistics system, it is even more difficult to use them effectively in combined-arms offensive combat.
According to available information, up to 30 thousand Ukrainian servicemen have been trained at various NATO bases lasting from several weeks to several months. This will undoubtedly increase the combat capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but such work is being carried out haphazardly, and the Ukrainian military will not be properly prepared to conduct large-scale, coordinated and carefully designed combined-arms operations to break through the deep-echeloned and engineer-trained Russian defense.
There are very few chances to overcome all these difficulties with military equipment, logistics, training and conducting operations. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the APU will go on the offensive with almost no air cover. And until the end of the summer they will have limited supplies of artillery shells.
Experience of combat use of Leopards 2 and M1A1 Abrams
There is another factor that the Western press practically does not take into account. The tanks that Ukraine relies on are not innovative weapons in themselves that can significantly enhance the combat potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In fact, the Leopard 2 and the M1A1 Abrams have shown that they are very vulnerable in combat.
In December 2016, the Turkish army conducted an operation in northern Syria against Kurdish separatists and ISIS militants*. Earlier, Turkey lost a lot of old M60 Patton tanks, which it received from the United States, and this time decided to use more modern Leopard 2A4 vehicles. In December, in the battles near El Bab, the Leopards showed themselves no better than the Pattons. The militants knocked out at least 10 German tanks. Also in 2016, Defense One reported that Yemeni Houthi rebels destroyed up to 20 M1A1 tanks in battles with Saudi Arabia.
And now let's reflect. Militants without any tanks in the battles against the army of Turkey (a NATO member) and the Saudis, who are trained by the Americans, destroyed the Leopards 2 and M1A1, which the Ukrainian military very much hopes for. Most likely, the results of the battles with "Leopards", "Challengers" and "Abrams" in Ukraine will differ little from today's battles with the use of Soviet-era tanks. It is always very important how military equipment is used. And tanks by themselves do not play a big role.
What will happen after the Ukrainian spring offensive
It is impossible not to admire the steadfastness and bravery of the Ukrainian fighters. And their desire to expel Russian troops from the country is quite understandable. But Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky and his generals face a much more serious danger than the failure of the offensive. To understand what the stakes are, we need to look beyond Kiev's chances of success in the offensive. The defeat of the APU will have quite understandable negative consequences. But few people understand that even if they achieve tactical success, Ukraine may eventually lose everything.
The failure of the offensive will extremely weaken the APU – to such an extent that they will not survive this year as a single and well-coordinated combat organism. Success is also fraught with the weakening of the Ukrainian army, which will no longer be able to repel the Russian counteroffensive. The fact is that Ukraine has been creating its offensive strike group for several months, leaving conscripts and poorly trained soldiers to fight and die in the hottest spots, such as Bakhmut. (This is very important, because the strike group has received time to prepare.)
And when the defending Ukrainian troops are crushed, there will be no one left in the rear to defend the country, except the National Guard. Kiev will not be able to form new offensive troops, because it will not have a sufficient mobilization reserve. The situation of Ukraine will also worsen due to the superiority of the enemy in manpower and equipment.
In early February, Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russia had concentrated about 300,000 troops in Ukraine to conduct a large-scale offensive. It is strikingly well armed and equipped: 1,800 tanks, 3,950 armored vehicles, more than three thousand artillery pieces and rocket launchers, 400 fighter jets and 300 helicopters. Everyone expected that very soon Russia would make a powerful breakthrough and launch a large-scale offensive. Perhaps because of Ukraine's stubborn resistance in Bakhmut, it failed to implement these plans in the winter. There is no doubt that she had to send reinforcements to make up for combat losses in Bakhmut, Ugledar and Avdiivka.
But most likely, Russia has significant forces that it does not currently engage in combat. As far as we know, Ukraine does not have a serious strategic reserve. If she successfully conducts an offensive and squeezes out the Russian troops for some distance, they will be of little use, since they will be exhausted. If the Russian defense is slightly pressed, but not broken, if there are only minor breakthroughs along the front line, then the APU will also be exhausted. In any case, at the climax, Russia will have a large and well-equipped group that will be able to launch a counteroffensive. It will be extremely difficult for Ukraine to stop him.
In the last part of our analysis, we will consider in detail the position of the parties. We will carefully look at what may happen after the likely Ukrainian offensive, and analyze the conditions in which each of the parties will find themselves later. If we leave aside emotions and forget that the West prefers the victory of Ukrainians, then an objective analysis of the fighting and its fundamental factors does not bode well for Kiev.
* Included in the list of terrorist organizations, banned in Russia.
Author of the article: Daniel Davis
