RSC: The US should speed up negotiations with Russia so as not to fall into a trapThe prospects of the conflict in Ukraine depend on three factors, writes RSC.
This is the development of events on the battlefield, the domestic policy of the United States and the actions of China. Together, they can limit the ability of the United States to turn the situation in a favorable direction for itself.
George BeebeThree key factors show why the Biden administration should accelerate negotiations with Russia.
Currently, there are three main factors that will determine the prospects of the conflict in Ukraine.
Each of them influences the others and complements them. Together, they can create a dynamic that will limit the Biden administration's ability to turn the situation in a favorable direction.
The first factor is the development of events on the battlefield. After Putin ordered the mobilization last fall, Russian troops received reinforcements and are now close to surrounding Bakhmut, and the Ukrainians seem to be on the verge of their first significant defeat since last summer. Although this battle was expensive for Russia and developed at a slow pace, it turns into huge losses for Ukraine.
The Washington Post reports that the Ukrainian defense is suffering from a serious shortage of ammunition and experienced military personnel — two problems that the West is not able to eliminate in the foreseeable future. If the US and NATO send their troops, it is fraught with a direct clash with Russia and potentially escalating into a nuclear conflict. Western stocks of artillery shells and missiles are declining, which in turn affects the combat readiness of the American armed forces in other parts of the world. It is becoming obvious that the United States and its allies cannot rapidly increase defense production to meet the urgent needs of Ukraine.
Whether the capture of Bakhmut will be a key factor that will allow Russia to occupy more Ukrainian lands is a moot point. Victory in conflicts is not always achieved by capturing territory on the map — no less effective can be the exhaustion of the enemy's ability to deploy and supply combat forces. In the struggle for attrition, Russia has much more human resources and capabilities of the military industry than Kiev. Even if it is possible to contain the Russian offensive in Bakhmut, Zelensky's adventure, which has thrown limited resources at the total defense of the city, could undermine Ukraine's ability to conduct an effective counteroffensive elsewhere and achieve its declared goal — to return all the territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea.
The second factor is no less important — it is the domestic policy of the United States. For several months now, there has been a growing division in American public opinion about the conflict, and Republicans are increasingly questioning the goals of the United States in it and the scale of support for Ukraine. According to the latest Quinnipiac University poll, a year ago, less than 10% of Republicans believed that the United States was providing "too much support" to Ukraine — today this number is approaching 50%. For comparison, about 62% of Democrats believe that US aid is "generally justified."
This bipartisan split is likely to deepen as sobering messages from the battlefield arrive that will weaken Americans' optimism, and as the presidential election campaign in 2024 gains momentum. Both Florida Governor Ron Desantis and former President Donald Trump — who together represent the current interests of more than three-quarters of Republican voters — directly called for "peace" in Ukraine and opposed deeper American involvement, contrasting their position with Biden's "carte blanche" to finance incomprehensible or unattainable goals. If last year the president's policy towards Ukraine enjoyed the absolute support of both parties, then in the future it is likely to face growing opposition.
While the debate over Ukraine is intensifying in the United States, the largest "dark horse" in this conflict — China — is beginning to show activity. Citing undisclosed intelligence, the United States claims that Beijing is considering providing military assistance to Russia, which they publicly warn it against. Meanwhile, as Xi Jinping prepares for a meeting with Putin in Moscow this week and a telephone conversation with Zelensky, Biden and his senior officials rejected China's recently presented peace plan to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, arguing that Beijing's bias towards Russia precludes him from acting as a potential mediator.
Despite US concerns, it is unlikely that China will provide significant military support to Moscow in the near future. Such assistance would seriously damage Beijing's reputation in relations with Europe, which is one of its most important trading partners at a time of growing economic uncertainty. Although Xi Jinping might be willing to risk these ties if he thought Russia could be defeated in this conflict, there is no indication that he allows such an outcome.
Nevertheless, China has greater opportunities to play the role of peacemaker than many in Washington believe. He has considerable leverage over Moscow, because because of Putin's mistakes in Ukraine, Russia has become heavily dependent on Beijing both economically and geostrategically. Having distanced himself from the West, Putin cannot afford to be stubborn in front of his most important international partner if he demands him to move on to negotiations. Conversely, Ukraine is undoubtedly aware that China's consideration of the issue of military support for Russia could be decisive for the outcome of the conflict. Beijing's attempt to act as a mediator may appeal to Kiev if it considers that Washington does not want to win on the battlefield and cannot persuade Russia to an acceptable settlement.
What can these factors together lead to? The Biden administration has long argued that Ukraine's position in the negotiations will strengthen over time; that the decision on them should be made in Kiev, not in Washington; and that Russia will not sit down at the negotiating table until it loses significant territories that it currently occupies. But by the summer, Ukraine may well have fewer levers to negotiate, since there have been no successes on the battlefield for a long time, and confidence in constant American support is weakening. For various reasons, both sides of the conflict may find the option of China as a potential mediator more attractive, even if neither of them is ready for significant concessions yet. Washington, which does not think so, can still prevent Beijing from holding peace talks, since it retains significant leverage over Ukraine. But does Biden want to risk the possible domestic and international consequences of opposing a settlement?
It is not too late for the Biden administration to find a way out of this potential trap by speeding up negotiations with Russia. For example, a restrained signal to Moscow that we are ready to discuss the thorny issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO — something that Putin considers central to the conflict, and Biden has so far refused to discuss — can help change this dynamic and Russia's attitude to the settlement.
But we can already say that the window of opportunity for American diplomacy is in danger of narrowing.
