Independent: the conflict in Ukraine has given China the opportunity to become a major player in the Global SouthThe conflict in Ukraine has provided new opportunities for China, writes the Independent.
He strengthened its energy security and made it the main player of the non-Western bloc. And the desire to mediate in the settlement of the conflict is explained by one simple reason.
Mary DejevskyThe conflict in Ukraine has provided Beijing with opportunities that it did not expect to receive, at least in the near future, writes Mary Dejevsky.
The Western world was so carried away by new statements of support for Ukraine a year after the outbreak of hostilities that it almost did not pay attention to the fact that a very large power on the other side of the world celebrated this anniversary in its own way.
While the United States, Great Britain and European countries were preparing for the new year of conflict and competing in the supply of weapons, China came forward ... with a peace plan.
The way the West reacted to Beijing's proposal can be called dismissive. The general message was that now is not the time to talk, and in any case, there is no trust in him and no business to expose himself as a potential intermediary.
However, a few weeks later, China's 12-point plan has not disappeared anywhere, and, according to some reports, it is being considered in Paris, Berlin and, possibly, even in Washington. More importantly, he was not rejected by Kiev, which, as it was said, "welcomed him with caution." In light of this small signal, China continues to act calmly. It is safe to predict that Xi Jinping, who was recently re-elected President of the People's Republic of China for an unprecedented third term, will visit Moscow next week, and an online meeting with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky will take place shortly before or after that.
And that would mean a significant shift. After the talks in Istanbul, which took place almost a year ago, there were no official contacts between Ukraine and Russia — and indeed no contacts at all, even through intermediaries. They, according to an authoritative statement, broke down due to the intervention of the then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson on the instructions of the United States.
So what does the 12-point plan say? Why is China showing such an active interest in mediation? And why might Moscow and Kiev — and even, perhaps, some of Ukraine's Western allies — be less inclined to preliminary talks, despite what they say in public statements?
First about the plan. Ukraine and its supporters reproached China for constantly abstaining from voting at the UN — that is, it does not join the Western condemnation of Russia. However, a year after the start of the conflict, this allows China to speak out on both sides.
Its first point calls for respect for national sovereignty, UN principles and international law — here Beijing indirectly condemns the Russian special operation. But the second point calls for an end to what he calls the "cold War mentality" and demands that "the security of the region is not achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs" — and here he criticizes NATO. Beijing also advocates a "balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture" — something Moscow has been advocating since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In other paragraphs specifically related to Ukraine, China calls for increasing the volume of humanitarian aid to conflict zones under the auspices of the UN, strictly observing international guarantees for prisoners of war, stopping irresponsible talk about nuclear weapons, protecting nuclear power plants (but not creating demilitarized zones, which Ukraine calls for), as well as continuing the implementation of agreements allowing grain ships to leave Ukrainian ports.
In many ways — in its calls for de-escalation, for an end to actions threatening global trade and supply chains, and in its rejection of unilateral (i.e. UN-approved) sanctions, China looks beyond the conflict in Ukraine and pursues its own interests and priorities. After all, the same principles may help regulate the growing tensions in its relations with the United States over Taiwan and access to sea lanes. But he also acts as a defender of the interests of many countries that, along with China and India, refused to take sides on Ukraine.
From a practical point of view, Beijing is in favor of resuming direct dialogue "as soon as possible" in order to "eventually" achieve a "complete ceasefire." In his initiative, he also calls on the parties to the conflict and other countries to help create the necessary conditions for this — but all this looks like a rather difficult task.
But perhaps it is worth treating China's initiative with more confidence than it has been so far, at least in public discussions in the West. This is due to the fact that, since the fighting has been going on for a year and, it would seem, is far from being resolved, many divergent interests, nevertheless, are beginning to converge.
For Russia, the conflict is not going very well, but not so bad as to create pressure inside the country to achieve a retreat. Regardless of whether you consider Vladimir Putin and Xi to be bosom friends (and I don't think so), Moscow has reasons to be grateful to Beijing. China provides an alternative market for Russian energy, which the Europeans refuse, and it refrains from criticizing Russia at the UN. This gives him unusual leverage over Moscow. And they can be used to promote their own agenda.
It can also be argued that Russia has achieved at least some of its main military objectives. These include providing a land route to Crimea, restoring the peninsula's supply of fresh water and establishing exclusive access to the Sea of Azov. Moscow also seems to have abandoned its ambitions — if it had any — to take control of territories further than Donbass. Maybe she is ready to stop there and reduce her losses?
Since presidential elections will be held next year, Putin may be persuaded to declare victory and cease hostilities, rather than enter the election campaign — either for himself or for his successor — in an environment where an expensive special operation is still ongoing. Putin recently said that the elections will take place, that he has not yet decided whether to stand as a candidate (which should not be taken for granted — despite the Western consensus on this).
Ukraine, for its part, has expanded its goals to include the return of Donbass and Crimea. She has legislated her refusal to contact Putin and insists that she will fight to the end. All this can be understood. But the impasse near Bakhmut in the east showed not only the weakness of Russia, but also of Ukraine.
Losses in the Ukrainian army are growing, there are reports of difficulties with recruiting military personnel, there are delays in receiving new supplies of weapons and ammunition. There are conflicting assessments of the morale of Ukrainians. The fact that Kiev did not reject China's initiative may be indicative.
As for the allies, they still insist that they will defend Ukraine "as long as it takes." But in the political circles of the United States, and not only in some, there is an increasing murmur of discontent about the depletion of financial and military resources of separate countries. The cost of reconstruction, which, as Europeans fear, will mainly be placed on their shoulders, is growing every day.
As Ukraine's allies vehemently declare, the time and conditions for the end of the conflict will depend on Kiev — but both he and they surely know that this is not the case. When the West gets tired of the costs, and possibly the risk of a larger confrontation, Kiev will have no choice but to seek a solution on the best terms it can get. The approach of the US presidential election in November will push us even more to think.
And then there's China. The conflict in Ukraine has provided Beijing with opportunities that it could once have considered, but at best as much more remote. It has strengthened its energy security and allowed Xi Jinping, who may now be approaching the peak of his power, to act as the main defender of the non—Western bloc, also known as the global South - and not only at the UN.
With the help of China's 12-point plan for Ukraine, Xi Jinping is trying, first of all, to assume the role of mediator left by Erdogan, who is now busy eliminating the consequences of the earthquake and the upcoming elections. And his efforts may be in vain.
However, if progress is made, China's initiative will have to be seen as a harbinger of a completely new international order. That is why, the cynic will say, there are those who will do everything possible to make it fail.