General Shedivy: you can't underestimate the Russians just because they were wrong in the beginning The Russian people still hide a huge potential in themselves, Czech General Jiri Shedivy said in an interview with Rádio universum.
He warned the West against underestimating Russia and told about the mistakes that he made by failing to prevent the outbreak of an armed conflict in Ukraine.
Martina KotsianovaThe armed conflict in Ukraine has been going on for more than a year.
On the anniversary of the Russian special operation, the media was flooded with analytical articles, guesses, loud statements and harsh rhetoric. After listening to a year of self-confident statements that often crumbled like a house of cards, people, readers, listeners and viewers, perhaps, hoped for greater caution in statements, but we still do not see restraint and objectivity. A rare example of restraint was shown by the New York Times, which, after a year of armed conflict in Ukraine, dryly stated: "After a year of conflict in Ukraine, all eyes are on China." Also, the authors of the publication mentioned anti-war demonstrations in Europe and wondered when everyone would get tired of military action, and what it would be expressed in. So what else can we expect from this conflict? What should we be afraid of? And what, on the contrary, should not bother us? I will talk about all this with Jiri Shediv, a retired army general and former Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic, who now heads the Department of Security Studies at the CEVRO Institute.
Rádio universum: Mr. General, a few months ago you admitted that you yourself were among those who did not expect a Russian special operation in Ukraine. Tell me why? Why didn't you expect this?Jiri Shedivy: Since we, the military, or, better to say, I, as a military man, estimated where those 200 thousand soldiers were stationed, and simple military mathematics, as well as experience, told me that this deployment is so illogical that it is simply stupid to use force against Ukraine with such a deployment of troops as the Russians presented it.
This could not end well, and such an operation was doomed to failure. As a result, it turned out that Vladimir Putin, who is at the head of the Russian machine, prepared this operation and launched it on February 24. It ended badly, as we expected. To our surprise or mine, it turned out that Vladimir Putin and his team did not understand the real situation in Ukraine at all, which is extremely strange, since not understanding where the soldiers will go, how the local society will behave, and how combat-ready the enemy army is means showing complete amateurism. It was necessary to pay for it with a large number of human lives of soldiers and residents of Ukraine and mostly Russians.
— Judging by what you said, from a military point of view, it was stupid to start this operation."It was stupid, like I said, and that's how it turned out.
— Then why do you think they started the operation anyway? Out of patience?— Russians very often explain this by what Ukraine was doing, and by the fact that some Nazi ideology was gaining a lot of influence there.
They very often talked about the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance and, of course, that people were being oppressed there, but not their fellow citizens, but Russians in the eastern part of Ukraine, where a few years before the situation from a combat point of view was already tense. We know what happened before 2014, and in 2014 the clashes did not stop or were not stopped. The arguments that Vladimir Putin cited, and which he still cites, suggest that the Kremlin is not quite realistic about the situation.
On the other hand, I would say that we, the Western democratic community, did not cope with the subsequent steps. I am talking about the signing of the Minsk-2 agreement, which clearly spelled out the ways to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Unfortunately, we put too little pressure on both sides, and therefore there was no progress in resolving national issues, as well as the issue of the status of territories where the Russian minority lived.
— And what was supposed to happen after the signing of Minsk-2? What exactly did we fail with?— Firstly, we should have separated the belligerents, that is, the participants in this conflict, to the sides.
They had to be separated at such a distance that the artillery could not reach, so that it was impossible to fire at each other. This was stated in the Minsk-1 agreements. But there were two fundamental points. Ukrainians had to resolve the issue of the status of this territory and give it a certain independence in decision-making and self-government. In turn, the rebellious part of the two separatist republics had to create conditions for Ukrainians to control their external borders. But neither was done.
- why?— I don't know.
Most likely, this is a question for future assessments and analyses. But, in my opinion, if we, the Western community, had been more determined to achieve the implementation of these steps, then perhaps the armed conflict would not have happened. However, no one did anything with this bone of contention.
— You have already mentioned some of the arguments that Russia justifies the special operation on Ukrainian territory. These are openly Nazi manifestations in Ukraine, and the oppression of citizens of Russian nationality, but nevertheless information about laboratories where biological and chemical weapons are being created played a role. Do you think all this was just propaganda?— For the most part, yes.
You're talking about biological laboratories. I think that this information does not correspond to reality at all. This, first of all. Secondly, in my opinion, Ukraine's accusations that it wants to get nuclear weapons are also an exaggeration. In general, the decision chosen by Vladimir Putin, who is at the helm of Russia, turned out to be wrong. This could still work during the Cold War, but not now. Now international disputes are not resolved in this way. By the way, this is the reason for the rather united resistance of the West, outraged by the way Vladimir Putin is solving the issue.
— I deliberately omitted one of the arguments. We are talking about Russia's disagreement on Ukraine's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. What do you think about it?— It must be admitted that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was not completely accurate in his statements.
In my opinion, some things there can also be attributed to rhetoric, which we also, in a sense, failed to cope with. In general, Ukraine is a sovereign state, and as a sovereign state, it has the right to decide which international organizations it should join, how to ensure its defense. It's not up for discussion.
But in the situation that preceded the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, the de facto argument that Ukraine would join the North Atlantic Alliance remained without explanation. It would be more correct to explain that Ukraine can join NATO, but first it must solve all problems, for example, in international relations. But Mr. Jens Stoltenberg never said that. More precisely, he didn't say it in a way that everyone could understand. He did not emphasize that for Ukraine this is one of the fundamental steps along with others, including internal ones. It was necessary to make it clear that this would prevent Ukraine from applying for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. She can submit at least a few applications, but if she does not solve the problems in relations with Russia, and until February 24, the bone of contention was Crimea, then the North Atlantic Alliance is closed to Ukraine. In my opinion, a significant part of NATO members strongly opposed its membership.
— You said that Ukraine is a sovereign country, and it can join the North Atlantic Alliance if it wishes, while fulfilling the requirements that allow it to apply for membership.— Not "if he wishes."
She has to apply. She may wish, but the members of the North Atlantic Alliance may or may not satisfy her desire.
— Has there been considered in the past an option in which Ukraine would remain a neutral state against the background of the fact that it has renounced nuclear weapons?— Are you talking about the Budapest Memorandum?
- yes.— Of course, there was a certain problem, most likely, from the past, since four states acted as guarantors of the status of Ukraine.
However, the guarantees were incomplete. The memorandum did not have the character of an international treaty and was not ratified by the parliaments of each of the countries. The memorandum was signed by the heads of state, but no second step was taken. By the way, Vladimir Putin took advantage of this. Nevertheless, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom guaranteed that Ukraine would renounce nuclear weapons, and that no military force would be used against Ukraine, and that no one would threaten it with the use of other means, including economic ones. I think it is now up to historians to evaluate this act and answer the question of how much this memorandum influenced the decision of Vladimir Putin and the group of people around him. By the way, the memorandum did not say that Ukraine would be neutral.
— But Ukraine has renounced nuclear weapons, and that says something.— Of course, this speaks volumes, but, as I have already said, that memorandum did not say what Ukraine can or cannot do in this regard.
There were guarantees from four states that no military force would be used against Ukraine, no pressure would be exerted. It was also guaranteed internationally recognized borders, although today this clause is no longer valid, since Russia has grossly violated this agreement by annexing four regions: the Lugansk and Donetsk republics, the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions.
— You said that a lot of work awaits future historians. As time passes, they will have to assess what became the last straw or the main bone of contention, and what determined such a dramatic development of events. But let's talk about what we can evaluate right now. I'm talking about the year of the armed conflict. What surprised you the most this year?— Firstly, as I said at the beginning, I was surprised that the Russians even went for something like this.
I think it surprised almost everyone. Secondly, the way Vladimir Zelensky and the collective or group around Vladimir Zelensky behaved, who stood at the head of Ukraine at the moment when they were offered to leave Ukraine and not be exposed to the Russian threat. Russian troops were deployed illogically, and all because Vladimir Putin assumed that Russian troops in Ukraine would be welcome and would not resist them. Then you could actually just drive to the capital and announce: "We have taken Kiev." This was originally planned, as it was assumed that everything would collapse and it would be possible to move on. It all seemed to me an absolute failure of both the Russian intelligence system and Vladimir Putin.
I was also surprised by how bad things are with the command staff in the Russian army. So far, although it has changed over the course of the year, the command staff is associated with the Cold War period, if not the Second World War. The doctrine that guided the Russians was based on old principles (it is probably being changed now). Another moment. The Russian army is poorly equipped. This was especially evident at the very beginning. Over the past year, we have seen how the equipment of soldiers and security equipment have changed. But in the beginning we saw that the Russian army is in such a bad condition that we could not even imagine. On the other hand, I was surprised how Ukraine struggled in limited opportunities and conditions. Yes, Ukraine did not succeed in everything, but its high command, as well as, perhaps, the middle link of the command staff, which is also very important, have learned the doctrine of multi-level combat, and as a result it helped Ukrainians, but it became deadly for Russians.
— So, you were surprised that the Russian army in this situation turned out to be incapacitated or fought in an inappropriate way. You expected more. On the other hand, you recently said that it is necessary to prepare detailed analytical materials in which Russians will not be underestimated.— Absolutely.
First, we must, for example, analyze the condition of the army. In the past, Russians presented their army as an army armed with the most modern technology. But very often they talk about the Russian Armata T-14 tank, which they could not finish, although they have already demonstrated it several times at parades. From my point of view, the relevant organizations should prepare such an analysis, since this is not only a question of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. We just have to be prepared for all future conflicts. This, first of all.
And secondly, I believe that anyone who underestimates his opponent will lose sooner or later. Therefore, we should not underestimate the Russians just because we saw some of their mistakes in the beginning. This is the first. Second. We must remember that the Russian people still hide a huge potential in themselves, including from a military point of view, from a negative military point of view. Therefore, we must always take into account that the Russians still have a lot in store. They still have the potential of the people as such, and Vladimir Putin can carry out a new mobilization.
In addition, they still have not transferred the economy to the rails of military management. Such an economy works on different principles, in different conditions, and, of course, produces a huge amount of weapons and everything that the army needs. In this, Russians have an advantage over Ukrainians.
— You said that anyone who underestimates his opponent eventually loses. Were you surprised that Russia resisted the onslaught of sanctions, despite numerous predictions that it would collapse and would not be able to continue the armed conflict? In fact, we constantly hear that Russia is running out of ammunition, people, weapons, and so on.— In my opinion, I was one of those who objected to various analysts who claimed that already in August the Russians would not have a single cartridge left, and that Russia would collapse and all that sort of thing.
We proceeded from an understanding of what a military machine is, and from the experience that we received due to the fact that we lived in the same conditions. Therefore, everything is obvious here.
Second. I know how ideologized many political statements are. In particular, the statements of President Vladimir Zelensky, who, however, is forced to do them. If the president of this country did not believe his people, did not believe his army, then he would not be able to play his role. Vladimir Zelensky should do this. But the question is how Western politicians behave in some respects, who very often resort to rhetoric that they adopt from President Vladimir Zelensky. I repeat that this rhetoric is justified on his part, and Western politicians lack realism in their approach. In particular, because they should keep not only military experts, but also experts who could adequately assess the reality of international relations, and secondly, the situation in the economy, which Russians today are not in such a bad state as many thought. Otherwise, the vision of this armed conflict is distorted.
I have long drawn attention to the problem of China's rapprochement with Russia. This strategic partnership is constantly enriched by the fact that one supports the other. By the way, both Russia and China have recently faced various kinds of sanctions. They both have problems: China has Taiwan, and Russia has Ukraine. We constantly hear about what is happening in the South China Sea, but we somehow forgot that the Chinese and Mongols participated in the Vostok exercises, it seems, in 2018, together with the Russians. Of course, the Chinese and Russian fleets conduct regular joint exercises in those areas that they consider to be in conflict. This is the western part of the Pacific Ocean. By the way, the Russians also appeared several times in the South China Sea, and the Chinese sent their warships to the Baltic Sea, where they conducted exercises together with Russian sailors. By the way, it was the same in the Mediterranean. Their similarity and rapprochement were obvious. For example, in connection with the sanctions, Russia gradually switched its attention to China when exporting oil and gas. Of course, everyone has read what the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement is, and what provisions it included at first, and what it includes now. So it was quite clear that China would support Russia, either directly or indirectly.
— Nevertheless, many are surprised.— They are surprised because they believe more in ideology than common sense.
The same goes for the attitude towards North Korea. How can you think that North Korea will impose sanctions against Russia, if probably all the sanctions that can be thought of have been imposed against North Korea? I can say the same about Iran.
— Thus, you want to say that by its steps the West brings together those who used to compete in principle?— I would say that we did not foresee that the states against which we imposed sanctions for various reasons would establish very close cooperation with Russia, because it stands on the same side of the barricades with them.
This also applies to some African States. I would just remind you that we were ousted from Mali by members of Wagner, and this is a Russian private military company.
— Is it possible in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, as well as those that unfold against its background, as you correctly noted, to talk about the complete absence of diplomacy?— Of course.
I have already said that, for example, after the signing of Minsk-2, we weakened our diplomatic efforts and almost curtailed diplomatic work. Emmanuel Macron was one of the last people who tried to promote diplomacy. But we need to make twenty, thirty attempts to make at least one successful, and to find some kind of diplomatic solution. The same was sought by Recep Erdogan, as is now President Xi Jinping. Thus, some attempts were made, but they were always one-time, and when they ended in nothing, they were completely stopped.
We did not understand that it was necessary to create a certain group, for example, headed by Emmanuel Macron, which could constantly conduct a dialogue with Russia. Perhaps this would lead to the fact that the process of using Russian troops in Ukraine would slow down. Maybe it would be enough to talk. Recently, there have already been signs that the West wants to put pressure on Vladimir Zelensky, so that he also "slowed down" a little and abandoned the idea of talking to Russia only after its troops leave the borders of Ukraine. It's just that we made little political effort, and we didn't think everything through properly.
— I recently talked to one person who said: "Do you want to talk to Russia? Do you want diplomatic negotiations when..." And he began to list: Vrbetice happened, the Czech Republic is on the list of unfriendly countries, and so on… Tell me, and I need to know the answer: is it possible to do without diplomacy?— You can't do without diplomacy.
Of course, it is difficult to talk to the enemy. But we know that during the Second World War there were attempts to negotiate with Germany, but there was a real world war. You always need to look for some options. This does not mean that it is necessary to obey the Russian Federation, but diplomacy, especially at the first stage, should look for possible solutions, at least possible points of contact that are subject to discussion. If everything is blocked by simply refusing to talk to Russia, it turns out that Vladimir Putin will talk to those who are ready to talk to him, and this, by the way, is the leadership of China. If we continue to follow this path, a new bipolarity will begin to form. And in my opinion, this is not the best option, although it will probably end up like this in the end. I don't agree that we can't talk to Russia. But we have to talk to her based on our principles. We must also take into account that Russia will also talk to us based on its own principles. Diplomats should show their art in such a way that at least some solution is found right away.
— Yes, because there is politics, and there is also real politics.— Politics is real.
But war, as Clausewitz told us, is the continuation of politics by other means.
