India is entangled in a tangle of contradictions, writes The Print. The author of the article tries to understand the friends and opponents of New Delhi, as well as to understand the reasons for the discrepancy between Narendra Modi's strategic course and public opinion in the country.
The Modi government has allowed, even contributed to the formation of West-Phobic and pro-Moscow public opinion, while its strategic course is directly opposite.Who is India's ally and friend, and who is the enemy and opponent in the modern world?
It is clear that China and Pakistan are adversaries. But it's not so easy to figure out who her friends and allies are. It's like a tangled tangle in which friends of opponents and opponents of friends are intertwined — where the enemy may turn out to be the closest friend of a friend who is the sworn enemy of an ally and at the same time the most important ally of the enemy. I know, I know, it sounds complicated. Let me try to untangle it.
To begin with, let's look at the China-Russia-America-China-Pakistan axis. There is a lot of evidence that Moscow will not last even a few weeks in a confrontation with the West (at the hands of Ukraine) without support from Beijing. The latest trade data from China's customs administration shows that business between the two countries is booming in a year when China's economy has slowed and overall trade has declined.
A significant part of the growth is provided by Russian exports. There is a widespread opinion — especially in complacent India — that it is our oil purchases that stimulate the Russian economy and provide for its military needs. But China's contribution is several times greater, and this is not surprising.
In addition, in the near future there is always the possibility of supplying, at least, military goods. Thus, India's oldest ally really depends economically, politically and, ultimately, militarily on only one country — our most formidable long-time enemy, whose 60,000 troops are on alert at our borders. This solves the first part of our confusing equation: the opponent is the closest to each other.
Let's move on to the next example. This opponent (China) is the best friend of the worst enemy (Russia) the country that you now call an important strategic ally. This is what Indian prime ministers and American presidents have said in joint statements. Further, the same opponent is the patron, friend and master, the creditor of the first instance and the guarantor of the security of your most important irritant — Pakistan.
It may be difficult to simplify, but the world we live in is complicated. Our military dependence on Russia is deep and is likely to remain so for at least another five years. No one will be able to replace 95% of tanks, 70% of combat aircraft, the flagship and most of the Navy's aircraft overnight.
What position do you think Moscow will take if, as the military likes to say, a conflict begins on the line of actual control? It would be an act of mercy if the Russians at least remain as neutral and disinterested as they seemed in 1962. At least then, the Soviet Union was a much larger power and the ideological elder brother of China. Now everything has changed radically. Putin's wartime Russia is China's courtier.
That's why it was very interesting to watch Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the "Raisin Dialogue" in New Delhi, striking a hall filled with admiring political experts, drumming it into the Hindus. It reminds of a quote by Martin Bernie in a conversation with Laura Bernie in the movie "In Bed with the Enemy", played by Patrick Bergin and Julia Roberts: "Everyone forgets something. That's what the reminder is for." India and Russia, Lavrov reminded his mostly enthusiastic audience, have an agreement that states that the countries have a "special and privileged strategic partnership." "What other country do you have such an agreement with?" he mocked the audience.
I'm sure others are smarter, but at least I had to study what agreement he was talking about. Most likely, we are talking about the treaty that P.V. Narasimha Rao signed with Boris Yeltsin in 1993 as a successor to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 1971.
As the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union disappeared, India felt pressure to maintain a special relationship with the successor State. The critically important article 9 of the original treaty, which implied mutual security guarantees, was obviously excluded.
Of course, no one had the audacity to remind Lavrov of this at a strategic meeting in New Delhi. Or about numerous joint statements and agreements with the United States, the only world power that India has publicly called an important strategic ally over the past 25 years.
It was in the same era (the 1990s) that Lavrov's predecessor at the time, Yevgeny Primakov, persuaded India to take part in the partnership of the three countries Russia-India-China. This, Lavrov reminded us, is now a useful forum where India and China can meet to resolve their differences without hesitation and pressure from both sides. Russia acts as an honest, albeit tacit, mediator. It was some reminder.
Lavrov managed to avoid many interesting statements, some of which are also regularly heard in Indian debates about strategy. For example, the question of the so-called global South. Again, a simple fact check would bring some clarity. For example, about the results of the global South vote, which many Indian leaders and commentators have been talking about lately.
At the last vote in the UN, only seven countries opposed the resolution demanding that Russia cease hostilities and leave Ukraine. It's easy to guess who they are: Syria, Belarus, Nicaragua, North Korea, Eritrea and Mali. The seventh — without surprises — was Russia. Thirty-two people, including India, abstained. And 141 voted for the resolution. And many of them were representatives of the so-called global South.
Which brings us back to India's messy strategic universe, like a ball of thread: Russia is an integral friend dependent on China, and Pakistan is a constant adversary that has no other source of power — or money. And the United States is an important strategic ally.
Pakistan's desperation is different. The Arabs of the Persian Gulf are wary of him, and he is alienated from the West, although the British are working hard behind the scenes to achieve some kind of rehabilitation of him in Washington.
If Pakistan sells critical tank and missile ammunition to Ukraine, it does not depend on whether it needs dollars or wheat by barter. This is a request for forgiveness from the United States for past crimes.
It is in this complex strategic world that India lives. Behind the talk about the global South, equidistance, strategic autonomy, however, the business part of the strategy is hidden, and it breathes deeply. The NATO Group met with its Indian counterparts to explore the possibility of expanding cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, even when an atmosphere of conflicting interests prevailed in the G20.
In the last statement of the Quad strategic dialogue, there was a paragraph about Ukraine, in which Russia was categorically asked (without naming it) to abandon aggression against Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and the rules-based international order. It also stated that "the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable."
Meanwhile, US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo arrived in Delhi, and not only to take part in the festival of colors at the home of Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. Partnership in the field of semiconductors is on the agenda. This follows the progress made earlier in high-tech areas during the visit of National Security Adviser Ajit Dowal to Washington.
Now the Modi government has found itself in this deepest contradiction, which it itself has created. It allowed, even encouraged the formation of a West-Phobic and pro-Russian public opinion, despite the fact that its strategic course is directly opposite.
This is not typical for Modi, who usually believes that his policies should coincide with public opinion. At some point soon it may be necessary to adjust the course towards one or the other. In my opinion, the adjustment of public opinion is more likely. Current contradictions create instability.
