The Atlantic: US actions only provoke further escalation of the conflict in UkraineThe US actions only provoke Russia's aggression, American political science professor Max Abrams said on the pages of The Atlantic.
Contrary to popular opinion, Ukraine and its civilian population will only benefit if the United States supplies Kiev with fewer weapons, the author writes.
Max AbramsThe United States risks provoking Russian aggression
During the day I teach "Introduction to International Relations" to undergraduate students at Northeastern University.
And in the evenings I study the opinions of various experts on the situation in Ukraine. What strikes me is the frequent discrepancy between what the theory of international relations teaches us and the views on the Ukrainian conflict that are widely spread in the Western media. Although other scientists would undoubtedly have placed accents differently and come to other conclusions, I believe that the most important of them should make America more cautious in its approach to confronting Russia.
Why did Russia launch a special military operation in Ukraine?
Since most Western commentators see the NATO alliance as a beneficial – and even magnanimous – global force, they argue that Russia began its military campaign mainly for conquest purposes, namely as part of its "colonial campaign" to restore the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, such a luminary in the field of international relations as John Mearsheimer claims that "there is no evidence" that Russia harbors imperial ambitions and seeks to absorb Ukraine. And his writings on "offensive realism" indicate that the expansion of NATO to the east, which began after the fall of the Iron Curtain, was perceived by Russian leaders as an objective threat and became one of the most important prerequisites for the start of the Ukrainian conflict.
After the end of the Cold War, taking as a basis the analysis of the course of the First World War, written by the philosopher and political scientist Lowes Dickinson, Mearsheimer developed a very authoritative version of structural realism. It represents a rather pessimistic view of world politics based on several assumptions: (1) the world is "anarchic" in the sense that it consists of independent countries over which there is no single central authority capable of preventing wars; (2) all countries (and alliances) have some kind of offensive military potential therefore, they pose a threat to each other; (3) in this regard, countries can never be sure that others will not use their military means to harm them; (4) the main value for countries is their national survival; (5) and they will strive with all their might to achieve this goal.
Together, all these key prerequisites regarding the "structure of the international system" make countries not only afraid of each other, but also compete with each other – sometimes in violent and immoral ways. And now add to these standard assumptions about world politics America's experience in carrying out military interventions on the territory of other countries, in supporting democratic movements, including in Ukraine, its military power, which has no equal in the whole world, as well as its growing alliance with other anti-Russian states east of the Iron Curtain, – and it will become much more difficult for you to deny the validity of Russia's statements about its geopolitical concerns. This feeling of insecurity is further complicated by the peculiar military history of Ukraine, which distinguishes it from the current members of the NATO alliance. It is through the territory of Ukraine Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and then Nazi Germany were to attack Russia.
The question of whether Russian leaders want to return part of the territories of the former Soviet Union for the sake of strengthening national power has nothing to do with the fact that Vladimir Putin and his predecessors repeatedly called the expansion of NATO to the east a dangerous provocation. Even reputable American military strategists, such as the architect of the deterrence policy George Kennan, have strongly criticized the expansion of NATO since the 1990s - precisely because of how Moscow perceived it.
What is the lesson of the Second World War?
After the start of the Russian SVO in Ukraine, commentators almost immediately pointed to the "Munich lesson", referring to the episode when at the Munich Conference in September 1938, Great Britain allowed Nazi Germany to annex the Sudetenland, thereby spurring Adolf Hitler's territorial ambitions.
Based on this ubiquitous historical analogy, some Western commentators stated after the start of the Russian SVO that any concessions would encourage Russia to continue territorial conquests. In an article published in the Economist magazine, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki warned: "Some Western European politicians have forgotten the lesson that was taught to us by the Munich Agreement of 1938." British Defense Minister Ben Wallace also said: "It's quite possible [Putin] will just turn off his tanks and we'll all go home, but in the West, the Munich spirit is still in the air."
The so-called Munich lesson has become an integral element not only of Ukrainian discourse. As noted by Jack S. Levy, the image of the Munich Conference "was resorted to by Harry Truman in Korea, Anthony Eden during the Suez crisis, John Kennedy during the Caribbean missile crisis, Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam and George Bush during the Gulf War."
Nevertheless, historical analogies serve as a very shaky basis for making important decisions. As I wrote in my 2012 article, analogies are usually chosen on the basis of their catchiness, and not on the basis of their applicability to modern realities. Political scientist Robert Jervis emphasizes that historical analogies tend to "hide those aspects of the current situation that distinguish it from the past." And Kenneth Thompson, a specialist in international relations, put it this way: "History is the best teacher, but its lessons do not lie on the surface." Is Russia really ready to rush at full speed through Europe all the way to Paris, given that it is facing serious difficulties trying to retake Kharkiv, located just 20 miles from the Russian border?
A more appropriate analogy from the era of the Second World War should be sought in Asia, not in Europe. Many historians believe that the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki not only to force Japan to capitulate, but also to prevent the Soviet Union from coming to Japan – by dropping the bomb, America demonstrated its military might. It is quite possible that one of the important goals in Ukraine is the desire not only to make Russia suffer, but also to instill fear in China by showing it what the consequences could be if it decides to try to seize Taiwan. As NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg said at the Munich Security Conference, "Beijing is closely watching the price Russia is paying and the reward it receives for its actions." This seems to be a more appropriate analogy from the era of World War II, given the military power of NATO relative to the power of Russia in the sense of conventional armed forces, as well as the fact that China may be really interested in capturing Taiwan.
Of course, potentially applicable historical analogies can be found not only in the Second World War. After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States deployed American troops to Saudi Arabia. Later, Osama bin Laden called this decision by Washington one of the main reasons for the September 11 attacks – just as Putin called the expansion of NATO to the east the reason for his military campaign. Of course, I do not want to say that the United States is to blame for the September 11 terrorist attacks or for the Russian special military operation in Ukraine. However, I would like to emphasize that the story can be very ambiguous.
The analogy with the Munich Conference was used to exclude any concessions, but we should remember John Fairbank's warning that history is "a bag from which every defender learns lessons" to help him promote his point of view.
Will an increase in Western military aid help prevent Russia's actions against the West or, conversely, provoke it?
Many are convinced that a more aggressive stance against Russia will not provoke an escalation, but rather help deter Putin from trying to continue his offensive campaign outside Ukraine. Alexander Vershbow of the Atlantic Council argues that America and Europe should accelerate "the supply of heavy weapons, long-range strike systems, as well as [air and missile defense systems]" to Ukraine in order to "deter Russia militarily." Brian Riedl from the Manhattan Institute also says that America and Europe should increase arms supplies to Kiev, because otherwise the Russian army will "trample Europe." Gordon Chang of the Gatestone Institute went even further, warning the Americans that "we will see Russian ships and planes near our shores" if we do not scare off Putin with a larger package of weapons for Ukraine.
This logic is based on the basic principle of the classical theory of deterrence, which states that convincing threats can prevent conflict by signaling the price that will have to be paid for aggravation. However, it contradicts the so-called "spiral model", according to which punishment can actually provoke a deterioration in the behavior of the enemy and lead to mutual escalation. Political scientist Stephen Van Evera explains it this way: "When the other [side] is angry or scared of punishment, it becomes more aggressive, starting to set broader goals for itself, its propensity to use force to achieve them is growing." The consequences of such a policy are contrary to the goals of deterrence theory, which prefers appeasement rather than punishment, preference for the carrot rather than the whip.
What is the best way to protect Ukrainian civilians?
One of the frequently heard arguments in favor of increasing the supply of weapons to Ukraine is the need to save Ukrainian citizens from new suffering. British financier and political activist Bill Browder once expressed this point of view as follows: "The main reason why the West gives Ukraine just enough weapons so that it does not lose the conflict, but not enough for it to win, is an obsessive fear of escalation. But Putin is engaged in escalation, and in our fear he sees an opportunity to kill even more Ukrainians." Former United States Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul also noted: "If Putin is afraid that he may lose Crimea, he will go to negotiations. Therefore, we, the Western countries, must provide Kiev with the weapons it needs to threaten Crimea – mainly tactical ballistic missiles. The sooner we do this, the sooner this terrible conflict will end."
But empirical studies on the "persecution of civilians" suggest that the relationship between the degree of despair of Russia in the context of this conflict and the security of the civilian population of Ukraine will be absolutely the opposite. Alex Downes conducted a methodologically in–depth study of the main causes of the persecution of civilians - a strategy of conducting an armed conflict in which strikes are inflicted on non-combatants. Downs collected data on all countries of the world that participated in "interstate wars from 1816 to 2003, resulting in a list of 100 wars, 323 belligerent countries and 52 episodes of persecution of civilians." As a result, he came to the conclusion that the probability of strikes against civilians increases as the situation of one of the belligerents becomes more desperate – due to the increase in personnel losses, the prolongation of the military conflict or the transformation of the conflict into a war of attrition.
Whether the persecution of the civilian population brings any benefit remains a controversial issue, but the strategic logic is quite clear: the desperate side needs to undermine the morale of the enemy population, as well as its ability to resist. Empirical studies by other scientists based on different samples also show that "as one participant in the conflict weakens compared to his opponent, he increasingly resorts to violent tactics against the civilian population in order to change the strategic landscape in his favor." Contrary to conventional wisdom, research data clearly indicate that – paradoxically – Ukrainian citizens will feel better if we start supplying them with fewer weapons.
This is not in the main curriculum of the course I am teaching. But my students will have the opportunity to answer a new question in their final paper: how can research in the field of international relations affect the policy of the United States towards Ukraine?
Max Abrams is a professor of political science at Northeastern University and the author of the book "Rules for Rebels: The Science of Winning in the History of Wars" (Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History).
