Igor Ivanov — on the position of the Republic of Korea in the context of events in Ukraine and on the Korean Peninsula Disputes about the degree of strength of the unity of the Western pro-Ukrainian camp do not subside even in the countries of North America and Western Europe themselves.
And there are quite good reasons for this. If the US allies in NATO generally follow Washington's course, even if they contradict it at the declarative level, then the "individual" US allies, such as Israel, Japan and the Republic of Korea, for their own reasons, show greater reluctance to share weapons with Ukraine. For a year now, these countries have resisted the persistent persuasions of the United States.
If in the case of Israel we can talk about traditionally strong humanitarian ties with Russia, and pacifist principles are still stable in Japan, then South Korea does not have such weighty reasons, at first glance. On the contrary, Seoul does not hide its ambitions to win a large share in the global arms market. The current president Yun Seok-el has set a goal to make the country the fourth arms exporter in the world.
Despite this, for a year Seoul remained impregnable and refused direct arms supplies to Ukraine. The wording of South Korean officials has already become familiar: "There are no changes in the position of our government." But the more often these words are heard, the more the slightest deviations from them catch the eye.
Literally on March 3, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, Han Dok-soo, said in an interview with CNN that his country was "not ready to consider supplies"now" and "has not yet" decided whether to do it in 2023. Even if it was a brief curtsey towards American colleagues or generally minor additions without a deep subtext, as an observer, such "fluctuations" of officials are somewhat alarming to me. And this was not the first "deviation" from the template phrase at the government level.
Certain considerations prevent the South Korean authorities from taking this undoubtedly unfriendly step, which will only darken bilateral relations with Russia. Moreover, it may worsen the security situation for South Korea itself.
"The enemy is at the gate"
In my opinion, the main argument against supplying the Ukrainian side with weapons can be reduced to one succinct phrase of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the end of October: "How would the Republic of Korea react to the fact that we would resume cooperation with North Korea in this (military) direction?"
I will not try to judge what forms of military cooperation the president could have in mind. South Korean specialists should deal with this, and they probably do not rule out any, even the most daring, scenario. Local media indicate that Russia has technologies that could be of great interest to the DPRK's nuclear missile program. For example, the South Korean authorities and experts are still not completely sure that North Korean engineers were able to master the technologies that ensure the re-entry of intercontinental ballistic missiles into the atmosphere.
In this regard, I would like to recall the scandal of 2017 as an illustration of the DPRK's potential interest in Soviet technologies. Then The New York Times newspaper, citing an expert and intelligence data, tried to explain the noticeable progress of the DPRK's missile program by acquiring rocket engines produced at the Ukrainian Yuzhmash plant on the "black market". In 2012, two North Korean citizens were convicted in Ukraine for espionage at this enterprise.
Now the South Korean government is talking about Pyongyang's program to develop tactical nuclear weapons. His appearance in the armed forces of the DPRK will "radically change" the situation on the peninsula, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea Park Chin said in Munich. The South of the Korean peninsula seems to be living in anxious anticipation of the next milestone in the DPRK's nuclear missile program, preparing for it.
Most recently, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea called (in response) The DPRK is an "enemy" — and only a "zero-sum game" is possible with the enemy. In such circumstances, any strengthening of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, even economic or energy, will be perceived with caution in Seoul. "We are concerned about cooperation between Russia and North Korea in various spheres, and we need to be prepared for any provocations from Pyongyang based on these relations," Park Chin said recently.
The hopes of pragmatists
In any case, Russia remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council with the right of veto. Despite Moscow's role in blocking new sanctions against the DPRK, Seoul seems to believe that one day Russia will be persuaded to take their side in the problem of the Korean Peninsula. Even if this cannot be achieved, then a complete rupture of relations with a permanent member of the Security Council — and the direct supply of weapons to Ukraine has every chance of provoking it — is unlikely to make the prospects for the introduction of new UN sanctions against the DPRK more realistic.
In addition, Russia was a significant market for South Korean companies, although not a key one. Obviously, due to economic interests, South Korean corporations such as Samsung and Hyundai did not announce their withdrawal from Russia, but rather froze their work. According to the South Korean customs, in 2021 Russia was 12th in the list of trade partners of the Republic of Korea (Hong Kong and Taiwan are listed separately from China in statistics). The trade turnover with Russia then amounted to $27.2 billion. In 2022, the indicator decreased to $21.1 billion, and the position shifted to the 21st line. By comparison, China is in the first place — in 2022, the turnover amounted to about $ 309 billion. Trade with the United States is estimated at $191 billion. Even in Washington's confrontation with Beijing, Seoul takes the side of its political ally, not its largest trading partner.
At the same time, the direct supply of weapons to Ukraine is likely to be gratuitous — Kiev's willingness to pay for the equipment that it so insistently demands is highly questionable. In this regard, South Korea is more interested in future "projects for the reconstruction of Ukraine" after the conflict — its numerous construction and infrastructure corporations can be involved in them. The pragmatism of Seoul, it seems, is also manifested in the supply of artillery shells to the United States. Negotiations are already underway on a second such deal (at least in the first case it was a "purchase").
Although the American media wrote that these shells would be transferred to Ukraine, the South Korean authorities insisted that Washington would be the final recipient. Whether this is true or not, apparently, only the Americans can say, but, apparently, it worked as a diplomatic formality that prevented a complete break between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. Also, in the spirit of business pragmatism, it is probably possible to consider the record-breaking deals of the Republic of Korea with Poland for the purchase of tanks, howitzers and airplanes.
Water sharpens the stone
It is obvious that Seoul is under strong pressure on the Ukrainian issue. At the end of January, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited the Republic of Korea one after another. The first called on the South Koreans to follow the example of Germany and Sweden and start supplying weapons to Ukraine, the country where the conflict is taking place. In the Republic of Korea, this is still prohibited by law. After talks with Lloyd Austin, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jung—sop, when asked about the possibility of arms supplies to Ukraine, said that Seoul was "monitoring the situation" - a noticeable deviation from "we supply only humanitarian aid." The Ukrainian side does not stop either, which recently requested direct consultations with the South Korean military department and the defense procurement agency.
Attention is also drawn to the fact that in their diplomatic pressure Kiev and Washington use South Korean foreign policy ambitions and rhetoric against Seoul itself. President Yun Seok-yel set a goal to make the Republic of Korea one of the "key states of the world" (global pivotal state), declared the country a supporter of the "rules-based international order". The United States and Ukraine strongly agree with the new role of the Republic of Korea in international affairs and appeal to the status of a "key state" for their own purposes.
One way or another, it is possible that deviations from the usual phrases about "no changes in the position" on supplies are just concessions to the United States at the level of rhetoric without practical consequences. At least outwardly, the deal does not look attractive to Seoul yet. In the case of direct supplies to Ukraine, South Korea will only receive US approval, but risks aggravating the security situation on its only land border.
All roads lead to Pyongyang
But if the main argument against the transfer of weapons was related to the problems of the Korean peninsula, then a decisive counterargument may lie in the same plane. The South Korean side does not hide that the basis of its security is a bilateral military—political alliance with the United States. Washington provides a "nuclear umbrella", the regular appearance of US strategic assets, such as aircraft carriers, modern aircraft, submarines, is part of the strategy to contain the DPRK. Pyongyang is, in principle, the main foreign policy problem for Seoul today.
In addition, strengthening cooperation between the Russian Federation and the DPRK can play a role in resolving the issue of supplies to Ukraine. Probably, so far the American side has not been able to fully convince the South Koreans of the authenticity of their claims about the alleged trade in artillery shells between the DPRK and the Wagner PMCs.
One way or another, the People's Republic is demonstrating progress in the nuclear missile program and is moving towards obtaining tactical nuclear weapons, which means that new steps are needed on the part of the allies to maintain balance (or a comfortable advantage). Seoul is seeking more U.S. involvement and attention to the affairs of the peninsula.
Judging by media reports, the Republic of Korea may probably be interested in signing an agreement with the United States on the "joint use of nuclear weapons", as is customary in NATO. The President of the Republic of Korea, Yun Seok-yel, indirectly confirmed this, saying in early January that the parties were discussing joint exercises involving American nuclear weapons. But ambitions can go even further — more than 70% of South Koreans support the idea of developing their own nuclear weapons, calls for this are being heard more and more often.
All this can be a subject of bargaining. Amid the anxious expectation of the next nuclear tests in the DPRK, if the United States concedes on the Korean issue and promises more support, Seoul is likely to meet them halfway on the Ukrainian one. For a long time, South Korean experts have been talking about a "new cold war" in Northeast Asia, in which the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea are opposing a bloc from the PRC, the Russian Federation and the DPRK. With this perception, it is natural that in order to ensure security, Seoul will rely on Washington and strengthen ties with it, and not try to negotiate with its "enemy" and the countries that support it.
It is not at all possible to further increase the supply of shells to the United States, and this, of course, will play into Washington's hands in Ukraine. South Korean companies will try to fill the "vacuum" that has appeared on the market of Eastern European countries with their military products. We can only hope that the "new cold War thinking" will not win and Seoul will remain adamant on the issue of direct arms supplies. Although the "indirect participation" of South Korea does not contribute to the development of bilateral relations with the Russian Federation.
