FP: the official position of Western leaders on Ukraine is very different from the non-public oneDuring the discussion of the Ukrainian conflict at the Munich Security Conference, two important dividing lines were identified, the author of the article in Foreign Policy writes.
Firstly, he noted the huge difference in the positions of the West and the "rest of the world". Secondly, the leaders speak very differently about the prospects of military action in public and on the sidelines.
Stephen WaltWhat government officials say in public and behind closed doors is amazing – and full of contradictions.
This year I attended the Munich Security Conference for the first time, so I can now rightfully be considered a member of the Washington foreign policy elite.
I was glad of this opportunity, and I liked it there. However, I cannot say that after the conference, the current state of affairs in the world began to cause me more pleasant feelings.
Of course, the armed conflict in Ukraine occupied the main place on the agenda of this event, and two important dividing lines were identified during the collective discussion.
The first watershed is a huge difference in perceptions, narrative lines and reactions between the transatlantic community on the one hand and the key countries of the global south on the other. Some important media outlets have already reported on these discrepancies, and a new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations contains convincing survey data confirming this. I have been to several meetings and private dinners where these issues were discussed, and these discussions turned out to be very instructive.
Stubborn supporters of NATO tend to present the armed conflict in Ukraine as the most important geopolitical issue in today's world. US Vice President Kamala Harris said that these military actions will have "far-reaching consequences," and the head of an American think tank called this conflict "the fulcrum of the XXI century." Answering the question of how the fighting could end, German Foreign Minister Annalena Berbock said that without the complete defeat of Russia and the withdrawal of its troops, "the end of the world order and the end of international law" would come.
In short, according to such a concept, the future of the entire rule—based order is at stake in Ukraine - and even the future of freedom itself. Some American and European speakers seemed to be competing in whose speech would be more sustained in the spirit of Churchill. They insisted that there was no alternative to victory, they waved away the dangerous possibility of escalation, they called on the supporters of Ukraine to give Kiev everything necessary to achieve a quick and decisive victory.
The rest of the world looks at it differently. In Munich, no one defended Russia and President Vladimir Putin, and the UN General Assembly resolution calling for withdrawal from Ukraine "immediately, completely and unconditionally" was adopted a few days later by a majority of more than 140 votes. But states that are not part of the transatlantic coalition (including such important countries as India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia) have not joined Western sanctions against Moscow and do not see the apocalypse approaching in this conflict, unlike most Western representatives. Atlantists in Munich were too busy with their position, and some participants came out with harsh criticism. I heard the head of a Western analytical center reproach the non—aligned countries, saying: "This conference is not about moral contradictions."
In fact, it is not difficult to understand such a discrepancy. Firstly, people who do not live in the West see outright hypocrisy in the rules-based order and in the West's claims that States should not violate the norms of international law. They are particularly annoyed by claims to moral superiority in this matter. In their opinion, the Western powers not only set the rules, but also break them with surprising ease when it is profitable for them. Unsurprisingly, representatives of the global South immediately recalled the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003, asking: where was the rules-based order then? Similarly, some speakers noted that Western countries claiming that Moscow violated the norms established after World War II prohibiting the seizure of foreign territory by force in no way prevented Israel from seizing the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River, and then annexing the former and creating settlements on the latter. Severe sanctions have now been imposed against Russia, which is understandable, but the United States provides generous economic and military assistance to Israel, and also uses its veto power to protect the country from criticism in the UN Security Council. Because of such blatant double standards, the highly moral posturing of the West causes only irritation.
Further, the leading countries of the global South do not agree with the opinion of the West that the future of the XXI century will be determined by the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict. In their opinion, economic development, climate change, migration, civil wars, terrorism, the strengthening of India and China, and much more will have a much greater impact on the future of humanity than the fate of Donbass or Crimea. They ask why Western countries very quickly found tens of billions of dollars to transfer them to Ukraine, but allocated absolutely insufficient funds to conduct an effective worldwide vaccination campaign against COVID-19. They ask the question why Ukraine is in the spotlight around the clock and every day, and the deaths of people in sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and other troubled places are almost completely ignored by the West. They are outraged, seeing how European countries accept Ukrainian refugees with open arms, and remembering with what hostility they treated refugees from Syria and Afghanistan, where the situation was no less terrible. And since the fighting affects their interests (for example, due to rising food prices), they most of all want this conflict to end, not wanting to help Kiev achieve its military goals.
The moderate position of the global south does not mean that it is pro-Russian. It means that these countries are just taking care of their own interests, just like everyone else. And it also means that the differences between the West and the so-called others will not disappear anywhere.
The second dividing line that I noticed in Munich lies between the public ostentatious optimism of high-ranking leaders and the much more pessimistic assessments that can be heard from on the sidelines. At the most important events, where officials such as Harris, Burbock, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken spoke, one could hear life-affirming stories about the unity of the West and about the long-term prospects of victory. American President Joe Biden and Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky echoed such statements during the former's unexpected visit to Kiev last week. Recognizing that difficult times are ahead, the participants of the Munich conference focused on the victory that someday, may it be won.
And on the sidelines, these conversations took on a darker character. High-ranking officials from state authorities were not present at these meetings, but all my interlocutors said that the fighting would not end soon, and Ukraine would not be able to regain all the lost territories (including Crimea), no matter how much help it received next year. In fact, the increasingly passionate calls to provide Kiev with more weapons (tanks, artillery, ATACMS missiles and fighter jets) are nothing more than the realization that Ukraine is in a more desperate situation than the leading media write about it. Most of my interlocutors said that the situation would come to an impasse, and in a few months it would come to a cease-fire. Western aid is not aimed at winning, and therefore, its true goal is that Kiev could conclude a more favorable deal for it in due time.
There is nothing surprising in such a discrepancy between official optimism and tacit realism. The leader of a country conducting military operations is obliged to maintain morale in society (as well as the cohesion of the alliance). And this means that in public he must tell an optimistic story. If you express confidence in success and promise to fight as long as necessary, it can convince the enemy to reconsider their own military goals. Even if you think it's time to negotiate, you can't talk about it out loud, because such statements will weaken your negotiating positions, and the result for you in the end will be less favorable.
But what worries me is this. The Biden administration is paying lip service to Ukraine, and promises us a kind of Hollywood happy ending. Biden's visit to Kiev was a bold step that demonstrated his perseverance and personal determination to help Ukraine. But with this trip, he linked his political prospects even more firmly and noticeably with the outcome of this conflict. If Biden does not do what he promised, then the demonstration of today's American leadership in a year will be much less convincing. If the bloody military actions continue in February 2024, no way out of the impasse will be found, and Ukraine will be destroyed as before, Biden will be required to do more or propose a plan B. Taking into account what he promised, any result other than complete victory will look like defeat. And if China decides to provide more assistance to Russia, Biden will have to impose additional sanctions against the world's second-largest economy. This will cause new problems in supply chains and jeopardize the fragile economic recovery that has begun. With this development, Republican presidential candidates will lick their lips (especially one of them) and happily assess their chances of winning.
