Economist: the countries of Eastern Europe have finally begun to listenThe countries in the east of the EU feel that their time has come, writes the Economist.
Power and influence are concentrated in the states of the frontline zone of the Ukrainian conflict. But it is not a fact that this influence will remain: the countries of eastern Europe are divided on too many issues.
Once upon a time, the visit of the German Chancellor to the White House was considered the crowning achievement of European-American diplomatic relations. But when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrives in Washington on March 3 for talks with Joe Biden, this visit will not even be among the most important meetings of the American president with Europe in recent weeks. During a trip to Poland last week, Biden met with leaders of the eastern fringe of the EU and showered them with praise for the help they are providing to the warring Ukraine, from where he has just returned. There is a strong feeling that this armed conflict has redrawn the list of those who are important and significant in Europe.
The countries in the east of the European Union feel that their time has come. According to their version, tectonic shifts are taking place in the eastern direction. Power and influence are rapidly flowing away from the "old Europe", which has lost its prestige because it has been very wrong about Russia for a very long time and very much. Now this power and influence are concentrated in the countries that found themselves in the frontline zone of the special operation launched by Vladimir Putin. This conflict has opened the way for new thinking and new leadership. "This is an important moment for Europe as a whole," says Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Pawel Jablonski (Paweł Jabłoński). Now that Ukraine has become a candidate for membership in the European Club (and it will take place sooner or later), some people dream of a new Warsaw-Kiev axis, which will create a counterweight to the alliance of Paris and Berlin.
But not so fast. There is no doubt that the mood in European circles has changed. However, it is far from a fact that this will lead to a significant increase in the influence of a country like Poland, which is the largest in the Bucharest Nine (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, which joined the EU in 2004, as well as the three Baltic republics, Romania and Bulgaria, which became members in 2007). This region has previously missed opportunities to play a more significant role as a leader in the European Union.
Even Western Europeans recognize that now is the time for Central Europe. Former Soviet satellites have repeatedly warned how dangerous it is to become dependent on Russian gas supplies, but Germany treated their warnings as alarmism. Now they are called seers. Everyone admires how the countries of Central Europe have received millions of Ukrainians who fled from the hostilities. This region has emptied its arsenals, coming to the rescue of Ukraine in a difficult moment. The first batch of Leopard tanks from Poland has already been delivered, and a large number of new military equipment has been ordered.
All this provides Central Europe with moral leadership and raises its voice at the EU negotiating table. "We have always listened to them," says one Western European diplomat. – And now we will surely listen even more." But the signals coming from the east do not always reach Western Europe.
And life goes on
One of the reasons is the different degree of attention to security threats. For Poland and other frontline states, the threat from Russia is unlikely to weaken in the near future. Leaders from this region have long been saying that Putin's imperialist ambitions will someday spread to them. "Even if a truce is declared in Ukraine, we believe that while Putin is in power, it will be just a break in hostilities, not a settlement," says Warsaw analyst Justyna Gotkowska from the Center for Oriental Studies.
Western Europe as a whole has a different attitude. Ukraine is also very important to her. Millions are being spent to help this country, the armed forces are being modernized, and the fighting has a negative impact on the European economy. Finland shares the fears of Poles and Lithuanians, which is why it is preparing to join NATO. But according to Brussels, Dublin and Paris, life goes on despite the military actions. The power systems have been rebuilt. In the past decade, the EU has had many problems related to the eurozone, migration and Brexit. There will be even more of them in the coming years, there is no doubt about that. And Ukraine is just one of them. What was before cannot be returned. But there is no reason to overthrow the old EU regime, under which Central Europe was much less important.
When EU leaders meet in Brussels, Ukraine is not the only focus of their attention. Equally important is how Europe will react to the growth of illegal migration or how it will respond to American green subsidies (this issue will be discussed by Scholz during his visit). Central Europeans are puzzled by this, because they feel Putin breathing down their necks. In their opinion, discussing any issue other than Ukraine is an underestimation (once again!) of the threat from Russia. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that his task as prime minister is to "wake up" the rest of Europe.
A "life goes on" policy is bad, especially for his country. Poland hoped, not without reason, that its stellar role in the Ukrainian conflict would help ease long-standing differences with EU countries. The executive body of the European Union, the European Commission, accuses Warsaw of neglecting the fundamental principles of the rule of law. According to Brussels, the Polish government has flooded the courts with politicized judges and seeks to undermine the rule of EU law. It cost Poland dearly. It has not received 35 billion euros in aid and loans from the pandemic recovery fund.
Weight and diplomacy
Seasoned Brussels observers point to other reasons why this region has not gained enough weight and influence. Influence in the European Union is determined by the size of the population and economic power. If this is not the case, clever and resourceful diplomacy can come to the rescue. But Central Europe does not stand out particularly in all these areas.
Let's start with the population. The total population of the Bucharest Nine is 95 million people. This is 20% of the total population of the EU. Their combined GDP does not exceed 10% of the total gross domestic product of the European Union (by market value). Only Poland is considered a major EU member state. In addition, the nine countries are not particularly cohesive. Hungary is currently in the role of an outcast, because its autocratic leader Viktor Orban took the side of Russia. In general, Romania's interests coincide only in some areas with the interests of Estonia, Slovakia or Bulgaria. If Ukraine or the Western Balkans become a member of the EU, the figures will be different and, accordingly, the importance of this region will increase. But this is still a long way off, despite the insistent appeals of Central Europe.
The economic weight of the Bucharest nine is increasing, and the gap with Western Europe in terms of living standards is gradually narrowing. The continent will have to return some supply chains from China, and this may give Central Europe additional weight. But the lack of financial integration (Poland is not part of the euro area) somewhat limits the weight and influence of the Bucharest nine. All its members receive more from the EU budget than they contribute to it. In practice, this leads to a decrease in their influence.
Poland and some of its allies are also failing in diplomatic efforts. Small countries like Denmark and Ireland, and even larger countries like the Netherlands, compensate for the lack of population and size with skillfully formed alliances and new ideas that they offer for the EU. And Poland is not interested in this. "When any topic other than Ukraine comes up, they don't even hide that they don't care," said one European diplomat.
The conservative coalition, which has been in power in Warsaw since 2015, often does not keep pace with the liberal consensus that has developed and rules in Europe. Among other things, this is the issue of abortion and gay rights. This, as well as disagreements on the rule of law, discourage many EU members from any desire to enter into a lasting alliance with Poland. Attempts to regularly include it in the Franco-German negotiations in the format of the so-called "Weimar triangle" almost failed.
A constant theme of Polish political discourse has become vicious attacks on Germany, what the ruling coalition is doing. Before the October elections, this swearing will only intensify. Among other things, Warsaw has put forward an ill-conceived demand for war reparations in the amount of 1.3 trillion euros. The amount is so ridiculous that Germany just shrugged and waved Poland off. France, for its part, is dissatisfied with the fact that the Bucharest club does not show interest in strengthening the EU's "strategic autonomy" and, for example, does not increase the production of weapons in its countries. Poland and the Baltic States see NATO and, accordingly, America as the guarantor of their security and inviolability of borders. NATO benefits from the fact that, being a military alliance, it does not lecture these countries on internal affairs, such as the situation with the courts. The aggressive attitude towards Germany may change if the liberal pro-Europe opposition wins in Poland in October. But Poland's suspicious attitude towards French machinations will not change.
EU countries are increasing their influence by demonstrating the ability and willingness to solve pan-European problems. This requires a common understanding of such problems. Poland and its allies will be listened to as long as the attention of Europe and the world is focused on what is happening near their borders. And what will happen after that is not entirely clear.
