Analyst Kaim: Germany has realized that it needs to do without Russia and even go against itDuring the year of the armed conflict in Ukraine, Germany has experienced fundamental changes in its policy, analyst Markus Kaim said in an interview with iROZHLAS.
Berlin's attitude towards Moscow was determined mainly by energy aspects. Now the "turning point" has come, the expert believes.
Germany's uncertainty and hesitation before the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine was put to an end by the decision of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who announced large investments in the army and weapons. The change in German foreign and security policy has become one of the key moments of the past year of armed conflict. We talked about the consequences of this step with Markus Kaim from a leading Berlin think tank.
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In the past military year, Germany has experienced fundamental changes. They are especially noticeable in foreign policy and security, so they even talk about a "turning point". What are the most significant points you highlight?Markus Kaim: That's what I'm studying.
As you correctly noted, so much has changed that I don't even know where to start. The German rebirth began with a speech by Olaf Scholz, in which he reported on the "zeitenwende", that is, in translation about the "turning point". However, in my opinion, this is too narrow a definition, since the changes are epochal.
Zeitenwende literally means "turning point". This concept refers to the change that Germany experienced as a result of the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine. This concept was used by Olaf Scholz, who on February 27 announced that Germany was entering a new era and starting to invest in the modernization of the armed forces. Thanks to this, in the following months Berlin agreed to supply weapons to Kiev.So we have entered a new era, and in a variety of areas.
In particular, in the field of finance, since we have allocated one hundred million euros for defense systems and committed ourselves to achieving two percent of GDP for defense spending. This is the core of the "tipping point". Germany has never supplied weapons to a war zone before.
— It was amazing to see how Germany, which for many years positioned itself as a country that categorically does not accept war and violence, changed its strategy because of the Russian special operation.— But this is not the only area where changes have made themselves felt.
Big changes have affected our foreign policy orientation. For at least 20 years we have pursued certain goals, which have now changed. For example, we used to believe that European security could be ensured only with Russia's participation, that Russia is one of the countries that cares about this. But how far we were from the truth.
Germany changed its geopolitical orientation, was forced to adapt to changes in the political environment. Even under former Chancellor Angela Merkel, we stressed the need for a common European policy. But after the start of the Russian special operation, the focus shifted to transatlantic ties, and now we are much more focused on the North Atlantic Alliance. I would say that the government of Olaf Scholz can be described as the most pro-Transatlantic oriented in many decades.
The question remains, how will this affect our future approach? We'll have to think about it. This step will inevitably have an impact on the institutional level.
But if the conflict had ended quickly, if arms supplies and Western aid had been able to accelerate and successfully end the armed conflict in Ukraine, then, it seems to me, we would have returned back to the way of thinking before February 24. Not completely, say, on the issue of energy independence, but in relations with Russia for sure. Already now we are noticing similar sentiments in society…
The Importance of Russia
— Are you talking about the political arena?- yes.
I mean mainly the political left. But the ultra-right also talks about special German-Russian relations that originate in the XIX century. They admit that the armed conflict was a mistake, but at the same time they argue that we should not underestimate the importance of Russia for German foreign policy and the European security architecture.
Now we have to change this train of thought. It is necessary not only to transfer the "turning point" into an active foreign and defense policy, but also to ensure that most of the political leadership and, of course, the public think so.
— I asked this question and got acquainted with the public opinion poll of Kerber-Stiftung. It follows from it that the majority of Germans would prefer a diplomatic path (65% of respondents), rather than a military one (14% of respondents).— Yes, I would say that this is one of the German qualities.
We are thoughtlessly and desperately rushing into all kinds of negotiations. We have become unaccustomed to active participation in military operations and have not developed our defense industry since 1945 for a reason that probably makes no sense to talk about today.
We are not used to the stage of military operations. Therefore, perhaps, unlike other Western European countries, we have a slow and protracted process of disputes and discussions. I think there are more calls for peace in Germany, which we all want, and demands for negotiations than anywhere else. This naturally affects the opposition and results in rejection of the military path.
Energy Lobby
— Let's talk in more detail about the "special relationship" between Germany and Russia. Is it possible to talk about the breakup of friendship now? We mentioned former Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was criticized and continues to be criticized for her approach to Russia, primarily after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Knowing everything we know today, tell me, did she act correctly, or should she have acted differently?— I think that the main role here was played by the angle of view that determined German politics.
Everything changed on February 24, but it was Angela Merkel, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and many others who embodied this trend. According to their statements, they did not see what was coming from Russia, and were terribly surprised by what happened on February 24.
But I don't believe their "we didn't see what was coming." They could read the reports of major German think tanks, which since 2014 have been writing about the development of Russian domestic policy, which was reflected in Russia's foreign policy steps. There was no doubt that something was being prepared. It was no secret in Berlin circles.
There was also a noticeable caution with which Russia was treated and an almost uncritical view of it. In addition, the energy lobby has always flourished in Germany. Since the 70s, the German energy industry has been very closely connected with Russia. Russian gas was not only cheap for us, but also a reliable resource.
— Was energy dependence and gas connection through the Nord Stream a key aspect on which Germany based its relations with Russia?— Absolutely.
I can't even tell you how true that is. The German attitude was completely based on this, and if we resort to figures, I would say that 70% of the attitude towards Russia was determined by these energy aspects. Only the remaining 30 percent concerned other strategic and foreign policy goals. In my opinion, for at least the last 20 years, everything has been like that.
This set the framework for German-Russian relations, and energy policy played the first fiddle, not security considerations. After February 24, it became clear that a revision of this approach cannot be avoided, that is, we will switch to a more cautious regime and in the field of energy we will follow the example of, for example, the Baltic countries that have diversified their sources.
— Can we say that over time Germany has awakened in the field of foreign policy, overestimating the attitude towards Russia, and maybe not only to it?— Absolutely.
However, this does not apply to all politicians and not all German citizens, because many of them are still surprised by the agenda of discussions. But I would say that most are aware of the need for awakening. Sometimes you can hear the old opinion from the left that perhaps we should not spend millions of euros on defense, but rather spend them on other needs. But there are few supporters of this opinion.
The current Scholz cabinet acted very decisively and made decisions quickly. They realized how important it was to fill in the gaps and fill up the debt that we had formed in relation to the North Atlantic Alliance, and they almost immediately invested in weapons.
A weapon against inflation
— From the point of view of the approach to weapons, Germany has taken truly principled steps during the past military year. At first, Berlin said it would send five thousand helmets to Ukraine, refused to send tanks there, and recently promised to deliver Leopard tanks to Kiev. How do you assess this period?— The statement you mentioned about the delivery of five thousand helmets actually sounded pathetic.
I was ashamed to hear that. At that time, Minister Christine Lambrecht was in charge of defense, but she no longer holds this post because she could not react to how much the situation in Europe and in the world in general had changed.
The Russian special operation in Ukraine has given a powerful impetus to German defense policy. The key question, from my point of view, how long will it last? I'm curious if it will last weeks, months, years — in general, it will end or not.
Probably, the same thing is happening in your country, and you, like us, are in some sense used to the armed conflict in Ukraine and even managed to get tired of it. I foresee possible problems related to the fact that the government decided to invest millions of euros in defense due to literally "tectonic changes" in foreign policy. But, on the other hand, there is an aspect that directly concerns citizens, and I mean, for example, high energy prices and inflation.
German society will support Scholz's decision as long as the authorities manage to keep the emphasis on the fact that something extraordinary has happened, to which we must pay attention.
— Under what circumstances can there be a change of course?— I admit that such a situation is possible.
For example, if in a few weeks Russian President Vladimir Putin declares that he wants to conclude a truce. I see that part of society and the political spectrum that at this moment would say: "Great, there will be peace in Ukraine, but then why should we spend millions of euros on defense?" They will seek to redirect spending to other needs, for example, to health care, the social sphere.
In this regard — just don't get me wrong — the worst thing for the German "turning point" is an imminent peace in Ukraine. Because then the transformational processes that are so important for German foreign policy will definitely stop.
— What long-term consequences will the "turning point" mentioned several times in German politics entail for relations with Russia? Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke recently at the Munich Security Conference about "the responsibility of a country the size of Germany." What did he mean by that? In which direction will German foreign policy move?— Many geopolitics use the phrase "leading nation", but it is uncharacteristic for Olaf Scholz himself.
After all, the questions arise: what are her signs? What is the status? What does she expect from others? From my point of view, Germany's obligations towards the North Atlantic Alliance are now fundamental, that is, compliance with the rule of two percent of GDP for defense.
This policy is based on two assumptions. First, our approach to Russia should be uniform, and we need to prolong its isolation. Secondly, we cannot stop helping Ukraine. Olaf Scholz supports both, which was confirmed by his speech at the Munich Security Conference. Therefore, I do not expect any fundamental changes in the field of German foreign policy.
Because of the Russian special operation, Germany reoriented itself to transatlantic ties. It's not that we didn't go in this direction before, but now the emphasis is on it. I would say that this is one of the most important aspects that I note. This is a key lesson, and after many years of anti—Americanism that prevailed in German society, the realization has come that the United States and NATO are our partners who will help ensure European security. We also realized that foreign policy cannot always be built together with Russia. On the contrary, as it turned out, it is necessary to do without Russia or even go against it.
Markus Kaim is the chief researcher and specialist on German foreign and defense policy, on transatlantic relations within the North Atlantic Alliance. He works at the leading Berlin foreign policy analytical center "Foundation for Science and Politics".
