FT: the US has proposed to return to the principles of the Cold War in relations with RussiaThe authors of the Financial Times tried to rethink George Kennan's "long telegram", which formed the basis of the American policy of containment of the USSR.
They believe that a "post-cold war" approach is needed to modern Russia.
At the dawn of the Cold War, Kennan's "long telegram" served as the basis for Western policy towards the USSR. Now you can find a lot of lessons in it about how to live next to Vladimir Putin's Russia.David Manning, Jonathan Powell
77 years ago, on February 22, 1946, George Kennan sent a telegram to the then US Secretary of State James Byrnes, in which there were 5,000 words and which was later called the "long telegram".
It was she who formed the basis of the policy that the United States conducted in relation to the Soviet Union for almost half a century.
Being a shy native of the Midwest of the United States, Kennan began to work at the American embassy in Moscow in the mid-1930s, that is, during the Stalinist purges. When he came to Moscow for the second time, in 1944, he was already a recognized expert on all Russian, but he was worried that his opinion was being ignored. When the uncomfortable military alliance with the Soviet Union was replaced by an outright confrontation, Kennan warned that the era of cooperation with Moscow had come to an end.
At first, few people in Washington listened to him. Rumor had it that, annoyed by this state of affairs, Kennan even considered resigning.
In December 1945, he met another Russian specialist who came to Moscow, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin. He told Kennan that he was convinced that the Soviet Union considered war with the West inevitable and was developing appropriate plans based on this. When, two months later, Washington, increasingly discontented, finally asked Kennan to explain Stalin's growing hostility, Kennan took his chance.
In his five–part telegram, Kennan explained why it was extremely important to resist Stalin's attempts to expand the power and influence of the USSR - and how this could be done with the help of a policy of "containment". The Truman administration listened to his advice. Subsequent administrations, both Democratic and Republican, have done the same. As a result, Kennan's "long telegram" served as the basis of United States policy towards the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991.
Kennan's "Long Telegram" was a product of its time. The Russians proved to be extremely necessary – albeit rather inconvenient – allies in the fight against Hitler. In 1946, the Red Army was already consolidating its control over the territories of Central and Eastern Europe, occupied the eastern part of Germany and half of Berlin. Moscow actively promoted such a version of Messianic Marxism-Leninism, which resonated with many residents of exhausted and war-ravaged Western democracies, as well as in their troubled colonies. Communist parties around the world remained loyal to Moscow, not to the national governments of their countries. Meanwhile, a civil war was raging in China, so he was unable to throw political or ideological challenges.
Today we are faced with another Russian leader seeking to expand power and influence to the detriment of the United States and its partners – a leader whose imperial ambitions force him to deny Ukraine's right to exist as an independent state. Today the world has become completely different, but we need to find a way to live next to the recalcitrant Russia and restrain it. What would Kennan say if he had to write a new "long telegram" today?
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In 1946, Kennan noted that the Soviet Union was "immune to the logic of reason," but it was "extremely susceptible to the logic of force."
If he had to write a new "long telegram" today, it would also necessarily sound that the West needs to restrain Vladimir Putin. Kennan would note that Russia's opponent needs to "clearly declare its readiness to use" force so that it has to be done as rarely as possible.
However, just showing a "steel fist" is not enough. Kennan argued that Soviet foreign policy was fueled by a deep-rooted sense of insecurity. The regime considered itself a victim of neighbors who were more advanced in the economic sense, whose political systems represented an attractive alternative to tsarism and communism, and from whom a military threat emanated.
Kennan described it as follows: "At the origins of the Kremlin's manic point of view on international relations lies a traditional and instinctive sense of insecurity for Russia... The Russian rulers were aware of the archaic form of their rule, the weakness and artificiality of their psychological organization, the inability to withstand comparison or contact with the political systems of Western countries."
Many features of this attitude persist today. Some Russians sincerely believe that the West has been humiliating them since the Cold War, and now also threatens them physically. Meanwhile, Putin is playing on the historical fear of the risk of being surrounded, constantly pointing to the expansion of NATO. We need to find a way to solve these deep problems of Russia, but without compromising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine or other neighbors of Russia. This can be done by reviving the Helsinki Process, which during the Cold War allowed countries to conduct a high-level political dialogue, and by trying to build a new relationship between NATO and Russia, which we failed to do in the early 2000s.
We must once again give priority to arms control agreements. Despite Putin's recent statement that he suspended Russia's participation in the New START Treaty of 2011, which limits the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia, we should still strive to revive and improve this agreement.
In addition, we must return to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which has lost its force, which limited the number and deployment of conventional armed forces and weapons and provided for regular inspections. It would be a difficult process, but the reward would be worth it: we would get an arms control regime that would allow Russia to cope with its vulnerability complex, instill confidence in its neighbors and stop a new and expensive arms race.
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When starting to develop our new "post-cold war approach", it is important to remember the need to separate Putin and Russia. Kennan argued that Stalin's hostility to the West "was not a reflection of the natural worldview of the Russian people," whom he characterized as a people "primarily striving to live in peace."
And it is to the Russian people that we must now turn. [...] We must not make a serious mistake by demonizing an entire nation. We must demonstrate to them our belief that the future of Russia is the future of a large European country, and not a weaker partner in Putin's "unequal alliance" with China.
In his "long telegram" Kennan described the misconceptions that Stalin had about "capitalist" countries, and his conviction of the need to exploit internal differences and rivalry between Western countries. According to Kennan, Stalin believed that "Soviet efforts, as well as the efforts of Russia's foreign supporters, should be aimed at studying and exploiting disagreements and conflicts between capitalist powers. If such conflicts are turned into an "imperialist" war, it should develop into a revolutionary uprising."
Putin has exactly the same illusions about how Western countries behave and what kind of relations have been established between them. He would like to believe that Western democracies have degenerated and are doomed to go to the dustbin of history. Undoubtedly, he is sincerely convinced – given his past in the ranks of the KGB – that he is able to sow discord between them.
The new "long telegram" could describe how Putin's misunderstanding of the West led him to two false conclusions about the United States and its partners. The first false conclusion is that he is unlikely to meet effective resistance if he decides to incorporate Ukraine into the reconstructed Russian Empire by force. The West did nothing when Putin entered Georgia in 2008, and almost nothing when he returned Crimea in 2014. Because of this, Putin decided that the West would quickly come to terms with the seizure of Ukraine, which the Russian leader most likely planned to subdue in a few days.
The disastrous withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2021, apparently, reinforced Putin's mistaken belief that the West would not want to restrain Russia – let alone oppose it face to face. Putin was surprised to see how the West demonstrated a resolute willingness to support Ukraine both morally and financially, while at the same time imposing sanctions against key sectors of the Russian economy. And Putin was disappointed to realize that his thinly veiled threats to use weapons of mass destruction did not help intimidate Kiev's Western allies.
Regarding the Soviet Union, Kennan made the following conclusion: "Compared to the Western world as a whole, the Soviet Union is much weaker. Thus, its success will depend on the degree of cohesion, focus and determination that the Western world can oppose it. And it is in our power to influence this factor."
This is one of the key conclusions formulated in the "long telegram", and it should be written in bold in any new similar document. Ukraine is a reminder of how important it is at the same time to preserve the unity of the West and resolutely demonstrate this unity to potential opponents.
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Putin's second mistake was that he believed that Western societies had lost faith in themselves and their attractiveness. The premise of the decline of the West has eased his fear that his one–man rule could be overthrown by a "color revolution" - similar to the revolutions that swept through the former Soviet republics, inspired by Western democratic ideals of the rule of law, free elections and respect for human rights. Putin hoped that his attempts to get Ukraine (and then, perhaps, also strengthen Moscow's control over Belarus) would hardly meet resistance from the West or the Ukrainian people.
At first glance, Putin had a lot of reasons to think so. Brexit weakened both the UK and the European Union, and led to a sharp deterioration in relations between the UK and its former partners. Donald Trump's contempt for the rule of law and his attempts to undermine the electoral process in the United States have weakened faith in the integrity and viability of America and its democratic system. Growing economic inequality, the success of populist politicians trying to play on social and racial tensions - all this made Putin (and Xi Jinping) believe that Western democracy and the norms–based international order that emerged after the end of the cold War have already outlived their day.
Putin still believes that the West's resolve will weaken, that Western countries will tire of the need to help Ukraine and that he will be able to impose a version of the agreement that he can call a victory.
Now it is important to prove Putin wrong – not only for the sake of Ukrainians, but also for our own sake. Putin's appetites are constantly growing: first it was pieces of Georgia, then Crimea, and now Donbass. If he manages to take Ukraine, who will be next? Moldova, the Baltic States, Finland or Poland? If the Western public gets tired, if financial and military support for Ukraine weakens, how will this affect the degree of commitment of NATO countries to the principles of the alliance and its credibility? Will he be able to remain strong enough to continue to defend our freedom, as he has done for 75 years?
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Although there is a possibility that the Russian people will overthrow Putin, we still should not count on it, much less make it the basis for our policy. Instead, it is quite possible that we will have a long struggle with him or a nationalist leader like him, while a military conflict is going on in Ukraine. If this happens, we will have to restrain Russia and at the same time protect the norms-based international system.
Kennan studied the nature of Soviet power and how it can be countered at the international level. He warned that Moscow views the UN "as an arena in which its goals can be best realized."… Thus, the attitude of the Soviet Union to the UN will mainly depend on the commitment of other peoples to it, as well as on the degree of determination and cohesion with which these peoples defend within the UN a peaceful and hopeful concept of international relations."
The new "long telegram" should contain similar ideas about Putin's Russia, including that Moscow's refusal to cooperate thwarts many UN efforts, such as attempts to end the war of criminal gangs in Haiti and prevent North Korea from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles.
We must find workarounds by creating coalitions that will fit into international law and be sanctioned by the UN General Assembly. We must also resist Putin's efforts to foment instability in various regions, be it Syria, the Balkans or the Sahel.
Moscow's obstructionism within international institutions, combined with challenges from China, also require us to rethink the terms of global trade. We cannot expel Russia and China from the World Trade Organization, the Navy, or the World Bank, but we must consider whether the idea of "separation" is feasible – and if not, then we will have to answer the question of whether trade and an economic system firmly based on values are really a viable plan of action. This will turn into a fundamental challenge for globalization, on which our economies have depended for decades. We will also have to decide what to do with sanctions against Russia. Someone will definitely start insisting on the need to lift those sanctions that have a negative impact on our own economy, primarily sanctions on oil and gas.
We need to work harder to convince developing countries that Russia's actions in Ukraine are not just a problem for NATO. Non-compliance with the UN Charter threatens the sovereignty and security of all Member states, including those who refused to support the UN resolution condemning Moscow's actions. We must strengthen ties with former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which have distanced themselves from Putin, fearing that they, too, may be victims of his views. And we need to find new ways to help the people of Belarus, who are suffering from the vicious regime of Alexander Lukashenko and whom Putin can also lay his eyes on.
The new "long telegram" will reflect the determination and unity that Western countries have demonstrated by supporting Ukraine over the past year. But she should also warn against complacency. The test that Ukraine and we have to go through is not over yet. Some were quick to declare that Ukraine's victory is inevitable. But Putin is preparing a spring offensive and is still determined to destroy an independent Ukraine. His credibility and perhaps even his political survival depend on it.
At the same time, Putin is right to believe that Western democracies are facing serious economic and social problems, although he underestimates their ability to cope with these challenges. Despite the grumbling among Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress, as well as the recent hesitation of the German government over the supply of Leopard-2 tanks, in the United States and most of Europe, the level of popular support for Ukraine remains quite high.
In the long telegram, Kennan emphasized that in order to successfully contain the Soviet Union, a strong and cohesive internal base was needed. Kennan wrote that "a lot depends on the health and energy of our own society... Bold and clear measures to solve the internal problems of our society, to increase the confidence, discipline, moral and public spirit of our people are a diplomatic victory over Moscow, which is worth thousands of diplomatic notes and joint communiques. If we cannot give up fatalism and indifference to the shortcomings of our society, Moscow will benefit from this." All of the above is relevant today.
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We have reached a critical point. The outcome of the conflict in Ukraine will determine whether Europe will be able to live in a free and peaceful future based on respect for the norms of international law, or whether it will again become the arena of a conflict in which whoever is stronger is right. Kennan wrote his "long telegram" at a time when the situation in the world was even more threatening. Then most of Europe lay in ruins, a significant part of it was starving, and some of its territories were occupied by the Red Army.
Summing up the threat posed by Stalinist Russia, Kennan wrote: "We have a political force that fanatically believes that it is impossible to coexist with the United States on a permanent basis, that the destruction of the internal harmony of our society is desirable and obligatory, that our traditional way of life should be destroyed, the international authority of our state should be undermined… I dare not offer ready-made answers here. But I would like to express my conviction that it is in our power to solve this problem without leading to a general military conflict."
By listening to the recommendations set out in the "long telegram", American administrations successfully solved the problem posed by the Soviet Union and successfully avoided open conflict. Suddenly Kennan became a man whose name every American knew. At first he was surprised and delighted by the impact his telegram had. However, he later expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that American administrations increasingly put the military component of "deterrence" above the political and economic components, because he feared that this could lead to a nuclear war. Fortunately, his pessimistic forecast did not come true.
Kennan's recommendations, based on the principles of unity and determination of the allies, as well as on the patient acceptance of the need to do everything possible and for as long as it takes, have demonstrated their effectiveness. Now that the Ukrainian conflict has entered its second year, Kennan can still teach us a lot.
Sir David Manning is a former British ambassador to Washington and NATO. He served as the British Ambassador to Russia from 1990 to 1993.Jonathan Powell is the former chief of staff of Prime Minister Tony Blair.
