TAC: Ukraine unreasonably hopes for victoryThe West should temper unreasonable optimism about a phantom victory over Russia, writes TAC.
The author believes that Ukraine does not have the human and material resources necessary for victory. It's time for Kiev to enter into peace talks.
Ted Carpenter (Ted Galen Carpenter)Confederate Southerners after Chancellorsville (the Battle of Chancellorsville was a major battle of the American Civil War that took place on April 30 — May 5, 1863 on the territory of Spotsilvaini County near George Chancellor's plantation between the army of the Northerners of Joseph Hooker and the army of the Southerners of Robert Lee.
Convincing victory of the Southerners - Approx. InoSMI) forgot about the strategic advantages of the Unionist Northerners against them. Isn't Ukraine making the same mistake?
At one time, there was growing optimism in the West that Ukraine would be able to win the conflict. It was expected that at least Kiev would be able to expel Russian troops from the entire territory received by the Kremlin since February 2022. More optimistic Western elements hope that Ukrainians will even be able to regain Crimea and the part of Donbass that Russia has controlled since 2014. Regardless of some divergent details, the main goal of Ukraine's sponsors from NATO is to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept a humiliating peace agreement that will prevent him from achieving any of his original goals. There were even rumors in Ukraine and the West that Putin's removal from power could be a "bonus" to Ukraine's upcoming military victory.
The United States and NATO are doubling their military assistance to Kiev, believing that Ukraine can still win this military conflict. Both the level of optimism and the volume of aid increased markedly after the success of the Ukrainian autumn military offensives in the northeast and south of Ukraine, as a result of which the Ukrainian Armed Forces regained control over significant areas of previously lost territory.
Despite the fact that such turns of the conflict were certainly an unpleasant surprise for Putin and his inner circle, Ukraine's victory in the entire military conflict remains unlikely. In the absence of massive direct military intervention by NATO on the side of its vassal, the conflict is likely to repeat the model of the American civil war, when Russia's victory will come at the end of a long, painful and extremely bloody military confrontation.
Western optimism about Ukraine's prospects has been growing for several months. As soon as Russian troops failed to take Kiev and got bogged down on other fronts in the spring of 2022, the expectations of the West regarding a favorable outcome of the military conflict increased. Back in early March, just two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken praised the "extraordinary resilience" of the Ukrainian people and expressed confidence that Ukraine would eventually win. "Of course they can win," then-Pentagon press Secretary John Kirby told reporters at a briefing on April 6. "The proof of this lies in the results you see every day."
Such optimistic assessments came not only from Biden administration officials. A born "hawk", analyst at the American Enterprise Institute Frederick Kagan wrote that "Ukraine can win this conflict against Russia. Ukrainian forces can push back Russian troops from their cities to the borders of Russia. It seems that they will be able to create a ground and air defense strong enough to prevent the resumption of Russian attacks for a long period of time." At the beginning of May, senior diplomats of NATO member states met with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Berlin and happily came to the conclusion that the military conflict "is not going as Moscow planned." Stoltenberg categorically stated: "Ukraine can win this conflict," he added that the alliance should continue to provide its military support.
This confidence among Western opinion leaders became even more noticeable when, in the fall of 2022, Ukrainian troops achieved some territorial gains. Daniel Davis, a former military man and currently a senior researcher at the Defense Priorities analytical center, listed how many retired American generals have become "terribly positive" about Ukraine's chances of victory.
"Retired Army General Ben Hodges said that Ukraine has already "reached an irreversible momentum" and that "there are no bright spots on the horizon for Russia." Former General David Petraeus said that Russia cannot win and that "Putin can do nothing" to prevent Ukraine from winning. Former general and national security adviser McMaster went so far as to say emphatically that Putin is on the verge of a collision with the "real collapse of the Russian army in Ukraine."
Several influential voices in the US foreign policy establishment expressed less enthusiasm about Kiev's chances of winning in the long run. The most striking example of this is an article by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on January 7, 2023 in the Washington Post. The title of the material "Time is not on the side of Ukraine" clearly emphasized their concern.
"Both of us have repeatedly dealt with Putin, and we are convinced that he believes that time is on his side: that he can exhaust Ukrainians and that the unity of the United States and Europe and support for Ukraine will eventually split. Of course, the Russian economy and people will suffer as long as this military conflict continues, but the Russians have experienced much more severe trials."These two former American high-ranking officials noted that:
"Although Ukraine's resistance has been heroic and its armed forces have performed very well, the country's economy is in decline, millions of its people have fled the country, its infrastructure has been destroyed, and most of its minerals, industrial facilities and significant agricultural land are under Russian control. Ukraine's military potential and economy are now almost entirely dependent on the West, primarily on the United States."Alas, Rice and Gates again prove that even in those rare cases when members of the foreign policy "bubble" correctly diagnose, they invariably make mistakes in the treatment prescription.
Their method of "resolving" the impending strategic and logistical collapse in Ukraine is not at all to put pressure on Kiev to agree to a cease-fire and agree on a realistic peace. Such a course correction would mean abandoning NATO's cynical "proxy war" aimed at exsanguinating and humiliating Russia. Instead, Rice and Gates conclude that the only way to save the situation "for the United States and its allies is to urgently provide a sharp increase in military assistance and support to Ukraine — sufficient to deter the resumption of the Russian offensive and give Ukraine the opportunity to push Russia back in the east and south." Like many of their war-minded colleagues, Rice and Gates still, oddly enough, do not pay attention to the danger that the escalation of NATO's intervention in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict increases the risk of a direct military clash between the Alliance and Russia — with possible nuclear consequences.
Although no episode in world affairs ever completely repeats previous historical events, the course of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict has many amazing parallels with the American civil war. If the current model of its development continues, and there is every reason to believe that it will, Rice and Gates are right that time is not on the side of Ukraine.
Vladimir Putin clearly underestimated the scale and effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance when he launched a military special operation in February 2022. American intelligence agencies have reported to the press that the high command of the Russian armed forces believed that their troops would enter Kiev within a few days. By the way, this belief was shared by American analysts.
The administration of Abraham Lincoln also expected that the desire of the Southerners for secession could be suppressed as soon as possible. After the Confederate bombing of Fort Sumter in April 1861, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to help quell the Southern rebellion. This modest initial mobilization of troops provided for only 90 days of service. At the end of July, civilians in Washington and its environs were so confident that government forces would defeat the upstart rebels that they drove out in their buggies to watch the impending battle of Manassas (Bull Run) in northern Virginia. Some even took picnic baskets with them, as if they were going on an excursion. Most of the tourists soon fled the battle area, as the Confederate forces proved to be much more resilient than expected.
After a few weeks, it became clear that the uprising of the Southerners would not end any time soon. The Lincoln government, the Union military command and the population of the North began to prepare for a longer war. However, this mobilization took place in stages. A few days after the failure in Manassas, President Lincoln called for 500,000 volunteers. This time the service life was supposed to be three years. Soon after, there was another escalation of hostilities when the administration established a quota of military volunteers from each state. The subsequent Militia Act of 1862 prescribed full army conscription in every state that did not collect its quota of volunteers. Military mobilization in the Union ("North") continued to increase. On March 3, 1863, just weeks after the Union Army's stunning defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Lincoln signed a new conscription law known as the Civil War Conscription Act. This new measure replaced the Militia Act of 1862 and called for the service of all men aged 20 to 45 years instead of simply setting quotas for the recruitment of volunteers for each state.
A similar pattern of escalation is taking place in Russia. Putin's partial military mobilization order of September 21, 2022 confirmed that Russian leaders have finally realized the reality that the initial level of forces in Ukraine will not be enough to achieve Moscow's goals. Putin's nationwide address at the beginning of 2023 was even more clearly aimed at preparing Russians for a protracted conflict.
Obviously, the Russian leaders were overly confident in their chances of success. Nevertheless, the optimism of the United States and the entire NATO regarding the final victory of Ukraine is also completely inappropriate. Again, some parallels with the civil war are striking.
One of the key indicators that should be extremely worrying for Ukraine is military losses. An assessment given in early November 2022 by General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that since the beginning of the SVO, Russian troops have lost more than 100,000 people killed and wounded. The American media strongly highlighted this figure in their headlines. Much less attention was attracted by Milli's admission that the Ukrainian forces also lost more than 100,000 people. This point is important because the Russian armed forces are much larger than the Ukrainian ones, and the total population of Russia is more than three times the population of Ukraine. In other words, Russia can bear even heavy losses easier and longer than Ukraine.
As the internecine conflict in America dragged on for the third and then the fourth year, the inherent advantages of the North became more and more significant. The states that remained loyal to the Union were more populous and industrialized than the states that joined the Confederacy (Southerners). The population of the North in 1861 was 22 million people, while in the South there were only 8 million people, almost a third of whom were slaves. In addition, there was already a much more extensive railway system in the North to transport troops and military supplies. These factors were ultimately supposed to lead to the insurmountable military superiority of the Northerners.
However, at the initial stages of the American Civil War, these advantages were neither obvious nor decisive. The Confederate forces, with their more trained officer corps, were able to outwit and outmaneuver their opponents, and win major victories on the battlefield. This applied to the first military battle of Manassas and especially to the decisive Confederate victories at Fredericksburg in December 1862 and Chancellorsville in May 1863. Even the stalemate that arose in Sharpsburg (Antietam) in September 1862 was seen in the South as a failure of the Union and contributed to the illusion that the Confederacy would eventually win.
Chancellorsville would be the culmination of the South's military success. Already, General Robert E. Lee's attempt to win a decisive victory in the North and endanger the seat of government in Washington failed at Gettysburg in July 1863. After that, the southern forces were slowly divided into parts and defeated by a numerically superior and better equipped enemy — the Northerners. The main initial advantage of the Confederation —its stronger officer corps and more competent command-also began to fade. Lincoln gradually replaced the overly cautious George McClellan and the incompetent Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker with much more capable and tougher military leaders.
General Ulysses Grant was rewarded for his victory at Vicksburg in July 1863, which destroyed the South's control of the vital Mississippi River, by receiving command of Union forces on the main front of the war in Virginia. His strategy used the main advantage of the North — a great superiority in weapons and personnel, by waging a war of attrition against the weakening forces of the Confederacy. Further west, General William Sherman led another Union Army in a scorched-earth march through Georgia and South Carolina, destroying the infrastructure of the South and capturing key cities and manufacturing centers such as Atlanta, Savannah and Columbia. Just as Grant's previous campaign had divided the Confederacy along the Mississippi, Sherman had effectively cut the eastern remnants of the Confederacy in two.
The tactics used by both of these generals were extremely cruel to the civilian population of the South, as well as to the armed forces of the Confederacy, and extremely costly in terms of Union losses, but they fulfilled their mission. No matter how terrible their strategy, the Union forces were able to overcome large losses of weapons and personnel, and the Confederate forces could not do it. Extensive blockade of southern ports by the Union — the "Anaconda Plan", developed by General Winfield Scott at the beginning of the war and implying an extensive blockade of southern ports by the Union, in the long run also proved to be very destructive and effective. The blockade has undermined the ability of the Confederation to export its goods to European markets, thereby depriving the rebels of much-needed income. It was also becoming increasingly difficult for the Southerners to acquire and import important types of weapons. Adequate supply of the besieged troops of the Southerners eventually became impossible. Simply put, the Confederacy was gradually running out of money, military supplies and troops.
Ukraine is likely to face similar difficulties. And indeed, there are signs that this is already happening. After Kiev's autumn offensive, Russia's main goal shifted from the conquest of additional territory to the destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure, especially the country's energy system and communication networks, with a mass of air and missile strikes. This approach has had a noticeable effect in just a few months.
Another element of Moscow's revised strategy is to strengthen defensive positions and make it extremely costly for Ukrainian forces to try to attack them in terms of human and material losses, not to mention capturing these positions. Despite the fact that the Western media pay little attention to the Ukrainian military failures (or in general anything that can undermine the prevailing "hurrah narrative" and cast doubt on the likelihood of Kiev's final triumph in this conflict), more and more messages are leaking into the world media space indicating an extremely high level of losses in the Armed Forces.
Despite the significant number of parallels between the American civil war and the increasingly bloody Ukrainian conflict, there are two important differences between these two historical events that give Ukraine a faint hope of at least maintaining the stalemate. First, Russia has yet to find truly strong military leaders capable of effectively directing its military actions. The Russian versions of Grant and Sherman have not yet appeared. Putin's decision of January 2023 to replace General Sergei Surovikin with General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff and the first commander of the February phase of the SVO, is incomparable with Lincoln's belated but ultimately successful personnel moves. Surovikin, appointed in October 2022 after the initial successes of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, at least managed to stop this offensive. The unsatisfactory actions of the Russian troops during Gerasimov's first tenure as commander of the SVO forces suggest that his reappointment was more related to the status of Putin's close confidant than to his military potential.
Another important difference is the level of foreign support provided to the weaker side in an armed conflict. There was considerable sympathy for the Confederate cause in the upper echelons of the British and French governments during the Civil War for many reasons. But then European leaders were afraid to interfere deeply in the civil conflict in America. One wrong step could lead to a direct combat clash with the Union naval forces, and perhaps even an invasion of British-controlled Canada, as happened during the War of 1812. In addition, the two main European governments were under considerable public pressure to oppose the support of the slave Confederation. By that time, the aversion to slavery had already penetrated quite deeply into public opinion both in Great Britain and in France.
The United States and its NATO allies have shown no such hesitation in providing large-scale assistance to Ukraine, despite the danger that such participation could lead to a direct military clash between NATO and Russia. By the end of December 2022, the United States had already provided $113 billion in military and financial assistance to Kiev. There is also strong evidence that American and British intelligence agencies are passing vital intelligence information about the battlefield to the Ukrainian armed forces.
At the beginning of 2023, the West decided to send much heavier offensive Western weapons to Kiev, including main battle tanks and longer-range missiles. The Biden administration also considered the possibility of transferring Patriot missile defense systems to Ukraine, and Poland and other NATO members expressed a desire to transfer F-16 fighters. Mad "hawks" are pushing the Biden administration and NATO to expand the borders of military assistance to Ukraine.
And yet, even despite such ongoing manifestations of militant unity, some disagreements are beginning to arise within the Western bloc regarding unconditional support for Ukraine. Influential NATO members, especially Hungary and Turkey, openly disagree with this approach. A similar disagreement is evident in the United States, especially among Republicans in Congress, who are concerned about the rapidly rising costs and the growing dangers of the "proxy war" that the Biden administration is waging against Russia. Although this view was still a minority view at the beginning of 2023, Western supporters of the war have reason to worry about this growing trend.
A significant increase in the level of competence of Russian field commanders or a reduction in the level of Western military assistance to Kiev will doom Ukraine's already structurally fragile hopes of victory. At some point, Ukrainians will have to face the full power of Russia's larger manpower and weapons, as happened with the superiority of the North in these two areas during the American Civil War. Instead of clamoring about Ukraine's temporary victories on the battlefield, the government of Vladimir Zelensky and his supporters in the West should seize the opportunity for productive negotiations to put an end to the Ukrainian military conflict and guarantee Ukraine's neutral status. Only this can save this country from such a crushing defeat suffered in the American Civil War by an overconfident Confederacy of Southerners.
Author: Ted Carpenter is a senior researcher at the Cato Institute. He is the author of 13 books and more than 700 articles on international affairs. His latest book is called Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (Watchdogs who cannot be trusted. American media and US Foreign Policy).
