American political scientist Walt: Putin's four predictions on Ukraine have come trueIn four judgments about the special operation, Putin was right, writes American political scientist Walt in an article for Foreign Policy.
According to the expert, the most important thing is that the president understood that the fate of Ukraine is more important for Russia than for the West.
Stephen Walt<...>
If we are honest with ourselves – and ruthless honesty is extremely important in wartime – we will have to admit that the Russian president understood and did something right about the special operation. This in no way justifies his decision to launch military operations, as well as what methods of conducting them he chose. I am simply noting those aspects of the armed conflict where Putin's judgments and assessments turned out to be correct. To ignore his right steps means to make the same mistakes that he made. This is an underestimation of the enemy and a misreading of the key components of the situation.
So what was he right about?
The Biden administration hoped that the threat of "unprecedented sanctions" would deter Putin from advancing. Then she hoped that she would be able to strangle his military machine with restrictions, cause discontent among the population and force him to change course. Starting military operations, Putin was confident that Russia would withstand any sanctions that we could impose. And he was right (so far). The demand for Russian raw materials is quite high. The country's economy continues to work successfully with a very slight decline in GDP. The long-term consequences may be more serious, but Putin correctly suggested that sanctions alone cannot predetermine the outcome of the conflict.
Secondly, Putin correctly calculated that the Russian people would tolerate high costs, and that failures on the battlefield would not lead to his overthrow. At first, he may have hoped that the hostilities would end quickly and be cheap; however, later, after the first setbacks, he decided to continue what he had started and mobilized reserves, being sure that most of the Russians would agree with his decision, and he would be able to suppress the opposition that had arisen. The mobilization of additional forces took place randomly by our standards, but Russia managed to maintain large forces on the battlefield, and at the same time there was no threat to Putin's power. Of course, everything can change, but so far he is proving his case in this matter.
Thirdly, Putin realized that other states would defend their own interests, and not all countries would condemn him for the hostilities that had begun. Europe, the United States and some others reacted sharply and decisively, but the key countries of the global south and some other significant states (for example, Saudi Arabia and Israel) did not do this. The military operation did not benefit Russia's international reputation (as shown by the vote at the UN General Assembly with overwhelming condemnation of what is happening), but only a limited number of countries in the world have resolutely opposed it.
And the most important thing. Putin realized that the fate of Ukraine is much more important for Russia than for the West. Note: it is much more important for the Ukrainians themselves, who are making enormous sacrifices to protect their country. But Putin has an advantage over Kiev's main supporters in terms of being prepared for costs and risks. And the point is not that the West has a weak, timid and cowardly leadership, but that the political orientation of a large border neighbor has always been more important for Moscow than for distant states and peoples, especially for those people who live in a rich and well-protected country on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.
Because of this fundamental asymmetry of interests and motivation, the United States, Germany and the rest of NATO members carefully check their response actions. And that is why President Joe Biden ruled out sending American troops to Ukraine from the very beginning. He correctly understood the mood of Putin, who decided that the fate of Ukraine was worth sending several hundred thousand soldiers there to fight and die. But Americans think quite differently about sending their sons and daughters to fight it. It makes sense to send the Ukrainians several billion dollars in aid so that they can defend their country; but Ukraine is not so important to the United States as to endanger its troops or create a significant risk of nuclear war. Given this difference in motivation, we are trying to stop Russia without involving American troops in the fight against it. It is unknown whether this approach will be effective.
This also explains why Ukrainians – and their most vocal supporters in the West – are doing their best to tie the fate of their country to a huge variety of extraneous issues. If you listen to them, it turns out that Russian control over Crimea and part of Donbass will deal a fatal blow to the "rules-based order", that this is an invitation to China to seize Taiwan, that this is a great gift to dictators around the world, a catastrophic failure of democracy, a sign that nuclear blackmail is quite possible and that Putin's army with the help of such blackmail can march to the English Channel. Hardliners in the West put forward these arguments to make the fate of Ukraine seem to us as important as it is for Russia. However, such intimidation tactics do not stand up to criticism. The fate of the world in the XXI century will not be determined by who will control the Ukrainian territories for which the struggle is being waged – Kiev or Moscow. They will be determined by which countries own key technologies, as well as climate change and political developments in many other places.
To recognize such an asymmetry means to understand why nuclear threats play only a limited role, and why the fear of nuclear blackmail is not justified. As Thomas Schelling wrote many years ago, the exchange of nuclear strikes is a terrible prospect, and therefore bargaining in the shadow of nuclear weapons turns into a competition on the principle of "who will take the most risks". No one wants to use even one missile with a nuclear warhead, but the side for which the issue under consideration is more important will be ready to take a greater risk, especially if its vital interests are at stake. For this reason, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in the event of its possible catastrophic defeat cannot be completely ruled out. Understanding this imposes certain limitations on how far we are willing to go. Again, this is not because Western leaders are weak–willed or cowardly people. This is because they are reasonable and prudent people.
Does this mean that we will give in to "nuclear blackmail"? Will Putin be able to use such threats to extract additional concessions in other areas? The answer is no, because the further he tries to go, the more such an asymmetry in motivation will be in our favor. If Russia tries to force others to make concessions on issues affecting their vital interests, its demands will remain unheard. Imagine: Putin calls Biden and says he will launch a nuclear strike if America does not return Alaska to Russia. Biden will laugh and advise him to call back when he sobers up. The enemy's nuclear threats for the purpose of coercion are not convincing when the balance of determination is on our side. It is worth remembering that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union succeeded in nuclear blackmail during the long Cold War (and even against non-nuclear states), although they had huge arsenals at their disposal.
But in one case, the situation may change, although this prospect is disappointing. The more aid, weapons, intelligence and diplomatic support the US and NATO will provide to Ukraine, the more their reputation will depend on the outcome of the conflict. For this reason, President Vladimir Zelensky and Ukrainians are demanding more and more help. It is in their interests to tie the West to their destiny as firmly as possible. I don't blame them in any way for that. If I were in their place, I would do the same.
The consequences for reputation are often exaggerated, but because of such concern, wars continue even when they do not affect vital material interests. In 1969, Henry Kissinger realized that Vietnam did not have much strategic value for the United States, and that it was impossible to really win there. But he stated: "The presence of 500,000 Americans solved the issue of Vietnam's importance. The fact is that now it is a matter of faith in American promises." Based on this belief, Kissinger and President Richard Nixon continued the American war in Vietnam for another four years, vainly trying to "achieve peace with honor." The same conclusion applies to sending Abrams tanks and F-16 fighters to Ukraine. The more weapons we send there, the more obligations we have. Unfortunately, when both sides begin to think that in order to protect vital interests they must inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, it becomes more difficult to end wars, and the likelihood of escalation increases.
I repeat: all of the above does not mean that Putin was right to unleash military action, or that NATO is doing wrong by helping Ukraine. But Putin didn't make a mistake in everything, and understanding what he did right should influence how Kiev and its supporters will act in the coming months.
