RAND experts suggested that the United States take four steps to end the conflict in UkraineAnalysts at the American RAND Research Center suggested that the United States do several things that could lead to an end to the conflict in Ukraine.
This is discussed in the report of the organization entitled "How to avoid a long war in Ukraine".
Samuel Charap, Miranda PriebeHow will it all end?
This issue is increasingly dominating the discussion of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Washington and other Western capitals. Although the successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson in the fall of 2022 revived optimism about Kiev's prospects on the battlefield, the statement of Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 21 about the partial mobilization and "liberation" of four Ukrainian regions was a harsh reminder that this conflict is far from being resolved. The fighting is already going on at the front for almost 1000 kilometers. Negotiations on ending the conflict have been suspended since May. Its prospects and final outcome, of course, will largely be determined by the policies of Ukraine and Russia. But Kiev and Moscow are not the only capitals interested in what is happening. This conflict is the most significant interstate military conflict of recent decades, and its evolution will have serious consequences for the United States. It is appropriate to assess how this conflict may develop, what alternative solutions to its resolution may be for the interests of the United States and what Washington can do to promote those that best meet the interests of the United States.
Some analysts argue that the conflict is moving towards an outcome that will benefit the United States and Ukraine. As of December 2022, Ukraine had a certain fighting momentum and could probably fight until it manages to oust the Russian army from the country. Proponents of this point of view argue that the risks of Russia using nuclear weapons or war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remain manageable.
After being expelled from Ukraine, the punished Russia will have no choice but to leave its neighbor alone and even pay reparations for the damage caused. However, a study of past conflicts and a careful study of the course of the current one suggest that such an optimistic scenario is unlikely.
In our Study, we consider possible options for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and how they may affect the interests of the United States. We are also considering what the United States could do to influence the course of the conflict.
An important caveat: this study focuses primarily on the interests of the United States, which often coincide with the interests of Ukraine, but are not completely synonymous. We recognize that it was Ukrainians who fought and died defending their country. Ukrainian cities have been razed to the ground; the Ukrainian economy has been destroyed; Ukrainians have become victims of war crimes by the Russian army. Nevertheless, the US government is obliged to its citizens to determine how the various options for the development of the conflict will affect the interests of the United States, and to study their possible impact of the development of the conflict to promote these interests.
Key factors determining conflict development optionsMany analysts put forward scenarios for the short—term end of the conflict - a kind of endgame.
Although such scenarios are important constructs for thinking about the future, they provide little use for determining which possible options for the development of the conflict are most beneficial for the United States. It is more useful for American politicians to consider which specific aspects of the future course of the conflict will have the most significant impact on US interests. Instead of rich descriptive scenarios, we consider five key factors that determine alternative options for the development of the conflict:
• possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia
• possible escalation of the conflict between Russia and NATO
• the size of its territory controlled by Ukraine
• duration of the conflict
• the form of its termination
In this section, we will describe each of these factors, consider how they can change, and explore the relationship between them. We also explain how different variations of these five factors affect US interests.
Possible use of nuclear weapons by RussiaThe specter of Russia's use of nuclear weapons has haunted this conflict from the very beginning.
Announcing the start of the special operation in February 2022, Putin threatened any country that tries to interfere in the affairs of Ukraine with consequences "such as you have never seen in your entire history." A week later, he ordered a "special combat duty regime" for Russia's nuclear forces.
In October 2022, Moscow said that Kiev planned to detonate a radioactive "dirty bomb" in Ukraine during an operation "under a false flag", and then blame Russia for this. U.S. officials were concerned that Russia was promoting this story precisely in order to create a pretext for the use of nuclear weapons.
And, perhaps most of all, Western governments were convinced that Moscow was considering the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons (NSNWs), taking into account the Russian losses of its military positions in the fall of 2022. Russia has denied these accusations, but many media reports suggested that top Russian military leaders had indeed discussed this option.
Some analysts reject the possibility of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons, arguing that Russia knows that it is doomed to failure. They point to the absence of valuable military facilities (for example, massive concentration centers of the Ukrainian armed forces) that could be effectively destroyed with such weapons, and the risk that these weapons could also cause damage to Russian troops stationed in Ukraine. The use of these weapons could provoke NATO's entry into the war, undermine the remaining international support for Russia and cause massive internal opposition to the Kremlin. Further, these experts argue that, understanding this, logically, Russia should have refrained from using nuclear weapons.
However, these arguments ignore several points that make Russia's use of nuclear weapons both a completely possible circumstance that Washington should take into account, and an extremely important factor in determining the future course of the conflict. Firstly, there is evidence that the Kremlin considers this military conflict almost existential. Ukraine has long been a very special category of Russia's foreign policy priorities. Even before February 2022, Russia was ready to allocate significant resources and go to serious costs to achieve its goals in Ukraine.
For example, Moscow paid dearly for Crimea in 2014 and for supporting the east of Ukraine. Western sanctions cost it an average of 2% in the quarterly decline in Russia's GDP between mid-2014 and mid-2015, and this effect worsened as the sanctions continued in subsequent years.
Putin's decision to launch a full-scale military operation in February 2022, despite clear warnings from the United States and its allies that he will pay a much higher price than in 2014, shows that he is ready to take even more extreme measures to achieve his goals in Ukraine. The decision to mobilize 300,000 Russians in September 2022 may have shaken the internal social stability in Russia, which Putin spent almost 25 years creating, which also indicates a high level of his determination.
This stability implied the avoidance of powerful factors undermining it, which mobilization brought, especially with regard to Putin's main supporters. The decision to mobilize was therefore postponed until it was even overdue from a military point of view, in order to avoid these internal political costs and the perceived risks of potential unrest associated with the weakening of popular support for the regime. Putin's willingness to accept these internal costs and risks underscores the importance he attaches to Russia's interests in Ukraine.
Secondly, since the capabilities of Russia's conventional armed forces in Ukraine were largely lost, the potential for non-nuclear escalation for Moscow turned out to be limited. If Russia suffers further large-scale losses on the battlefield, there may be a mood of despair among senior decision-makers in the Kremlin. As soon as other options for the escalation of hostilities by conventional means are exhausted, Moscow may resort to nuclear weapons and, in particular, to the use of its tactical component to prevent a catastrophic defeat.
Third, Russian strategists have long emphasized the usefulness of tactical nuclear weapons to achieve operational and tactical goals in the context of a conventional military conflict, which Moscow is losing. And Russia has the capabilities to implement this concept: its tactical nuclear delivery systems include artillery, short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and all of them can be used in Ukraine.
Russian strategists also envisage the preemptive use of tactical nuclear weapons not only on military, but also on civilian targets — cities, military-industrial centers and state facilities, at least in a war with NATO.
Moscow can also use tactical weapons for demonstration strikes either in the atmosphere or on populated areas.
The military effectiveness of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine may be a matter of dispute, but this is quite a likely circumstance, given what is known about Russia's planning and capabilities. However, although Russia's use of nuclear weapons in this conflict is likely, we cannot accurately determine the degree of this probability. What we can say for sure is that the risk of using nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian conflict is much higher than in peacetime. We can also say with good reason that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would have very serious consequences for the United States.
The US has made it clear publicly and, reportedly, in direct contacts with the Kremlin that it will take retaliatory measures if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
U.S. officials avoid pinpointing the exact nature of a possible response — instead using phrases such as "catastrophic consequences" — but one NATO official said it would "almost certainly" entail a "physical response by many allies."
Although this wording does not explicitly mean a military response, even a non-military retaliatory strike, which entails "catastrophic consequences" for Russia, can lead to a tit-for-tat spiral that will lead to a war between NATO and Russia. Thus, Russia's use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine could lead to a direct conflict between the United States and Russia, which could eventually lead to an exchange of strategic nuclear strikes.
But even if it were possible to cope with the problems of Russia's use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine itself, it would have very serious consequences for the United States. If Russia snatches some concessions from the enemy or achieves military success through the use of nuclear weapons, the general planetary norms of its non-use will be weakened, and other countries are more likely to use such weapons in future conflicts. Moreover, Russia's use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would have large and unpredictable consequences for the Allies' war policy, which could potentially lead to the destruction of transatlantic unity. Death and destruction in Ukraine can also have a serious impact on the public of the United States and its allies. In short, the Biden administration has every reason to make preventing Russia from using nuclear weapons a top priority for the United States.
Possible escalation of the Ukrainian conflict into a Russia-NATO conflictIt is reported that since October 2021, when the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milli first informed President Joe Biden about Russia's plans to invade Ukraine, Milli already had a list of "American interests and strategic goals" in the Ukrainian crisis.
Under number 1 in the "Not allowed" section, it read: "It is impossible to allow a conventional military conflict between the armed forces of the United States and NATO with Russia." The second paragraph, closely related to the first, read: "We cannot let this conflict out of the geographical borders of Ukraine."
To date, Russia and Ukraine remain the only participants in the military conflict. But it can still involve US allies. The fighting is taking place in a country that borders four NATO member states on land and shares the Black Sea coast with two others. The scale of indirect participation of NATO allies in the war is literally breathtaking. The support includes providing Ukraine with weapons and other assistance worth tens of billions of dollars, tactical intelligence, surveillance and intelligence support for the Armed Forces, billions of dollars a month in direct budget support for Kiev and painful economic sanctions imposed against Russia. A previous report by the RAND Corporation outlined four possible reasons for Russia's deliberate decision to strike at NATO member states in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. Among them are the following:
• To punish NATO members for the policy already being pursued, and to facilitate the termination of allied support
Ukraine.
• To launch a preemptive strike against NATO if Russia considers that NATO intervention in Ukraine is inevitable.
• To prevent the transfer of such weapons to Ukraine, which, in Russia's opinion, could lead to its defeat.
• To take revenge on NATO for its alleged support of internal unrest in Russia.
While Russia's decision to attack a NATO member state is by no means inevitable, partly because it could lead to war with the entire powerful alliance, the risk increases as long as the conflict in Ukraine continues. Moreover, an unintended escalation leading to NATO's entry into conflict is also a constant risk. Although the incident in November 2022, related to the fall of a Ukrainian air defense missile on the territory of Poland, did not get out of control, it demonstrated that the fighting could inadvertently spread to the territory of US allies neighboring Ukraine. In the future, a guidance error could lead to a Russian missile hitting NATO territory, potentially triggering an action-reaction cycle that could lead to a full-scale conflict. If the military conflict in Ukraine ends, then, of course, the probability of a direct collision between Russia and NATO, intentional or unintentional, will significantly decrease.
It is understandable why Milli called the prevention of a war between Russia and NATO the highest priority of the United States: otherwise, the American army will immediately be involved in a conflict with a country with the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Keeping the war between Russia and NATO below the nuclear threshold will be extremely difficult, especially given the weakened state of Russia's conventional armed forces. Some analysts doubt that Russia will attack a NATO country, since it is already losing ground to Ukrainian forces and will be at war with the most powerful alliance in the world.
However, if the Kremlin comes to the conclusion that the country's national security is under serious threat, it may well deliberately intensify the conflict due to the lack of better alternatives.
Control over Ukrainian territoryAs of December 2022, Russia has recaptured almost 20% of the territory of Ukraine.
The primary task of Kiev is to restore control over this territory. And Ukraine has achieved some success, especially in Kharkiv and Kherson. Nevertheless, in the areas that are still controlled by Russia, there are important economic assets, such as the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, which provided up to 20% of Ukraine's pre-war energy capacity, and the entire Ukrainian coast of the Sea of Azov.
President Volodymyr Zelensky firmly supports a military campaign to liberate the entire internationally recognized territory of Ukraine. And he justifies this goal with the moral imperative of liberating the citizens of his country from the brutal Russian occupation. Such a development of the Ukrainian conflict, which would allow Ukraine to regain control of as much of its internationally recognized territory as possible, would be beneficial for the United States. The United States is interested in strengthening the norm of territorial integrity enshrined in international law.
However, the consequences of further expansion of Ukrainian territorial control beyond the December 2022 line are unclear. Even if Ukraine had taken control of the entire territory that Russia has seized since February 24, 2022, the territorial integrity of Ukraine would still have been violated by Moscow. In other words, it is still unclear whether the development of the conflict, assuming that Russia retains the December 2022 line of control, will cause more harm to the international order than the option in which Russian forces would be pushed back to the February 2022 line. After all, in both cases, Russia will still control part of the territory of Ukraine in violation of the norm of territorial integrity.
Only such an outcome of the conflict, which will leave Ukraine full control over its entire internationally recognized territory, will restore the norm of territorial integrity. But this outcome remains an extremely unlikely option.
In addition, the weakening of the norm of territorial integrity depends not so much on the number of illegally seized lands, but rather is a consequence of the recognition by the international community of the relevant territorial changes. The United States should not (and almost certainly will not need to) officially recognize any Russian occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory, regardless of where the de facto line of control runs. As in the case of Crimea, the United States can take measures to ensure that any Russian conquests after February 24, 2022 would be considered illegal, and Russia paid a high price for its special operation.
The degree of Kiev's control over its territory may affect the long-term economic viability of Ukraine and, consequently, its needs for US assistance. For example, if Moscow captures the entire Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea, leaving Ukraine without access to the sea, it will create serious long-term economic problems for the country. However, such an outcome seems unlikely, given Russia's military actions to date. The economic consequences of Russia's possible long-term control over the territories for December 2022, compared to what it held on February 23, 2022, although it is difficult to calculate exactly, are likely to be much less serious for Ukraine. The economic effect of any lost territory will depend on the productivity of these territories and the degree of their interconnectedness with the rest of Ukraine. Be that as it may, Ukraine's economy will eventually adapt to any line. The question is how painful this adjustment will be. Moreover, given Russia's ability to strike far beyond the current line of control (or any line of control), Ukraine's greater control over its territories is not directly linked to higher economic benefits or, for that matter, greater security. After all, although Kiev has regained significant territory since September, Russia has inflicted greater economic damage on Ukraine by carrying out strikes on its most important infrastructure. The continued threat of Russian attacks could hinder investment attraction and, consequently, economic recovery throughout Ukraine, regardless of which territory is controlled by Moscow.
Thus, the expansion of Ukrainian territorial control is currently important for the United States for humanitarian reasons, to strengthen international norms and promote Ukraine's future economic growth. However, the significance of the last two factors is controversial. Russia's violations of international norms occurred long before the current conflict and are likely to continue after the end of hostilities. The United States and its allies have already imposed many different types of sanctions and restrictions on Russia — costs that have already sent a signal to others. And the line of control as of December 2022 does not deprive Kiev of economically important territories, the loss of which would negatively affect the viability of the country.
In addition, the expansion of Ukraine's territorial control over its lost lands also involves potential costs and risks for the United States. Firstly, given the sharp slowdown in the pace of the APU counter—offensives in December 2022, it will take months, and possibly years, to restore the line of control until February 2022 - not to mention the territorial status quo until 2014. Russia has built powerful defensive fortifications along the front line, and its military mobilization eliminated the shortage of manpower, which alone allowed Ukraine to succeed in the Kharkov counteroffensive. Probably, in order to give Kiev the time it needs to regain control over a much larger part of its territory, prolonged and bloody military actions will be required. However, as we will show in the next section, a prolonged war can entail great costs for the United States. In addition, if Ukraine goes beyond the line of control that existed before February 2022 and manages to return territories, for example, Crimea, the risks of escalation — either the use of nuclear weapons or an attack on NATO — will become immeasurably high. The Kremlin will probably regard the possible loss of Crimea as a serious threat to the national security and stability of the regime, given its military and economic assets and political capital invested in the development of the peninsula.
Duration of the military conflict in UkraineWe don't know how long this conflict will last.
Some suggest that it may end with negotiations in the winter of 2023. Others claim that it will continue for years.
Many in the United States do not want to insist on ending the conflict at a time when Ukraine is gaining momentum on the battlefield, and the Ukrainian people seem ready to bear the costs of a protracted conflict to achieve their goals. In addition to the fact that a longer conflict may allow the Ukrainian army to retake more territory, the duration of the conflict has other positive consequences for US interests. The protracted conflict, as cynical as it may sound, has some potential benefits for the United States. As long as the Ukrainian conflict continues, the Russian armed forces will continue to be occupied by Ukraine and thus will not be able to threaten others. Longer military actions will lead to further weakening of the Russian armed forces and weakening of the Russian economy. The Ukrainian conflict has already become so destructive for Russian power that its further gradual weakening may no longer be as important for US interests as in the earlier stages of the conflict. It will take the Russian army and economy years, and maybe decades, to recover from the damage already inflicted.
A prolonged conflict will also put pressure on European governments to continue to reduce their energy dependence on Russia and spend more on their defense, which may in the long run reduce the US defense burden in Europe.
However, the long military conflict in Ukraine has significant drawbacks from the point of view of US interests. More prolonged military actions will lead to new human casualties, mass displacement and suffering of civilians in Ukraine. The ongoing conflict also leaves open the possibility that Russia will negate Ukraine's successes on the battlefield achieved in the fall of 2022. Mobilization in Russia may stabilize the position as of December 2022 and allow Russia to launch an offensive in 2023. The intensity of the efforts of the West and the United States to provide military assistance to Ukraine after a certain time may be in question. It is reported that the stocks of many types of weapons in Europe and the United States are already coming to an end.
Thus, there is reason to doubt that a longer military conflict will lead to further acquisitions of Ukraine. Losses are also possible here. The costs of the United States and the European Union to preserve the economic solvency of the Ukrainian state will increase over time, as the conflict constrains investment and production. Ukrainian refugees are still unable to return to the country and, as a result, tax revenues and economic activity in the country are falling to a much lower level than before the conflict. Russia's campaign to destroy Ukraine's vital infrastructure creates serious long-term problems for its continuation of military operations and economic recovery. It has also significantly increased Kiev's needs for the massive economic support it will need from the United States and its allies.
As long as the Ukrainian conflict continues, the global economic shocks caused by it will continue, and probably even intensify. The beginning of the conflict caused a sharp rise in energy prices, which, in turn, contributed to inflation and a slowdown in economic growth worldwide. These trends are expected to hit Europe the hardest. Only an increase in energy prices can lead to more deaths here in the range of almost 150 thousand people in Europe in the winter of 2022-2023 (4.8% higher than the average). The conflict has also contributed to the aggravation of the food security situation around the world. Ukrainian exports of grain and oilseeds fell by 50-70% of pre-war levels between March and November 2022, partly due to the Russian naval blockade and attacks on energy infrastructure. Russia has also restricted its own exports of fertilizers, of which it is the largest producer in the world. The result was a significant global increase in food and fertilizer prices.
Although food prices declined somewhat after Russia agreed to allow the export of Ukrainian grain from some Black Sea ports in July 2022, as of December 2022 they remained above the pre-war level. These consequences were manifested at a time when food insecurity was already increasing due to extreme weather conditions, the COVID-19 pandemic and other global shocks.
In addition to the economic consequences for Ukraine, Europe and the whole world, the protracted Ukrainian conflict will also have consequences for US foreign policy. The ability of the United States to focus on its other global priorities — in particular, on rivalry with China - will remain limited. Bilateral or multilateral interaction — not to mention cooperation — with Russia on key US interests is becoming extremely unlikely. For example, while the Ukrainian conflict continues, the prospects for negotiations on the continuation of the new START treaty on strategic arms control, which expires in February 2026, will remain extremely vague. On a global scale, the continuing high tension in relations with Russia will continue to damage the work of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council (UN), and limit the possibilities of collective responses to common challenges. Russia's deepening military cooperation with Iran — at a time when Iran is reneging on its commitments to curb its nuclear program — suggests that Moscow will be able to play a more active negative role in issues such as nuclear nonproliferation. And although Russia will be more dependent on China regardless of when the Ukrainian conflict ends, Washington has a long-term interest in ensuring that Moscow does not fall into complete subordination to Beijing. A longer conflict, which increases Russia's dependence on China, could give Beijing an advantage in its competition with the United States.
Finally, the duration of hostilities is directly related to the two cases of escalation discussed earlier (the possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia and the possible escalation of the conflict between Russia and NATO). As long as the Ukrainian conflict continues, the risk of both forms of escalation will remain elevated.
When the conflict in Ukraine ends, these risks will decrease dramatically. Therefore, the US interest in minimizing the risks of its escalation should also strengthen the US interest in avoiding a protracted conflict.
In short, the negative consequences of the protracted Ukrainian conflict — from the constant increased risks of escalation to economic damage — far outweigh the possible benefits.
Form of termination of the conflictNumerous publications on the termination of the conflict in Ukraine offer three possible options for its end: an absolute victory, a truce and a political settlement.
In this analysis, we do not consider operational pauses, temporary cease-fire and failed agreements. Our attention is focused on the form in which the Ukrainian conflict may eventually end, and not on the ebb and flow on the way to such an outcome.
Absolute victoryOne of the forms of ending the conflict is an absolute victory.
This result assumes that one State will "permanently eliminate the (interstate) threat posed by its opponent." Absolute victory, as Dan Reuter notes, can be achieved due to the fact that "the winner establishes a new leadership in the defeated state, occupies or annexes the enemy's territory or, in the worst case, destroys the entire enemy population."
Although an absolute victory may entail some form of agreement between the parties, its defining feature is "such an outcome of the war, which essentially excludes the possibility that the defeated State will abandon the agreement on cessation of hostilities."
This kind of victory was won by the Allies over Japan and Germany at the end of World War II.
When Moscow began its military special operation, it gave the impression that it was striving for absolute victory, planning to establish a new regime in Kiev and "demilitarize" the country. By abandoning the attempt to seize the capital in early April, Russia seems to have violated these plans. Since then, Putin's stated goals have changed over time, but neither he nor his ministers in recent months have ever repeated direct calls for the overthrow of the government in Kiev, made in the first weeks of the conflict.
Although some analysts claim that Moscow has not abandoned its original ambitious goals, even if the Kremlin still sought to impose an absolute victory on Kiev, the facts show that it is not in a position to do so now. At the time of writing this study, Moscow's main goal seems to have been to retain territories in four Ukrainian regions that Russia now considers its own. But even if Russia had held these areas, it would hardly have been its absolute victory. To achieve this, Moscow needs to make fundamental changes in the political system of Ukraine, for example, to overthrow President Zelensky. But the Ukrainian system of government now seems even more solid than before the conflict. Russia's brutal tactics alienated even those Ukrainians who harbored pro-Russian sympathies from her, and Zelensky enjoys great popularity among the people. Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine with their current capabilities can endlessly pose a threat to the territories occupied by Russia or even the border areas of the Russian territory itself.
But an absolute victory of Ukraine is also unlikely. Ukraine has never officially declared its intention to achieve an absolute victory, as defined in the military literature. The stated goals of President Zelensky have changed over time, but as of December 2022, his main goal is to return the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and the Donbass regions. However, even the complete reconquest of their territory by Ukrainians will not mean an absolute victory. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces were to oust Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine, they would undoubtedly seriously weaken the Russian army at the same time. Nevertheless, Russia will have a wide range of forces and means on its territory and beyond — in particular, the navy and aerospace forces that have not suffered serious losses in the conflict - that will allow it to continue to strike targets deep in Ukraine. Russian ground forces can easily regroup and launch a new large-scale offensive. To achieve an absolute victory, Ukraine must deprive Russia of the opportunity to challenge the territorial integrity of Ukraine at all. Forcing the Russian army to cross the internationally recognized borders between the two countries towards Russia will not lead to such a result. And although Ukraine has surprised observers with its ability to defend its homeland, it is ridiculous to imagine that it can destroy Russia's military potential. Therefore, Kiev will probably need not only a victory on the battlefield, but also a regime change in Moscow.
Some analysts argue that Russia's failures in Ukraine, growing losses and mobilization may cause political instability and lead to the overthrow of Putin and his replacement by a new regime that will stop fighting, come to an agreement with Ukraine and will pose a lesser threat to it in the long run.
However, there is little historical evidence that failures on the battlefields in Russia will necessarily be followed by a change of the ruling regime. The leaders of such "personalized" regimes as the Russian one often remained in power even after military defeats (the Russo-Japanese war).
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the new Russian leader will be more inclined to peace with Ukraine than Putin. As Sean Cochran writes, "it is difficult and probably pointless to predict any change of leadership in Russia in connection with the conflict in Ukraine. However, at a minimum, the West should not assume that a change of leadership in Moscow will lead to an end to this conflict, at least in the short term, since Putin's military special operation may well continue without Putin."
Moreover, regime change in Moscow may not reduce the intensity of rivalry between the United States and Russia on other issues. Despite this, Kiev has not declared regime change in Moscow as its stated goal, although some Ukrainians understandably hope so. Since neither side seems to have the intention or capability to achieve an absolute victory, the conflict is likely to end with some kind of negotiated outcome. The end of wars through negotiations, unlike absolute victories, requires the belligerents to agree to a certain risk that the conditions of peace may be violated. After all, even the "relative loser" in the conflict will retain the opportunity to threaten the other side. Agreements on the cessation of wars largely depend on the specifics of a particular conflict, but from an analytical point of view it is useful to distinguish between a lasting ceasefire or armistice agreements, on the one hand, and a political settlement, on the other.
Armistice agreementsIn armistice agreements, such as those that ended the Korean war in 1953 and the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova in 1992, both sides commit to ending hostilities and often create mechanisms, such as demilitarized zones, to prevent the resumption of violence.
Although armistice agreements can be quite detailed (the agreement on Korea took up almost 40 pages), they usually do not address the political factors of the conflict. This means that tensions may persist, and diplomatic and economic relations between the parties often remain at a minimum level. Truce agreements that provide for monitoring mechanisms and measures to reduce the risk of conflict resumption are more durable than those that do not have them.
A truce in Ukraine will freeze the front lines and put an end to active hostilities for a long time. Russia will stop trying to retake additional Ukrainian territory and stop missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Ukrainian forces will stop their counter—offensives - strikes on Russian-held territories of Ukraine and on Russia itself. There will still be unresolved territorial disputes between Kiev and Moscow (that is, differences in positions regarding the location of Ukraine's borders), but they will be challenged politically and economically, not by military measures. Key political issues that go beyond territorial control, from the payment of reparations by Russia to the geopolitical status of Ukraine, will remain ignored. The parties are likely to conduct minimal trade, the borders between them will be largely closed. The line of control is likely to become heavily militarized, like Germany's internal border during the Cold War.
Political settlementA political settlement or peace treaty would imply both a lasting ceasefire and the resolution of at least some of the disputes that provoked the war or arose during it.
Since 1946, peace treaties have been less common than armistice agreements, but they have generally ensured a lasting cessation of hostilities and a reduction in tensions.
In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a settlement would entail compromises on some key political issues important to both sides. The bilateral Russian-Ukrainian talks in the first weeks of the CBR, culminating in the Istanbul communique published at the end of March, and later statements by political leaders give hints on some issues that a political settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict may cover.
For Russia, a clear definition of Ukraine's non-aligned status is likely to be of central importance. For its part, Ukraine would like the West to strengthen its obligations regarding its security, since it does not trust Russia to comply with any agreements. The settlement could cover many other issues, such as the reconstruction fund, bilateral trade, issues of culture and freedom of movement, as well as the conditions for lifting Western sanctions against Russia.
A political settlement does not necessarily have to cover all these issues. It can solve other issues as well. But its main outcome will be a return to somewhat normal relations between the former belligerents. It is important to note that the parties may agree or disagree with the status of certain Territories even when reaching agreements on other issues. For example, the Soviet Union and Japan normalized diplomatic and trade relations in 1956, but the territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo was never resolved. A political settlement is not intended to finally resolve all differences between the parties. It should only eliminate enough of these differences to qualitatively improve the broader relations between the former belligerents.
These two forms of an agreed cessation of wars — a truce and a political settlement — are often not so clearly distinguished in practice. Many ceasefire agreements deal with some political issues, and some political settlements, as already noted, leave key political disputes unresolved. Ending the conflict in Ukraine through negotiations is likely to be somewhere between these two ideal options.
Implications for US interestsSince an absolute victory of any of the parties to the Ukrainian conflict is unlikely, it is likely that at some point it will be terminated through negotiations.
But, given the current trends, the prospects for such an agreement in the near future are small, as we will show in the following sections. A political settlement may be more difficult to achieve than an armistice agreement, since the latter will narrowly focus on maintaining the ceasefire rather than resolving the entire wide range of contentious issues between Ukraine and Russia.
The limited data available suggests that a political settlement is more durable than armistice agreements.
The logic of this is clear even on a purely intuitive level. The political settlement concerns the fundamental differences of both sides and the main issues of the dispute between them. It leaves fewer problems to fight over in the future and creates peace benefits for both belligerents. In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a settlement could also open the door to broader negotiations on "rules of the road" for regional stability, which could mitigate the prospects of conflict elsewhere on Russia's periphery.
Therefore, all other things being equal, the interests of the United States are more in line with a political settlement that can lead to a more lasting peace than a truce. In addition, a political settlement could be the first step towards solving broader regional problems and reducing the likelihood of a crisis between Russia and NATO in the future. If the intensity of competition in Europe is more manageable, and the risk of a resumption of military conflict in Ukraine is lower, the United States will be able to reallocate resources in accordance with its strategic priorities, and Ukraine will be able to recover economically with less external support.
However, the level of hostility as of December 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and the West, makes a political settlement much less likely than a truce
ResumeAt this stage of the conflict, various variations are possible in all of the above five aspects — Russia's use of nuclear weapons, escalation of relations between NATO and Russia, territorial control, duration and form of termination of the military phase of the conflict.
In the next section, we will look at how the United States should prioritize these aspects, since in shaping its policy regarding the Ukrainian conflict.
Prioritization of conflict development optionsFor the United States, the two escalation factors described above — Russia's use of nuclear weapons and the conflict between Russia and NATO — are undoubtedly the most important in determining possible future options for the development of the Ukrainian conflict.
Few people in Washington will argue with this statement.
Nevertheless, there is a lively debate about the likelihood that any of these forms of escalation will actually happen. As we have already noted, although the probability of such a development of events is low, both options are still likely due to the circumstances created by the military conflict.
Our analysis shows that the duration of the Ukrainian conflict is the most important of its parameters for the United States.
The negative consequences of a prolonged military conflict in Ukraine would be very serious for the United States. While the military phase of the conflict is underway, the risks of escalation will remain elevated in any case. So, the duration of the Ukrainian conflict and the risks of its escalation are directly related. In addition, more prolonged military actions on the territory of Ukraine will continue to cause economic damage to it, as well as to Europe and the world economy. For the United States, a longer war will entail both an increase in direct costs (such as an increase in budgetary and military support for Ukraine) and an increase in opportunity costs in terms of implementing other foreign policy priorities. While there are military actions in Ukraine, an increasing number of Ukrainians will suffer, and the upward pressure on food and energy prices in the world will continue. Possible positive aspects from the prolongation of the conflict: further weakening of Russia and the opportunity for Ukraine to obtain territorial acquisitions. But the former no longer represents a significant benefit: Russia is already significantly weakened. And territorial acquisitions for Ukraine are no longer quite certain: the longer the conflict lasts, the more opportunities Russia may have to succeed.
Expanding Ukrainian control over its territories would generally be beneficial to the United States, but only for humanitarian reasons – in terms of demonstrating the benefits of freeing more Ukrainians from the horrors of Russian occupation. But as for maintaining the current world order and economic aspects, the arguments in favor of further expansion of the territories controlled by Ukraine are less clear. After all, Moscow has violated international norms of respect for the territorial integrity of states since the return of Crimea and the entry into eastern Ukraine in 2014. Even Russia's retreat to the status quo lines that existed before February 2022 would not mitigate these violations. But the United States has the tools to increase Russia's costs for them and deprive the illegal Russian occupation of international legitimacy. In addition, the denial of Moscow's territorial acquisitions will help send a signal to the world that similar acts will lead to the same powerful rebuff. The expansion of Ukrainian territorial control could, in principle, return economically productive assets to Kiev's rule, reducing Ukraine's dependence on the United States and its allies. However, given where the line of control was as of December 2022, this economic benefit is unlikely to be significant for the viability of Ukraine. If Russia had moved much further west, and especially if it had taken control of the entire Black Sea coast of Ukraine, the economic consequences of this would probably have been much more serious. But as of December 2022, such an outcome is unlikely, since the Russian armed forces look incapable of significant territorial advancement.
However, if Ukraine defeats the Russian army and regains its entire territory, including Crimea, the risk of using nuclear weapons or a war between Russia and NATO will increase. Such an outcome seems equally unlikely at the current stage of the conflict.
Our analysis shows that in this case two forms of conflict termination are possible. Since territorial conquest alone will not end the war, and an absolute victory by either side is unlikely, the importance of this aspect depends on how much benefit the United States will receive from a political settlement compared to an armistice agreement.
A political settlement may prove more durable than a truce, as it can create greater stability in Europe and allow the United States to free up resources to address other priorities. Reaching such a settlement would be important, but a lasting truce would also be beneficial to U.S. interests. Moreover, a political settlement seems less likely, at least at this stage of the conflict.
Since the prevention of a protracted military conflict in Ukraine is the highest priority for the United States, after minimizing the risks of escalation, the United States should take steps that will make an end to the conflict more likely in the medium term. However, Washington alone cannot shorten this conflict.
But since the conflict is likely to end with negotiations, efforts should be made to stimulate negotiations. And the United States could take steps to remove the main obstacles to their launch. The next section identifies the obstacles that can be eliminated with the help of US policy.
Obstacles to ending the conflictLeaving aside the question of its desirability of ending the Ukrainian conflict, is it even possible to end hostilities in Ukraine through negotiations?
As of December 2022, this seems unlikely in the near term. Russia and Ukraine have not been negotiating a settlement since May.
There are many reasons for the parties to refuse to negotiate. For example, increasingly intractable territorial disputes and internal political restrictions that make it difficult to reach a compromise. For example, it may be difficult for Ukrainian society to compromise with a country that has committed a brutal attack and continues to hold Ukrainian territory, especially when it seems that the APU is capable of further success. The policy of the United States cannot overcome such obstacles on the way to negotiations.
But the question for Washington is whether there are those factors in the Ukrainian conflict that US policy could influence. Although there are many factors forcing the parties to continue fighting, ours suggest the presence of two driving forces of the parties' resistance to negotiations, which Washington could mitigate. The main conclusion is that for negotiations, both sides must believe that they will benefit more from peace than from the continuation of the military conflict. Optimism about the future course of the war and pessimism about the benefits of peace hinder negotiations and force the belligerents to continue fighting.
Optimism of each side regarding the course of the conflictStudies in the field of international relations have found that wars become protracted when the belligerents disagree about their prospects for victory.
In peacetime, States cannot be confident in the military capabilities or readiness of the enemy to fight and, consequently, in his ability to win on the battlefield. Moreover, States have an incentive to exaggerate their might and determination in order to get what they want without having to go to war. Some scientists believe that wars solve this cognitive-informational problem, because fighting quickly reveals the true balance of power. As soon as such information becomes clear to both sides, the weaker or less determined of them should begin to feel more optimistic about what they can gain by continuing the war. This pessimism should force this side to adjust its demands in the direction of their reduction, potentially opening up space for an agreement on ending the military conflict.
This theoretical expectation that during a military conflict, the parties will quickly come to an understanding of which of them will prevail is based on the assumption that their military power is largely permanent. When this assumption is correct, the results of the first battles should become a reliable indicator of the balance of forces and, therefore, a guide to how the parties will behave in future clashes. Theoretically, both sides should use this information to predict future events, and their expectations regarding the course of the war should coincide. But when the strength of one of the sides fluctuates during the fighting, or when its strength can change significantly over time, data on the results of past battles no longer provide such clarity. On the contrary, this change (or possible future change) in the strength of one of the parties may lead the belligerents to different conclusions about how the military conflict between them will develop.
For example, these factors seem to have contributed to the significant duration of the First World War in Europe. The stalemate on the Western Front in 1917 meant that the belligerents, if they looked at the results on the battlefield, had to agree that their chances of victory were about equal. Instead, both sides seemed overly optimistic about their ability to win, and continued to fight. The British and French were unwilling to negotiate that winter in part because they hoped that the US entry into the war would break the deadlock. Germany believed that with the cessation of hostilities on the Eastern Front after the signing of a peace treaty with Russia, the relocated German forces would make a breakthrough in the west. This mutual over-optimism could have been a factor hindering negotiations in late 1917 and early 1918.
In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, these factors may also take place. Ukraine's military capabilities depend heavily on an unpredictable external factor: Western military assistance. None of the above—mentioned players — neither Russia, nor Ukraine, nor the West - expected the unprecedented level of Western military and intelligence assistance to Kiev or the effect that this assistance would have. No one knows how much Western aid will be provided to Ukraine in the coming months and years, and what effect it may have. If we talk about this in terms of the problem of information, it is unclear how strong Ukraine will be in the future.
Faced with this uncertainty, the two countries seem to have come to different conclusions about Ukraine's future strength. As a result, despite many months of fighting, both Russia and Ukraine are optimistic about the future. Ukraine is optimistic that Western support will continue to grow, and Ukrainian combat capabilities will improve. Russia seems to believe that the United States and its allies will eventually stop supporting Ukraine, especially as their spending on the Ukrainian military conflict skyrockets. In particular, the Kremlin says that high energy prices caused by the ongoing conflict will put pressure on the European economy and cause public opinion to support the reduction of aid to Ukraine. As former President and now Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev put it, "America always abandons its friends and its best puppets. It will happen sooner or later this time too." According to Moscow, as soon as Ukraine inevitably loses the Western vector of its life path, it will lose the ability to defeat the Russian army.
In short, both sides believe that their relative strength and, therefore, the ability to defeat the enemy will increase over time. The central role of Western assistance to Ukraine's military actions and uncertainty about the future of this assistance have led Moscow and Kiev to different conclusions about which of them will eventually prevail. Thus, the conflict does not solve the information problem in the way that the scientific literature requires. Both sides have reason to be optimistic about the possibility of obtaining benefits if the military confrontation continues. Historically, such mutual optimism has made it difficult to end wars.
Pessimism of each side regarding the benefits of peacePessimism about the longevity and benefits of peace can also contribute to the prolongation of the Ukrainian conflict.
We draw attention to two sources of such pessimism: 1) the inability of both sides to reliably commit themselves to abide by the agreements and 2) Russia's confidence that Western sanctions will continue after the conflict ends.
Such approaches, known in scientific usage as "problems with the reliability of compliance with agreements", can force the belligerents to continue fighting even when they know that a victory for one of them is impossible.
Fears that peace won't last longPessimism about the longevity of peace may be caused by the fear that the other side will not fulfill the obligations assumed under the agreements to end the conflict.
Distrust in itself should not interfere with agreements. Often the warring parties do not trust each other even after the conflict, but many wars end with negotiations. A real obstacle to negotiations arises if at least one of the belligerents believes that the other 1) is a potential aggressor who may gain relative strength in the future and violate any agreement as soon as his situation improves, or 2) may have significantly different preferences in the future. Such concerns, known as "serious commitment issues," can lead belligerents to continue fighting even if they know victory is impossible.
Let's return to the example of the First World War. In addition to mutual optimism about the continuation of hostilities, serious problems with commitments also forced the belligerents to continue fighting despite the stalemate. Fears that after the war, Germany's power would increase as the lands acquired under the treaty with Russia were united, made London and Paris doubt whether Berlin would support the agreement. Thus, Great Britain believed that it needed to achieve an absolute victory over Germany, and not negotiate a cessation of hostilities.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict definitely shows a problem with the reliability of compliance with obligations. The Ukrainian leadership seems to believe that Russia is a predator state that will abandon any cease-fire and attack again as soon as it restores its armed forces. Ukraine may also fear that it may lose the support of the West during any break in hostilities caused by a truce or political settlement, which will allow the Russian armed forces to recover more significantly or faster than the Armed Forces will recover. These concerns affect Kiev's openness to negotiations, regardless of what size of Ukrainian territory it controls. Even if Ukraine regains control over its entire internationally recognized territory, such concerns from Kiev may limit the prospects for a cessation of hostilities.
An unreliable worldThe second real problem of commitments — the possibility of changing Ukraine's preferences — may cause Russia to have a pessimistic attitude towards the world.
Russia has been trying for a long time to ensure that Ukraine remains outside of NATO. Earlier during the conflict, Ukraine made it clear that it could agree to neutrality as part of the settlement.
Russia, apparently, will see significant benefits only from such a world in which Ukraine assumes a reliable commitment not to join NATO. But Russia has little faith that any promise of Ukraine's neutrality will be fulfilled. Moscow has already experienced serious "somersaults" in Ukraine's foreign policy and negatively assesses the ability of the Ukrainian elite to fulfill its promises in the long term. Therefore, the Kremlin will be concerned that any future Ukrainian government that may come to power may cancel any promise of neutrality made as part of the settlement and take a line on an even more active aspiration to NATO.
Another factor may also explain Russia's pessimism about the benefits of peace: the prospect of maintaining Western sanctions after and after the end of the conflict. The United States and its allies have imposed unprecedented tough sanctions against Russia as punishment for its actions in Ukraine. And it is still completely unclear whether the United States and its partners are ready to participate in a multilateral negotiation process in which they would offer Russia a way to ease sanctions. This pessimism is reinforced by statements by some US officials that one of Washington's goals is to weaken Russia in the long term. Moscow has every reason to believe that Western sanctions are likely to remain, even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is resolved bilaterally with Kiev with the cessation of the military conflict.
US options for removing obstacles to negotiationsIn the previous section, three factors were summarized that reinforce the general rejection by the parties of the start of negotiations on the cessation of hostilities: mutual optimism about the future, resulting from a reassessment of their relative strength; mutual pessimism about peace, resulting from serious problems with commitments; and for Russia, also the lack of a clear path to easing sanctions.
These are far from the only obstacles to negotiations. However, it is on them that the United States is most able to influence through its own policies. In this section, we describe the policy options, as well as their compromises, that are available to Washington. We recognize that there are strategies that the belligerents themselves or other international players, such as the European Union, could adopt to eliminate these same obstacles. For example, Russia and Ukraine could agree to bilateral measures, such as demilitarized zones, to allay fears of a renewed conflict. The United States could encourage other States to pursue such policies. However, here we will focus on options that the United States could implement directly.
Clarifying the future in helping UkraineThe main source of uncertainty about the prospects is the relative lack of clarity on the future of military assistance to the United States and its allies in Ukraine — both the supply of weapons and the provision of intelligence.
Although the effectiveness of the Ukrainian armed forces is an important factor in their success, external military and other assistance from the West and the United States was, was, undoubtedly, a key factor. For example, American and Allied high-precision long-range multiple launch rocket systems provided to Ukraine in the summer of 2022 caused serious disruptions in Russian military logistics and resupply.
Greater clarity about the future of U.S. and allied military assistance can be used to achieve two goals.
First, if a clear long-term plan were adopted with credible delivery schedules and clear consequences for Ukraine's military potential, this could force Russia to take a more restrained position regarding the future of its military operation. The United States has already taken steps in this direction by issuing the "Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative" (USAI) and creating a component of the US European Command dedicated exclusively to providing assistance to Ukraine. But the supply of Western weapons to Ukraine has not yet become regular, and there is no transparent long-term plan for their implementation. Western aid is still largely just a reaction to Russia's actions, and thus Ukraine's future military capabilities remain uncertain. Transparent long-term plans with strong domestic and international support can minimize this unpredictability, although they may be less responsive to the changing composition of threats.
Secondly, the United States may decide to condition its future military assistance to Ukraine on its consent to negotiations. Setting conditions for assistance to Ukraine would eliminate the main source of Kiev's optimism that could contribute to prolonging the conflict: the belief that Western aid will continue indefinitely or increase in quality and quantity.
At the same time, the United States could also promise Ukraine more assistance in the post-war period to allay Kiev's concerns about the durability of peace. Washington has done so on other occasions in the past, giving Israel enormous help after it signed the Camp David Accords and a bilateral peace treaty with Egypt, ensuring that Israel's military capabilities will surpass those of its neighbors. Although this example differs in many ways from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it suggests that the United States has ways to reconcile its long-term aid commitments so as to convince its close partners of their ability to protect themselves. By doing so in this case, as well as signaling a possible limitation of assistance to Ukraine in wartime, it would be possible to dispel Kiev's excessive optimism about the continuation of hostilities and increase its confidence in the durability of any agreements on the cessation of hostilities.
Linking aid to Ukraine with its willingness to negotiate has so far been "anathema" in political discussions in the West, and there is a good reason for this: Ukraine is defending itself from Russia. However, US approaches may change as costs and risks increase. And the use of this American lever can be verified. For example, the United States could reduce aid somewhat, but not cut it sharply if Ukraine does not negotiate. And again, a decision on some "leveling" of support in anticipation of negotiations can be made in tandem with promises of a post-war steady increase in aid in the long term.
Clarifying the future of U.S. aid to Ukraine could create perverse incentives, depending on how this policy is implemented. The commitment to increase aid to Ukraine in order to reduce Russia's optimism about victory may encourage Ukrainians to obstruct negotiations, try to blame Moscow for their failures and get even more support from the West. The announcement of a reduction or "leveling" of aid to Ukraine in order to reduce Kiev's optimism about the conflict may lead Russia to see this step as a signal that the United States is weakening support for Ukraine.
If Russia understood it this way, it could continue fighting in the hope that the United States would completely abandon Ukraine. The United States should closely and impartially monitor events and focus its efforts on achieving the desired effect on the side whose excessive optimism is a key obstacle to starting negotiations.
Obligations of the United States and allies regarding the security of UkraineIn order to solve the problem of reliable commitments for Ukraine, the United States and its allies could consider identifying long-term commitments that they are willing to take on with respect to Ukraine's security if Kiev com
