How the Afghan crisis developed in 2022The transition of Afghanistan to a different state – from a State affected by conflict to a State that faces problems of post–conflict governance - has somewhat stalled.
After the Taliban movement came to power in August 2021 (banned in the Russian Federation), regular terrorist attacks are taking place in the country, organized by groups such as IG-Khorasan (banned in the Russian Federation), mainly against the Taliban and the Hazara Shiite community. Despite the obligations stipulated in the 2020 peace agreement with the United States, the Taliban have not severed ties with Al-Qaeda terrorists (banned in the Russian Federation). The Taliban's claim to dominance in the country is disputed by the armed opposition.
All this prevents the Taliban from ensuring the security of Afghanistan, gaining legitimacy and recognition of the international community.
DIVISIONS WITHIN THE TALIBANThe Taliban-led movement was divided into moderate and hardliners long before coming to power.
Since then, the split has widened and deepened. The hard-line faction, led by the leaders of the Haqqani Network (banned in the Russian Federation), holds positions. Sirad-jaddin, Anas and Khalil ul-Rahman Haqqani are hindering the attempts of the moderate faction led by Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar to make the Islamic Emirate more acceptable to the international community.
The hardline faction is supported by the head of the Taliban, Haibatullah Akhundzade, and his inner circle. The moderate faction sometimes expresses other views, but has little influence on political decisions.
Disagreements remain over who deserves to be rewarded for "winning." From time to time, open conflicts break out between supporters of the two lines. For example, changes in the Cabinet of Ministers led to clashes between supporters of Khalil Haqqani and Mullah Baradar at the presidential palace in Kabul in September 2021, as a result of which the latter was injured. The Islamic Emirate tried to hide internal differences, but contradictory statements, frequent revocation of decisions and the inability of the government to refrain from violence against persons associated with the previous regime show that there is no consensus among the Taliban.
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONSThe Islamic Emirate is implementing a two-pronged strategy that leads to gross violations of human rights in Afghanistan.
First, the Government has implemented a system of governance based on Sharia law; it contradicts the principles of democracy and freedom that the previous pro-Western Government implemented. The new policy affected ethnic and religious minorities, women, civil servants, officials and employees of the disbanded Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Taliban tracked down former ANDSF employees and government officials and harassed them. Although the Taliban announced a general amnesty, it was implemented selectively. Sometimes those who responded to the call for amnesty were subjected to extrajudicial execution immediately after being released.
Women and girls are deprived of the right to education and work under Sharia law. Educational institutions were closed, briefly reopened, and then their work was suspended again, pointing out the lack of separate rooms for boys and girls. With the exception of the professions of nurse and municipal worker, women are prohibited from doing any work. A ban was imposed on women leaving the house unaccompanied by men.
Secondly, the Islamic Emirate is trying to avoid negative publicity that could affect the prospects of its recognition by other countries. A decree was issued prohibiting the press from reporting anything negative about the new regime. Censorship has spread not only to journalists, but also to social networks. To justify the detentions and physical violence, a number of media representatives were accused of promoting Western culture, insulting the Koran and supporting the opposition.
ARMED OPPOSITIONThe Taliban used hundreds of militants to suppress armed resistance in the Panjshir Valley.
The leadership of the National Resistance Front (FTS) group fled to neighboring countries. But since then, the FNS, under the leadership of Ahmad Masood, the son of the legendary field commander Ahmad Shah Masood, has dispersed across the northern provinces of the country and continued attacks on Taliban forces. There are conflicting opinions about the success of the Federal Tax Service. The leadership of the front in social networks often claims victories in small battles. The Taliban portrays the Federal Tax Service as a marginal militant group that does not affect the situation in any way.
But the Federal Tax Service is increasingly challenging the Taliban's attempts to dominate the country. This is evident from the decision taken in August 2022 to appoint Abdul Qayum Zakir, who is responsible for efforts to counter the front, as a senior Taliban commander in the Andarab and Panjshir valleys. Ethnic divisions within the Pashtun-dominated Taliban movement also hinder the fight against the Federal Tax Service. The Tajik Taliban no longer want to fight against the front in Panjshir, their local commander deserted and joined the Federal Tax Service in May 2022.
The successes of the Federal Tax Service and the growth of anti-Taliban sentiment led to the birth of at least 22 resistance groups. Among them is the Freedom Front of Afghanistan, led by Yasin Zia, which continues to seize and hold territories in almost a dozen northern provinces. The task of these groups is to establish unity and, as an opposition to the Taliban, to receive international support, which is not available at the moment.
IG-KHORASANAfter the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, the IG-Khorasan terrorists became the toughest armed group in the country.
IS-Khorasan is rapidly gaining strength, including in the northern provinces of Balkh, Kunduz, Takhar and Mazar-I-Sharif, where the group was previously less active. Among its targets are not only the leaders of the Taliban. In September 2022, human rights defenders of the organization Human Rights Watch listed 13 armed attacks by "IG-Khorasan" on Hazara mosques and schools, in which more than 700 people died in a year.
It is worth recalling that the suicide bomber "IG-Khorasan" self-detonated near the Russian Embassy in Kabul on September 5, 2022, killing two employees of the diplomatic mission and at least six Afghans. The organization claims that it is no longer looking for random targets to raise public awareness, now it identifies specific targets and performs precise attacks against them.
The group presents itself as the only surviving anti-Western terrorist organization and is trying to actively recruit supporters of the Taliban movement. At the same time, IG-Khorasan emphasizes its multinational status, counting on the recruitment of militants from different ethnic groups. Recent propaganda materials of "IG-Khorasan" indicated that Uighur, Baluch, Tajik and Uzbek militants are involved in terrorist attacks and suicide bombings. In March 2022, a suicide bombing at a Shiite mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan, killed more than 60 people. In April and May, IG-Khorasan announced rocket attacks on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Although both countries deny that the missiles have reached their territory, the UN Security Council indicates that "the risk of such attacks remains."
A SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORISTSThe leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was eliminated as a result of an American drone strike in Kabul on August 2, 2022.
It was reported that the house in the Sherpur district, where al-Zawahiri lived, was captured by the Taliban in August 2021. The assassination of the group's leader raised questions about the future of Al-Qaeda, the prospects of its relations with the Taliban and the consequences of this incident for the global terrorist landscape. Al-Qaeda has not yet appointed a new leader, which indicates a succession crisis. Some experts called Saif al-Adel and Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi potential successors of al-Zawahiri. But regardless of who takes his post, it will be difficult for Al-Qaeda to maintain a foothold in the Afghan-Pakistani region. The killing of al-Zawahiri may force Al-Qaeda to remain dormant.
The elimination of al-Zawahiri again pointed to the Taliban's non-compliance with the Doha Agreements, according to which the movement does not allow the use of Afghan territory against the United States and its allies. After the elimination of al-Zawahiri, the Taliban predictably stated that they did not know about his presence in Kabul, and also protested against the violation of the sovereignty of the Islamic Emirate by the United States. The Taliban use the presence of Al-Qaeda to gain leverage in negotiations with the United States and the international community.
At the same time, the Taliban are pursuing a rational policy towards groups that were previously part of their network. For example, they are ready to restrict the activities of the "Islamic Movement of East Turkestan" (IDVT) in order to reduce tension in relations with China. The Taliban also facilitated negotiations between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TPP, banned in Russia) and the Pakistani government. At the same time, the Taliban movement remains ambivalent about Kashmir-oriented groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, banned in the Russian Federation) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).
Thus, a year and a half after the Taliban came to power, Afghanistan remains a hotbed of terrorist groups pursuing regional and global goals.
Measures against the extremist threat emanating from Afghanistan can be divided into several types: the counter-terrorism policy of the Taliban, measures by the United States and the international community, as well as the efforts of regional powers.
The Islamic Emirate believes that the main challenges to its dominance in Afghanistan come from the armed opposition represented by the Federal Tax Service and IG Khorasan. Therefore, the bulk of its military potential is used against these two groups. As mentioned earlier, the Taliban gave priority to operations against the Federal Tax Service.
There are two trends in the Taliban's approach to IG Khorasan. First, the Taliban fears the growing influence of the group among the opposition. For example, some cells within the "Islamic Movement of East Turkestan" (IDVT) could potentially be turned over by "IG-Khorasan". Therefore, the Taliban's military operations against the group have one goal: not to allow it to become so large that it poses a threat to the ruling regime. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported on the extrajudicial executions of at least 50 people suspected of having links with ISIS-Khorasan. Such harsh actions help the Taliban demonstrate their commitment to containing terror.
On the other hand, although the Taliban claim that they have taken the necessary measures to protect the Hazara community, it is likely that they are giving IG-Khorasan complete freedom of action against this minority. This approach reveals an extremely dangerous tendency of a selective approach to the fight against terrorism.
The US withdrawal from the country indicates a noticeable change in their approach to the problem. Washington remains committed to containing terror, which potentially threatens its own interests. Therefore, the assassination of al-Zawahiri in August 2022 is important for two reasons. Firstly, it hinders Al-Qaeda's plans to restore positions in the Afghan-Pakistani region. Al-Qaeda will have to settle for a presence in Africa and parts of Asia for now. Secondly, the promises made by the Americans to conduct "over-the-horizon operations" after leaving Afghanistan can now deter Islamist groups from concentrating under the rule of the Taliban, since Washington has promised to repeat such strikes in the future.
But the US approach remains problematic, since the US government does not attach much importance to the Taliban's ties with other regional terrorist groups. In recent months, there has been some convergence of views between the countries of the region regarding the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan. This was indicated by the statements of Pakistan, Iran and India at the UN. The press also reported that China was concerned about the Taliban's lack of intention to resist the IDWT; for this reason, Beijing suspended its plan for economic investment in Afghanistan. But in the absence of unity of goals and an agreed plan of action, the statements of these countries have only symbolic significance and are unlikely to exert strong pressure on the Taliban.
the prospectsIG-Khorasan is strengthening its position in Afghanistan due to the selectivity of the Taliban in relation to counter-terrorism activities.
Although the assassination of Ayman al-Zawahiri is a setback for Al-Qaeda, it cannot be interpreted as a fatal blow for the group.
In addition, in 2022, the Taliban continued to provide the territory of Afghanistan to other regional terrorist organizations. Most likely, the Taliban will spend most of their resources to achieve international recognition and funding, as well as to destroy the Federal Tax Service, rather than liberating the country from terror. It is important to understand that none of the Taliban's dual goals will be achieved in the short and medium term.
The international community must realize that neither the boycott of the Taliban Government nor the conduct of "over-the-horizon operations" can provide a solution to the Afghan problem. This is possible only with the creation of an inclusive Government in Afghanistan and the provision of continuous international assistance based on the principles of transparency and total accountability.
Larisa ShashokLarisa Aleksandrovna Shashok is a teacher at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
