The sides of the South Asian triangle are deformed by stressA year and a half after coming to power, the radical Islamist Taliban movement (banned in the Russian Federation) is stubbornly trying to gain international legitimacy and gain recognition from the United Nations.
At the same time, the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan still persists. And networks of paramilitary groups pursuing their own interests continue to manifest themselves on the territory of the country.
Due to the constantly tense situation in South Asia, Pakistan and India, neighboring Afghanistan, face a number of security problems.
THE GENERAL SITUATION IN A POOR COUNTRYThe Taliban is likely to continue to rule Afghanistan in the medium term.
However, it will remain unrecognized – both at the global international level and in the South Asian region. After the withdrawal of the forces of the international coalition led by the United States from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban regime that came to power had a negative impact on such areas as trade and the economy. It has also exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and human rights problems.
The revival of the Taliban's former project – the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – is causing concern on the part of Western governments. Especially considering that the leadership of the Taliban movement did not sever ties with the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (banned in the Russian Federation).
However, the return of the Taliban to power could have serious consequences for the long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since both Pakistan and India maintain ties with Afghanistan through proxies and invest in various spheres, thereby competing with each other. Both Islamabad and New Delhi are trying to anticipate the actions and influence of a competitor in Afghanistan and are actively developing a strategy to neutralize each other's achievements.
According to a World Bank monitoring study conducted in Afghanistan in March 2022, 70% of respondents say they cannot buy basic food and other necessary goods (compared to 35% in May 2021). At the same time, more than a third (37%) the population could not cover the cost of food at all.
There was also a sharp decrease in the amount of food consumed and its quality. In the fall of 2021, about 94% of Afghan residents in need of medical care could not receive it.
Despite the growth of employment in rural and urban areas (with the exception of the public sector due to the reduction of jobs in the security sector and in the government), there has been a significant drop in the income of the population in Afghanistan. It is not surprising that the Taliban regime seeks to get support for its projects in the field of economic development. Moreover, some Afghan assets worth $9 billion were confiscated and stored in American banks.
This situation gives rise to the desire of the State and the civilian population of Afghanistan to cooperate in order to bring the country out of its plight. At the same time, the Taliban are taking care that in the eyes of the international community the image of a movement desperately seeking outside support is not formed. The West is still skeptical about the intentions and goals of the Taliban, while the country's leadership is trying to pretend that it keeps the situation in the country under control.
TRIANGLE NEW DELHI-ISLAMABAD-KABULAlthough the Taliban took full control of the territory of Afghanistan, other militant groups, which along with them resisted the military presence of the international coalition forces, began to pursue their own ideological and religious interests.
Both Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AKIS) and IG-Khorasan (both organizations are banned in the Russian Federation) have their own plans for South Asia.
In addition, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan group (TTP, banned in the Russian Federation) remains active. It is supported by the Afghan Taliban, but it acts against the interests of Pakistan. Islamabad accuses India of supporting the TPP as its trusted organization and is inclined to accuse Indian intelligence of facilitating the planning and implementation of attacks on Pakistan from Afghan territory.
Relations between Afghanistan and India over the past decades can be described as positive – with the exception of the period of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001. Since August 2021, India has been reviewing the nature of its relations with Afghanistan, which is under the control of the Taliban, while at the same time offering humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. India still remembers that during the first Taliban regime in Kashmir there was a significant increase in the number and scale of terrorist attacks.
Broad segments of the Afghan population as a whole perceive India as a friendly country. The Taliban themselves do not seem to be antagonistic towards New Delhi. Over the past few decades, India has provided $3 billion in aid to Afghanistan to support water supply, road network development, healthcare, agriculture, electricity generation and education.
So far, the Taliban have not made any hostile statements against India. On the contrary, in August 2022, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, said that Afghanistan had asked India to complete development projects such as the construction of the Shakhtut dam and restore its diplomatic mission in Kabul. At the same time, the Taliban government provided India with guarantees of protection.
Pakistan has also provided financial assistance to Afghanistan for many years. But despite the support from Pakistan, foreign experts note that the Taliban are not puppets of the Pakistani government. At the same time, Islamabad is able to establish indirect control over the Taliban group through careful manipulations.
In some issues, the Taliban demonstrate a certain level of autonomy from Pakistan's policy towards India. For example, their government considers the Kashmir issue an internal matter of New Delhi. However, groups supported by Pakistan, in particular the Haqqani Network (banned in the Russian Federation), are considered to pose a threat to India's interests. Thus, Afghanistan serves as a kind of platform for interaction and counteraction of various extremist networks and regional players.
A TANGLE OF CONTRADICTIONSThe agreement concluded in February 2020 between the Taliban and the United States stipulates that the movement will not allow the interests of Washington and their allies to be harmed from Afghan territory.
At the same time, neighboring countries such as India and Pakistan, which do not quite fit the definition of US allies, feel vulnerable. Even despite the fact that at the moment there is a kind of shift in US policy towards rapprochement with India.
Vulnerability exists because Taliban-linked groups motivated by a common victory over the pro-Western regime have their own interests that they pursue in neighboring countries.
In particular, in the case of India, the activities of the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad (banned in the Russian Federation), Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent and IG Khorasan in Afghanistan create serious problems. In the case of Pakistan, the border dispute with Afghanistan along the Durand Line and the subversive activities of the TPP threaten the sovereignty of the State.
Adding to these problems is the ongoing rivalry between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. As well as Islamab's ideological proximity to the Taliban regime. As well as support from Afghanistan and Pakistan for militant groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba in their efforts to liberate Kashmir from Indian control.
New Delhi has long-term security interests and strategic interests related to Afghanistan. During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, India's interests came under intense pressure, which led to the closure of its embassy in Kabul. In the period after the events of September 11, 2001, when the United States declared war on international terrorism and overthrew the Taliban because of their support for Al-Qaeda, India reopened its diplomatic missions in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-I-Sharif and Herat.
The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 led to a completely different dynamic of trilateral relations between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, since the Taliban, who have tacit support from Islamabad, control Kabul. This infringes on the interests of New Delhi, since the most radical militant wing of the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, continues to be seen as damaging India's interests in Afghanistan (for example, attacking Sikh communities).
India is currently facing three key challenges emanating from Afghanistan.
CHALLENGES FROM AL-QAEDASeveral large paramilitary groups, such as Harakat ul-Jihad al Islami and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, joined the Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AKIS, banned in the Russian Federation), created in September 2014.
However, with the exception of collusion with the Lashkar-e-Taiba group during the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, Al-Qaeda did not participate in any major attacks in India.
Her role in this situation seems to be limited to indoctrination. For example, in June 2017, when the group announced its comprehensive strategic plan, the main focus was on the atrocities committed by the Indian Government against Kashmiris.
The leadership of Al-Qaeda called on the militants to target the Indian Security Forces (ISF). In December 2017, AKIS released a video that tells about the abuse and arbitrariness on the part of the HMB. However, in mid–2019, the HMB eliminated the group's leader Zakir Musa, and in October 2019, his successor Hamid Lelhari. This created a gap in the leadership of AKIS in implementing the strategy in Kashmir.
Despite the statement of the HMB, in March 2020, AKIS changed the name of its magazine from "Navai, Afghan Jihad" to "Navai-Gazwa-ul-Hind". Having thus emphasized that after the victory over the forces of the international coalition in Afghanistan, his attention will shift to the liberation of Kashmir.
Indeed, after the Taliban signed a peace agreement with the United States in February 2020, the authoritative ideologue of AKIS Hafiz Mustafa Abdul Karim began actively recruiting new cadres in Kashmir. Based on intelligence data, the ISB conducted major operations in Kashmir to neutralize various militant groups. In addition, the Government of India revoked the special status granted to Kashmir (in accordance with Article 370 of the Constitution of India), and also divided it into two union territories.
A large number of HMB operations, its vigilance regarding the situation on the border with Pakistan, as well as the airstrikes carried out by the service on militant training camps played a significant role in curbing AKIS activity in the state. However, a week before the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, a video message published by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri made a reference to the conflict in Kashmir.
The assassination of al-Zawahiri in July 2022 gave India time to rethink its strategy. Because at the moment it remains unclear who will become the permanent successor of al-Zawahiri and what his political orientation towards India will be.
CHALLENGES FROM IG-KHORASANThe "Islamic State" (banned in the Russian Federation) included India in its agenda long before its regional unit "IG-Khorasan" appeared in 2015.
Extremist groups such as the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Ansar-ut-Tawhid (AUT) have sworn allegiance to IS. In 2016, IG-Khorasan received a great incentive to strengthen its activities in the region after one of its key leaders, Shafi Armar, was killed.
An elite special forces fighter looks after the order at the Bangalore Airshow. Photo by Vladimir Karnozov In May 2019, ISIS announced the creation of an Indian branch of Wilayat Hind to make up for the losses in the ranks of the militants.
In response to India's repeal of Article 370 of the Constitution concerning Kashmir, Shafi Armar recruited members of local cells into the ranks of his group. At the same time, the weekly newspaper of the Islamic State "Al-Naba" published calls for attacks on Hindus living in the Persian Gulf countries.
The Wilayat Hind group caused some damage to India's internal security by attacking HMB bases and discrediting local militant groups that did not support the IG-Khorasan ideology, which views the Kashmir conflict as a religious one. However, by May 2019, the militants of Wilayat Hind and its leader Ishfaq Ahmed Sofi were eliminated by the ISB. In fact, they were destroyed before they could gain a foothold in Kashmir.
IS, in turn, has been attacking India's interests in Afghanistan. For example, by attacking a Sikh temple in Kabul and killing 25 people in March 2020. And later – two more people during another attack in June 2022.
The lack of support from Kashmiris and the high vigilance on the part of the IS has so far prevented IS from gaining a foothold in India. However, the Government of India considers the threat emanating from it as permanent.
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONSSince gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan has had strained relations with Afghanistan – with the exception of the period from 1996 to 2001, when the first Taliban regime existed.
The disputed border, which runs along the "Durand Line" (an almost unmarked 2,640-kilometer border between Afghanistan and Pakistan – the legacy of the British colonial regime), and the associated problems of Pashtun nationalism from the very beginning exacerbated the confrontation and mutual hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is worth recalling that Afghanistan voted against the recognition of Pakistan at the UN meeting in 1947 – because of the presence of a large Pashtun community on the other side of the "Durand line". The Afghan government also did not support Pakistan's claim to Kashmir.
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan decided to become an advanced ally of the United States. Now many experts agree that in order to supply the Mujahideen, the then President of Pakistan, Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, turned Pakistan into a theocratic state with the ultimate goal of making Afghanistan the fifth province of Pakistan. Since then, most Afghan rulers have been suspicious of Islamabad's ulterior motives and remain adamant in defending their sovereignty.
Despite this rejection, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan helped the Taliban establish control over Afghanistan in 1996-2001. Some Mujahideen trained on Afghan territory were sent across the border to Kashmir to liberate and separate it from India. However, the Afghan-Pakistani disagreements over the "Durand line" continued.
In the period after September 11, 2001, Pakistan reluctantly joined the United States in its "war on terrorism." This put Islamabad in an awkward position, since it had to fight the Taliban, which actually formed on Pakistani territory.
Although Islamabad acted quite flexibly in the fight against ordinary militants of the movement, the top leadership of the Taliban continued to hide in Pakistan. However, the discovery of Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad exposed the double standards that Islamabad adhered to.
Nevertheless, the Pakistani authorities facilitated the signing of a peace agreement between Washington and the Taliban in February 2020. Since August 2021, the Taliban has been in power in Afghanistan again, and Pakistan has faced two problems emanating from it.
CHALLENGES FROM TEHREEK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTANThe Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan organization was formed in December 2007 by Pashtun militants stationed along the Afghan-Pakistani border – in response to the operation of the Armed Forces of Pakistan against Al-Qaeda militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Territory (FTP).
Since then, the TTP has been fighting against the Armed Forces of Pakistan and poses a threat to the national sovereignty of the state.
Supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, the TTP continued attacks on strategically important targets in Pakistan. Faced with major attacks from the TTP, Pakistani security forces conducted two major special operations: Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 and Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017. During these offensive operations, many TTP militants were neutralized or forced to cross the border with Afghanistan.
Some members of the TTP have defected to IG-Khorasan. Others, like the head of the TTP, Nur Wali Mehsud, publicly swore allegiance to the supreme leader of the Taliban, Haibatullah Akhundzada, and stated that the TTP is an offshoot of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan.
Since July 2020, 10 militant groups opposed to the Pakistani state have teamed up with the TTP. Among them, among others, were three Pakistani branches of Al-Qaeda and four main groups that separated from the TTP earlier, in 2014.
Thus, knowing about the US plans to leave the territory of Afghanistan, the group increased the intensity of its attacks against the security forces of Pakistan, acting both from Afghan and Pakistani territory. In addition, the TTP was strengthened when the Taliban, having seized power in August 2021, opened the gates of prisons, and many of its leaders and militants were again at large.
Pakistan tried to put pressure on the TPP through its ally, one of the leaders of the Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani. And at the same time he offered a deal: if the TTP surrenders, disarms and accepts the conditions of the state, the government will grant its members a general amnesty. But during the 20-day TTP ceasefire in North Waziristan in December 2021, the government did not agree to release more than 100 militants of the group from Pakistani prisons due to fears of escalating violence.
In response, the TTP unilaterally tore up the ceasefire agreement. Since then, the intensity of the group's large-scale attacks against Pakistani government forces has increased many times. In addition, the murder of the co-founder of the TTP and its senior commander Omar Khalid Khorasani in eastern Afghanistan in August 2022, when a truce was in effect between the TTP and the army, could further exacerbate the conflict.
In this context, it is also advisable to recall the murder of the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, by a drone strike in Kabul. Acting Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub blamed Pakistan for this, saying: "According to our information, they [US drones] are entering Afghanistan using Pakistan's airspace." However, Islamabad denied this information, which led to a lack of trust and increased tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan.
In the current situation, Islamabad found itself at a crossroads. On the one hand, he does not want to lose a friendly government in Afghanistan, even though the Taliban continue to support the TPP. At the same time, Pakistan is not able to provide sufficient financial assistance or achieve international recognition of the Taliban Government. Thus, Pakistan seems to have limited leverage over the situation. And at the same time, he does not want to give up the Afghan space, as he fears that India may fill the vacuum and damage his national interests.
BORDER DISPUTEAnticipating the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the subsequent flow of refugees and militants across the border, Pakistan began to fence the disputed "Durand Line" in 2018.
The then government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani objected to this move.
Observing the continuation of the installation of fortifications, the Taliban militants began to break down the erected wall and shoot at the Pakistani border guards, which resulted in the death of several of them. In response, Islamabad said it would continue to build fortifications on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The then representative of the Taliban Defense Ministry, Enayatullah Khorezmi, condemned the construction of the wall by Pakistan as an "illegal action". He expressed the belief that the country's authorities "have no right" to divide the Pashtuns living on both sides of the border.
Moreover, in order to contain the increase in the number of TTP attacks from Afghan territory, in April 2022, Pakistan launched air strikes on TTP shelters in eastern Afghanistan, resulting in the death of dozens of civilians.
Instead of trying to control the activities of the TTP, the Taliban focused on abuses by the Pakistani authorities in this situation. Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid called the killing of civilians unjustified brutality and said that such actions by Pakistan would lead to "hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan." All these events have weakened Islamabad's influence in Afghanistan and reinforced the idea in extremist circles that the TTP attacks on the Pakistani state were somehow justified.
Given the above, it can be argued that Afghanistan has turned into a kind of battlefield between India and Pakistan, where both countries face threats of terrorism.
India denies its mediating role in the Afghan conflict, but many experts question New Delhi's claims of its own innocence.
After coming to power, the Taliban assured the UN of its determination not to allow the threat to spread from Afghan territory to other states. However, his actual inaction against the background of the desire of India and Pakistan to outwit each other on Afghan soil can be seen as an antagonistic game.
Some analysts consider Pakistan's influence on Afghanistan to be simply a desire to expand its economic presence in the region, and not to counteract India. However, New Delhi's interest in Afghanistan is obviously connected not only with the regional situation, but also due to the long-standing rivalry with Pakistan over Kashmir.
WHAT'S NEXTMilitant groups operating in Afghanistan maintain complex forms of relations, cooperating and competing at different levels, sometimes uniting for a common cause, maintaining autonomy and acting as proxies and organizations for various external players.
However, today this is a serious obstacle to the international recognition of the Taliban regime, and other extremists use this situation to achieve their goals.
India is facing challenges from Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and pro-Pakistan groups operating from Afghan territory, while Pakistan has to confront the TPP. So far, India has successfully resisted terrorist threats emanating from Afghan territory, while Pakistan continues to be attacked by TTP militants.
The influence of numerous extremist groups existing in Afghanistan has a negative impact on internal and regional security. Currently, Afghanistan is experiencing an acute shortage of food and a variety of domestic political problems.
Pakistan is facing an economic and domestic political crisis, while India is on the verge of transformation from a regional to a world power. Their mutual distrust will bring neither a secure future to any side, nor benefits and tranquility for the region as a whole.
Larisa ShashokLarisa Aleksandrovna Shashok is a teacher at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
