How not to miss the beginning of aggressionSurprise is one of the key principles of the art of war.
Its essence is to achieve success through actions that have the effect of surprise for the enemy. The factor of surprise in many situations makes it possible to paralyze the enemy's will to resist, disorganize the management of troops and defeat him even with a lack of forces and means.
Surprise often puts a tight time frame in front of the enemy to eliminate the unequal conditions that have arisen, and when using some military developments (tank breakthroughs, air and sea landings, the use of new types of weapons), surprise is a decisive prerequisite for success.
The surprise factor has manifested itself in different ways in military conflicts of the past and present. The unifying feature is that many do not believe in the real danger of war or do not want to believe until the war begins. Political and psychological explanations can be found for this phenomenon. One of the forms of psychological protection is repression, in which the traumatic factor disappears from consciousness, being displaced into the unconscious. Despite the harsh reality of impending events, many people tend to switch their minds to more pleasant events.
In situations critical for countries and peoples, statesmen and military figures need a high concentration of will to force themselves and convince society to realize the high probability, sometimes the inevitability of what seems unthinkable.
HISTORY AND MODERNITYOn June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union, the Red Army, was struck by the Nazi Wehrmacht of enormous strength.
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Andrei Kokoshin in the article "The meanness was not sudden" notes: "Although the war was by and large an expected event, the attack of Nazi Germany itself, the forms and scale of the military operations unfolding in the west of our country were characterized by a high degree of surprise – not only tactical and operational, but also strategic."
The party-state leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army the whole country was preparing for a large-scale war, and it was not unexpected in principle. Over the years, great efforts have been made in the country to develop the industry as a whole and its defense industries, to develop and manufacture weapons and military equipment. Many industries were created by overstretched labor in the first five years almost from scratch. The subject of constant concerns of the Soviet leadership was the construction of the Armed Forces, the prestige of military service, the provision of military personnel. Stalin paid great attention directly to the development of aviation, tanks, artillery.
Summing up the results of the first difficult nine months of the war, on February 23, 1942, People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin signed order No. 55, which stated: "Now the fate of the war will be decided not by such an incoming moment as the moment of surprise, but by constantly acting factors: the strength of the rear, morale, the number and quality of divisions, the armament of the army, the organizational abilities of the commander the composition of the army. At the same time, one circumstance should be noted: it was worth the moment of surprise to disappear in the arsenal of the Germans, so that the German fascist army would face a catastrophe."
The order contains relevant instructions in the projection on the military conflicts of today: not for a minute to weaken the preparation of reserves for the front, to double the capacity of the military industry so that the front receives more and more tanks, planes, guns, machine guns, ammunition. The importance of the moral factor as a source of strength and power of the Red Army is emphasized.
At the same time, it is not entirely clear why the moment of surprise in the order is characterized as "incoming". Ushakov's explanatory dictionary (1935) interprets the concept of "incoming" as "added by chance, from the outside, from the outside, an outsider." Apparently, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense in the part concerning surprise reflected the general shortcomings inherent in the views on the war in the 1930s - early 1940s, when military construction was dominated not by scientific approaches, but by decisions of state leaders laced with political considerations.
At the same time, the significance of the surprise factor is reflected in the statements of many major Soviet military leaders. Mikhail Frunze, systematizing the experience of the Civil War, noted: "The side holding the initiative, the side having the moment of surprise at its disposal, often thwarts the will of the enemy and thereby creates favorable conditions for itself." Georgy Zhukov believed that "the biggest factor influencing the success of operations is the achievement of operational and tactical surprise. Surprise is achieved mainly through two elements: deception of the enemy and impetuosity of action."
In this regard, the considerations of the authors of the article "The Military Doctrine of Russia of the XXI century" Ivan Vorobyov and Valery Kiselyov ("Army Collection" No. 1, 2009) should be recognized as justified, that the development of a unified Soviet military doctrine in the 1920s was of great importance in determining the cardinal directions of military construction. But since the mid-1930s, a number of provisions of the doctrine have been deformed, discussion on its improvement has stopped, and voluntarism has prevailed in views on the nature of the future war. For example, in the draft Field Charter of the Red Army of 1939, the following statement was formulated: "The USSR will respond to any attack by the enemy with a crushing blow with the full power of its armed Forces... We will conduct the war offensively, transferring it to enemy territory."
Overestimating their capabilities, underestimating the enemy's forces and ignoring the moment of surprise in military doctrine became one of the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Union did not take into account either its own strategic resources or the resources of potential opponents.
The author failed to find the concept of "surprise" in the strategic planning documents of the Russian Federation, which are the National Security Strategy, Military Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept. Apparently, the task of preventing surprise ("Illusions harm national security", "HBO" from 12.01.23) should be included in the list of strategic national priorities of Russia. Especially in conditions when a number of States call our country a military enemy, the risk of armed conflicts escalating into local and regional wars, including with the participation of nuclear powers, increases.
IF THERE'S A WAR TOMORROWThe current military-political situation necessitates the constant clarification of views on the theory and practice of military policy, on the preparation and armed defense of the country.
In the light of the US and NATO military development of the territory of Ukraine, the deployment of combat forces in the areas bordering Russia from the Baltic States to the Black Sea, the transfer of heavy tanks to Eastern Europe and Ukraine involuntarily recall the preparations of nazi Germany for an attack on our country in 1940-1941.
At that time, Hitler justified the transfer of tank armies, aviation and ground forces of the Wehrmacht to the East by referring to the need to rest German soldiers before landing in the UK. Today, the United States and NATO are telling the whole world about the need to "protect democracy" in Ukraine from an allegedly aggressive Russia. And after all, they managed to convince 51 countries to join their actions – to the proxy war unleashed against Russia.
And it's not just about US attempts to prolong the conflict in Ukraine and cash in on military supplies.
The transfer of troops, aircraft, armored vehicles to the borders of Russia under the legend of helping the "victim of aggression" and ensuring the security of NATO allies can also be considered as a cover for an invasion of our country. The strategy of the fascist blitzkrieg finds followers in the face of "defenders of democracy and human rights."
At the same time, the Americans will not necessarily go to the forefront of the attackers: Rather, they will retain the role of an "arsenal of democracy" and a supplier of weapons. There will be other participants of the "coalition of the willing" for the war.
Some are already conducting large-scale mobilization, training pilots to "carry" nuclear bombs to facilities in Russia and Belarus. Others are looking for a place under the American security umbrella and the cover of US nuclear safeguards.
The "go-ahead" to the beginning of the aggression will be given from Washington. They expect that the use of American tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe will not entail a strike by Russia's strategic nuclear forces on the territory of the instigator of the war. Apparently, other nuclear powers in Europe – France and the United Kingdom - are also hoping for relative impunity. The logic is simple: we do not use our nuclear weapons against Moscow, we are for what!
When it comes to the very existence of entire European states, other factors that are not provided for by the NATO charter and the mutual obligations of the member states of the alliance will come into force. There will be no united front willing to expose themselves to retaliatory strikes by Russian weapons.
The preparation of a hypothetical military conflict is still being conducted in compliance with all secrecy and precautionary measures, and the calculation is made on the suddenness and coordination of strikes along the entire front – from the northern to the southern borders of Russia.
Such plans are based on the saturation of Ukraine and the NATO border states with powerful, high-precision and long-range weapons, F-35 nuclear weapons carriers, strike and reconnaissance drones, the transfer of troops from overseas, and increasing the combat readiness of NATO forces.
Such actions should be considered as a sign of betting on a sudden aggression against Russia with the simultaneous destruction in a short time and to a great depth of the most important objects and elements of the combat order of our troops.
The enemy's plans in the transition from a proxy war in Ukraine to a sudden large-scale aggression against Russia are based on keeping real strategies and plans secret; misleading about their goals and intentions; secrecy of the location and condition of their armed forces; choosing unexpected areas of concentration; speed of maneuvering and impetuosity of actions; preemptive strikes; unexpected engagement weapons and equipment; the use of geographical features, weather, time of year and day, the study of the features of the strategic culture of the country-the object of aggression.
SURPRISE WARNINGIn order to prevent the suddenness of an attack, the Russian leadership takes the necessary precautions in advance, uses all types of intelligence, carries out strategic forecasting to reflect challenges and threats.
In military affairs, the presence of advanced reflection (modeling the likely outcomes of conceived, conceived or already developing military-political situations) creates prerequisites for the formation of offensive and defensive strategies and the choice of the most effective forms and methods of influencing the enemy.
Scientists of the Military Academy of Communications Alexander Kudryavtsev and his colleagues talk about the importance of intelligence and proactive reflection in the article "Problems of the gray zone in solving problems of assessing the geopolitical situation" (2021).
Taking into account the factor of advanced reflection in the strategy of the proxy war of the United States and NATO in Ukraine, the main strike was planned on the national consciousness of the population of Ukraine, its self-identification, and in general on the cultural and ideological sphere. Falsifications of the history of Ukraine are actively used to form Russophobic sentiments in society.
Anticipatory reflection of probable situations is system-forming for the whole complex of laws of proxy war and planning of the development of a military conflict.
It cannot be ruled out that under certain conditions, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be forced to strike back and counterattack on the prepared groups and strategically important enemy objects. In recent years, our literature has been actively discussing the issue of preventive (preemptive) actions of the Red Army in June 1941 as a hypothetical alternative to the defensive strategy that military theorists Alexander Svechin, Alexander Neznamov, Alexander Verkhovsky insisted on.
Army General Mahmud Gareev wrote: "With all certainty, we can say that, starting the first military operations, the Red Army troops would not have suffered such large losses, especially in aviation, they would have acted more organized than they managed in June-July 1941. And even in the case of unsuccessful offensive operations and counter battles, they would have the opportunity to go on the defensive in more favorable conditions. The enemy would have lost the opportunity to deliver sudden stunning blows."
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Andrey Kokoshin emphasizes: "The criminal goals of the leadership of Nazi Germany in the war against our Motherland included the destruction of the Soviet Union as a state, the seizure of its wealth and lands, the extermination of the most active part of the population… The rest of the citizens were destined for either exile to Siberia without means of subsistence, or the fate of slaves of Aryan masters."
Today, our enemies openly talk about exactly the same ultimate goals of aggression.
One conclusion suggests itself: the interests of both military and state (national) security urgently require the creation of reliable mechanisms for opening and timely suppression of aggressive actions against Russia.
Such an imperative should be reflected in the updated Military Doctrine and other strategic planning documents, accompanied by concrete measures to increase the combat capability and combat readiness of our armed Forces, strengthen the unity of the peoples of a multinational country, and actively search for reliable allies and partners.
Alexander BartoshAlexander Alexandrovich Bartosh is a corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences of Russia, an expert of the League of Military Diplomats.
