Why universal military training will not help the Russian army

Military observer Khodorenok explained why military training will not help Russia win in the conflicts of the XXI century A member of the Duma Defense Committee, Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev, proposed sending "100% of young people" to military training.

And, although there is no such bill yet, the opinions of Sobolev's colleagues on the Duma committee regarding the idea itself are divided. Military observer of the Newspaper.En" Mikhail Khodarenok analyzed the effectiveness of the proposed measures.

Recently, there have been repeated calls to improve the quality of the mobilization resource by attracting citizens of various ages to military training, but the question raised by some generals about the training of reserve servicemen should be raised much more broadly.

To begin with, it should be noted that there has not been any meaningful discussion in Russian open sources on the issues of partial or complete strategic deployment of the armed forces, the transfer of the economy from peacetime to martial law, the restructuring of state and military administration in connection with the outbreak of hostilities in recent years. And we don't have many specialists on these problems.

Recall that the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces is a set of measures and actions to transfer the army and navy from peacetime to martial law (with mobilization deployment), the creation of armed forces groups in theaters of military operations and in the interior of the country, as well as to increase the capabilities of the orbital grouping in the strategic space zone for the organized entry of the state into the war and successful conducting the first strategic operations of the initial period of the war.

For example, one of the components of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces is the transfer of the Armed Forces from peacetime to martial law (bringing the Armed Forces into full combat readiness with the mobilization deployment of troops and fleet forces and direct preparation for combat missions according to the plans of the first operations).

However, in the second half of the "zero", the word "mobilization" itself was considered very irrelevant and completely out of line with the spirit of the times. It was assumed that the peacetime army would consist only of units and formations of constant readiness and focused on fighting at best with a few irregular formations.

A prolonged large-scale war using only conventional means of destruction was not predicted by anyone and, by and large, no one was preparing for its conduct. Moreover,

At the same time, it should be noted that the process of strategic deployment, taking into account modern realities, is very, very contradictory.

On the one hand, there is no way to do without carrying out mobilization measures to one degree or another in the wars of the XXI century, or even in the conflicts of the XXII century. Let's explain this with the simplest examples.

For example, in peacetime, it is possible to mobilize the repair and restoration base of armored armament units (RVBA-BT). To call on reserve servicemen (of the relevant military accounting specialties), equip and equip this organization with everything necessary - equipment, equipment, military-technical property. However, there is absolutely nothing to do with this RVBA-BT in peacetime - there is simply no mass failure of armored weapons. People will suffer from idleness.

Or it is possible to bring into full readiness an advanced hospital base designed to receive, provide qualified and specialized medical care and treatment of the wounded and sick as part of triage, multidisciplinary, surgical, therapeutic, neurological and infectious diseases hospitals. Again, what should the staff do in peacetime? There is no flow of wounded and sick. Qualified doctors, nurses, orderlies will be idle.

Finally, it is possible to mobilize, for example, a separate evacuation battalion for the removal of military equipment disabled during battles to the assembly points of damaged vehicles for its subsequent dispatch to repair bodies. To catch up with this battalion of automobile cranes, tractors with multi-ton efforts on winches, trailers. And they will frankly have nothing to do in peacetime. There are no fights, no one needs to be evacuated anywhere.

That is, such units, units and institutions will be in demand only during the war (during a special period, as the military sometimes say). They have absolutely nothing to do in peacetime.

And these are just three examples. In fact, there are, figuratively speaking, three thousand of them. So there is no way to do without mobilization deployment in any serious military conflict of this or the next century. The whole question is just how to do it. And it should be noted that our views on mobilization have been preserved largely on the basis of the experience of the two world wars. And there have been no conceptual changes in this area over the past few decades.

There are no modern combat-ready aircraft at storage bases, just as there are no aircraft storage bases themselves today. There are no extra ships in NZ. Yes, there are no modern tanks and artillery systems. They cannot be, because even the troops of constant combat readiness are equipped with modern and promising weapons at best by 70-80 percent. And what to do with this problem is not quite clear yet.

It is possible to equip the army with shooters and rear workers, but success in modern warfare is still determined by space, high-tech intelligence, aviation, navy, electronic warfare and high-precision long-range weapons. That is, today, with what weapons the army starts the war, with that it will have to end the conflict in the vast majority of cases. This is especially true for aviation and the navy. Other weapons, as previously during the two world wars, can not be done in time.

It is important to understand that it is impossible to train highly qualified specialists who determine the combat readiness and combat capability of units and formations at any short-term training camps today. Yes, there is no corresponding material base or teaching staff for this. At the training camp, at best, you can only master the initial exercise of shooting from a machine gun and throw a hand grenade twice. But this is clearly preparation for the war of the middle of the last century (if not its beginning), when the main weapons of the army were 7.62 mm Mosin rifles of the 1891 model and 76 mm field guns of the 1902 model.

For example, flight personnel, navigators, engineering and technical personnel, specialists of other complex military accounting specialties, who in peacetime need to be trained for many years.

It is quite possible that the Reserve Army will make up 10-15 percent of the personnel of the Armed Forces. But it should be built on completely different principles than the modern stay of military personnel in reserve. The officers and non-commissioned officers of the Reserve Army should be highly motivated and be financially interested in their high professional training.

And as for various kinds of fees and initial military training, in many respects this is money for nothing, especially if we take into account the exceptionally high requirements for the military skills of soldiers and commanders of the army of the XXI century.

The armed struggle of the XXI century will take place in all environments, including space and cyberspace, and readiness for its conduct is not decided during military training.

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.Biography of the author:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.

Ru", retired colonel.

Columnist of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).Mikhail Khodarenok