Alexey Polishchuk — in an interview with TASS about the possibility of negotiations on UkraineDirector of the second CIS Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexey Polishchuk in an exclusive interview with TASS answered questions about the possibility of negotiations on Ukraine, joint actions with Belarus in case of escalation from the West, and also told why Kiev refused the Christmas truce.
— There is often talk about the need for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Ukraine, many countries offer their mediation services. However, despite all these statements, there is a feeling that so far the parties are quite far from diplomacy. How would you assess the prospects for a diplomatic settlement of the crisis around Ukraine today?— You are right, there is no shortage of offers of mediation and so-called good offices.
There are already about twenty of them. Unfortunately, not all of them are sincere and trustworthy. First of all, this applies to countries that have imposed illegal sanctions against Russia and are supplying weapons to Ukraine, thereby becoming a party to the conflict. It is unclear how this can be combined with their intermediary ambitions.
It is not easy to talk about the prospects of a diplomatic settlement now. In fact, we are not dealing with Kiev. He is a tool in the hands of the West, primarily the United States. In fact, Russia opposes not Ukraine, but the NATO-Ukrainian military-industrial conglomerate, in which Ukrainians perform the functions of an instrument of armed struggle against Russia, and the alliance countries play the role of the rear, supplier of weapons, intelligence and targeting.
I would like to remind you that the Russian side has never shied away from negotiations. At the end of February 2022, we responded to Kiev's request and by the end of March— beginning of April, after many rounds of hard work in face-to-face and video format, we reached a mutually acceptable basis for agreements. However, Kiev — clearly at the behest of the Anglo—Saxons, who were afraid of the prospect of a peaceful settlement - unexpectedly interrupted the negotiation process, leaving our proposals of April 15 unanswered.
After that, there was no development on the negotiation track. During this time, the situation has changed significantly, new regions have joined Russia. Accordingly, with the possible resumption and further progress of negotiations, new realities should be taken into account.
— Ukraine rejected Russia's initiative to cease fire on Christmas. How does Moscow assess this refusal and does it mean that Kiev is completely incapable of negotiating even on such sensitive topics?— The Kiev regime's rude and irresponsible rejection of the Christmas truce suggests that it has ceased to associate itself both with the residents of the new Russian regions, which it considers its own, and with its own citizens, whose lives and destinies are indifferent to it.
We are not surprised by this. We have eight years of experience of Kiev sabotage of the work of the contact group and the Normandy format, daily shelling of the cities of Donbass by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite the agreements reached at that time on a ceasefire for Christmas, Easter and the beginning of the school year.
We regret that international structures and Western countries, as before, condone such behavior of the Ukrainian authorities.
— US President Joe Biden claimed that his Ukrainian counterpart Vladimir Zelensky is "open to promoting peace," while official Washington has repeatedly said that it will not push Kiev to negotiate and is not ready to discuss the topic of Ukraine in contacts with Moscow. In this regard, is the Russian side ready for the fact that possible negotiations in the future will have to be conducted directly with the current authorities of Kiev?— So far, we have only communicated directly with Ukrainians, using the platforms that were kindly provided to us, which we appreciate very much.
In February — April last year, three rounds of the Russian-Ukrainian dialogue were held in Belarus and one in Turkey. Then almost daily contacts were carried out by video. These were direct negotiations with Ukrainians.
If and when these contacts resume, they will most likely also be direct. And this would be the best option, because, as practice shows, Western mediators often pursue their own goals and try to influence the course of negotiations, acting not to resolve the conflict, but in their own political and economic interests.
— Zelensky proposed to organize a global summit in winter to discuss ending the conflict in Ukraine. How do they regard such an initiative in Moscow?— This idea does not look serious, as another populist event to attract attention to Ukrainian affairs.
It confirms the inadequacy of Kiev's perception of modern realities. It is difficult to imagine how, in the conditions in which the Kiev authorities and the Ukrainian Armed Forces are today, it is possible to propose discussion at the "global summit" of such issues as the "liberation" of territories, the payment of reparations by Russia or the holding of an international tribunal against our country. The self-confidence of the Ukrainian leadership meets the best traditions of the "Quarter 95" and deserves the highest praise for humorous talents.
— Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Polish nationalists dream of taking Western Ukraine. In the Polish media, information has even appeared about the date of a possible Polish invasion of Ukraine — May 4, 2023. According to the publications, by this time the Ukrainian army will allegedly completely lose its combat capability and will not be able to fight on two fronts. Is there any data indicating that these assumptions are realistic? What information is being received about Poland's intentions in Ukraine?— In Polish nationalist circles, imperial ambitions are indeed alive.
They remember the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth "from sea to sea", they dream of returning the so-called historical Polish lands, including those that were transferred to Soviet Ukraine at one time.
For many years, the Polish leadership has been striving to create its own sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, primarily in Ukraine. Whoever has been in power in Poland since the early 1990s, the Polish cultural and economic expansion in Ukraine has not stopped. After 2014, it acquired a military-political dimension. Warsaw worked through NATO and the EU's Eastern Partnership, invested in new projects — the Three Seas Initiative and the Lublin Triangle.
In Poland itself, this course is fueled by the efforts of state propaganda. For example, at one time there was a train running near the Polish-Ukrainian border, on which one could see the contours of the pre-war Polish state, which included Western Ukrainian lands. Now on the pages of the Polish passport, Lviv and Vilnius can be found among the "historical Polish cities".
After the start of the special military operation, Poland, acting as a transit hub for Western weapons, moved to more active development of Western Ukrainian lands, implementing a whole range of political and military measures. Of course, such aspirations of Warsaw cannot but cause concern from the point of view of regional security.
— Belarus is increasingly paying attention to the threat to this country from NATO. Minsk accuses Poland of plans to assert its rights to the Belarusian territories, strike or provoke an escalation. How do you assess these risks? To what extent are Moscow and Minsk unanimous in their assessments of the situation? Is the Union State ready to respond to such challenges?— Indeed, in recent years, NATO has been building up strike units on the borders of the Union State, primarily in Poland and the Baltic States.
It is presented as if we are talking about preventive actions aimed at stopping certain threats from our side. At the same time, if earlier it was said about the alleged temporary deployment of alliance forces on a rotational basis, today no one hides that the Western military came there for a long time. It is fundamentally important that it is NATO that brings the military infrastructure closer to the borders of the Union State. We are forced to react and respond adequately to such unfriendly steps.
As for the talk about Polish rights to Belarusian lands, the reminders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth "from sea to sea" and its "eastern borders", of course, cannot but worry not only Belarus, but also Russia as its closest ally. Despite the fact that such statements are mostly made by Polish political scientists and experts, they do not contribute to defusing the already tense situation in the region.
How great are the risks of provoking escalation and strikes from Poland against Belarus is a question for military analysts. Let me just remind you that Russia and Belarus form a single defense space and are bound by corresponding obligations. Any attempts to launch such strikes are doomed to failure. The western borders of the Union State are reliably protected by the armed forces of Belarus and the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional grouping of troops.
In the current military-political situation, since October last year, additional contingents of this group have been deployed on the Belarusian territory, combat coordination events, exercises and maneuvers have been held. They are defensive in nature, aimed at ensuring the security of the Union State and are designed to discourage our potential opponents from escalating and provoking. We have a complete understanding with our Belarusian allies on this issue.
— The topic of Belarus' possible involvement in the Ukrainian conflict is being discussed in the Western media. How can you comment on such publications? Are there any scenarios in which this can become real?— In November 2021, the updated Military Doctrine of the Union State was approved.
It is exclusively defensive in nature, but assumes that the use of military force against any participating State is considered an encroachment on the Union State as a whole. Our countries have similar obligations on mutual support in the event of external aggression within the framework of the CSTO.
In other words, from a legal point of view, the use of military force by the Kiev regime or the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the territory of Belarus or Russia are sufficient grounds for collective retaliatory measures. At the same time, their adoption remains at the discretion of the political and military leadership of the two countries. The determining principle is the expediency of the use of joint forces and the proportionality of a common response to the threats that arise in a particular situation.
In addition to participation in military operations, there are other forms of allied support. First of all, this is military-technical cooperation, which, and it's no secret, is at the highest level between Moscow and Minsk. Our countries carry out mutual supplies of weapons and components for the production of military equipment, cooperate in border protection issues, and increase the combat capability of the unified Russian-Belarusian air defense system.
President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has repeatedly spoken about his readiness to give a tough response in case Ukraine strikes on Belarusian territory and other aggressive provocations. This is the sovereign right of the republic to defend its territory by all available means, and Minsk can count on Russia's full support in this.
— President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko said that the military of Russia and Belarus are preparing as a single army as part of the deployment of a regional grouping. When will the formation of the unified defense space of the Union State be completed? Is it possible to form a unified command?— It is better to ask this question to the Russian and Belarusian military, who, no doubt, are more deeply immersed in the topic.
For my part, I can say that the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State provides for a joint defense policy, coordination in the field of military construction and development of the armed forces, joint use of military infrastructure and the adoption of other measures to maintain the defense capability of the Union State.
The most important joint decisions in the military sphere are made by the Supreme State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Union State. In addition, joint meetings of the governing structures are held by the security councils, the Ministries of Defense and the general staffs of the two countries. They coordinate on a daily basis at the working level, including on the activities of the joint Regional grouping of Troops and the Unified Regional Air Defense System. The Border Committee of the Union State also functions. The work of these joint bodies, together with mutual obligations in the event of external aggression, largely forms the unified defense space of the Union State.
— What are the goals of the Union State in 2023?— The main goal, without exaggeration, remains the further development of the integration construction of the Union State, the strengthening of its institutional and contractual legal framework.
The key task for the current year is to achieve full implementation of the "Main directions for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State for 2021-2023" and 28 sectoral union programs approved by the Supreme State Council in November 2021. This will make it possible to advance in the formation of a single economic space and stimulate cooperation in the economic sphere.
To date, the relevant departments of Russia and Belarus have managed to achieve significant results in this. At the meeting of Alexander Lukashenko with the Secretary of State of the Union State Dmitry Mezentsev on January 9 in Minsk, it was announced that seven union programs and 68% of 989 integration measures were fully implemented. In many ways, the regulatory framework for regulating economic activity in Russia and Belarus has been synchronized. A unified system of traceability of goods has been launched, control systems in the field of veterinary and phytosanitary have been combined. The Interstate Coordination Center for Customs Issues has started its work. The next step is the introduction of a unified system for the administration of indirect taxes and the establishment of a supranational Tax center.
This year, it is also necessary to agree on a new package of decisions on deepening union integration for the next three—year period - from 2024 to 2026. Its elaboration at the government level is actively underway. Joint proposals must be submitted for approval to the supreme bodies of the Union State.
— Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova Nicolai Popescu said that he sees no practical need for his country to remain in the CIS, and noted that internal discussions on this matter are currently underway in the country. What is the risk for Moldova of leaving the CIS and how realistic does this prospect look for Moscow? And how, in turn, can Chisinau's decision to withdraw affect the Commonwealth?— Indeed, official Chisinau has actually suspended work within the CIS at the moment, evades participation in meetings of the Commonwealth bodies.
It is significant that in 2023, the Moldovan city of Comrat, the capital of Gagauzia, was supposed to become the cultural capital of the CIS, but, unfortunately, at the end of 2022, the Moldovan leadership refused this.
Talks about the possibility of Moldova's withdrawal from the CIS began after pro-Western forces came to power in the country. However, so far the Moldovan leadership has not taken practical steps in this direction. It is obvious that Chisinau is aware of the real socio-economic benefits of participating in the Commonwealth. First of all, we are talking about visa-free regime, free trade zone, labor, social and other preferences for migrant workers. In addition, it should be taken into account that about 25% of Moldova's trade turnover is accounted for by the CIS countries.
That is why the leaders of the republic speak of the need for a pragmatic approach that takes into account the hundreds of treaties in force in the CIS. We hope that this approach will prevail, and Moldova, in the interests of its own citizens, will remain in the Commonwealth and resume participation in the work of its bodies.
— The director of the Information and Security Service of Moldova, Alexander Mustatse, recently in an interview with TVR Moldova, made the statement that Moscow would inevitably "launch an offensive" on the republic in order to unite with Transnistria. How would you comment on such statements?— Usually, the position of high-ranking leaders implies a responsible attitude to public statements.
It is noteworthy that at the same time as the statement you mentioned, directly opposite assessments about the absence of any threats to the Republic of Moldova from Russia were made both by the Moldovan leadership, including the president and the chairman of the Parliament, and by the leadership of NATO and neighboring states with Moldova.
— Earlier, the head of Pridnestrovie Vadim Krasnoselsky said that the possibility of holding an informal meeting of participants in the "5+2" format is being discussed. Are there consultations with the participants of the format on the organization of such a meeting? When can the work of the "5+2" negotiation format be unfrozen? Is there any interest of other parties in this?— Today, the work of the "5+2" negotiation format on the Transnistrian settlement, in which Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE are mediators, and the EU and the USA are observers, is "on pause".
It is still premature to talk about contacts within its framework.
— What retaliatory measures does Moscow intend to take because of the suspension of broadcasting of Russian-language TV channels in Moldova? Has Russia already sent a request to international organizations demanding to understand this situation and is there any chance at all to get a clear answer from them?— The Russian Foreign Ministry has already assessed such a decision by the Moldovan authorities.
I repeat: we consider this an unprecedented act of political censorship, a violation of the principle of media pluralism, and the deliberate deprivation of millions of Russian-speaking Moldovans of sources of news content in their preferred language. We are seeking, including in international organizations, a proper assessment of this lawlessness and the lifting of these restrictions.
Speaking about possible retaliatory measures, it is necessary to understand that Moldovan citizens are not strangers to us. The introduction of such measures will further complicate cultural, humanitarian and human contacts between the peoples of our countries. This is exactly what the external forces that are pushing Moldova to break ties with Russia are trying to achieve. We constantly urge our Moldovan colleagues not to follow their lead.
As for appeals to international structures, we constantly use their platforms to draw attention to our concerns about the violation of rights and freedoms both in Moldova and in other countries. The Russian Foreign Ministry regularly sends reports "On the human rights situation in certain countries of the world" to international human rights structures. Another such report is being prepared and will soon be published. As far as we know, Moldovan and Russian public organizations also apply to multilateral structures.
Unfortunately, in many international associations there is a dominance of representatives of Western countries who sin by double standards and do not differ in objective assessments. It is not necessary to wait for an impartial reaction from them. Despite this, we do not stop our efforts to draw attention to the situation with media freedom in Moldova.
