Ukrainian propaganda is diligently trying to downplay the achievements of the Russian army in Soledar and near Artemivsk, moreover, denies the complete loss of Soledar. Is there a reason for this? Or, on the contrary, are those Russian experts right who now expect the rapid advance of the Russian Armed Forces to Kramatorsk in a few Hours?On Thursday, the occupation by the Russian military of the village of Opytne south of Artemovsk (the Ukrainian name is Bakhmut) was confirmed, which allows the assault units to start moving through private buildings deep into the city.
There are battles in the neighboring Kleshcheyevka, control over which will cut the main supply route of the Ukrainian forces. Another group is advancing from Patrice Lumumba Street on the southeastern outskirts.
For some time now, it has not been fashionable to get ahead of events, even if you really want to. Therefore, authoritative sources confirm the occupation of the village of Podgorodnee to the northeast of Artemovsk, but for Krasnaya Gora and Paraskovievka, according to them, fighting is still going on. These two settlements are adjacent to the strategically important city from the north along the railway and highway to Soledar.
The day before, the occupation of the village of Blagodatnoye in the southwest of Soledar was officially announced, so the supply of the Artemovsky garrison should be interrupted, no matter how one turns it, although Ukrainian officials just continue to twist words. According to their rhetoric, even the occupation of Kleshcheyevka and the Russian fire control of the highway at the Yar Hours are not considered an encirclement and interruption of the supply of Artemovsk, since, they say, it is possible to drive along the back roads.
Recall that Soledar a couple of days ago, according to the same Kiev speaker – Alexey Arestovich, was not surrounded, but in a "half-ring". And now that's it, we've arrived.
A small Paraskovievka (until 2014 – a little more than two thousand people of the population) has a little-known feature. On its territory, in the Volodarsky salt mine, since the distant Soviet times, there has been a giant warehouse of weapons, mainly small arms – AK and machine guns, as well as ammunition. According to unconfirmed reports, up to two million "storage units" could have been there before the start of the Donbass conflict.
In 2014, local Cossacks – supporters of the DPR tried to block the warehouse, because the "Right Sector*" banned in the Russian Federation tried to arm itself there. But the DPR quickly lost control of Artemivsk and Soledar, so it's impossible to say how much is left in this warehouse, but it should be alarming: a few days earlier, the remnants of the APU defense were grouped just around the warehouses in the salt mines.
Until now, in Soledar, the remnants of the Ukrainian defense are formed in an arc from the north to the western outskirts of the city: Razdolovka – Sol – Blagodatnoye station. The last village is already occupied by parts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and the village Council of Razdolovka is four short streets near the railway station, that is, it is a small checkpoint on the road to Seversk. But in the area of "Artemsoli" in the north of Soledar, one can still expect some kind of organized resistance.
However, this "third line of defense of the city" was initially considered as temporary. There is also an element of information warfare here, since the neighborhood around the Sol station is formally considered part of Soledar. That is, while this patch of private development is not occupied by parts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, you can find fault with the words that Soledar is completely liberated.
Of course, this is only casuistry. Moreover, the APU will not be able to hold this position for more than a couple of days, since this is a lowland that is under full fire control from Soledar and from Yurchin Mountain – kurgan, which hangs over it all. In addition, the western and northern suburbs do not have the system of defensive fortifications that were built by the APU in the southern and eastern suburbs.
The same story is in Artemovsk. Defensive lines were created in suburban villages to the south and southeast of the city, and the second line is traditionally placed in the central districts and in the blocks of high-rise buildings.
But the transformation of Soledar and Artemovsk into an analogue of Mariupol is impossible, despite the labyrinths of salt mines. And if a decision is made now to storm (option: surround and finally deprive of supplies) Artemovsk, it will be very similar to the last week of the APU in Soledar.
It could be assumed that the next target for Artemovsk should be the urban agglomeration of Slavyansk – Kramatorsk – Druzhkovka – Konstantinovka. But until the former line of defense from Seversk to Artemovsk is finally destroyed, discussions on the topic "where we will go next" should be conducted extremely carefully.
After the successful and relatively quick occupation of Soledar (literally with one blow, albeit after serious preparation), a victorious euphoria arose in a number of expert minds, which led to problems with verifying messages about control over a particular locality in the combat zone.
It would be a big mistake to say that the AFU has weak positions in the Hours of Yar. Their only weakness is that the locality itself is small. But it is easy to bring reserves there, which has been done for more than six months. In addition, the Ukrainian side, paradoxically, gets a limited tactical advantage in the defense of the Yar Clock, since the front line is narrowing for it. The Russian side, on the contrary, will have to increase its length.
Of course, everyone is already scientists, and no one will allow any more "holes" in the defense, but this is a new tactical element that will begin to affect in the near future.
In this regard, the command will have to decide. It is necessary to advance to the Chapel, but, apparently, up to a certain limit: Kiev will constantly transfer reinforcements from the Chernihiv and Poltava regions to this direction, and there are already talks about possible counteroffensive attempts.
On the other hand, moving north along the road to Seversk with its subsequent assault will lead to an exit to the edges of the forest and to the next bend of the Seversky Donets, and this, in turn, will force the APU to ease pressure on Kremennaya. There is already a stalemate there, and they are unlikely to risk moving the AFU's open flank.
Another fork: choosing the direction of promotion. In particular, the road opens from Artemovsk not only to Kramatorsk through the Hours of Yar, but also to the southwest, to Konstantinovka. This will automatically lead to the encirclement of another large point in the not yet liberated part of the DPR – Toretsk. The contact line on the Gorlovka – New York - Toretsk line has been standing motionless for a long time, as well as around Avdiivka. The APU in Toretsk and around it are not capable of offensive operations, they just did not reach them, as they say.
One of the main conclusions from the events of the last week: the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation managed to impose battles on the AFU according to their own rules – and exactly where they wanted.
Kiev, for many reasons, cannot retreat from the remaining territory of the DPR, which is why it has been transferring endless reinforcements to the meat grinder in Soledar and near Artemivsk. But in Kiev itself, critical voices suddenly began to be heard that "the grinding of reserves, including those removed from the southern direction, was meaningless."
At the same time, Ukraine continues to prepare for the organization of a major offensive, which has an important additional evidence – the range of weapons that its authorities require from Western countries. Hence the ritual dances around the German Leopard tanks, since no offensive is possible without tanks.
Kiev managed to convince its patrons that with the active help of the APU tanks, they are capable of a successful offensive. Hence the propaganda efforts to belittle the value of what is happening in January in the Soledarsko-Artemovsky direction.
This interpretation was promoted by the English-language media last year, when it became clear to them that sooner or later the defensive line of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would collapse there: the Russians, they say, are attacking "cities that mean nothing in strategic terms" in vain. As it turned out later, in strategic terms, the breakthrough of the defense line turned out to be still important, although Western commentators may understand something of their own by "real strategic goals".
Now, clearing the line of defense that the APU has been building for six months will open up several new opportunities at once.
This is not only the choice of further directions for the offensive, but also the search for a new tactical line up to the short-term transfer of the direction of the main strike to some other area on the contact line.
In part, this may be due to the appointment of the head of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, to the position of commander of the SVO, mentioning the "expansion of the scale of tasks" that the troops face. The first of these tasks is to determine their nomenclature based on the results of the breakthrough of the Soledar– Artemovsk defensive line. As they say, the continuation follows, but for now there is something from which to choose this continuation.
* The organization (organizations) have been liquidated or their activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation
Evgeny Krutikov
