FA: The West will have to cooperate with the Kremlin to avoid a war between Russia and NATOThe West should prepare for a protracted conflict with Russia, according to the authors of the article for Foreign Affairs.
He needs to develop a strategy that will both support Kiev and maintain relations with Moscow, preventing a large-scale confrontation.
Ivo Daalder, James GoldgeierWhenever the United States faces a foreign policy crisis, critics say that the U.S. government does either too much or too little.
It's the same with Ukraine. Many blame the Biden administration for not providing Ukrainian forces with heavy weapons, mainly tanks, long-range missiles and combat aircraft, which these critics say are necessary to drive Russian troops from Ukrainian soil. Others, concerned about the continued power of the West and the growing human and economic costs of the conflict, call on the administration to put pressure on Kiev to reach a peace agreement with Russia, even if it means giving up part of Ukrainian territory.
Both of these positions are unconvincing. The Ukrainian army surprised everyone with its ability to defend the country and even win back part of the territory that Ukrainians lost at the beginning of the conflict. But expelling Russian troops from its entire territory, including Crimea, will be extremely difficult, even with greater military assistance from the West than now. Achieving such an outcome will require the defeat of a heavily entrenched and fortified Russian defense and risks starting a direct war between NATO and Moscow. That is, the scenario of the end of the world that no one needs. Russian President Vladimir Putin shows no signs that he is ready to give up his imperial dream of controlling Ukraine. And it will be just as difficult to convince the Ukrainian government to cede territories to the occupying forces in exchange for an unreliable peace. Given that both warring parties have serious motives to continue fighting, a third outcome is much more likely: a protracted, exhausting conflict that is gradually freezing on the line of contact, which does not suit either side.
The idea that wars always end either in victory or in a negotiated settlement is confirmed by history and, of course, by the presence of numerous frozen conflicts along Russia's borders. And Ukraine itself is a vivid example of this. The fighting in the Donbass for eight years was just such a frozen conflict that led to a full-scale Russian military operation in Ukraine, which began in February 2022. The current phase of the military confrontation may be no different: after more than ten months of fierce fighting and months of punitive strikes by Moscow on Ukrainian facilities, the Ukrainian government will not accept Russian control over any part of its territory. But Russia is also very unlikely to voluntarily give up the Ukrainian territory, which it considers its own.
Until now, Washington and its allies have quite justifiably focused on the urgent tasks of helping Ukraine and preventing the escalation of hostilities. But there is also an urgent need to consider a longer-term perspective on the development of the conflict and develop a policy towards both Russia and Ukraine, based on the emerging reality, which is that the fighting is likely to continue for quite a long time. Instead of believing that the confrontation can be ended with victory or negotiations, the West needs to reflect on a situation in which the conflict continues, but neither victory nor peace is expected. Western states and their allies will need to continue to provide Ukraine with military support to defend against further Russian attacks and deter Russia's larger ambitions by maintaining economic sanctions and diplomatically isolating it. And they will need to ensure that the conflict does not escalate. At the same time, the West will need to lay a long-term foundation for security and stability in Europe. This will require Kiev's full integration with the West in developing a deterrence policy that focuses both on preventing a Russian offensive and on involving Moscow in efforts to prevent the conflict from escalating into a larger military confrontation, which no one wants. Balancing the policy towards Ukraine with the policy in the Russian direction will be a difficult task for the West in the long term. However, both of these areas will be of crucial importance for the future of European security.
No victory, no peace
The military conflict in Ukraine was full of surprises. Despite the Biden administration's public disclosure of intelligence data indicating Moscow was preparing for a special operation, many were stunned that Russia used more than 175,000 troops to attack a neighboring country that "did not cause it any threat to its security." And even for those who expected a full-scale conflict, events did not go as expected: many were surprised that Russia failed to quickly seize control of Ukraine and overthrow its government.
Contrary to the expectations of many, the Russian armed forces demonstrated weak and imperfect planning, errors in communications and logistics, which allowed the Ukrainian forces, which were significantly inferior in numbers and armament, to restrain the Russian offensive on Kiev. And then, with the help of Western military and intelligence assistance on a scale unimaginable before February, Ukraine surprised the world by changing the course of the conflict over the summer and regaining about half of the territory it lost during Moscow's initial offensive. At the same time, the West was able to deliver a crushing economic blow to Russia with amazing determination and unity of purpose. Particularly noteworthy was Europe's willingness to end its dependence on Russian fossil fuels at a price that many expect European governments are unlikely to agree to.
Although in the early autumn of 2022, the Ukrainian forces were able to achieve some success and are not going to stop fighting, in the last months of the year, the dynamics of the conflict have changed again. Ukraine enters 2023 largely defeated, including due to Russia's incessant missile strikes on its energy system and other infrastructure. A huge number of Ukrainian military and civilians were also killed. However, unlike the first 10 months of the conflict, there will probably be no significant changes in the current lines of confrontation in the coming months, and Russian drone strikes on Ukraine's infrastructure have only strengthened Ukrainians' resolve to resist.
But it will be increasingly difficult for Kiev to break through the Russian defense with acceptable human and material losses. Ukrainian forces could possibly continue to conduct offensives in certain directions, for example, in the south towards Melitopol and the Sea of Azov. But until the Russian defense collapses completely, Kiev will not have enough strength even to hold on to its possible achievements for a long time without exposing itself to Moscow's dangerous counterattacks elsewhere.
Since autumn, Western strategists have tried to pre-empt the military confrontation in Ukraine in two ways. Some of them, for example, the leaders of the Baltic countries, stubbornly urged the West to arm Kiev with a large number of heavy weapons that would be required to expel Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory. Others, including Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that Ukraine's political leaders consider the possibility of resolving the conflict through negotiations. Although this will not lead to a complete victory for Kiev, it will at least put an end to the fighting.
Certain limits are beginning to be seen in the volume of military assistance and weapons that Washington and its allies will be ready to provide to Ukraine. Part of these restrictions stems from the fact that even the United States is running out of excess capacity to support Ukraine. Take artillery shells. Last year, Ukraine produced as many of them in a week as the United States can produce in a month. More advanced weapons are also lacking. In October, Germany supplied Ukraine with modern IRIS-T air defense systems. But it turned out to be difficult for the Germans to supply them with the number of anti-aircraft missiles that Kiev needs to maintain effective air defense. Given the massive military assistance that the West has already provided to Ukraine and the reduction of its own arsenals, NATO is likely to supply Kiev with significantly fewer weapons during the next six months of the new year than in the last six months of last year.
In addition to restrictions on the number of supplies, Washington and its allies do not send Kiev some more complex types of weapons, since they require careful training and may end up in the hands of Russia if used on the battlefield. Fighters from the F-16 to newer generation models belong to the first category. The second category includes sophisticated drones, such as the Grey Eagle, which, once in the hands of Russian troops, will give Moscow important information about US military capabilities and technologies.
In addition, there is a great danger of escalation. Moscow has repeatedly warned Washington not to send long-range missiles to Ukraine, including the MGM-140 army tactical missile system, or ATACMS, which has a range of 300 kilometers and can strike from Ukraine deep into Russian territory. US President Joe Biden has consistently rejected calls to send these high-performance missiles to Ukraine, arguing that this will lead to a split of NATO and risk provoking a direct military confrontation with Russia, and even World War III. These concerns can be easily dismissed, as many experienced observers do. But it is extremely important for Washington to take the risks of escalation seriously. The administration must constantly weigh the risks associated with the consequences of too much aid to Kiev, including the possibility that Moscow may use tactical nuclear weapons in response. The undeniable reality is that there is a clear internal limit to how much the interests of Ukraine and America overlap in response to Russia's actions.
Of course, the Pentagon and the White House are constantly reviewing Ukraine's needs and what the United States can do to meet them. Some systems excluded from the supply list at the beginning of the conflict, including long-range artillery and advanced air defense systems such as Patriot, have now been sent to Ukraine. More recently, the same change has affected armored vehicles, as the United States and France have agreed to supply Kiev with armored fighting vehicles and light tanks. But although these weapons and equipment can probably help Ukraine, they are unlikely to change the balance of forces on the battlefield enough to end hostilities.
If a complete military victory of Ukraine is unlikely in the near future, then the prospects for a negotiated peace seem even more remote. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated his readiness to "agree with all participants in this process on some acceptable results," he is clearly disingenuous. Putin has always preferred to discuss his territorial goals directly with the United States rather than engage in serious relations with the Ukrainian leadership. Moreover, he continues to insist that the four Ukrainian regions that Moscow illegally annexed in September, together with Crimea, which it received in 2014, are an integral part of Russia. Vladimir Zelensky, for his part, said that Kiev would never accept any Russian claims to the territory of Ukraine and that for final peace it would be necessary to recognize the borders of Ukraine of the 1991 model. No amount of persuasion from the West will change the position of Zelensky, who enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian public – despite the extraordinary suffering that the conflict has brought to Ukrainians, and perhaps because of these sufferings.
The best game is the game "for a long time"
Since achieving complete victory or concluding peace through negotiations is unlikely in the near future, the Ukrainian military conflict will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian defenses in the east and south are being strengthened along the 1,000-kilometer front line, which now separates Russian and Ukrainian forces. Both sides will try to find weaknesses in the enemy's defense, but if neither of them suffers a more significant collapse, the line of confrontation will most likely remain more or less where it is. The depletion of material resources and the shortage of personnel can even lead to long pauses in hostilities, which can contribute to the achievement of ceasefire agreements, even if they are temporary. Not all wars end. And not all of them end in peace. The Korean War ended with an armistice, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War led to "disengagement agreements", which in the case of Israel and Syria still remain in force. Moreover, Russia is no stranger to living with frozen conflicts, including in Georgia and Moldova.
If Ukrainians face such a bleak future — that is, a situation in which a state of military conflict persists with or without intense fighting — the West will need a multi-vector long-term strategy that would not imply indifference to the future of Ukraine or refusal to contact Russia on issues of mutual interest. Although it is difficult for the West to imagine cooperation with Putin and his regime now, in the long run it may not have much choice. Putin is, of course, weakened by the failures in this conflict, but he has usefully spent the previous 22 years consolidating his power to ensure that no one can successfully challenge him. A revolution from below is also unlikely, given Moscow's ability to control the Russian people. And even if Putin is removed from power, his successor may well be someone who shares his vision of a Great Russia and, perhaps, even believes that he was not tough enough.
Moreover, despite Putin's rigidity, both Kiev and Washington have continued to maintain direct contacts with Moscow since the beginning of the conflict. Ukraine and Russia were negotiating an exchange of prisoners. With the assistance of Turkey and the UN, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement on grain exports, which was largely implemented. And the United States and Russia have agreed to exchange prisoners: American basketball star Brittney Griner for Russian "arms dealer" Viktor Bout. In the strategy of a long conflict, the West will need to strengthen such contacts, even if there are very few points of contact with Russia.
In order to develop an effective approach to resolving the protracted conflict, the West must also continue to provide Ukraine with sufficient support to protect the territory it currently controls and, if possible, to liberate new regions. The United States and NATO countries need to commit to security in order to provide Ukraine with the weapons necessary to defend against Russia in the long term, just as the United States has done with Israel for decades. Washington, together with its allies, should also work to increase the prospects of the EU membership promised to Kiev, while at the same time dealing with the issue of possible NATO membership.
Meanwhile, Western leaders need to get back to the business of containing the Russian threat. This will require maintaining all the financial, trade and economic sanctions that they have imposed since Russia first entered Ukraine in 2014. And this means the need to do everything possible to prevent Moscow from accessing the technologies necessary to support its economy, including in the defense sector.
An effective long-term deterrence policy will require further political isolation of Russia. Moscow's exclusion from sports and cultural events helps to ensure this isolation, as does the vote in the UN General Assembly, demonstrating the lack of support for its illegal special operation in Ukraine. But even more concerted Western efforts are needed to demonstrate to the countries of the Global South that an alliance with Moscow — or even just non—alignment - ultimately undermines the foundations of peace and security on which the international order is based. This does not mean ensuring that all countries of the world follow the economic policy of the West against Russia. This means convincing them that Russia is guilty and that its behavior is the main cause of their economic woes. As part of these efforts, Washington and its Western partners can do much more to overcome the food, energy and economic crises that have arisen as a result of Russia's unprovoked actions — starting with debt cancellation and providing food aid to the most needy countries of the world.
Finally, defending against Russia will require the West to maintain a strong deterrent position regarding not only its military threats, but also threats to Western institutions and communities. This means that Europe will have to increase its defense spending more than it has already increased in response to Russian actions since 2014. The US will have to maintain a significant presence in Europe even as it pays more and more attention to China's challenges in the Pacific region. In addition, NATO and EU countries need to step up their individual and joint efforts to prevent Russian interference in their elections and to respond decisively to economic blackmail, political actions and other forms of hybrid warfare. Although some of the Russian armed forces have been destroyed in Ukraine, Moscow remains a serious threat to the West.
However, along with containing Russia and its political and economic isolation, the West will also need to maintain channels of communication with the Kremlin in order to avoid a direct war between Russia and NATO and maintain strategic stability. With the continuation of intense hostilities in Ukraine, broad negotiations between the West and Russia are unlikely to be possible. But, as in the last cold war, there may be opportunities for both sides to take confidence-building measures that can help avoid a confrontation that neither of them wants. One of the important steps could be the beginning of negotiations on the extension of the new START treaty, which expires in 2026, and which provides for intrusive verification and exchange of information on nuclear weapons available to both Russia and the United States.
Restraining Russia, strengthening Europe
For the United States and its partners, a long-term strategy to contain Russia is hardly a new idea. After all, the West pursued such a policy towards the Soviet Union for four decades before it led to the "meltdown" of Soviet power that diplomat George Kennan spoke about when he created his "containment strategy". But during the Cold War, especially after the 1962 Caribbean crisis, the United States also used diplomacy to avoid the worst outcome in the form of an all-out nuclear war. Even President Ronald Reagan, who criticized detente for giving too much to the Soviet Union, supported maintaining diplomacy in relations with the USSR in the darkest moments before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. For example, right after the Soviet Union shot down a South Korean civilian airliner in 1983.
As in the case of his Soviet predecessors, Putin must be deprived of the opportunity to expand his "evil empire". But Russia will not disappear from this. The West needs a policy on Kiev and Moscow. He can't afford to have a relationship with one of them and not have one with the other. For the West, a free Ukraine is important. And imperial Russia remains a threat to Europe. Neither the "containment" nor the "involvement" of Moscow in itself is enough to protect the West and avoid a larger conflict.
Even a non-imperial Russia focused on itself will have its own security interests. All states have them. And if the West recognizes this, it will not mean its weakness. Russia does not need "security guarantees," as French President Emmanuel Macron said about them in December. But for Russia, from the point of view of ensuring its legitimate interests, it is quite natural to protect its internationally recognized borders, which must be respected. Of course, Moscow can protect itself with its own nuclear deterrent capability, but it is interested in reducing the military buildup, and, consequently, in reducing the possibility of undesirable escalation along the border between NATO and Russia. Just as the West wants it.
In the end, both the West and Russia will have to accept some version of the agreements concluded by the United States and its allies with the Soviet Union between 1975 and 1990 in order to prevent the worst consequences and ensure greater stability in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 obliged all parties to recognize the existing borders and seek to change them only by peaceful means. The Vienna Document, signed in 1990 and updated periodically in subsequent years, was a set of confidence-building measures that limited military action, provided for the exchange of information on military stocks and required prior notification of significant troop movements. The verification and inspection provisions stipulated in this document were designed to exclude the possibility that any country could resort to large-scale use of military force without prior notice.
It is most likely impossible to reach such agreements now. They may not be possible at all while Putin is in power, although the West should consider such options. However, they remain the only viable means of interacting with Russia in the long term, even though Washington is defending itself and helping Ukraine defend itself in a conflict that promises to be long and difficult.
Ivo Daalder is President of the Chicago Council on Global Issues. From 2009 to 2013, he was the US Ambassador to NATO.James Goldgeier is a researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and the Brookings Institution.
